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CONTENTS

SIDDHĀNTA-KAUMUDĪ

S. D. Joshi

Director, CASS, University of Pune,
PUNE

Date and Caste of Bhaṭṭoji :

The date of Bhaṭṭoji, the author of the *Siddhānta-kaumudī* has been the subject of much discussion. The facts are best treated by P. K. Gode, who has fixed Bhaṭṭoji's literary career as between about A. D. 1560 and 1620 (*Studies in Indian Literary History*, Vol. II, pp. 65–74). Various opinions have been held regarding the caste to which Bhaṭṭoji belonged : that he was a Deśastha Brahmin, that he was a Sārasvata Brahmin, or, what is now most generally accepted view, that he was a Telanga Brahmin originally from the South.

Works of Bhaṭṭoji :

Bhaṭṭoji was well grounded in all forms of Shastric learning, as will be clear from the works and authors that he mentions in his *Śabdakaustubha*. He was the author of numerous works on grammar, law and philosophy. The following have been printed :

1. *Śabdakaustubha*
2. *Siddhāntakaumudī*
3. *Prauḍhamanoramā*
4. *Caturviṁśatimatasaṁgraha*
5. *Tithinirṇaya*
6. *Vedabhāṣyasāra*
7. *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana*

Bhaṭṭoji's *Sidhāntakaumudī* is a commentary on the recast of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini. Next to Pāṇini the most frequently quoted authors are Kātyāyana and Patañjali whose respective works, the *Vārttikas* and the *Mahābhāṣya*, are accepted as unquestionable guides to the interpretation of Pāṇini and as support for the theories which Bhaṭṭoji advocates.

Date of Pāṇini :

There is no agreement among scholars with regard to the date of Pāṇini. The majority of Scholars is inclined to believe that Pāṇini belongs to the fourth Century before Christ (C. 350 B.C.).

Pāṇini's Grammar and Ancillary Texts :

Pāṇini's Aṣṭadhyāyī, which consists of nearly 4000 aphorisms, is divided into eight *Adhyāyas*, 'books'. Each book is further divided into four Sections called *pādas* 'quarters'. The original text was transmitted orally, because of the sacredness of the work and the scarcity of the writing material. The manuscript tradition gives practically no variations in its readings.

Besides the *Sūtrapāṭha* (text of rules) the tradition ascribes the *Dhātupātha* (list of roots) and the *Gaṇapātha* (list of nominal stems) topāṇini. We find a close interconnection between the *Sūtrapāṭha*, and the *Dhātupāṭha*, since Pāṇini mentions in the *sūtras* all the conjugational classes and even some of their subdivisions as they occur in the *Dhātupātha*. We cannot assign all the *Uṇādisūtras* to Pāṇini's authorship, although they follow the Pāṇinian technique and method of description. The Uṇādisūtras follow the view of Śākaṭāyana, a pre-Pāṇinian grammarian who strectched the principle of analysis to the extreme by deriving every basic nominal stem from a verbal root. The present form of the *Uṇādisūtras*, which attempts an analysis of words possibly not known to Pāṇini, is no doubt Post-Pāṇinian. The *Liṅgānuśāsana* (a treatise on gender) and the *Paṇiniyaśikṣā* (a treatise on general Phonetics) which bears the stamp of modernity are highly unlikely to stem from Pāṇini. Pāṇini's grammar does not deal with gender which is grammatically unpredictable, and the knowledge of Phonetics is virtually taken for granted.

Pāṇinian Commentarial Literature :

The main aim of Kātyāyana's short notes on Pāṇini sūtras, called *Vārttikas* (C. 250 B.C. ?), is not to explain Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, but to improve on it where it falls short of achieving its goal. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (140 B.C. ?), the second most important text in the Indian grammatical tradition, also tries to make Pāṇini's system logically and materially perfect. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* is a storehouse of information concerning problems of general linguistics, linguistic philosophy and

semantics. Kātyāyana and Patañjali show a difference in attitude towards the Pāṇinian tradition. The former straightforwardly proposes changes in Pāṇini's rules, but the latter is more inclined to make use of interpretation and to keep the Pāninian original formulations intact.

The earliest existing *vṛtti* on Pāṇini is the *Kāśikā* (7th Century A.D.) composed jointly by Jayāditya and Vāmana. This *vṛtti* is an indispensable aid for the understanding of the *Aṣṭadhyayī*. Then many diverse schools (Kātantra, Cāndra, Jainendra, Mugdhabodha, etc.) arose in the course of time, but none of them remained as the centre of attraction. They are entirely dependent on the Pāṇinian model of description, and display little originality.

Prakriyā Works Prior to the Kaumudī :

However, the contribution of the above-mentioned scholars of grammar was to facilitate the learning of the Sanskrit language by adopting new methods. The *Haimavyākaraṇa* preferred to deal with classical language only. The *Mugdhabodha* in the middle of the thirteenth Century divided the Sūtras under particular grammatical topics like *Saṁjñā*, *Sandhi*, etc. Thus germs of the *Prakriyā*-method can be traced back to the above-mentioned grammatical schools.

The *Rūpāvatāra* of Dharmakīti. (four centuries before Bhaṭṭoji) is the first systematic work which re-compiles the *sūtras* in different order, according to grammatical topics. The author divides his work into chapters which he calls *avatāras*. The first half of this work deals with *Saṁjñāvatāra*, *Vibhaktyavatāra*, *avyayāvatāra*, etc. The second half deals with conjugation, etc. Between the *Rūpāvatāra* of Dharmakīrti and the *Siddhāntakaumudī* of Bhaṭṭoji we find two important *prakriyā* works : the *Rūpamālā* of Vimala-Sarasvati and the *Prakriyā-Kāumudī* of Ramacandra. The *Prakriyā-sarvasva* of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa is considered to be a contemporary of Bhaṭṭoji.

The Siddhānta Kaumudī :

Thus the *prakriyā* school of the Pāṇinian grammarians to which Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita belongs had come into existence at least four centuries before the composition of the *Siddhāntakaumdī*. Bhaṭṭoji's *Siddhānta-kaumudī* reforms the *prakriyā*-method and concentrates its efforts on the technique and methodology of word-derivation. It criticizes the views of

ancient grammarians like Jayāditya, Vāmana, Haradatta, Jinendrabuddhi and the author of the *Prakriyākaumudī*. Bhaṭṭoji's *Kaumudī* soon eclipsed the glory of all previous *Prakriyā*-works and was gradually regarded as the most standard text of the *Prakriyā* method of the Pāṇinian school. Twenty-four commentaries are known to have been written on the *Siddhānta-kaumudī* amongst which the following are outstanding:

(1) *Prauḍhamanoramā* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita
(2) *Tattvabodhinī* of Jñānendra Sarasvatī
(3) *Bṛhat-śabdenduśekhara* of Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa
(4) *Laghu-śabdenduśekhara* of Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa
(5) *Subodhinī* of Jayakṛṣṇa
(6) *Bālamanoramā* of Vāsudeva Vājapeyī

About the Prakriyā Method :

This *prakriyā*-method is wholly different from the method that has been adopted by Pāṇini in grouping the rules together in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The rules are grouped together in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by the device of *utsarga* 'general rule' and *apavāda* 'special rule'. Another general device for the organization of rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is called *adhikāra* 'heading'. Rules dealing with one and the same topic are grouped together in the *Aṣṭadhyāyī*. This *adhikāra* device is employed throughout the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. For instance, the topic *samāsa* introduced by P. 2.1.3 follows up to the end of the second *Adhyāya*. The section-heading *pratyaya* (P. 3.1.1) runs through the fifth *Adhyāya*. The Section *aṅgasya* (P. 6.4.1) states operations which are mainly applicable in the stem-suffix context. This section runs through the 7th *Adhyāya*. The *asiddha* topic is introduced by P. 8.2.1 and ends with his last Sūtra. This part is *Tripādī* and it constitutes a separate Section of the Grammar wherein the application of rules is ordered according to the order in which the rules are stated.

Anuvṛtti and Other Devices of Arrangement :

The device of *anuvṛtti* 'chain-techique' is employed by Pāṇini to achieve maximum economy in phrasing rules in the *Aṣṭsdhyāyī*. The arrangement of rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is set out in such a way that a repetition of words in relation to suceeding rules is avoided. The *anuvṛtti* of certain words, which is sometimes extended over fifty or more rules, forces the arrangement of rules in a fixed order. For achieving this sort of economy, rules are at a time taken away from their

natural places and pasted together with those belonging to other Sections. Such rules are said to be causing 'associative digression' by Faddegon.

Pāṇini does not state the conventions pertaining to *anuvṛtti*. But one can reconstruct them by studying the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* :

(*i*) Normally items are continued by *anuvṛtti* from preceding rules into subsequent rules until they are blocked by an incompatible item.

(*ii*) The function of *ca* is to abbreviate two rules into one by allowing continuation of an incompatible item from the preceding rule into the following rule.

(*iii*) *ca* amounts to 'option' if the rule containing *ca* introduces new similar process (*vidheya*).

Apart from the function of unblocking or abbreviating two rules, *ca* has also the function of grouping; it is always added after the first word in the rule. In such cases the first word introduces new condition under which a rule is to be applied. In such a case, this *ca* added after the first word indicates that some compatible environment like *vibhāṣā*, *chandasi*, and other contexts are extended to the rule in hand. On the basis of *ca* used after the first word, commentators supply the preceding environments. When *ca* occurs after the first word in three or four successive rules, they form any grouping and subgrouping relation with the preceding and following rules. For achieving brevity Pāṇini uses this device of *anuvṛtti*.

It is well-known that the arrangement of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is mainly based upon the devices of *anuvṛiti*, *adhikāra* and *utsargāpavāda* relation. Pāṇini's object in framing the sūtras is to scrupulously avoid repetition of those words which can be supplied from the preceding rules to the following ones. It is obvious that the arrangement or grouping of these rules has nothing to do with the pertinent formation of words. Rules relating to the particular topic (e.g. *subanta* formation or *tiṅanta* formation) are not consecutively, but they are dispersed in several chapters. However, rules relating to *guṇa*, *vṛddhi*, *ṣatva ṇatva* operations are stated at one place for the sake of brevity. The *prakriyā* school, on the other hand, solely aims at teaching the Sanskrit language through paradigmatic method, because each independently derived form can be seen as belonging to a particular paradigm built around one specific nominal or

verbal stem. In the *prakriyā*–method, rules relating to a particular topic (of *subanta* or *tiṇanta* formation) are grouped together after detaching them from their respective places in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

Two Methods of Interpreting Pāṇini :

There are two methods of interpreting Pāṇini : the analytic method (*yathoddeśapakṣa*) and the syntactic method (*kāryakālapakṣa*). The *paribhāṣās: yathoddeśaṁ saṁjñāparibhāṣam* and *kāryakālaṁ saṁjñāparibhāṣam* lay down these two standard methods by which the rules of Pāṇini could be interpreted.

The analytical method (*yathoddeśapakṣa*) shows that rules in the Pāṇinian system are to be interpreted as and how they are taught by Pāṇini. The other method (*kāryakālapakṣa*) shows that rules are to be interpreted together in order to form a connected idea in the process of a particular grammatical operation. The purpose of the *yathoddeśapakṣa* lies in acquainting the students of grammar with the general notion given by the rule without taking into consideration the technique of application. If one follows this method, one cannot acquire the special knowledge with which the rules may be needed in the formation of words. According to the *yathoddeśapakṣa*, rules are studied for understanding the procedure of the Pāṇinian system without caring much for its actual demonstration. The *yathoddeśa* method examines accurately the import of Pāṇini's statement. The *kāryakāla* method, on the other hand, is limited to the application of Pāṇini's formal statements. The *kāryakālapakṣa* proposes the way of studying the system with the question : how does Pāṇini's statement demonstrate the result ? This view emphasises that mere acquaintance with the notion is inadequate unless we have a clear and distinct comprehension of it through proper application.

These two methods represent two outlooks : The *yathoddeśapakṣā* pays greater attention to the procedure and devices of Pāṇini's system for generating expressions, the manner of the arrangement of the rules and the precise scheme of grammatical description. On the other hand, the *kāryakālapakṣa* shows the method in applying the precise scheme for the production of an infinite set of the significant classes of words. In this way we can distinguish the study of the system from the method of application. The theoretical study provides us with the raw materials, and by the experimental method we can produce finished products out of the

raw materials. A study of the fundamental principles and technique of description cannot be separated from the wonderful, faultless, formal application of the system. It is by both, the study of the principles of the system and its generative application, that we will be able to judge the merit of the system. Therefore, according to my understanding, the *yathoddeśapakṣa* and *kāryakālapakṣa* do not represent dimetrically opposite views but form two sides of one and the same coin. In other words, these two views portray a complete picture of the technique both in its theoretical and experimental aspects.

The *Kāśikā*, a commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, written by Jayāditya and Vāmana, follows the first model in interpreting the *sūtras* without changing the order of Pāṇini's enunciation of the sūtras. But in the *Siddhāntakaumudī* and similar other works, a special emphasis is laid upon the application of the system. The *prakriyā* school to which Bhaṭṭoji belongs has attempted an arrangement different from Pāṇini's by taking into consideration the application of rules pertinent to specific types of word-formation. Adherents of the *prakriyā* school (i.e. *kāryakālapakṣa*) maintain that, if we follow the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* arrangement it becomes a really difficult task to bring together the rules which are dispersed in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* but are needed for complete formation of words. This method brings out the fact that in the *Aṣṭādhyāyi* arrangement, Pāṇini teaches general rules, exceptions, counter exceptions and further limitations so that the reader cannot keep in view their intended connection and utility. If a word is given as an example under a rule, sometimes thirty or more rules taught previously or subsequently have a share in the formation of a word, thereby making it extremely difficult for one to remember all the rules dispersed in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* before one can devise a given form.

Bhaṭṭoji claims no originality in interpreting Pāṇini's rules. For the most part he relies upon older authorities. In the opening verse of his commentary he tells us that his *Kaumudī* is grounded on the views of *munitraya*, namely, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Since the time of Bhartṛhari the Pāṇinian grammarians show scarcely any originality in interpreting the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. But Bhaṭṭoji has a technique that is vastly superior to that of the early *prakriyā*-texts. Bhaṭṭoji's genius lies in presenting all the stages of formation-specifications (*prakriyās*) which are obtained by the rules of substitution (*ādeśa*), augmentation (*āgama*) and

concatenation (order of wordbuilding elements). In presenting formation-specifications Bhaṭṭoji strictly followed the Pāṇinian school of grammar unlike the early *prakriyā* works who indulge in accepting rules also from the non-Pāṇinian schools. There are many works of genuine originality composed during the period between the *Aṣṭādhyayī* and the *Kaumudī* which were supplanted by the latter. None of these works could secure the status of handy text-book for learning Pāṇini's grammar. The *Siddhāntakaumudī* introduced the scholars and students of Sanskrit grammar to a paradigmatic approach towards the teaching and learning of Sanskrit. The *padasaṁskārapakṣa* or the paradigmatic approach really represents the learners' view of Pāṇini's grammar. It maintains that the *pada* must be treated and derived as a single utterance, independently of its connection with another word, and that is joined afterwards only with other similarly derived *padas*. The *Siddhāntakaumudī* basically adopts a paradigmatic method because each independently derived form like *rāmeṇa*, *rāmāya, rāmasya*, *rāme* can be seen as belonging to a particular paradigm built around one lexical stem. In the entire *prakriyā* school the *Kaumudī* enjoys a unique place and immense popularity because it teaches a method of word-formation which is helpful in acquiring the knowledge of Pāṇini's rules and their application. It is the method according to which the Pāṇinian grammar was taught and still is being taught in the Pāṭhaśālās. Within a short period of its composition the *Kaumudī* dominated over the other works because it could teach Pāṇini and the Sanskrit language more easily through the method of word-formation. The main contribution of the *Kaumudī* lies in the fact that it teaches a practical grammar which was the need of the age in which the *Kaumudī* was composed. How Pāṇini, Patañjali and Jayāditya and Vāmana were relegated to the background for sometime is clear from the history of Sanskrit grammar after Bhaṭṭoji. It was the *Kaumudī* of Bhaṭṭoji rather than the *Mahābhāṣya* and other commentaries, which became the sole treatise through which the students were initiated to Pāṇini. This is very well expressed in the following traditionally handed down verse *kaumudī yadi kaṇṭhāsthā vṛthā bhāṣye pariśramaḥ| kaumudī yady akaṇṭhasthā vṛthā bhāṣye pariśramaḥ||*

The early commentarial literature which is an enormous storehouse of subtle insights forms the background of the *Siddhāntakaumudī*. Bhaṭṭoji has utilized the entire traditional material which was available to him

for presenting a complete picture of Pāṇinian grammar. Bhaṭṭoji includes in the *Kaumudī* all the five ancillary grammatical texts : the *Sūtrapāṭha*, the *Dhātupāṭha*, the *Gaṇapāṭha*, the *Uṇādisūtrapāṭha* and the *Liṅgānuśāsana*.

Bhaṭṭoji divides his *Kaumudī* into two broad Sections : the *Pūrvārdha* 'the first half' and the *Uttarārdha* 'the second half'. In the Firsh Half he deals with *Saṁjñās* (technical terms), *paribhāṣās* (conventions), *sandhis* (euphonic combinations), *subantas* (declension of nouns), *strīpratyayas* (formation of feminine bases), *kārakas* (noun-verb relations) *śeṣa*-relations (i.e. noun-noun relations), *samāsas* (compound-formations). and *taddhitas* (secondary noun-formations). In the Second Half he primarily deals with the finite verb forms (*tiṅantas*) and the primary derivatives (*Kṛdantas*).

Technical terms (Saṁjñās) :

Pāṇini uses nearly three hundred technical terms, but all of them are not defined by him. Out of these he has defined only about 125 terms. Bhaṭṭoji mentions only twenty-one of these terms which are helpful for the explanation of phonological and morphological operations generally. Fourteen *śivasūtras* are added at the beginning to explain the grouping of sounds technically known as *pratyāhāras*. The remaining *saṁjñās* are defined only when they are needed for the explanation of specific type of derivation (like *subanta*, *tiṅanta*, *samāsa*, *kṛdanta*, *taddhita*). Thus, for instance, the term *prātipadika* is defined in the treatment of declension and the terms *parasamaipada*, *ātmanepada*, etc. are mentioned during the treatment of conjugation.

Conventions (Paribhāṣās) :

The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* contains a number of *paribhāṣās* (conventions) for a fuller understanding of the structure of the Pāṇinian system. In the *paribhāṣāprakaraṇa* Bhaṭṭoji explains common *paribhāṣās* which are not restricted to any particular section of the derivation. For instance, Bhaṭṭoji discusses *paribhāṣās* which define the meaning of the ablative (*pañcamī*), genitive (*ṣaṣṭhī*) and locative (*saptamī*), respectively as 'after', 'in place of' and 'before'. Pāṇini sets up abstract basic forms called *sthānins* which are later converted into the actuals (*ādeśas*). Bhaṭṭoji mentions the convention regarding how the rules of substitution and augmentations operate. The rules deal with the basic equipment and conventions needed for word-formations. Finally Bhaṭṭoji mentions the

ordering principles, namely, *pūrva / para, anitya / nitya, bahiraṅga/antaraṅga, utsarga/apavāda* : in the case of conflict, each succeeding one prevails over the other.

Sandhi rules :

In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the *sandhi*-rules are mentioned in the First, Sixth and Eighth books. However, Bhaṭṭoji arranged them together in the section which was later (traditionally) called *Pañcasandhi* and which covers : *ac-sandhi* 'euphonic combination of vowels', *pragṛhya-sandhi* 'not subject to the rule of sandhi', *hal-sandhi* 'euphonic combination of consonants', *visarga-sandhi* 'euphonic combination affecting voiceless *ḥ* (*visarga*)', *svādi-sandhi* 'euphonic combination affecting the *visarga* originating from the case-and verb-endings'. Although the *visarga-sandhi* and *svādi-sandhi* could be included in the *ac/hal sandhis*, yet they have been separately treated as they have a prominent place in word-formation, for the base-morphemes vary before inflectional and conjugational suffixes. In the *Pañcasandhi* Section Bhaṭṭoji treats all *Sandhi* modifications which operate internally as well as externally to the word.

Subanta (Declension of Nouns) :

In this chapter Bhaṭṭoji treats masculine (*pulliṅga*), feminine (*strīliṅga*) and neuter (*napuṁsaka*) variation in the inflectional suffixes added to nominal stems ending in vowels (*ajanta*) and consonants (*halanta*). In this chapter which is known as *ṣaḍliṅgī* the declension of nouns has been worked out with greater care. Here we find a perfection in the *prakriyā* method which can teach the Sanskrit language more easily through the method of word-formation.

The next two chapters : (*i*) indeclinables (*avyayas*) and (*ii*) *strīpratyayas* (feminine suffixes) do not have much scope to exhibit one's skill in the *prakriyā* method.

Kārakas :

The manifold relations between nouns and verbs are signified by cases which convey the *kāraka* relations according to Pāṇini. These syntactic relations are divided into six broad groups : *apādāna* 'departure', *sampradāna* 'aiming at', *karana* 'most effective means', *adhikaraṇa* 'location', *karman* 'the object positively effected by the action' and *Kartṛ* 'agent'.

Bhaṭṭoji in this chapter establishes the correspondence between the Syntactic meanings, the *kāraka*-names and the Case-endings. This gives the following scheme :

Semantic Feature	*Syntactic Name*	*Case Name*
dhruvam	apādāna	pancamī
abhiprāya	saṁpradāna	caturthī
sādhakatama	karaṇa	tṛtīyā
ādhāra	adhikaraṇa	saptamī
īpsitatama	karman	dvitīyā
svatantra	kartṛ	tṛtīyā
śesa-relation		ṣaṣṭhī
prātipadikārtha		prathamā

Following Pāṇini Bhaṭṭoji mentions exceptional cases where this correspondance does not work. In Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the *kāraka*-names are linked with syntactic meanings in the fourth quarter of the First book. But these *kāraka*-names are linked to the case-ending in the third quarter of the Second book. The *Kaumudī*, however, treats these correspondances in one and the same chapter.

Compound Formation :

Pāṇini generally considers that a compound like *rājapuruṣa* : 'king's man', and its formally nearmost wordgroup *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*, have the same underlying syntactic structure. He derives compounds with the help of transformational rules from the common underlying representation (*rājan* + genitive + *puruṣa* + nominative). In the course of derivation the inflectional endings are deleted. The whole compound-form is considered to be one single lexical item.

Following the order of the *Aṣṭādhāyī* Bhaṭṭoji discusses the four broad categories of compounds with their subdivisions :

(1) *avyayībhāva*

(2) *tatpuruṣa*, with the subdivisions :

(a) *vibhaktitatpuruṣa or tatpuruṣa* proper

(b) *karmadhāraya* or *samānādhikaraṇatatpuruṣa*

(c) *dvigu*

(3) *bahuvrīhi*

(4) *dvandva*, with the subdivisions :

(*a*) *ekavat*, i.e. *samāhāradvandva*

(*b*) other than *ekavat*, i.e. what the later grammarians call *itaretarayoga*.

The indeclinable compounds come under the first variety. *Tatpuruṣa* is a name given to compounds like *tatpuruṣa* 'his man' where the first member can occur with various case endings (*vibhaktitatpuruṣa*). The *karmadhāraya*, which is a subclass of *tatpuruṣa*, shows concord between its two members For instance, *nīlakamalam* 'a blue lotus'. A *tatpuruṣa* compound is called *dvigu* if its first member is a numeral. For instance, *saptarṣayaḥ* 'seven ṛṣis'. A compound is called *bahuvrīhi* ('country having plenty of rice') when it conveys a meaning in addition to what is expressed by its constituents The *avyayībhāva* & *tatpuruṣa* are endocentric because the constituent structure itself accounts for the meaning and the syntactic explanation of the compounds. The *bahuvrīhi* & dvandva compounds are an exocentric (*anyapadārtha*, P 2–2–24) construction, because their constituent structure cannot account for the meaning conveyed by them.

In the *ekaśeṣa* chapter Bhaṭṭoji shows that the *ekaśeṣa* is formed by items which are alike in form and meaning. However, forms like *pitarau* 'mother and father' are treated as exceptional cases of *ekaśeṣa* in P. 1–2–68, 70 and 71. In all cases of *ekaśeṣa* one form which is retained represents the meaning of the other form which is deleted.

In the *sarvasamāsaśeṣa* chapter Bhaṭṭoji gives a sixfold classification of compounds on the basis of the morphological structure of constituents without involving a primary or a subordinate status of their meanings : (*i*) combination of case-inflected words, (*ii*) a combination of a case-inflected word with a verb, (*iii*) combination of a case-inflected word with a nominal stem, (*iv*) combination of a case-inflected word with a verbal base, (*v*) combination of two finite verb-forms, and (*vi*) combination of a finite verb-form with a case-inflected word. Pāṇini does not allow a compound with a finite verb or of two finite verbs. Therefore such compounds are of late origin.

In the *samasāntaprakaraṇa* Bhaṭṭoji deals the *taddhita* suffixes *ṬaC*, *aC*, etc which are added to compound stems belonging to the different varieties of compounds.

In the *aluksamāsaprakaraṇa* Bhaṭṭoji describes the cases in which the case endings of the first constituent has not been deleted. For instance, *dāsyāḥputraḥ* 'son of a bitch', *yudhiṣṭhiraḥ* 'name of a person'. These must be taken as *samāsas* because otherwise the single accent, changes like *ṣatva*, *ṇatva*, and the specialized meaning cannot be accounted for.

Samāsāśrayavidhi comes last of all in the compounds. It deals with the changes that occur in the formation of some of the compound words. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the rules concerning *samāsas* are mentioned in the Second, Fifth and Sixth books. Bhaṭṭoji has, however, nicely arranged them together into nine sections. Thus we find all the *sūtras* of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* dealing with *samāsa* in one place. Bhaṭṭoji, however, does not include Pāṇini's compound accent rules in this section because he thinks that Pāṇini's accent rules are valid for the Vedic language alone.

Taddhitas :

There is not much to note in the arrangement of the *taddhita*-section of the *Kaumudī*. Bhaṭṭoji essentially follows the order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* rules taken from the Fourth and Fifth chapters. The entire *taddhita* section has been divided into nineteen chapters in the *Kaumudī*. Of the nineteen chapters five have been named after the suffixes like *ṭhagadhikāra*. Four chapters are named after a definite limit indicated by the word *prāk* (for instance, *prāgdīvyatīya*, etc). Other chapters are classified under the heads of general or specific meanings, i.e. *apatya*, *raktādyarthaka*, *cāturarthika*, *śaiṣika*, *ārhīya*, etc.

The Fourth and the Fifth books of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* exhaustively list the secondary suffixes (taddhita) forming nominals from already existing nominal stems. The *taddhita* section forms nearly one-fourth of the entire *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

Pāṇini has classified the secondary suffixes under various subheadings: *tasyāpatyam* (P. 4.1.92) 'his offspring', *tasya samūhaḥ* (P. 4.2.37) 'collection of it', *tena nirvṛttam* (P. 4.2.68) 'built by him', *tata āgataḥ* (P. 4 3.74) 'arrived from there'. The words *tena*, *tasya*, *tataḥ*, etc. indicate the 'syntactic relations' : instrument, possession, departure, etc. that exist between a nominal meaning and a *taddhita-meaning*. For instance, *dāśarathi-daśaratha*+genitive + *iñ* (P. 4.1.95) 'offspring of Daśaratha' Under each subheading the suffixes *a(ṇ)*, *ṭha(k)* (= *ika*), *pha(k)*

(=*āyana*) etc. are grouped together which convey the same meaning. In dealing with the *taddhita* suffixes, Pāṇini adopts a double principle of classification : grouping different meanings under the same suffix, and grouping different suffixes under the same meaning. In this section Bhaṭṭoji follows the order of rules from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. It is with the *taddhita* section that the First Half of the *Kaumudī* ends. The Second Half begins with the *Tiṅanta* section.

Tiṅanta-section :

This section is the most important one from the point of the *prakriyā*-method. In this section a special emphasis is laid upon the application of rules which are taught in different sections in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. In this section we find many examples which require thirty or more rules for their derivation. As in the *subanta* section in the *tiṅanta* section also, we find a *prakriyā*-wise arrangement of rules which is different from the order of rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyi*.

The entire *tiṅanta* section has been divided into twenty-two sections. Of these the first ten chapters from *bhrādi* to *curādi* are popularly known by the name *daśagaṇī* 'ten-type conjugation'. This system of conjugation follows the order of the *Dhātupāṭha* of Pāṇini.

Pāṇini finds it convenient to present the tenses and moods by the symbolic terms *laṭ*, *liṭ*, etc, which belong to the abstract level of the underlying representation. The common symbol for all the finite suffixes denotes the syntactic meanings, either 'agent (kartari)', 'object (*karmaṇi*)' or 'state (*bhāve*)'. The surface endings *ti*, *tas*, *anti* etc., each of them, cover the semantic distinctions : voice, person and number. Of theses ten *lakāras*, *leṭ* (subjunctive mood) is used only in the Vedic language, while the eighth (*liṅ*, is divided into vidhi and *āśis* which lead to different formations known as optative and precative.

The rest of the *tiṅanta* section mainly deals with the secondary conjugation popularly known as *prakriyās*. Again this *prakriyā* section is divided into twelve chapters, viz., causative (*ṇijanta*), desiderative (*sannanta*), frequentative (*yaṅanta*), denominative (*nāmadhātu*), middle and active voices (*ātmanepada* and *parasmipada*), passive, impersonal passive and reflexive passive (*karman*, *bhāva karmakartṛ*), etc. The last chapter *lakārārtha-prakriyā* deals with various aspectual and modal meanings of *lakāras*.

Since the days of Bhaṭṭoji, the *tiṅanta* section in the *Kaumudi* received immense popularity at all the centres of Sanskritic education in India. This section was regarded as the basic one for students to acquire knowledge of interaction of Pāṇini's rules and their application. After studying this section students attained maturity in the *prakriyā* method. It is with the help of the *Kaumudi* generally and with the help of the *tiṅanta* section specially that students in the Pāṭhaśālās mastered the Sanskrit language which was no longer a spoken one.

The *kṛdanta* section deals with the primary suffixes added to verbal bases. This section is divided into two broad sections : *Pūrvakṛdanta* and the *Uttarakṛdanta*. Again the *Pūrvakṛdanta* section is divided in to two sbusections (*i*) the *kṛtya* (*kṛt*) suffixes and (*ii*) *non-kṛtya* (*kṛt*) suffixes. The *kṛtya* suffixes *tavyat, anīya, yat, kyap, ṇyat,* etc., have a modal character as they express the meaning *vidhi* (injunction) *praiṣa* (command), *prārthanā* (request) etc. Syntactically the *kṛtya*-words are used either as passive (*karmaṇi*) or as stative (*bhāve*). The remaining *Pūrvakṛdanta* section deals with the suffixes *ṇvul, tṛc, yuc,* etc. which do not require a preceding *upapada* (accompanying word), the suffixes *aṇ, ṭa, ac,* etc. prescribed after a verbal base which require an accompanying word (like *kumbha* in *kumbhakāra* 'pot-maker' (where *kāra* is a bound form), and the participle suffixes *kta, ktavatu, śatṛ, śānac, kānac*. The suffixes in the *Pūrvakṛdanta* basically denote the sense *kartṛ* (*kṛtyas* express *karman* or *bhāva*), but the suffixes in the *Uttarakṛdanta* express *bhāva* (state) or continuity of two actions (*dhātusambandha*).

The *Uttarakṛdanta* deals with the suffixes *ghañ*, ac, *ap*, etc. forming action nouns (like *pāka, yāga, jaya*) and the suffixes forming gerunds and infinitives, etc. which link the two verbs. In *bhuktvā svapiti* 'having eaten he sleeps' and *bhoktum vrajati* 'he goes away to eat' the suffixes tvā and *tum* depend upon the following verbs which stand for the posterior and prior actions respectively. The suffixes prescribed under the heading rule P. 3.4.1 link two verbs. The implication is that *bhuktvā svap-* and *bhoktum gam*-become semantically single verbs.

The *Uṇādisūtras* have been inserted between the *Pūrvakṛdanta* and the *Uttarakṛdanta*. These *sūtras* cannot be assigned to Pāṇini although they follow the Pāṇinian teachnique and description. Many awkward and

theoretically inconsistent derivations given by the *Uṇādisūtras* lack the systematic and logical character of Pāṇinian analysis.

In the *kṛdanta* section Bhaṭṭoji practically follows the order of rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Like the *taddhita* section this section also is not very important from the point of view of the *prakriyā* method.

The Vaidikī Prakriyā and the Svaraprakriyā :

These Appendices in the *Kaumudī* clearly show that the Vedic and Accentual rules were neglected in the *Prakriyā* method. Like the *Cāndra-vyākarana,* the *Kaumudī* also treats the rules on the classical language separately. Since the *Aṣṭādhyāyi* is basically a grammar of the Sanskrit language, it was practical to teach in it the derivation of forms used in the classical language. Bhaṭṭoji could not organise the Vedic rules in accordance to the *prakriyā*-method because the Vedic forms which show diversity in inflexions and conjugations could not be derived step by step with the help of rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyi*. Therefore, in the *Vaidikī prakriyā* Bhaṭṭoji follows the order of rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

But he adopts the *prakriyā* method while dealing with the rules of Accent. He divides the *svaraprakriyā* into six sections : (*i*) general system of accents (*ii*) root-accents, (*iii*) nominal accents, (*iv*) suffixal accents, (*v*) compound accents and (*vi*) verb-accents. The section on nominal-accents is based on the *phiṭ*-sūtras of Śāntanavācārya. Since the accent-rules are relegated to Appendices in the *Kaumudī*, it creats a wrong impression that accent-rules are to be utilized for determining the Vedic accent alone. But most of Pāṇini's rules dealing with accent are common to both the Vedic and Classical Sanskrit, and as such are intended to be applied to both the Vedic and Classical forms. Pāṇini devotes 380 rules to a systematic study of accentuation.

Accents in verbs, primary nouns and secondary nouns are often indicated by itel-markers (*anubandhas*) attached to the suffixes. In fact, derivation of nominal and verbal forms in the Pāṇinian system without fixing the accent is well-nigh impossible. In Pāṇini's system accent is an inseparable element of morphology. Therefore Bhaṭṭoji ought to have delt with the rules on accent according to the *prakriyā*-method in the respective sections of the *Kaumudī*. But in the post-Patañjali period scholars use the Classical Sanskrit without indicating the accents. It is this reason which apparently

led Bhaṭṭoji to deal with the rules on accent in the Appendix called *Svaraprakriyā.*

The defects in the prakriyā-method :

Bhaṭṭoji's *Kaumudī* is appreciated for the *prakriyā*-method, specially for its treatment of morphophonemic and phonological rules for deriving word-forms. But it fails to give a clear idea of the aspects of syntax treated in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The *Kaumudī* derives isolated words independently of their connection with another word. According to the *prakriyā*-method, derivation starts from the analytical elements of a *pada.* But this method overlooks the treatment of syntax as presented in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. According to Pāṇini there can be only one method, namely, *vākyasaṁskāra,* according to which the entire *vākya* is to be treated as a single coherent utterance. The devices like *samartha, kāraka, dhātusaṁbandha, anabhihita* imply that words are derived taking into accoumt their connection with other words. The derivation of isolated words suppresses the idea of syntactic connection which is fundamental in Pāṇini's grammar. In fact, the *pada-siddhi* method fails to provide insight into the syntactic design of the *kāraka*-functions. Bhaṭṭoji's paradigmatic method which derives the isolated forms *rāmam, rāmeṇa, rāmāt* etc. creates the impression that words are derived in an unconnected manner. To understand grammar both in its design and in its operation we must start the derivation from the analytic elements of connected words.

The main problem in interpreting Pāṇini's text is the technique of *anuvṛtti.* The *anuvṛtti* procedure is an economy procedure which is very basic to the structure of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Often rules and parts of rules are carried over in the subsequent rules. The *Kāśikāvṛtti* following the *anuvṛtti* method gives full paraphrases of rules supplying recurrences of a word or a group of words from the preceding rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* from grouping and subgrouping relations with the preceding and following rules. This integrity of a topic is completely lost in the *Kaumudī* where the rules are detached from their context. Therefore, these detached rules become unintelligible without the *vṛtti* of Bhaṭṭoji and present difficulties in understanding their meaning. Hence, students of the *Kaumudī* are compelled to study by heart Bhaṭṭoji's *vṛtti.*

Further, the recast of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as given in the *Kaumudī* fails to provide insights into the procedures and devices of Pāṇini's system for generating utterances. The working of the *asiddha* principle (P. 8.2.1.) and the *vipratiṣedha* principle (P. 1.4.2.) can be easily grasped when the concerned rules are studied following the well-knit arragement in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. But the detached rules from the *Kaumudī* lack harmony within a topic. The result is that students find difficulties in understanding the above devices and principles.

Justification of the Prakriyā-method :

This however does not detract the *Kaumudī* from its merits, because *prakriyā*-method is the only method which shows how to bring together the rules which are dispersed in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

In Pāṇini's days Sanskrit was probably used as the language of religion, scholarship and administration, while Prakrit vernaculars were preferred in private talks. Later on also, for several centuries Sanskrit continued to remin the medium of all learned and religious discourses. After the twelfth century, however, Sanskrit ceased to be used as the language of administration for official purpose. During this period (i.e. after the twelfth century), the *Kātantra* and *Mugdhabodha* schools grew more and more strong, and they posed a grave danger to the existence of Pāṇini's school. However, the development of the *prakriyā*-method in the 13th century successfully re-established the supremacy of Pāṇini's system over other systems. The *prakriyā*-method insisted that the main aim of *Śabdānuśāsana* was to impart instructions regarding distinction between the correct and the corrupt words. Teaching of Sanskrit through the method of word-formation was the need of the times (the 18th century). This *prakriyā*-method obtained maturity in the *Kaumudī*. Matchless popularity was attained by the *Kaumudi* because it could teach the Sanskrit language successfully through the method of word-formation.

ŚROTAVYAḤ MANTAVYAḤ NIDIDHYĀSITAVYAḤ — IS THIS A VIDHI (injunction) ?*

E. A. SOLOMON, M.A., PH.D.,
Professor and Head,
Department of Sanskrit,
School of Languages,
Gujarat University, Ahmedabad–380 009

I

Śaṅkarācārya in his *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* I.1.4 makes the point that an action is that which is enjoined independently of the nature of existing things and as dependent on the operation of the mind of a person; e.g. 'To whichever divinity the offering is made on that let him meditate (*dhyāyet*) when about to say '*vaṣaṭ*' and so on. Meditation (*dhyāna*) and reflection (*cintana*) are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating or reflecting) person, they may be done, or not done or done otherwise than as enjoined. Knowledge, on the other hand, is produced by the means of valid knowledge, and the means of valid knowledge have for their objects things as they are. Knowledge cannot therefore be brought about or not brought about or brought about otherwise according to the will or inclination of the knower. It is simply dependent on the thing as it is and the means of knowledge and is not dependent on injunctions or on the person. Although mental it thus differs widely from meditation and the like.[1] Thus, meditation, for instance, on man or woman as fire (–see *Ch. Up.* V.7.1, 8.1) is produced as a result of an injunction and is dependent on the person. On the other hand, the conception of fire which refers to the well-known (empirically real) fire is neither dependent on any injunction, nor on any man; it is simply dependent on the real thing which is an object of perception. This remark applies to all the things that are the objects of the different means of valid knowledge. This being so, knowledge of Brahman as it is as the self is not dependent on

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any Vedic injunction. Hence though '*liṅ*' and other similar forms may be found in the Vedic texts as referring to the knowledge of Brahman, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when employed in respect of a stone or the like. Such '*liṅ*' and other forms have for their object something which can neither be avoided nor pursued and attained.[2]

But, it may be asked, what could then be the purpose of those statements which at any rate have the appearance of injunctions, e.g. '*Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ.*' (*Bṛh. Up.* II. 4.5)? Well, these are meant to divert people from the objects of activities which are natural to man.[3] Usually, in the mundane state of affairs, a man acts being intent on external things and anxious to attain things of his liking and to eschew things that he hates or that are not favourable to him, and such a man does not in this way attain the highest good. Now, even this man desires to attain the highest good, and so such texts as the one quoted above divert him from the objects of actions natural to man and turn the stream of his thought on to the Inner Self. For him who is engaged in the inquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self which is not a thing to be endeavoured after and attained or avoided is taught by means of such texts as 'All that is this Self' (*Bṛh.* Up II 4.6), 'But when for him all this is just the Self, by what should he see what, by what should he know what?', 'By what should he know the knower?' (*Bṛh. Up.*IV 5.15), 'This Self is Brahman' (*Bṛh. Up.*II 5.19). It is very much acceptable to the Advaita-Vedāntin that the knowledge of Brahman attaches importance to something which is not a thing to be brought about and so is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance of any action. The Kevalādvaitin feels that this is his glory that as soon as Brahman is comprehended as the Self there is nothing left to be done; this itself is the fulfilment, and all duties come to an end.[4] Therefore, Brahman is not presented in the Vedic texts as being the object of injunctions regarding knowing (*tasmān na pratipatti–vidhi–viṣayatayā Brahmaṇaḥ samarpaṇam—Br. Sū.ŚB.* I.1.IV,p.130).

Śaṅkarācārya does not seem to recognise *jñāna* as a *kriyā*, though he regards it as mental. Vācaspati Miśra interprets Śaṅkara's words '*Na, vailakṣaṇyāt*' as signifying, "True, knowledge is a mental act, but it does not or cannot produce any result affecting Brahman, because it has been

said that being self-luminous it cannot possibly be the object of the act of knowing." Thus, according to Vācaspati, Śaṅkara distinguishes between activity which produces a result in the object and activity (—here the mental act of Brahma-knowledge—) which does not produce any result in the object (Brahman). This difference being there, there is another distinction; where there is an injunction in respect of an object but invariably irrespective of its nature, that is a *kriyā;* e.g. the act of meditation (*dhyāna-kriyā*) on the divinity to whom an offering is to be made, or conception of fire (*agni-buddhi*) in respect of a man or woman—this meditation is not dependent on the nature of the actual divinity or fire. The meditation on the deity is not '*prāpta*' (something accruing or known) before the injunction enjoining it, whereas the knowledge of *Brahmātmabhāva* (Brahman being the Self) is certainly something that has already been attained by virtue of the means of valid knowledge known as Verbal Testimony (from the Upaniṣadic passage starting with '*sad eva saumyedam*' and ending with '*tat tvam asi*'), just like the apprehension of a jar in broad daylight in the case of a person whose mind is attentive, this knowledge being attained by virture of the contact of the sense and the object. This knowledge coming into existence by the force of its own causal apparatus, cannot, unlike the meditation on the deity, be brought about otherwise, and so an injunction cannot serve any purpose in respect of knowledge. *Upāsanā* or culmination in realisation (*anubhava-paryantatā*) does not fall within the scope of this injunction, for since the potency of even these two in respect of realisation or removal of beginningless *Avidyā* is *prāpta* (known) by *anvaya-vyatireka* (positive and negative concomitance) without an injunction, they cannot be not done or done otherwise according to the will of man. Therefore, even though *Brahma-jñāna* (knowledge of Brahman) is a mental act, it does not fall within the scope of an injunction. Moreover, the fact that *kriyā* dependent on the mental operation of man is not dependent on the nature of the actual thing is at times not conflicting or opposed in nature, as for example, in the *kriyā* of meditation on the deity where there is no conflict with the nature of the thing. And at times it is in conflict with the nature of the actual thing; as for example, in the case of the conception of fire in respect of man or woman. What is brought about by just an injunction is only a *kriyā* (*kriyaiva*) says

Saṅkara emphatically in order to set aside any misconception of its being based or dependent on the actual thing.

It may be urged that, nevertheless, we find such injunctions as '*Ātmety eva upāsīta*' and they certainly are not 'lunatic's songs' for they have the same force of tradition behind them (—they are also meant for *adhyayana* from the mouth of the teacher and so on—*Kalpataru*), so there must certainly be something that is enjoined.[5] The answer to this is that there is no denying the fact that '*liṅ*', etc., are there in the *Veda* in this context, but they are not related to injunction, for otherwise they would lose their validity (—an injunction cannot be valid in respect of *Brahmātma-jñāna* since it is not something that can be brought about). An injunction is always in respect of something that can be avoided or attained, and what man can do, not do or do otherwise can alone be avoided or attained. And only in respect of such a thing, can a capable agent, being eligible, be inspired to act. *Śravaṇa, manana, upāsana, darśana* are certainly not such. Therefore, since the object and the doer are absent, there is the absence of an injunction (—which is pervaded by or invariably concomitant with them). Therefore though '*liṅ*', etc., may be employed, they are incapable of inspiring anyone to activity and so become invalid like the sharpness of a razor tried on a stone. Only a capable and so eligible doer can be set to work. If he is not capable he cannot be a doer and so is not eligible and so cannot be asked to do that. Still the question remains. These may not be injunctive statements as there is no injunction; why then are such expressions employed as have the semblance or appearance of an injunction? They could not be meaningless for in that case they could not possibly be grasped by virtue of the *Svādhyāya-vidhi* ('*Svādhyāyo*' *dhyetavyaḥ*'). The answer to this is that even as they are obtained from another source, they are reiterated by means of sentences which have the form of injunctions. And reiteration though it be, it is not purposeless for it has a special function. To wit, a person becomes an extrovert because his heart is made to drift by the desire to attain what is desirable and avoid what is undesirable and so cannot concentrate or meditate on the Inner Self. But by these statements regarding '*Ātmaśravaṇa*', etc., which appear like injunctions, the stream of his mental thought is blocked as far as mundane objects are concerned and the flood-gate opening on the Inner Self is opened.

This is the special function of these re-iterative statements, and so they are purposeful and so can justifiably be grasped in view of the *Svādhyāya-vidhi.*[6] It is not true to say that if the said *ātmajñāna* is not subsidiary to any performance, it will not serve any human purpose (—it is not *puruṣārtha*), for it is established that it is inherently a *puruṣārtha* and that it does not subserve any performance is an ornamental characteristic and not a drawback. Thus Brahman is not presented in the Veda as an object of the injunction concerning knowledge.

Explaining why Vācaspati has admitted '*satyaṁ jñānaṁ nāma mānasī kriyā*', Amalānanda in his *Kalpataru* says : Vācaspati has admitted that *jñāna* is a *kriyā,* but he has refuted the stand that it is capable of being enjoined. What is meant is that Brahman cannot be an object of the act of knowing and the Niyogavādins do not admit *aupādhika karmatva* (adventitious or conditional objectness). If the *Bhāṣya* is explained on the lines that *jñāna* is not a *kriyā* at all, then it would be difficult to explain that like '*pacati*', the expression '*jānāti*' is well known and it is known to express a series of successive stages (*pūrvāparibhāva*)[7], Amalānanda, like Vācaspati, makes an effort to show that when Śaṅkara says that *dhyāna* is just *kriyā* and that conception of fire as fire is just *jñāna,* not *kriyā,* he means by *lakṣaṇā* the *avastutantratva* (not being dependent on the actual thing) of *kriyā* and he negates this in the case of *jñāna* which is a *kriyā* but is *vastutantra,* and is not dependent on an injunction or on man (i.e. is not *codanātantra* and *puruṣatantrā*). Even while accepting *jñāna* as a *kriyā,* Śaṅkarācārya cannot tolerate its being something that should be, or requires to be enjoined.[8]

Śravaṇa etc., are not such as can be enjoined. *Śravaṇa* signifies 'knowing the purport' (*tātparyāvagama*) of the statement '*tat tvam asi*' in respect of *Brahmātman* by a detailed consideration of the expressed meaning etc., of '*tat*' and the like, for till this notion determined by a particular object is known, the knowledge that *śravaṇa* is to be done would not be possible; and once this happens, *śravaṇa* has already occurred, and it is not therefore again capable of being done or not done or done otherwise. That is to say, even while trying to know what (viz. *śravaṇa*) is said by the sentence as being fit to be done, it (*śravaṇa*) occurs and so nothing remains to be enjoined or done. Such also is the case with *manana*

(reflection), for that *manana*, or thorough consideration by means of logical reasoning determined by a specific object, which is not known cannot be done. Even in the case of *upāsanā* (*nididhyāsana*)—repeated occurrence of the conception in accordance with *śravaṇa* and *manana*,–when it is known, the repeated occurrence has certainly taken place twice or thrice, and so the thing which is intended to be enjoined and is known does not require to be done again. And it is obvious that *darśana* is something impossible to be brought about.[9] What Vācaspati wants to convey is that such statements regarding *śravaṇa*, etc., are reiterative in character as they convey known things, but they thus by *lakṣaṇā* praise *śravaṇa*, etc., and create a liking for them and at the same time create a dislike for the thought of things which are the non-self, and thus bring about excellence in the activity.[10] S'aṅkara has refuted the view that there is no part of the *Veda* which speaks of an already established thing except it be in relation to an injunction or prohibition or something subsidiary to it. This he does in order to prove the validity of the *Upaniṣad*s in respect of an established thing (*Brahman*), and to refute the argument that the Vedic statements cannot be consistently construed in respect of a *siddha* thing and so on.

Clarifying the statement of Amalānanda that Brahman cannot be an object of the act of knowing and '*aupādhika karmatva*' is not acceptable to the Niyogavādin, Appayya Dīkṣita says in his *Kalpataru-parimala* that by *aupādhika karmatva* is meant *karmatva* which has for its *upādhi* the coloration by or relation with the *vṛtti* (i.e. *Brahmātmākārā vṛtti*) for this will not be in accordance with the nature of the Highest.[11]

It may be urged that in the case of one who has done the *adhyayana* of the *Veda*, the knowledge of the meaning based on critical examination is, like *dhyāna*, not '*prāpta*' without an injunction. The answer to this is that it is not so, for this (*vicārapūrvaka-arthajñāna*) is implied by the *Vedāntas* (Upaniṣadic statements) which are brought to the stage of the comprehension of things having a fruit) by means of the *adhyayana-vidhi* ('*Svadhyāyo' dhyetavyaḥ*'), esp. by those whose meanings are doubtful, and so there is its *prāpti* in the case of those desirous of *mokṣa*.[12]

Appayya Dīkṣita says that the Ṭīkākāra (Vācaspati) has in the *Sarvāpekṣādhikaraṇa* (*Br. Sū.* III. 4.26) explained that there are four *pratipattis* (apprehensions) in respect of Brahman. The first occurs by

just the *śravaṇa* (textual study) of the Upaniṣadic sentences; this they call *śravaṇa.* The second occurs from that very Upaniṣadic sentence along with ratiocination, and this they call *manana.* The third constitutes a continuum of thought (*cintāsantati*) and this they call *nididhyāsana;* whereas the fourth embraces realisation (direct knowledge) and is of the nature of *vṛtti* (modification of the intellect in the shape of Brahman). It has already been shown that all these four are '*prāpta*' and so cannot be enjoined.

Appayya Dīkṣita feels that Amalānanda has in view a different conception of *śravaṇa,* etc., when he says that no injunction is possible in their case. According to this, *śravaṇa* signifies determining the purport of the Upaniṣadic sentence by means of *nyāyas* (rules of Vedic interpretation; e.g. purport can be determined by *upakrama, upasaṁhāra,* etc.). And *manana* signifies the reflection that follows on its meaning by means of ratiocination in the form of inference, etc., supporting and strengthening the determination of the purport in *śravaṇa.* In this view it can be also differently shown that *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana* cannot possibly be enjoined. And this is what Amalananda has done. The *adhyayanavidhi* (*svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ*) has the meaning of the *Veda* as its fruit, and this itself leads us to accept that all the Vedic statements are meaningful. By this *vidhi* itself the knowledge of the purport of the meaning is established in general in the case of the *Upaniṣads* as in the case of the *Karmakāṇḍā,* and so for its knowledge no injunction regarding *Śravaṇa* need be accepted. But it may be accepted as pertaining to the knowledge of the purport as determined by a particular object, viz., 'One should know by *nyāya* the purport of the Upaniṣadic sentences in respect of the Indivisible Brahman'. But the Vedāntin argues that if this is not known it cannot be enjoined, and if it is known it need not be enjoined. In any case, an injunction in respect of *śravaṇa* is not possible. (*Śravaṇa* here signifies '*viṣayaviśeṣāvacchinnatātparyajñāna*).

It may be urged : In the case of a person who has done the *adhyayana* of the *Veda* along with the *aṅgas,* a doubt is likely to arise as to where the purport of the *Upaniṣads* lies when they have diverse meanings or contents in the form of *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa,* so it is quite possible to enjoin, "One should conclusively know by means of *nyāya* the purport

determined by a particular object of the form of *nirguṇa* which has occupied the intellect (i.e. which is known cursorily as a result of the *adhyayana-vidhi*).

The answer to this is that it is not so. When the specific fruit is known from the determination of the meaning of the *Veda*, effort in the direction of its consideration by means of *nyāya* will take place automatically for the sake of the determination of the purport of its meaning and so no *vidhi* is required as in the case of the consideration of the meaning of the *Karmakāṇḍa*.[13]

This is true of *manana* also. If *yuktiviśeṣālocana'* (consideration by particular or special ratiocination) is not known it cannot be enjoined, and if it is known it is '*prāpta*' and so need not be enjoined. In any case an injunction regarding *manana* is not possible. 'Consideration by means of reasoning' in general need not be enjoined as it is *prāpta* automatically as it has a seen fruit in the form of setting aside of *asambhāvanā* (—the meaning or what is stated not being possible), etc[14].

Upāsanā signifies *pratyayāvrtti* (repeated occurrence of the notion or conception) and at the time of *śravana* and *manana*, even if one *pratyaya* (conception) arises each time, *upāsanā* of the form of two *pratyayas* is already established (*siddhaiva*) at the time of knowing the *nididhyāsana* which is to be enjoined; the knowledge of the repeated occurrence which is to be enjoined is also related to *Brahmātmaikya* which is its object, so if we include this, *upāsanā* of the form of three *pratyayas* is certainly established. The word '*dhyāna'* signifies just repeated occurrence and not repetition determined by a particular number, viz., hundred or thousand. So the meaning of the scripture regarding *āvṛtti* (repetition) is already obtained even when two or three *pratyayas* occur, just as even when the pestle is used once, the meaning of the scriptural statement '*sarvauṣadhasya pūrayitvā' vahanti*' (Filling all grains, he pounds/i.e. he should pound) is fulfilled. If *dhyāna* is accepted as having a seen fruit in the form of *sākṣatkāra* (direct knowledge), then its repetition until the seen fruit rises is obtained or it accrues as in the case of the *avaghāta* (pounding) meant for the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice. Now, if it has a seen fruit, no injunction is required. Since no other means of *sākaṣātkāra* accrues, even a *Niyamavidhi* has no scope. It may be said that '*dhyāna*' signifies uninte-

rrupted repetition of the *pratyaya* (*avicchinna-pratyayāvṛtti*) and this is not already *siddha.* But this argument is not proper, for at the time of knowing the meaning of the injunction 'Meditation of the form of *pratyayāvṛtti* in accordance with *śravaṇa* and *manana* should be done', since as was the *pratyaya* at the time of *śravaṇa,* and as it was at the time of *manana,* even these *pratyayas* are to be linked up in order, so even uninterruptedness is *prāpta.* Thus no injunction is possible for *nididhyāsana*[15].

This Upanisadic statement has attracted the attention of many thinkers of the Śaṅkara School, especially because this has been regarded as the basis of the very first sūtra of the *Brahma-sūtra* (*Athā' to Brāhma-jijñāsā*). For instance, Appayya Dīkṣita has discussed at length whether there could be any injunction in respect of *śravaṇa,* etc and he mentions the divergent opinions of thinkers of the Śāṅkara school. Considerable importance is attached to this in the *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* of Appayya Dīkṣita. Before we come to this, we may note the contents of the *Śāṅkara-Bhāsya* on '*Sahakāryantaravidhiḥ paksena tṛtiyaṁ tadvato vidhyādivat* (*Br. Sū.* III, 4.47), which according to Saṅkara means, "In the alternative, there is an injunction about a third co-operating item (viz. *mauna*) (over and above *bālya* and *pāṇḍitya*) for one who possesses that (i.e. who is a man of knowledge and is a *sannyāsin.* but in whom the notion of duality still persists). This is like injunctions, etc." The Upanisadic sentence under discussion is '*Tasmād Brāhmaṇaḥ pāṇḍityaṁ nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset bālyaṁ ca pāṇḍityaṁ ca nirvidyā' tha munir amaunaṁ ca maunaṁ ca nirvidyā'-tha Brāhmaṇaḥ* (*Br. Up.* III.5.1) (Therefore, a Brāhmaṇa after having fully acquired scholarship should try to live with childlike purity and after having acquired scholarship and childlike purity such a one becomes a Muni (one with excellence of knowledge), and after having acquired or known *amauna* and *mauna,* he becomes a Brāhmaṇa). Explaining this Śaṅkara has made two statements, viz. (1) "There is an injunction with regard to the third auxiliary (in the acquisition of knowledge), viz., "*mauna*" (which signifies excellence of knowledge and the state of a *sannyāsin*) in the same way as there are injunctions in respect of '*bālya*' and '*pāṇḍitya*', because it is something '*apūrva*' unique, not known by other means of knowledge, something not accruing)". (2) "But (says the opponent) if a person is possessed of knowledge, its excellence (*jñānāti śaya*) necessarily follows, and of what use then is any such injunction ? The *Sūtra*

says, 'In the alternative', that is to say, when because of the force of seeing things as different (due to *Avidyā*) excellence of knowledge does not accrue, in that case this serves as an injunction".16

All later thinkers who recognise *śravaṇa vidhi* here refer to these statements and in a manner convenient to them explain them as supporting their view that *śravaṇa-vidhi* is an *apūrva-vidhi* or a *niyama-vidhi* or a *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi*. There are some who hold that there is no scope for any sort of injunction.

Vācaspati does not have anything original to say, in his *Bhāmatī* here except that the '*Vidyāvat*' referred to, in the *Sūtra* and the *Bhāsya* on it, is not a man with excellence of knowledge but one who is indulging in the practice of bringing about the rise of *vidyā*, and in the case of such a person because of there being *bheda-darśana* at times, in that alternative, the injunction is possible.17

Amalānanda has pointedly explained the terms *pāṇḍitya*, etc., in his *Kalpataru* (pp. 917–918)—*Paṇḍā'dhyayanajā Brahmadhīs tadvān paṇḍitah, tasya kṛtyam pāṇḍityaṁ śravanam*—knowledge of Brahman resulting from the study of the scriptures—scholarship, it signifies *śravana*. '*Bālyena jñānabala-bhāvena yuktito*' *saṁbhāvanānirāsarūpamananena vā śuddhahṛdayena vā*'—*Bālya* signifies the state of strength resulting from knowledge i.e. reflection in the from of the setting aside of the untenability of scriptural statements by means of ratiocination' (*Bālya=manana*), or purity of heart. '*Munir Mananaśīlaḥ nididhyāsakaḥ*'-*Thus* '*mauna*' signifies '*nididhyāsana*'.. '*Atha Brāhmaṇaḥ brahmā*' *hamity avagacchatīti brāhmaṇaḥ saksātkrtabrahmā bhavatīty arthaḥ*'-'Brāhmana' in the final stage signifies one who has the direct knowledge (*sākṣātkāra*) of *Brahman*.

The reader is likely to be confused for in the *Bhāṣya* on the *Samanvaya-sūtra* (*Br.sū.* I. 1.4), Śaṅkarācārya has emphatically said that no injunction is possible in respect of *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana*. And here he speaks of '*apūrvatva*' and 'a *vidhi* being possible in the alternative when *mauna* does not accrue due to '*bhedadarśanaprābalya*'. Amalānanda tries to solve this in the following manner: In the *Samanvaya-sūtra* it has been said that by *anvaya-vyatireka* it is established that '*vastvavagamavai-śadya*' results from *nididhyāsana* etc., so no injunction is required in respect of them. But here it is said that though *nididhyāsana* is *siddha* by the

above-mentioned *anvaya-vyatireka*, it is quite likely that a person may feel a sense of fulfilment by just *śābda-jñana* (verbal knowledge of scriptures) and complacently not proceed in the direction of *nididhyāsana*, of the form of *jñānātiśaya* (excellence of knowledge). *Nididhyāsana* is thus 'not *prāpta*' for him and so it is enjoined in respect of such a one. Or '*apūrvatva*' may signify that *mauna* is not *prāpta* from other words such as '*pāṇḍitya*' etc., and its *vidhitva* (being an injunction) signifies that even while being an *arthavāda-vākya* it brings about excellence in the activity through its praise. It is therefore that Śaṅkarācārya has used the expression '*vidhicchāyāni vacanāni*' in his *Bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra*, I.1.4 (*Samanvaya-Sūtra*). Moreover, it is said,

> " *Nātrāpūrvavidhiḥ prāpter ananyopāyato na ca,*
> *niyamaḥ parisaṁkhyā vā śravaṇādiṣu saṁbhavet.*"

(There is not an *apūrvavidhi* in this respect as *śravaṇa*, etc., are already '*prāpta*', and since there are no other means besides them accruing alternatively or jointly neither a *niyamavidhi* nor a *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi* is possible to exclude them).[18]

Commenting on the *Kalpataru*, Appayya Dīkṣita says in his *Kalpataruparimala* that *śravaṇa* signifies cursory knowledge of Brahman that is produced by the *adhyayana* of the *Veda* along with the *aṅgas*. Its strength is *manana* which is of the form of reflection by means of arguments and which firmly establishes it; *bālya* or state of strength signifies setting aside untenability; this being brought about by *manana* is secondarily called *manana*. This explanation is in accordance with Śaṅkarācārya's *Bhāṣya* on the relevant passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* (III 5.1). And the explanation 'purity of heart' of '*bālya*' is in accordance with the *Bhāṣya* on *Br. Sū.* III 4.50 (*Anāviṣkurvannanvayāt*).

Further on, he says that it is said that *mauna* or *nididhyāsana* is enjoined in the alternative when a person feels that his task is over even when he has attained verbal knowledge of the *Upaniṣads* and does not go in for *nididhyāsana*. In this case it would be a *niyama-vidhi*, and the apparent contradiction in the statements of Śaṅkarācārya can be resolved by understanding in this way that when he says that it cannot be enjoined he means that it cannot be an object of *apūrva-vidhi*, while he says that it is the object of *niyama-vidhi*. But even thus we cannot explain how or

why he calls such injunctions '*vidhicchāyāni*' (those having the appearance of *vidhis*). So not being satisfied with the above explanation, Amalānanda offers another one. Actually no one expects *sākṣātkāra* to occur by means of just verbal knowledge without the help of *dhyāna* (meditation) and so no one has any reason to feel a sense of fulfilment on having just verbal knowledge. Therefore, a *niyama-vidhi* is not required. Amalānanda justifies the statement made by Śaṅkarācārya and Vācaspati, even while resorting to the Siddhānta regarding *vidhyabhāva*, (viz. no injunction is possible in respect of *śravaṇa*, etc). He says that it is '*apūrva*' inasmuch as it is not obtained from other words like '*pāṇḍitya* etc., and it is '*vidhi*' inasmuch, as even while being an *arthavādavākya* it brings about excellence in the activity through its praise.[19]

Appayya Dīkṣita then discusses other views regarding this as an *apūrva-vidhi* or a *niyama-vidhi* or a *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi*, but we shall now turn to the discussion in the *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* of Appayya Dīkṣita in which almost all this and much more is found with the names of the thinkers who held these divergemt views.

Vidhis (injunctions) are of three kinds, viz., (a) *apūrva-vidhi* laying down something unique that does not in any way obtain or is not known from any other source in all the three times); (b) *niyama-vidhi* (injunction of restriction that supplies what does not obtain or is not resorted to is the case of something, for the accomplishment of which more than one means alternatively accrue); (c) *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi* (injunction of exclusion, which excludes all other means which simultaneously accrue as leading to the desired end). "*Vrīhīn prokṣati*", "*Vrihin avahanti*" and "*imām agṛbhṇan raśanām ṛtasyā ity aśvābhidhānīm ādatte*" are well known examples of *apūrva vidhi, niyama vidhi* (which here ties down the performer to *avahanana* or pounding rather than *nakha-vidalana* or unhusking of rice-grain with the help of nails which also alternatively accrues) and *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi* (which here excludes the use of this mantra at the time of holding the reins of the ass when it simultaneously accrued.).[20]

What sort of a *vidhi* is it that we find in regard to the *śravaṇa* of *Vedānta* (*Upaniṣads*) for the purpose of the knowledge of *Brahman* as the Self, this being meant for one in whom the desire to know it has arisen after having known it cursorily from the *adhyayana* of the *Upaniṣads* which

he has done in obedience to the compulsory injunction '*svādhyāyo' dhyetavyaḥ*'. The Upaniṣadic statement in question is '*Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ*.'

(*a*) The author of the *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa* and others regard it as an *apūrva-vidhi*, as *śravaṇa* would not have otherwise accrued, for there is no proof of the type of *anvaya-vyatireka* which would enable us to know that *Vedānta-śravaṇa* is the cause of *Brahma-sākṣātkāra*. *Sākṣātkāra* is not possible even when one has done *śravaṇa*, and we know of Vāmadeva having had *Brahma-sākṣātkāra* even when he was in his mother's womb and had not done any *śravaṇa*. Nor is there a general rule that all *śravaṇa* (hearing) leads to the realisation or direct knowledge of the thing that is heard so that we could apply it to this particular case and feel certain that *Vedanta-śravaṇa* is the cause of *Brahma-sākṣātkāra*, Granted that *śravaṇa* of Gandharva and other *śāstras* becomes the cause of the *sākṣātkāra* of the musical notes *ṣaḍja*, etc., and the like, yet we also have to note that *sākṣātkāra* of *dharma*, etc., is not seen to result from the *śravaṇa* of *Karmakāṇḍa*, etc. Therefore '*śrotavyaḥ*' is an *apūrva-vidhi*.

Śaṅkarācārya too has, in his *Bhāṣya* on '*Sahakāryantara-vidhiḥ*......' (*Br. Sū.* III, 4.47), said that one should admit only a *vidhi* in respect of *mauna* (*dhyāna*) which is an aid to *Vidyā* as one admits in the case of *bālya* (*manana*) and *pāṇḍitya* (*śravana*) as it is something *apūrva*. (*vidyā-sahakāriṇo maunasya bālya-pāṇḍityavad vidhir evāśrayitavyaḥ apūrvatvāt*). Thus an *apūrva-vidhi* in respect of *śravaṇa*, which is denoted by the word '*pāṇḍitya*' here, is admitted by Śaṅkarācarya himself. It may be noted that Kṛṣṇānandatīrtha commenting on this portion of the *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* (pp. 10–11) remarks that it could be argued that the Brahmasūtrakāra has used the word '*pakṣena*' which should indicate that according to him the injunction regarding *mauna* (or *nididhyāsana* or *dhyana*) is a *niyama-vidhi* enjoining restriction in case a person alternatively feels attracted towards the perception of sensuous objects. But Śaṅkara, in his *Bhāṣya*, has instead of stressing this, used the expression '*apūrvatvāt*' and thus he wants to convey that *śravaṇa*-*vidhi* is an *apūrva-vidhi* only.[21]

(*b*) The followers of the Vivaraṇa school contend that it is a *niyama-vidhi*. It is not true to say that it is not known from any source that *Vedanta-śravana* is the cause of *Brahma-ṣākṣātkāra*. The Vedāntins

themselves believe in *Śabdāparokṣavāda* or the theory that the *Upaniṣads* give rise to the direct knowledge of Brahman. It is known that all critical consideration (*vicāra*) leads to decisive knowledge regarding the thing thus considered and that *pramāṇa* (proof) regarding Brahman is the cause of the *sākṣatkāra* (direct knowledge) of Brahman (wihch is *nitya aparokṣa*, always present and so can be directly known). Therefore it is known that *śravaṇa* of the form of the khowledge of the words of the *Upaniṣads* which is duly critically examined is the cause of *Brahma-sākṣātkāra*.

As regards the deviations pointed out, one must bear in mind that some co-operative factors must be lacking or insufficient in the case of those who do not have *Brahma-sākṣātkāra* even after *Vedānta-śravaṇa;* and that *Brahma-sākṣātkāra* resulted in the case of Vāmadeva, who could remember all that happened in his previous lives, on account of the *śravaṇa* of another birth. Thus it being known even without a *vidhi* that *Vedānta-śravaṇa* is the cause of *Brahma-sākṣātkāra*, '*śrotavyaḥ*' is not an *apūrva-vidhi*.

It is because of this that Śaṅkarācārya commenting on '*āvṛttir asakṛd upadeśāt* (*Br. Sū*. IV. 1.1) says that *śravaṇa*, etc., being repeated over and over again culminate in *darśana* (direct experience) and have a seen purpose like pounding, etc., resulting in paddy-grains becoming rice-grains. Since *śravaṇa* etc., meant for direct knowledge of Brahman have a seen purpose, the rule regarding *āvṛtti* (repeated performance) which holds good in the case of the pounding connected with the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa is applied here. This would not be consistent if Śaṅkara regarded it as an *apūrva-vidhi*. For in the pounding of all grains in connection with the rite of *agnicayana* enjoined by the *apūrva-vidhi*, '*sarvauṣadhasya pūrayitvā' vahanti athaitad upadadhāti* (Having filled the *ūlūkhala* or mortar with all grains one should pound and then duly place it), it is said in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (XI, 1.6) that this *avaghāta* (pounding) being meant only for the *saṃskāra* (sanctification) of the *ulūkhala* which is to be placed does not have a seen purpose and so is not to be repeated. Therefore, '*śrotavyaḥ*' is not an *apūrvavidhi*, but is a *niyama-vidhi*.[22]

As a person seeing a thing with his eyes on being told by someone of some peculiarity which has not been noticed by him proceeds to employ carefully and attentively those very eyes for knowing that, so in respect of

the individual soul which is known by the mind, having heard from the *Vedāntas* the *adhyayana* of which he has done that it is of the nature of sentiency of *Brahman* which is non-differentitaed, he may perhaps proceed to concentrate his mind only in respect of it for knowing this. Though some Upanisadic statements say that the non-differentiated *Brahman* of the nature of sentiency is not an object of the mind (i.e. cannot be known by the mind–'*aprāpya manasā saha*') yet he may feel that such statements speak of the inattentive mind, for we have also statements like '*manasaivā'nudraṣṭavyam*', '*dṛśyate tv agryayā buddhyā*' which seem to clearly say that Brahman can certainly be known by an attentive mind. Thus in the alternative when *Vedānta-śravaṇa* is *aprāpta*, this *niyama-vidhi* (*s'rotavyaḥ*) would step in and supply that which does not accrue and thereby exclude the mental operations. It restricts the person to *Vedānta-śravana* as leading to *śabdāparokṣa*.[23]

Or, we have Vedic statements like "*juṣṭaṁ yadā paśvati anyam īśam asya mahimānam eti vīta-śokaḥ*" [When he sees another, the Lord, resorted to (by the sages), he being free from grief attains His greatness]. From such statements, a person is likely to have the misconception that emancipation results from the knowledge of the *Ātman* different from the individual soul, and for the attainment of this knowledge which would bring about emancipation he might as one alternative proceed to indulge in the *śravaṇa* of another *Śastra* (e.g. Nyāya or the like). In such an alternative, this should be accepted as a *niyama-vidhi* in respect of *śravaṇa* of the *Upaniṣads* giving knowledge of the Non-dual Ātman.[24]

Or, the direct knowledge of Brahman of the form of determination of its existence (reality) is possible due to *Vedānta-vicāra* (critical understanding of the *Upaniṣads*) which can be accomplished in the case of an intelligent person as much by just his own effort as by the *śravaṇa* from the mouth of the teacher. But the *adṛṣṭa* resulting from the *niyama* (restriction) in respect of the latter is useful for the removal of ignorance through the elimination of impurity (*kalmaṣa*), so in its absence the above-mentioned knowledge of Brahman being obstructed by the absence of the removal of impurity would not be able to remove ignorance and so would be as good as indirect knowledge. Thus, just as the *niyamavidhi* regarding *adhyayana* from the *guru's* mouth functions in the alternative when *svādhyāya-grahaṇa*

(learning by rote of the Veda) accrues from the recitation of the written word, so in the alternative when *Vedānta-vicāra* is resorted to solely on the strength of one's own effort with a view to Brahma-realisation of the form of determination of its existence, this *śravaṇa-vidhi* may step in as a *niyama-vidhi* restricting the person to *śravaṇa* depending on the word of mouth of the teacher.

The injunction '*tad-vijñanārthaṁ sa gurum evābhigacchet*' (In order to know that he should approach the *guru* only) by itself does not serve this purpose of enjoining the above-mentioned restriction, as approaching and sitting at the feet of the teacher being subsidiary to or a means to *śravaṇa*, this *vidhi* (injunction) itself would not be there in the absence of the *śravaṇa-vidhi*, which is, thus, not rendered superfluous. Otherwise, the above-mentioned *vidhi* enjoining sitting at the feet of the guru could be said to exclude recitation of the written word and thus render the *adhyayana-vidhi* ('*Svādhyāyo' dhyetavyaḥ*') superfluous.[25]

Or one may be tempted to go in for the *sravaṇa* of works in the dialectal languages (*bhāṣā-prabandha*) propounding the Non-dual *Ātman* in spite of the prohibition '*na mlecchitavai*' as he feels that his intelligence not being sufficiently sharp, *Vedānta-śravaṇa* will not be possible for him. In such an alternative, the *śravaṇa-vidhi* justifiably serves as a *niyama-vidhi*. Or a person may proceed to do the *śravaṇa* of works of human authors like the *Itihāsa, Purāṇa* which are based on the *Upaniṣads*. In such an alternative also, the *śravaṇa-vidhi* functions as a *niyama-vidhi*. Thus taking everything into consideration '*śrotavyaḥ*' is a *niyamavidhi* only.[26]

In the commentary on '*Sahakāryantaravidhih.........*' (*Br.Su.* III, 4.47) Śaṅkarācārya has used the expression '*apūrva*', but this is in view of the *Vedānta-śravaṇa* not accruing in one alternative even though the *Śravaṇa-vidhi* is a *niyama-vidhi* and this has been clarified there only by the way in which the word '*pakṣena*' in the *sūtra* is construed.

Thus according to the Vivaraṇa School, '*Śrotavyaḥ*' is a *niyama-vidhi*.[27]

(*c*) A section of the Vivaraṇa-school holds that *śravaṇa* by itself can lead only to indirect knowledge free from doubt. Only when *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are resorted to does direct knowledge arise from *śabda* equipped with the co-operation of sumptuous brooding or contemplation

(*bhāvanā-pracaya; mananadhyānātmakabhāvanāpracaya*—Commentary.) This is a known fact as sumptuous residual traces of knowledge enable, by their co-operation, the sense-organ or the internal organ to have direct knowledge of an object separated in time and space as in the case of *pratyabhijña*- (recognition) and the direct experience of a beloved by a separated lover. Therefore, an *apūrva-vidhi* cannot be recognised here as goading a person to the performance of *śravaṇa,* etc. Hence the *śravaṇa-vidhi* is a *niyama-vidhi* functioning in the alternative when *śravaṇa* of *bhāṣā-prabandhas* and the like is likely to be resorted to for the knowledge of the Non-dual *Ātman*, and this *niyama-vidhi* restricts the person to *Vedānta-śravaṇa* and excludes. *śravaṇa* of *bhāṣā-prabandhas, etc.*[28]

(*d*) Another view is that *Vedānta-śravaṇa* cannot lead to *Brahma-sākṣātkara*; the mind alone can be instrumental in bringing it about, for we have the *śruti* '*manasaivānudraṣṭavyam*' and Śaṅkarācarya says in his *Gitā-Bhāṣya* '*Śāstrācāryopadeśa–śamadamādi-saṁskṛtaṁ mana ātmadarśane karaṇam*' (The mind cultured by the *śāstra* and the teaching of the preceptor and by all-round restraint and the like is the peculiar instrument of perception or direct knowledge of the self). *Śravaṇa* is nevertheless meant for the indirect verbal knowledge that is free from doubt and it is for this only that the *śravaṇa-vidhi* is a *niyama-vidhi.*[29]

(*e*) Still others hold that the *niyama-vidhi* in respect of *śravaṇa* is only inasmuch as it is meant for the direct knowledge of the non-dual *Ātman*, for the fruit is mentioned here—'*draṣṭavyaḥ*'. And it serves this end only by co-operating with the mind which is the instrument of direct knowledge of the *Ātman* and not directly, for it is accepted that direct knowledge cannot be had from *śabda*. It may be noted that the co-operation of *Śāstra-śravaṇa* in the direct knowledge, free from non-discrimination, of the musical notes *ṣaḍja*, etc. by the ear is known, so this is not something unknown and hence the *śravaṇa-vidhi* is not an *apūrva-vidhi* but is a *niyama-vidhi.*[30]

(*f*) According to the author of the *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka* (i.e. Sarvajñātman), *śravaṇa* is of the form of a particular mental operation consisting of the consideration by means of *nyāyas* favourable to the determination of the purport of Upaniṣadic sentences in respect of the non-dual *Brahman*. *Śravaṇa* cannot have for its fruit knowledge, direct or indirect,

in respect of *Brahman*, for knowledge is the fruit of the means of proof–Verbal Testimony etc. It may be urged that *śravaṇa* signifies verbal knowledge itself qualified by the puport determined by the above-mentioned consideration (i.e. *nyāya-vicāra*), and it is proper that *Brahma-jñāna* should be its fruit. But this is not proper, for an injunction is not possible in respect of knowledge. And since the *śravaṇa-vidhi* is accepted as the basis of the *jijñāsā-sūtra* (*Br.* Sū. I. 1.1) enjoining that *vicāra* should be done, *s'ravaṇa* could only be *vicāra* of the form of a mental act consisting of critical consideration by means of *nyāyas*. It should not be argued that this *vicāra* itself through the removal by it of the obstructions in the form of human faults like erroneous conception of the purport or through the determination of the purport leads to the fruit in the form of *Brahma-jñāna*. Such an argument would not be proper because knowledge of purport is not accepted as cause in respect of verbal knowledge (—one may have verbal knowledge even without the knowledge of the purport as in the case of a sentence uttered by a parrot or a child, or in the case of sentences like '*aho vimalaṁ jalaṁ nadyāḥ kacche mahiṣāś caranti*' '*paya ānīyatām*' where the verbal knowledge is there, but the purport is not known or determined—Comm.). And negation of obstruction is not accepted as a cause. Therefore, determination of purport and removal of obstruction cannot serve as intermediaries. If *Brahma—jñāna* were produced by an additional cause, viz., *vicāra* over and above *śabda-pramāṇa*, its validity would come to be extrinsic. Therefore, there is a *niyama-vidhi* in respect of *ravaṇa* of the form of *vicāra* (–a mental act) only in as much as it is meant for the removal of human fault through the determination of the purport. The term '*draṣṭavyaḥ*' (fit to be seen) is not meant to point out the fruit of *śravaṇa,* but is meant only to extol *Ātman* as being worthy of being seen, so that a person may feel inclined to indulge in *śravaṇa,* etc.[31]

(*g*) According to the followers of the *Vārttika,* the *s'ravaṇa-vidhi* is a *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi* (injunction of exclusion). *Vedānta-śravaṇa* is *prāpta* as meant for *Brahma-jñāna.* But one who is doing it may in the middle be distracted and indulge in some other operation also. So the injunction '*śrotavyaḥ*' has for its fruit the exclusion of the indulgence in other operations. The *Śruti* '*Brahma-saṁstho amṛtatvam eti*' (Ch. Up. II, 23.1) (One who is stationed in Brahman attains immortality) signifies conclusively that not having another operation (i.e. single-minded devotion) is

the means to salvation, for the word '*sam* + √*sthā* ' expresses culmination, and therefore culmination in *Brahman* is of the form of not having any other operation. Some *Śruti* and *Smṛti* passages expressly state that other activities are to be avoided–' *Tam evaikaṁ jānatha anyā vāco vimuñcatha* ' (know that one alone, leave other talk); *āsupter āmṛteh kālaṁ nayed vedānta-cintayā* (–One should pass the time up to sleep or death by thinking about *Vedānta* i.e. the *Upaniṣads*).

It may be urged that another operation not useful for *Brahma-jñāna* does not accrue jointly with *śravaṇa* in respect of the same end and so no *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi* is required for its exclusion. This is not proper for in the *sūtra* ' *sahakāryantaravidhiḥ.........*' (*Br. Sū*. III 4.47) and in the *Bhāṣya*, " By virtue of the force of perception of difference, *mauna* or *nididhyāsana* does not obtain as an alternative, so it is a *niyama-vidhi* ". what is said is that one who has done *śravaṇa* and who feels a sense of fulfilment from just the verbal knowledge (and therefore may indulge in other activities), may not proceed to do *nididhyāsana* which is useful for *sākṣātkāra* (direct experience) which removes *Avidyā* and so just because what is not a means to it accrues as an alternative, a *niyama-vidhi* is accepted in respect of *nididhyāsana*. On the same lines it can be argued that when what is not a means accrues simultaneously (with *śravana* etc.), a *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi* meant for its exclusion is possible. Some following the *Vārttika* say, " The meaning of the injunction could be restriction or exclusion for we meditate on the Highest Self by just the non-perception of the Non-self ".[32]

(*h*) According to Vācaspati and his followers, *śravaṇa*, like *manana*, etc., stated as referring to *Ātman* (*ātmā śrotavyaḥ*) is just knowledge of Ātman produced by the *Śastra* or the teaching of the preceptor. It is not of the form of the consideration of the purport (for consideration or *vicāra* being of the form of a *kriyā*, a mental act that can be done, cannot directly have Ātman for its object). Therefore, there is no injunction in respect of *śravaṇa*. (The Commentator remarks that *manana* does not signify the operation of ratiocination or reflection by means of arguments, but signifies inferential knowledge of *Brahman*, and of the unreality of everything other than *Brahman*. So also *nididhyāsana* signifies knowledge

not dependent on anything. Hence a *vidhi* is not possible in respect of these too.).

Śaṅkarācārya has said the same thing in his *Bhāṣya* on the *samanvaya-sūtra* (Br. Sū. I, 1.4). After proving that an injunction is not possible in respect of the knowledge of the Self, he raises the question as to why there are expressions having the appearance of injunctions (*vidhicchāyāni*) and says that they are meant to turn away men from the objects of activities natural to man in the mundane world.

If *śravaṇa* be of the form of the consideration of the purport of the *Upaniṣads* (*Vedānta-tātparyavicāra*), then its fruit could be only the removal of the obstructions in the form of erroneous conception of the purport of the *Upaniṣads* or doubt regarding it, through the determination of the purport, but not the removal of other obstructions (like *pāpa*, etc), nor the knowledge of Brahman. That it has this fruit is known from our worldly experience (*anvaya-vyatireka*) only. And no other means accrues alternatively or jointly with it. So none of the three *vidhis* has any scope here.[33]

Even in the absence of an injunction regarding *vicāra,* the sitting at the feet of the *guru* which is enjoined as meant for knowledge will result in knowledge only through the *Vedānta-vicāra* depending on the mouth of the teacher, as when a seen intermediary is possible, it is not proper to imagine an unseen one. By this only, *vicāra* accomplished by one's own effort will be excluded automatically. On the other hand, in the absence of the *adhyayana-vidhi,* the *upagamana* (approaching the teacher) which is enjoined, not being enjoined for the attainment of the *Veda* (i.e. learning the words of the *Veda*) will not seek as its intermediary *adhyayana* of the form of reciting after the recitation done by the *guru,* so the exclusion of the recitation of the written word and the like will not accrue, and so the *adhyayana-vidhi,* which is a *niyama-vidhi,* is purposeful as warding off the recitation of the written word and the like.

It is also not true to say that one wanting to do *Vedānt-vicāra* may proceed in the direction of *Śāstra* propounding duality in order to set aside misconception, etc., regarding the purport, for even in it the *Vedānta* text is construed in a way acceptable to them; so the *śravaṇa-vidhi* restricting the person to *Vedānta-vicāra* heading towards the Non-dual Self is

NOTES

1. Nanu jñānaṁ nāma mānasī kriyā. Na, vailakṣaṇyāt, kriyā hi nāma sā yatra vastu-svarūpa-nirapekṣaiva codyate, puruṣacittavyāpārādhinā ca. yatha-'yasyai devatāyai havir gṛhītaṁ syāt taṁ manasā dhyāyet vaṣaṭ-kariṣyan ' iti, ' saṁdhyāṁ manasā dhyāyet ' iti caivamādiṣu, dhyānaṁ cintanaṁ yady api mānasaṁ tathāpi pursuṣeṇa kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṁ śakyaṁ puruṣa-tantratvāt; jñānaṁ tu pramāṇa-janyam, pramāṇaṁ ca yathābhūtavastu-viṣayam. ato jñānaṁ kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṁ aśakyaṁ, kevalaṁ vastu-tantram eva tat, na codanā-tantraṁ nāpi puruṣa-tantram. tasmāt mānasatve'pi jñānasya mahad vailakṣaṇyam.- *Br.Sū.* ŚB, I. 1.4 (pp. 128-129) (Nirnaya sagar Ed. Bombay, 1938).

2. Tatraivaṁ sati yathābhūta-Brahmātmaviṣayam api jñānaṁ na codanā-tantram. tadviṣaye liṅadayaḥ śrūyamāṇā apy aniyojyaviṣayatvāt kuṇṭhī-bhavanti, upalādiṣu prayukta-kṣura-taikṣṇyādivat, aheyānupādeya-vastuviṣayatvāt. (*Ibid,* p. 129).

3. Kimarthāni tarhi ' Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ ' ityādīni vidhi-cchāyāni vacanāni ? svābhāvika-pravṛttiviṣaya-vimukhīkaraṇārthānīti brūmaḥ—*Ibid,* p. 130.

4. Yad apy akartavya-pradhānam ātmajñānaṁ hānāyopādānāya vā na bhavatīti, tat tathaivety abhyupagamyate. Alaṁkaro hy ayam asmākaṁ yad Brahmātmāvagatau satyāṁ sarvakartavyatāhāniḥ kṛtakṛtyatā ceti-*Ibid,* p. 130.

5. Nanu, ' Ātmety evopāsīta ', ity-ādayaḥ vidhayaḥ śrūyante. Na ca pra-matta-gītāḥ, tulyaṁ hi sāṁpradāyikaṁ, tasmād vidheyenātra bhavita-vyam—*Bhāmati*, p. 129.

6. Tattadiṣṭāniṣṭaviṣayepsājihāsāpahṛtahṛdayatayā bahirmukho na pratyag-ātmani samādhātum arhati. Ātma-śravaṇādi-vidhisarupais tu vacanair manaso viṣaya-srotaḥ khilīkṛtya, pratyagātmasrota udghāṭyate iti

pravṛttiviśeṣakaratā ' nuvādānam astīti saprayojanatayā svādhyāya-vidhyadhīnagrahaṇatvam upapadyate iti—*Bhāmatī*, p. 130.

7. Vastuto vidikriyāyāḥ karmabhāvānupapatter ity arthaḥ. Aupādhikaṁ tu karmatvam aniṣṭaṁ Niyogavādinām. Yadā tu jñānaṁ kriyaiva na bhavatīty evaṁparatayā Bhāṣyam vyākhyayāte, tadā pacatītīvad jānātīti pūrvāparībhāvaprasiddhir duścikitsā syād iti-*Kalpataru,* p. 128.

8. *Kalpataru,* pp. 128–129.

9. Śravaṇaṁ hi Brahmātmani ' tat tvam asi ' vākyasya tac-chabda-śrutyādi-paryālocanayā tātparyāvagamaḥ; asya ca viṣayaviśeṣāvacchinnapratyayasyānavagame tatkartavyatvabodhāyogāt, avagame ca śravaṇasyaiva jātatvāt punaḥ kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṁ aśakyatvāt. Evaṁ mananasyāpi viṣayaviśeṣaniyata-yuktyā " locanasyā ' navagatasya kartum aśakyatvāt iti. Upāsanasyāpi yathāśravaṇa-mananaṁ pratyayāvṛtter avagame dvi-trivārāvṛtter avaśyaṁbhāvād vidhitsitārthasya jñātasya na punaḥ kartavyatvaṁ, darśanasya tv aśakyatvaṁ sphuṭam iti—*Kalpataru,* p. 130.

10. Darśanārthaṁ kartavyatvenānvaya-vyatirekāvagatān Śravaṇādīn anuvadanti vacāṁsi tadgata-prāśastya-lakṣaṇayā teṣu rucim utpādyānātma-cintāyām aruciṁ kurvanti, pravṛttyatiśayaṁ janayantīty arthaḥ.-*Kalpataru,* pp. 130–131.

11. Aupādhikaṁ tv iti-vṛttyuparāgopādhikaṁ karmatvam ity arthaḥ. Idaṁ tu parānanuguṇyān neti bhāvaḥ-*Kalpataruparimala,* p. 128.

12. *Kalpataruparimala,* p. 128.

13. *Ibid,* p. 130

14. Yuktiviśeṣālocana-vidhāne prāk tadavagamānavagamābhyāṁ prāptir vidhānāśaktiś ca. Sāmānyato yuktyālocanaṁ tu na vidheyaṁ, asambhāvanādi-nirāsarūpadṛṣṭārthatvena svata eva prāpter iti bhāvaḥ-*Ibid,* p. 130.

15. *Ibid,* pp. 130–132.

16. Vidyāsahakāriṇo maunasya bālya-pāṇḍityavad vidhir evāśrayitavyo' pūrvatvāt......yasmin pakṣe bheda-darśana-prābalyāt na prāpnoti tasminneṣa vidhir iti.–*Br. Sū. S'ā. Bh.* III; 4.47 (p.918).

17. Vidyāvān iti na vidyātiśayo vivakṣitaḥ, api tu vidyodayābhyāse pravṛtto na punar utpannavidyātiśayaḥ, tathā cāsya pakṣe kadācid bhedadarśanāt sambhava ity arthaḥ-*Bhāmati,* p.919.

18. *Kalpataru,* pp. 917–920.

19. *Kalpataruparimala,* p. 919.

20. Tisraḥ khalu vidher vidhāḥ-apūrva-vidhiḥ, niyama-vidhiḥ, parisaṁkhyā-vidhiś ceti–tatra kālatraye' pi katham apy aprāptasya prāpti-phalako vidhir ādyaḥ, yathā ' vrīhīn prokṣati '...... pakṣa-prāptasyā' prāptāṁśa-paripūraṇaphalako vidhir dvitīyaḥ–yathā ' vrīhīn avahanti ' iti........ dvayoḥ śeṣiṇor ekasya śeṣiṇi vā ekasmin śeṣiṇi dvayoḥ śeṣayor vā nityaprāptau śeṣyantarasya śeṣāntarasya vā nivṛtti-phalako vidhis tṛtīyaḥ—yathā agnicayane " Imām agṛbhṇan raśanām ṛtasya ' ity aśvābhidhānīm ādatte " iti...... *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha,* pp. 5–7 (Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, 1916).

21. *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha,* pp. 8–11 and Kṛṣṇānanda-tīrtha's *Vyākhyā* on it.

22. *Ibid,* pp. 11–15

23. *Ibid,* pp. 15–16.

24. *Ibid.* pp. 16–18

25. *Ibid,* pp. 19–21

26. *Ibid,* pp. 21–23.

27. *Ibid,* p. 23.

28. *Ibid,* pp. 24–25. See also *Advaitasiddhi,* (NSP) pp. 863–865.

29. *Ibid*, pp. 25–26.

30 *Ibid*, pp. 26–27

31. *Ibid*, pp. 27–30

32. *Ibid*, pp. 30–33

33. *Ibid*, pp. 33–39

34. *Ibid*, pp. 39–41

35. *Ibid*, pp. 42–46. Sea *Advaitasiddhi* pp. 870 (NSP)

36. See *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 866 of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay 1937).

37. See *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* of Prakāśātam, pp. 104–5 (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series).

38. *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad-Bhāṣya-vārttika*, pp. 1068–60.

39. *Śrībhāṣya*, I.I.I. (*Laghu-uttarapakṣa*).

meaningful. This is a false argument for that which is itself the cause of the misconception regarding purport cannot possibly remove it, so no other means for removal of misconception obtains and no *niyama-vidhi* is required.

And if a person is devoid of faith in Non-duality which comes only from the grace of God, then even if the sentence '*śrotavyaḥ*......' is there, he will construe the Upaniṣadic sentence while examining it according to the mode of construing acceptable to those who recognise duality, as he will interpret '*Ātmā Śrotavyaḥ*' as referring to the individual soul which is different from the Highest Self, and even a hundred *vidhis* cannot stop him from *Vedanta-vicāra* as referring to the individual soul as different from *Brahman*.

Nor is a *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi* required to exclude other operations of a mundane character. For the stoppage of mundane activities is impossible in the case of one who is not a *sannyāsin*, and for a *sannysāin* this abstinence from mundane activities already accrues from another *vidhi* enjoining renunciation along with culmination in Brahman) '*Brahma-saṁstho*' *mṛtatvam eti*'), so the *śravaṇa-vidhi*, having in view another *vidhi* enjoining renunciation and meant for teaching abstinence from other operations is useless[34].

It may be argued that even when a *vicāra-vidhi* is not possible, a *niyama-vidhi* restricting *Vedānta* as the object of *vicāra* is possible, for *bhāṣā-prabandhas* are there which require to be set aside. This argument is not proper for from the very vicinity of *Vedānta* (Upaniṣadic text) this restriction obtains and so need not be made the object of *vidhi*. One who has done the *adhyayana* of the *Veda* along with the *Aṅgas* and has cursory knowledge of *Brahman* as the Self and wants to know more, will be in search of an object of *vicāra*. The *Vedānta* texts being in his mind he will have the thought of going in for their *vicāra*; thus this restriction regarding *Vedānta* as the object of *vicāra* accrues of itself and so no *niyama-vidhi* is required for it. And even by virtue of the *niyama-vidhi* meant for the knowledge of the meaning, viz., '*Svādhyāyo*' *dhyetavyaḥ*' it is known that the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda, which arises from the *Veda* which is grasped (*gṛhita*, learnt by heart), results in a fruit, and not the knowledge produced by other causes, so this being already known, when Brahman, the meaning of the *Veda*, is to be known for the sake of eman-

cipation, the *bhāsā-prabandhas, etc.,* do not come in for consideration and so no *niyama-vidhi* is required for setting them aside.

It should not also be argued that a *vidhi* has been accepted in respect of *śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana* termed *pāṇḍitya, bālya, mauna* respectively in the *Br. Sū.* III, 4.47 (*sahakāryantara-vidhiḥ*.........) and its *Bhāṣya.* It is known even from our worldly experience that *vicāra* (i.e. *s'ravaṇa*) is the cause of the determination of the purport of that which is subjected to *vicāra,* and that *manana* of the form of application of arguments favourable to the demonstration of the thing in question (Reality of *Brahman* as *Ātman*), and *nididhyāsana* of the form of the repetition of that notion or conception are the cause of clarity in the knowledge of the thing; therefore no *vidhi* is required in respect of *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana.* '*Śrotavyaḥ...*' is therefore an *arthavāda* sentence having the appearance of a *vidhi,* and is said to be a *vidhi* inasmuch as it brings about excellence in the activity by praising it. Therefore, the followers of Vācaspati urge that since there is no injunction regarding *śravaṇa,* like the *Karmakāṇḍavicāra,* the *Brahmakāṇḍa-vicāra* also is based on the *adhyayana-vidhi* ('*svādhyāyo*' '*dhyetavyaḥ*').[35]

From the above discussions we may conclude that Śaṅkarācārya in his anxiety to set aside the stand of the Mīmāṁsakas that all statements to be meaningful must be somehow related to action,—in which case Upaniṣadic statements about the nature of the Highest Reality would not be significant unless related to some Vedic rite, or at least the act of knowledge or meditation—shows that the main concern of the *Upaniṣads* **is** *Brahma-jñāna* and *jñāna* has nothing to do with action and so cannot be enjoined. Thus, no injunction is possible in respect of knowledge which unlike *kriyā* is *vastu-tantra* and *pramāṇa-tantra* and not *puruṣa-tantra,* and therefore flashes forth of itself and is not something that can be done or not done or done otherwise. Further, Brahman is not an object of knowledge, so no injunction pertaining to knowledge having Brahman as its object could be possible. Brahman is of the nature of self-luminous *Anubhūti* (Pure consciousness) and so does not depend on any psychosis (*vṛtti*) for being illumined. *Brahma-jñāna* in the highest sense is *Brahma-rūpa jñāna,* sentiency in the form of Brahman, which is always there. Nevertheless, we hear of *brahma-jñāna* leading to emancipation. This *brahma-jñāna* or *brahma-sākṣātkara* or

brahma-aparokṣānubhūti which is a mental mode emerges from *śravaṇa* aided by *manana* and *nididhyāsana* (–though some would say it emerges from *Śabda-pramāṇa,* aided though it be by *śravaṇa, manana nididhyāsana*). This *brahma-jñāna,* a mental mode could at the most remove *ajñāna,* when Brahman shines forth in its own nature.

Thus, the discussion at the philosophical level would centre round this *brahma-jñāna* of the form of a *vṛtti* (mental mode or psychosis) which unlike *kriyā* is *pramāṇa-tantra* and *vastutantra,* but not *puruṣa-tantra* and so cannot be enjoined. This is the spirit in which Śaṅkara says that no injunction is possible in respect of knowledge. *Śravaṇa* in the sense of critical textual knowledge, *manana* in the sense of inferential knowledge and *nididhyāsana* in the sense of direct knowledge cannot be enjoined, argues Śaṅkarācārya.

Now, *śravaṇa* etc., can be understood in a two-fold sense – (*i*) knowledge (as explained), as a mental mode, in respect of which it is urged an injunction is not possible; (*ii*) mental operation of attaining the above mentioned knowledge; in this sense it is a mental act consisting of successive stages and an injunction can certainly be possible.[36]

But is it possible to establish such a cleavage between *jñāna* and *kriyā*? Of course, some sort of *jñāna* of a thing is presupposed in asking a person to see something or infer something, and it is true to some extent that you can draw his attention to the importance of the thing but not make him know and he also cannot know as he chooses. It is certainly one thing to have knowledge of a thing and another to do it. And action brings about a change in the thing operated upon. Not so knowledge which affects the knower himself. But *jñāna* is certainly preceded by some human effort and it is this processed phase of its pursuit that is also referred to by the words *śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana.* The followers of Śaṅkarācārya realised this and so changed the trend of the discussion even while having to explain the words of Śaṅkarācārya. They say that if a person has the cursory knowledge of *Brahman* from the *Svādhyāya* of the *Vedānta* which he has done, and if he has the desire to know *Brahman* he will of himself indulge in *śravaṇa,* etc., for he knows that his textual understanding in order to be precise should be based on exegetical principles and free from doubt (*śravaṇa*), that he should firmly establish the

teaching of the *Upaniṣads* in his intellect by means of reasoning so that intellectually there is no supsicion of *asaṁbhāvanā* and *viparītabhāvanā* in respect of the Highest Reality that he has known, and that a firm and steady and uninterrupted meditation which would be on the fringe of Brahma-realisation is a must in order to enable *Śabda-pramāṇa* to lead to the direct knowledge of *Brahman*. So what he knows, what is *prāpta* need not be enjoined.

Only the author of the *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa* says that an *apūrva-vidhi* is required for enjoining *śravaṇa* as it is not *prāpta* for one does not have definite knowledge that *śravaṇa* leads to *Brahma-sākṣātkāra*, the concomitance of the two is not known as certain and invariable. The problem, before him as before all, must have been that the *Upaniṣads* would not unnecessarily have in a number of cases forms ending in *liṅ*, etc which are used while enjoining something. And how far would it be justifiable to, explain them away as '*vidhicchāyāni vacanāni*'? So some sort of injunction has to be recognised. Hence the Śaṅkaraites admitted a *niyamavidhi* or a *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi* in the case of '*śrotavyaḥ*' which they interpreted as meant to restrict a person to *Vedānta-vicāra*, or to exclude other operations which are likely to intrude into the sphere of the pursuit of *Vedānta-vicāra* for *aparokṣa Brahma-jñāna*, direct knowledge of Brahman. They have mostly concentrated on *śravaṇa* in this discussion as generally *śravaṇa* equipped and aided by *manana* and *nididhyāsana* is believed to lead to *Brahmadarśana* or direct knowledge of *Brahman*. This is the confirmed view of the Vivaraṇa School.[37] Sureśvara holds that *śravaṇa* and manana repeatedly practised result in *nididhyāsana*, a stage directly antecedent to Brahma-realisation. According to him, no injunction is needed for *nididhyāsana* which emerges spontaneously and may be said to be on the fringe of Brahma-realisation.[38] It is interesting to note that according to Rāmānujacarya no injunction may be required for *śravaṇa* and *manana* but *nididhyāsana* or *dhyāna* is certainly enjoined.[39]

KUNTAKA, A REAPPRAISAL

DR. T. S. NANDI,
University School of Languages,
Gujarat University,
Navrangpura, Ahmedabad-380 009.

This paper proposes to study Kuntaka's position with reference to Ānandavardhana's theory of Dhvani. Was Kuntakā a dhvanivādin or not? My answer is both 'yes' and 'no'! To substantiate this remark a thorough reappraisal of Kuntakā is attempted here.

Kuntaka refers to 'Dhvanikāra' directly and also to his theory of dhvani through suggestion at II 9, while illustrating rūḍhi-Vaicitrya-Vakratā as in tālā jāanti guṇā...' etc., an illustration also borrowed from Ānandavardhana. Says he, "yasmātdhvanikāreṇa Vyaṅgya-Vyañjaka-bhāvo'tra sutaraṃ samarthitastat kim paunaruktyena.'* The reference speaks for itself. This makes him almost a disciple of Ānandavardhana. The whole text of his Vakrokti-Jīvita (VJ.) is replete with references to Ānanda's views. At places where he explains a number of varieties of Vakratā, he seems to give a new name to some varieties of dhvani, and he illustrates these, very often, with instances borrowed from the Dhvanyāloka. At all these places, he does not choose to refer to 'vyañjanā; the term itself he never uses, though he uses terms such as 'pratīyate', 'lokottarātiśayādhyāropaṃ garbhīkṛtya', (I. 19, p. 29) etc., Instead, he has, what he calls, 'Vicitrā abhidhā', which for him seems to include in its wider fold all śabda-vṛttis Viz. abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. He seems to concern himself with 'kavivyāpāra' taking Shape through 'vicitrā-abhidhā' or poetic expression in general. This causes a sort of ambiguity on his part so for as the clearly defined scheme of śabda-vṛttis based on the inherent difference in

*P. 83, K. Krishnamoorthy's edn. of the Vakrokti-jīvita (VJ.), published by the Karnatak University, Dharwad. Dec. 1977.-All our references are to this edn. only. This paper was read at the Vth world Sanskrit Conference held in Varanasi in Oct.'81.

nature and scope i.e. Viṣayabheda and svarūpa-bheda, is concerned. Perhaps this would place him on par with a dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra Vādin', or the so called 'antarbhāva-vādin'. He does not seem to come out openly only for 'Vyañjanā', but seems to stick to what he designates as 'vicitrā abhidhā'. But vyañjanā, and vyañjanā alone, I suppose, is the differentia, the sine qua non of a true dhvanivādin. For, without vyañjanā, the acceptance of the implicit sense, the 'pratīyamāna artha', is welcome to many, including Mahimā, perhaps the most formidable opponent of Ānanda, or any other ālaṃkārika, who may be safely deemed as an anti-dhvani theorist. An ālaṃkārika, to my mind, is a dhvanivādin in the true sense of the term, only if he accepts the implicit sense, or pratīyamāna artha, arrived at through vyañjanā and vyañjanā alone, and in no other way. The mere acceptance of the suggested sense, either as principal only or as subordinate also, does not make one a true dhvanivādin. Viewed thus, and along with the meticulous care Kuntaka takes in not mentioning 'Vyañjanā' or 'dhvani' in so many terms, should we call him a dhvanivādin ?

To add to this, Kuntaka seems to use the terms such as 'dyotya' and 'vyaṅgya' and also 'dyotaka' and 'vyañjaka' (See, vṛtti on I. 8, p.14), without showing proper discrimination. I wonder how Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy translates 'dyotaka' and 'Vyañjaka' as 'indicative' and 'suggestive', (see p.300, of his VJ., edn.'77, Karnatak Uni. publication). If by 'dyotaka' Kuntaka really means 'lakṣaka', and by 'dyotya' he means 'lakṣya then he creates further confusion with reference to the normally accepted pattern. Ānandavardhana had a neat scheme of three or four śabda-Vṛttis, based on svarūpabheda and visaya-bheda, including of course the tātparya vṛtti which is a Vākya-vṛtti. Kuntaka seems to flout this superb scheme and seems to make a mass of it, when he makes his 'Vicitrā abhidhā' at times refer to abhidhā pure and simple, at other times also to refer to either lakṣaṇā or vyañjanā without any rhyme or rhythm. All this is unpardonable from the point of view of ture dhvanivādin.

To his credit, we may say, goes the fact of many more varieties of of Vakratā or poetic expression, and a special mention may be made of the varieties grouped under 'prakaraṇa-vakrata'. But on the other hand, it is also equally true that Ānandavardhana nowhere puts a limit to the innumerable possible varieties of dhavani, and is open enough to

further admit in his fold any number of newer varieties that may prop up due to the nature of vyañjakas to be enumerated afresh by you with your resourceful and imaginative approach. In the recognition of some very charming newer varieties of vakratā, Kuntaka perhaps fills some gap left out by Ānandavardhana and further elaborates the theory, giving it a different name and thereby, just serves new wine in an old bottle. His approach to the problems of Svabhāvokti and rasavat also deserves further and fuller discussion. If Kuntaka were thoroughly a dhvanivādin as Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy would like us to believe, he need not have written a treatise in the way he has done. He would have perhaps chosen to follow a track such as one followed by the great Vāgdevatāvatāra Mammaṭa, or by the greater still, Panditarāja Jagannātha. But with a full awareness on his part of his inability to do away with vyañjanā totally, he chooses a different track of the so-called 'vicitrā abhidhā' and the So-called 'vakropti' which drags him into deeper waters never to be pulled out from ! If later writers pay him any attention, it is to the extent he falls in line with Ānandavarshana.

All this, and perhaps also a tendency to verbosity in his otherwise lucid' and flowing style, makes him a lesser name to be ranked below the great names of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Appayya, Jagannatha and perhaps even Ruyyaka, who though he treats only alaṃkāras in his Alaṃkarasarvasva, is otherwise every inch a dhvanivādin. True, Kuntaka is loaded, perhaps infatuated with Ānandavardhana, whom he follows at so many places, now borrowing phrases after phrases, or now borrowing illustrations after illustrations to explain his varieties of Vakrokti, which are, very often, but new labels given to some varieties of dhvani. Actually, in his special moments he refers to vyañjanā, but without making a direct mentioning of the term. But he errs only when he equates some charming illustrations of vyañjanā with those of abhidhā, perhaps equally exquisite from his point of view, and dumps them all on equal footing under the banner of Vakrokti. For him. varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā and rūḍhi vaicitrya vakratā stand on the same footing and this sounds fantastic to to a follower of dhvani. But all the same, virtually he turns out to be, so to say, a Super-dhvanivādin in the sense that he seems to be all drunk with Ānandavardhana. At times he is only revoicing what the great master has said earlier : anuraṇan sphuṭayati kāvyālokam, as it were, in the same

way as done by Abhinavagupta. He perhaps makes an effort to liberalise poetry from the network of vyañjanā. For him vyañjanā is only a cog in the wheel, a part of his wider scheme of Vakratā or poetic expression, which embraces in its fold abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, all alike. His vicitra abhidhā is a pre-condition for poetry and for this he is prepared to sacrifice the well-defined scheme of Ānandavardhana, resulting in the recognition of dhvani, guṇībhūtavyaṅgya and citra. Perhaps he refuses to accept the casteist approach of the dhvanivādin, wherein abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā remain in a way strictly separate. His vicirā abhidhā is a field where all vṛttis mingle and merge with one another. Thus, he fills up gaps left out by Ānandavardhana and perhaps goes ahead of him. But to class all vakratā on the same footing is something a true dhvanivādin can never never forgive, and for this he may be placed outside the loyalist class of dhvanivādins. True, he has gone into subtler details and has labelled many charms exclusive to the fold of so-called abhidhā alone, but to equate a charm belonging to the vācyavācaka level with the one operating at vyaṅgyavyañjaka level is a crime in the eyes of a dhvanivādin and the crime can never escape punishment. The whole point is unthinkable from the point of view of a true dhvanivādin. There are aesthetes and aesthetes who may pick up a never ending quarrel over this, but, by and large, Kuntaka may be taken as a 'praśiṣya' of a 'mahāguru' whom he forsakes for an untrodden track of his own ! And for exactly this, we may not blame Kuntaka but love him all the more, for he is a lone traveller, uncompromising in a way, trying to get out of the Vyañjanā, inhibition and arriving at a more practicable, more pragmetic solution of literary beauty.

Thus, Ānandavardhana suggested, a tri-varga vyavasthā, so to say, or perhaps a caturvarga vyavasthā ' as suggested by Jagannātha, which is smashed and put aside by Kuntaka to promote a 'classless' or 'casteless' pattern, so to say, in the field of literary criticism. But alas, the 'cāturvarṇya' of the dhvanivādin, as it was firmly saddled on 'guṇa (karma) Vibhāga,' held out firmly in the minds of many aesthetes and Kuntaka's voice is lost in wilderness without finding followers and he dies a martyr's death as a lone champion of his cause. He does not seem to be a leader cast in the mould of Ānandavardhana, the greatest, but a path-seeker guided by the light of his inner conviction.

All this is spelt out in greater details with all the necessary references from Vakrokti-Jīvita, in this paper.

Now we will try to examine Kuntaka (=K.)'s views on various aspects of poetry. Herein we will follow the sequence of his Vakroktijīvita (=VJ.) In VJ. I.2 (p.2), he promises to offer 'a fresh study of poetry, like an added ornament to it'. Needless to say that he uses the word 'alaṃkāra' in a wider contest to designate the whole work itself wherein topics like simile and the like form its subject matter. Actually a critical appreciation of poetic beauty is his goal. For him, the word 'alaṃkāra', in this wider context signifies 'poetic beauty' and 'kāvya' or 'poetry its the 'alaṃkarya'[1] For him, 'kāvya', or 'poetry' is kaveh karma, i.e. poet's activity. So, whatever carries the stamp of being the result of a poet's activity is poetry for K. K. thus places the concept of poetry on a very broad base, perhaps intending to include everything beginning with abhidhā and ending with Vyañjanā under the same banner, provided it turns out to be a genuine 'kavi-karma'. So for him 'kāvya' is a 'solid, compact, whole' in itself; an abstraction revealed through the medium of signs called letters. It is, so to say,' akhaṇḍa-buddhi-samāsvādya'. It is incapable of any analysis, because it is of the nature of synthesis. So, when you discuss of 'poetry'. and 'pactic beauty', it is only an academic matter. The supreme reality in poetry is having an innate poetic beauty which cannot be thought of separately. He observes[2] (on I. 6): "The truth is this. Poetry is the work of a poet wherein the undivided whole of 'adorned' and the 'adornment' is the reality. Therefore it is clear that poetry is the name of what is adorned and the question of super-adding ornaments to pre-existing poetry, does not arise". (Trans. K. K. p. 292). We can compare this with Ānanda's observation on alaṃkāras when he says that when properly delineated alaṃkāras are never ectraneous.[3]

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1. *Vṛtti on I.* 2 (*p.* 2) : alaṃkāro vidhīyate, alaṃkaraṇam kriyate, pasya kāvyasya. kaveḥ karma kāvyaṃ, tasya.

2. *Vṛtti on I.* 6 (*p.* 6) : tadayamatra paramārthaḥ-sālalṃkārasyālaṃkaraṇa sahitasya sakalasya nirastāvayavasya sataḥ. Samudāyasya kāvyatā kavikarmatvam. tenālaṃkṛtasya kāvyatvamiti sthitaṃ, na punaḥ kāvyāsyālaṃkāra yogaḥ, tii.

3 Vṛtti, on Dhvanyāloka (Dhv.) II. 16, p. 60 edn. K. K., 74—tasmānna tesaṃ bahiraṅgatvaṃ rasābhivyaktau.

K. seems to follow Ānanda in his broad concept of poetry when he says that both word and sense taken together enshined in a style revealing the artistic creativity of the poet on one hand and giving aesthetic delight to man of taste on the other (I.7) He wants that both word and sense are to be of a peculiar nature. The expression or word and content or thought or meaning should both be charming and so to say, 'made for each other'. "Thus, thought, though striping in itself, will be no better than a corpse when it is not embodied in an adequately striking word. In the same way, a word which does not have an adequate thought-content but which expresses something irrelevant, is to be deemed as a "disease of the poem !" (Trans. K. K., p. 296)[4]. This again smells of Ānanda's observation on Dhv. I. 8, wherein he holds that only the implicit sense and word having capacity to suggest the same deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet.[5] K. almost follows Ānanda, without conditioning his word and sense by vyañjanā alone. He seems to develop an independent approach which is not vyañjanā-biased. But he does not go further as we will go to observe, and all his tall talk about Vakratā peters out into this or that variety of dhvani based on vyañjanā alone. By mere throwing away the terminology or just by replacing an old one by a new one, you don't gain much. Exactly this happens in case of K., who can not totally tear himself away from Ānanda's terminology and at times seems to confuse the orginal clear concepts of Ānanda. For example, he makes a mess of things when he observes that words are both 'dyotaka' and 'vyñjaka', without drawing a line of demarcation between the two.[6] We have observed earlier that we are not satisfied with Dr. K. K.'s translation (on p. 300) in this respect when he writes : One might object that the indicative and suggestive words too which have their own signification may yet be termed 'word' and the above statement would illustrate the fallacy of "two narrow". Our reply is that they

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4 Vṛtti. on VJ. I. 7, p. 13 : tathā cārthaḥ samartha vācaka sadbhāve svātmanā sphurannapi mṛtakalpa evavatiṣṭhate. śabdo'pi vakyopayogi vācya saṃbhave Vacyāntaravācakaḥ san vākyasya vyādhi-bhūtah pratibhāti.

5 Vṛtti, Dhv. I. 8, (p. 14, 16) : sa vyañgyórthastadvyakti sāmarthyayogī sabdaścha kas'cana, na sarvah, tāveva s'abdārthau mahākaveḥ pratyabhijñevau.
—Dr. K. Krishnamoorty

6 Vṛtti, on VJ. I. 8 (P. 38) : nanu ca dyotaka Vyañjakāvapi s'abdau saṃbhavataḥ, etc....evaṃ dyotya-vyañgyayorthayoḥ pratyeyatvasāmānyāt.

are expressive words by implication, the metaphorical application being based on their similarity with denotative words. Similarly, the meanings alluded to..." It is clear that for all those who understand Sanskrit poetics, the words 'dyotya' and 'vyaṅgya' and the words 'dyotaka' and 'vyañjakā' are synonyms and K. cannot mean 'lakṣya' and 'lakṣaka' by them. So. it is clear confusion on K'.s part. It is one thing not to accept Ānanda, but it is quite another to misquote or misrepresent. K. here seems to do the latter.

K. can also be charged of an added crime when he extends to connotation of 'vācakatva' so as to include even the 'vyañjakatva' of Ānanda. Normally, one can choose a different track. But in case of K. who almost looks a disciple of Ānanda, this looks quite unworthy. He does this when on I. 9 he observes that,[7] the proper definition of 'signification' is that capacity to concey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet'. (Trans K. K., p. 302). This is criminal if one chooses to call oneself a follower of Ānanda. Actually the whole paragraph here is only a sort of paraphrase of Ānanda's "tau s'abdārthau mahākaveḥ", but not in the way Ānanda does. And all this, with the full knowledge of the terminology made current oy Ānanda, looks unpardonable. K. knows what 'dyotayanti' means when he observes on verse no. 28 (p. 16), Viz.,' saṃrambhaḥ karikiṭa' etc., that, "the adjective 'trivial' qualifying 'enterprise' reinforces the low stature of the common lions and thus adds to the force of the intended thought." (Trans. K. K., p.303).[8] Similar is the use of the word 'vyakti' when on verse no. 29, under I. 9.K observes that, 'tasya ca tadāhlāda-sāmarthyaṃ saṃbhāvyate yena kācideva svabhāva-mahattā rasaparipoṣāṅgatvaṃ vā Vyaktimāsādayati. Here also K does not mention 'vyañjanā' by name. In a similar vein, K. explains the suggestivity of the word 'muniḥ' in illustration no. 31,

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7 Vṛtti, on I. 9 (p. 16) : Kavi-vivakṣita-vis'eṣābhihāna-kṣamatva m eva vācakatva-lakṣanam......Vivaksā vidheyatvenābhidheyatā padavīmava-tarantaṣta thā vidha-viśeṣa-pṛatipādana-samarthenābhidhīyāmānā.

8. *Vṛtti, on I.9, verse* 28, (*p.*16) : hevakasya leśa-śabdābhidhānenā-lpatā--Pratipattirityete *vivakṣītaikārtha-vācakatvaṃ dyotayanti.*

under I.9.[9] Here also vayñjanī is not alluded to. On verse 32, he offers some criticism wherein words such as 'dyotyate' and 'dyotayati',[10] are used only in the normally accepted sense of 'suggestion', but here too he overlooks the mentioning of vyañjanāvṛtti. He uses even 'bhaṇyate', in the sense of 'dyotyate' or 'vyajyate' here.[11] K. is out to smash the perfectly evloved torminology of Ānanda. He explains the suggested sense of the whole expression with the words : 'tadayaṃ atra vākyārthaḥ' (p. 19). This 'vākyārtha' is 'vyaṅgyārtha', pure and simple, without being designated as such.

K. raises a fresh problem at I.10, (p.20), when he observes : "Both these are the 'adorned'. Their adornment consists in the poetic pr cess known as 'artistic turn of speech'... Let us sum it up once again : apparently, words and meanings both have their distinct existence in poetry and come to be adorned by something different from themeselves. The fact of the matter is that the very process of poetic utterance is constituted by the artistic turns assumed by words and meanings. The po.tic process itself, in this sense, is the real ornamentation. For it is extremely delighting in itself This shall ergage our attention more when we consider the concept of artistic beauty further on." (Trans. K. K., p. 306)[12] True, even Ānanda suggested that no ornamentation could be 'bahiraṅga' or 'external'

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9. *Vṛtti, on I.9, verse* 30, *p.*18 : atra kósau munīriti paryāyapadamātre vaktavye parama-kāruṇikasya niṣāda-nirbhinnaśakuni-sandarśanamātra-samutthitaḥ śokah ślokatvamabhajata yasyeti tasya tadavasthajanakarājaputrī-dasā-darśana-vivaśa vṛtte-rantaḥ karaṇa-parispandaḥ, karuṇa-rasa-paripoṣāṅgatayā sahṛdaya-hṛdayāhlāda-kārīkaverabhipretaḥ.

10. *Vṛtti, on* I.9; *verse* 32, *p.*18 : hṛdaya-nihitādapi suhṛttva-vihitaṃ sāvadhānatvaṃ *dyotyate*...ambhvāha–nityātmanaḥ tatkāritābhidhānaṃ *dyotayati.*

11. *Vṛtti, on I.9; verse* 32*; p.* 19: abalāśabdenātra tatpreyasī-virahavaidhuryā sahaivaṃ *bhaṇyate.*

12. *Vṛtti, on I.*12,10,*p.*20 :

"ubhāvetā-valaṃkāryau tayoḥ punaralaṃkṛtiḥ,
vakroktireva vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhaṇitirucyate".

......"tadidamatra tātparyaṃ—yat śabdārthau pṛthagavasthitau na kenā'pi vyatiriktenālaṃkaraṇena yojyete, kintu vakratā-vaicitryayogitayā bhidhānamevānayoralaṃkāraḥ, tasyaiva śobhātiśayakāritvāt. etacca vakratā-vyākhyānā vasara eva udāhariṣyate.

if properly executed by the poet: Poetic beanty is inharent in poetry, and the 'whole' is born and enjoyed. But when you analyse the poetic beauty, you must have a scheme to support your observations and the whole analogy of 'śarīra' or 'body' and 'soul' or 'ātman' of poetry walks in. For Ānanda, it is easy to explain when he regards 'dhvani', particularly 'rasa-dhvani' as the 'soul' of poetry and 'word and sense'—śabdārthau', forming its body. On III. 33, in the Dhv., Ānanda discusses this 'Jīva-śarīra-vyavahāra'. And in a way, this scheme is very helpful in understanding poetic beauty which in itself is only 'amūrta' or abstract or conceptual. For K., the position becomes rather difficult when at this stage if a question is raised as to the exact position of 'rasa' in his scheme. True, he has, as we will go to observe, tried to incorporate the inummerable shades of rasa and bhāva in his different types of vakratā, but then these vakratās seem to get mixed up with one another rather than shine out independently as clear sub-varieties. And, once again, if 's'abdārthau' are 'alaṃkāryam, should we call him a 'dehātmavādin'? I for myself won't grudge it, and surely it is not a bad name either!

One more question. If only 'vakrokti' is an alaṃkara, of course inherently connected with a poem, then what about 'svabhāvokti'? Is not 'svabhāvokti', if taken in the normal connotation of the term given to it by practically all the ālaṃkārikas, in itlself a variety of K.'s Vakrokti? K.S' own concept of svabhāvokti seems to refer only to the basic subject matter as it is. But 'svabhāvokti' as divined by others is not a bare statement, the 'vārtā of Bhāmaha, but a poetic expression of an object or its very normal activities. Actually no bare statement of fact has ever any entry in the realm of genuine poetry. And, a poetic expression, say charged with K'.s vakrokti, concerning such objects an activity of a child, and the like, could as much be taken as an alaṃkāra in the limited sense of the term; e.g. the limited sense in which an expression deserving similarity or upamā is designated an alaṃkāra. So, it seems that the whole criticism of K. against svabhāvokti being taken as an alaṃ-kāra is misdirected. If, for the sake of an agrument we accept either 'saṃkara' or 'saṃsṛṣṭi' (VJ. I 14,15, p.22) as argued by K., even then the case for 'svabhāvokti' is not ruled out. Any other alaṃkāra can also find an entry in a 'saṃkara' or a 'saṃsṛṣṭi' without losing its independent

status as an alaṃkāra. This patters out only in an effort by K. to look smart in the eyes of others !

Under I. 16, (p.23), K. takes great pains to carve out the exact nature of ' sāhitya ', which is not mere coming together of word and sense, which is found to be even in the ordinary walk of life. Says he, " The point, however, is that here in poetry we are not alluding to the well-known intimate relationship invariably characterising word and meaning.[13] Perhaps the same point is hinted at by Ānanda in his dhv.I.8, and the vṛtti thereon, where it is observed that a first-rate poet has to strive for that particular meaning and that rare word only. Says he[14], " that meaning " refers to the implicit and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it ' points out that it is not any and every word (recorded in dictionary). Such a word and such a meaning—only these two deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet. " (Trans. K. K., p. 15). K. unlike Ānanda, has no special bias for the ' suggested ' only, but the whole approach carries an influence of the great predecessor. Ānanda's position is safer with his three-fold classification of poetry into ' dhvani ', guṇībhūtavyaṅgya ', and ' citra ', which becomes 'uttama ', madhyama ' and ' adhama ' ;— terms, which Ananda has refrained from using, but his illustrious follower, vāgdevatāvatāra Mammaṭa, has managed to make current and popular. But for K., poetry is either genuine poetry or no poetry at all ! you cannot classify poetry or poetic effort into various categories. But the experience of the aesthetes world over, and for centuries, has something to more in favour of Ānanda then K.

Here, and perhaps at many other places K.'s style becomes porlix or verbose and we need not quote instances to prove the case[15]. Ānanda never does it; never K. seems to have passionately fallen in love with the words ' spanda ' and ' parispanda ' which are very often left out in translation by

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13. *vṛtti, on* 1, 16: *p.* 23: Satyaṃ etat, kintu na vācya-vācaka-lakṣaṇa-śaśvata-saṃbandha-nibandhanaṃ vastutaḥ sāhityaṃ ityucyate.

14. *vṛtti, on dhv. I.*8;*p.*14: sa vyangyo'rthastadvyakti-sāmarthyayogī s'abdas'ca kas'cana, na sarvaḥ, tāveve s'abdārthau mahākaveh pratyabhijneyau.

15. *vṛtti, on I.*16; *p.*28: tadadya sarasvatī-hṛdayāravinda-makaranda-bindu- sandoha-sund-arāṇām Satkavi-vacasāṃ antarāmoda-manoharatvena parisphurat etat sahṛdaya ṣaṭ-caraṇa-gocaratāṃ nīyate.

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy.[16] Quoting illustrations need not detain us, as they are self-evident and quite in abundance. K. once again seems to refer to Ānanda's 'vyaṅgyārtha', when in verse no.38, he observes that 'vakrokti' is, that which is relished in its entirety without distinction of word and sentence import after the initial grasp of primary meanings, even like the unique savour of a sweet drink by men of taste. (Trans. K.K., p.313) there is another reading viz. 'pada-vāpyārtha-varjatam, which leads straight to the suggested sense alone.

K.'s classification of vakratā is broadly hiuted at in I.18 as six-fold, each having many sub-varieties. We will go to see that all these varieties carry undisputable stamp of Ānanda's classification of dhvani.

K. enumerates the first three varieties of vakaratā as varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratva, pada-pūrvardha-vakratā and pratyaya-vakratā, in I.19 (p.26) We will observe that whatever charm is pointed out here is due to the suggested sense alone and we may say : 'nāmāntara-karaṇena tu kiyad-idaṃ pā-ḍityam ?' Simply by giving a new name, the thing is itself does not change. K. has relied so much on Ānanda that very often he borrows words or phrases from his master i.e. Ānanda. The word, 'prasiddha-prasthana-vyatireki' in the vṛtti on I. 18, is an instance in point. On I.19, K., while explaining 'varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā' observes :[18] "Here we see a perfect instance of abounding verbal beauty brought about solely by the poet's skill in the arrangement of syllables. This skill in verbal arrangement itself is well recognised even by the ancient theorists under the term 'Alliteration !"(Trans. K. K. p.314) It reflects but poorly on K.'s thinking if he tries to equate this variety of vakratā, a mere s'abda-citra, with anyother vakratā which may look charged with the suggested sense. It is unthinkable to put all varieties of vakratā on equal footing. But perhaps it is exactly this point where K. has drawn his dagger to stab Ānanda.

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16. See K.K.'s translation of verse no. 26, on p.312. The whole paragraph can be read with interest.

17 Verse 38, p. 26 : Vācyāvabodha-niṣpattau padavākyrātha-jivītam, yatkimapyarpayatyantaḥ pānakāsvādavatsatām.

18 Vṛtti, on I.19, p.27 : ...atra varṇavinyāsa-vakratā mātra-vihitaḥ śabda-sobhātis'ayaḥ sutaraṃ samunmīlitaḥ, etadeva varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratvaṃ cirantanes'u anuprāsa iti prasiddham.

K. proceeds to explain pada-pūrvardha vakratā on p. 27, under I.19.[19] He observes : 'Art in the base form of substantives' : words may be nouns or verbs. Their crude form will be either base or root. In their usage by the poet there is scope for artistic skill. In fact, this admits of various forms. when a word in common usage is employed so as to include an attribution of associate meanings other than the primary one, we have the first variety, eg.—Rāma I am, and can bear every mishap'." (Trans. K.K., p.314). Then he illustrates the second variety where a proper noun is employed in such a way that it involves an attribution of the extar-ordinary speciality of the feature under description in the sentence primarilly. Art in the use of synonym is also illustrated. All these instances are borrowed from Ānanda, without an open acceptannce of vyañjanā. And therefore all sounds unconvincing.

Again, in the illustration, viz, 'rāmo'smi sarvaṃ sahe,' K. observes that here there is attribution of associate meanings other than the primary one : 'vācya-prasiddha-dharmāntarā dhyāropa-garbhatvena nibandhaḥ'. This observation is also far from exact. Here what happens is not the attribution—adhyāropa–of another meaning which is not the primary one, for in that case it would be just lakṣaṇā. Actually here the second sense arrives even when the primary sense continues. They Co-exist like an object and a lamp that illumines it. Ānanda has ruled out the case of a mere secondary sense or lakṣyārtha which seems to be hinted at by K. Mammaṭa has utilized the same illustrations for the establishment of vyañjanā, independent of lakṣanā here. So, K., while citing the second illustration, ciz., rāmo'sau etc. (verse no 43, p.27), when he observes that this involves an attribution of the extra-ordinary speciality of the feature under description— lokottarātiśayādhyāropaṃ garbhīkṛtyo-panibandhaḥ'—he almost suggests that there is the suggested meaning or 'vyaṅgyārtha' cencealed in a given statement. 'garbhīkṛtya' hints directly at Ānanda's implicit sense. And for this Ānanda has vyañjanā Vṛtti, while K. gropes in darkness in flouting this clear-cut

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19 Vṛtti, on I.19 ; p.27 : pada-pūrvardha-vakratā-padasya subantasya tiṅgantasya vā vakra-bhāvo vinyāsa-vaicitryam tatra ca bahavāḥ prakārāḥ sambhavanti. yatra rūdhi-s'abdasyaiva prastāvasamucitatvena vācya-prasiddha-dharmāntarādhyā ropa-garbhatvena nibandhah, sa pada-pūrvārdha-vakrātayaḥ prathamaḥ prakaraḥ. yathā, Rāmo'smi sarvaṃ sahe. (82).

scheme as laid down by Ānanda. K. again has no fixed and clear expression, for in one case he has, 'lokottarātiśayādhyāropaṃ garbhī-kṛtya', and in the next breath he has 'lokottara-S'auryādi-dharmātiśayā-dhyāropa- paratvena'.

K. goes to illustrate further how out of a number of synonyms possible, only that is chosen which is especially significant in the context, e.g., 'vamaṃ kajjalavat...' etc. (verse, 44, p.28). Now, this illustration runs parallel to the one in which 'papālinaḥ' is kreferred and 'pinākinaḥ' rejected by Kālidāsa. Here also there is charm caused by vyañjanā, without mentioning the same. Again, it is unthinkable to put 'varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā' and this 'paryāya-vakratā' on the same footing. K. observes that, "this artistic use of synonyms is also found to include hints of even features Which are conceivably no parts of literal meanings." (Trans. K.K., p.315)[20]. This again is vyañjanā, pure and simple, Needless to say that the illustrations viz., 'aṅgarāja senāpate....' (verse no. 45 p. 28), etc., also contain 'vyaṅgyā rtha', which is the only source of charm.

The upacāra-vakratā variety of prabandha-prūvardha vakratā wherein the charm is caused by metaphor[21] is nothing else but 'lakṣaṇā-Vila sita' i.e. the charm is caused due to lakṣaṇa or indication. In 'nikārakaṇika', 'hatstavaceyaṃ yaśaḥ' etc., the charm lies in lakṣaṇā or indication, and then in the ultimate suggestion of 'stokatva or 'slightness', 'bahutva', etc. Similarly, expressions like 'billowy', which primarily apply to liquids, when they are serging with waves, are often found in poetic tradition to apply even to solids, only on the basis of general similarity.

Viśeṣaṇa-vakratva or 'beauty in epithets', is also a variety of 'pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā' or 'art in the base form of substantives wherein art or beauty springs from the significance of epithets only. This again, we may say, is a charm due to yañjanā. The illustration, viz., vrīḍāyogānnatavadanayā etc., is borrowed straight from Ānanda[22].

20. *vṛtti, on I.* 19 ; *p.* 28 ; etacca paryāya-vakratvaṃ vācyāsaṃbhavi-dharmāntara-garbhīkāre..āpi paridṛśyate.

21. *Vṛtti, on I.* 19 ; *p.* 28 ; Yatrāmūrtasya vastunaḥ mūrtadravyābhidhāyinā S'abdenābhidhānaṃ upacārāt.

22. *Vṛtti, on dhv. III.* 4 ; *p.* 116 : padāvayavena dyotanaṃ yathā, 'vrīḍayogat...' etc.

'Saṃvṛtivakratva' or 'beauty of concealed expression', is also a variety of 'pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā,' wherein the nature of an object endowed with a unique loveliness in its peculiar setting. which cannot be conveyed clearly in a direct way, is conveyed by a concealed expression rich in suggestive force.[23] This is pure vyañjanā. K. calls it 'vicitrā abhidhā' in both the cases which as those of 'sākṣāt abhidhā' and also 'asākṣāt abhidhā'. This perhaps may lead us to brand him as a dīrgha-dirghatarābhidhavādin, or a 'tātpara vādin' like dhanañjaya! But after studying Ānanda, it is unthinkable not to accept difference in śabda-vṛttis even in the presence of 'viṣayabheda' and 'svarūpabheda' i.e. difference in nature and scope.

The illustration, viz. nidrā-nimīlita-dṛśaḥ', etc. (verse no 51, p.30), has a word viz. 'dhvananti' which means 'vyañjayanti' pure and simple, but K. does not explicitly accept it. In the absence[24] of a clear acceptance of vyañjanā, how can we call K. a dhvanivādin? We may call him a 'vicitrābhidhā-vādin', or this. that and every thing else but a dhvanivādin, for he does not openly accept the scheme of Ānanda. We will go to observe that under II, 9, while discussing rūḍhi-vaicityra-vakratā (on p. 83), K. clearly refers to the Dhvanikāra and his 'vyangya-vyañjakābhā and adds that it is duely and ably established there and therefore need not be re-established here. This shows he works under Ānanda's spell and fully conscious of it and yet tries to cut a new track and evolve new terminology. But he lands himself in a hopeless situation when he equates all types of vakratās, which are but names for different titles given by Ānanda, under one banner and on equal footing and thereby belying the experience of the aesthetes.

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23. *Vṛtti on I.* 19 ; *p.* 30 : ayamaparaḥ pada-pūrvārdha-vakratāyāḥ prakāro yadidaṃ saṃvrti-vakratvaṃ nāma-yatra padārthasvarūpaṃ prastāvānuguṇyena kenāpi nikarṣeṅotkaṣeṇa vā yuktaṃ vyaktatayā Sākṣād, abhidhātuṃ aśakyaṃ S'aṃvṛti-sāmarthyopayogitayā śabdenābhidhīyate.

24. *vṛtti, on I.*19, ; *p.*30 : atra kimapīti tadākarṇana vihitāyāś cittacamatkṛteranubhavaika-gocaratva lakṣaṇa-mavyapades'yatvaṃ pratipādyate. tānītit at–havidhānubhava viśiṣṭatayā smaryamāṇāni. nāpyartha-vantīti svasaṃvedyatvena vyapadeś'āviṣayatvaṃ prakāśyate. teṣāṃ ca na ca yāni nirarthakānī-tyalankika-camatkāra-kāritvādapārthakatvaṃ nivārya triṣvapi eteṣu viśeṣaṇa-vakratvaṃ pratīyate.

That K. is absolutely conscious about Ānandas theory is very clear when he uses terms such as ' pratīyate ', ' pratipādyate ', ' prakāsyate ', etc., in the sense of ' vyajyate ' only. Then why does he grudge the use of 'vyajyate ' or ' vyañjanā ' or ' dhvani ' ? It he is a clean follower of Ānanda, he should have made a clear statement to this effect, as is done by the great Mammata and Ācārya Hemachandra who follow the of Abhinavagupta who himself in his turn does not make a secret of his being a follower of Ānanda And, in that case, K. need not have attempted this sort of a treatise at all.[25]

We have noted earlier that K'.s use of ' pratīyate ' is eqiuvalent to ' vyajyate '. Now, he deals with ' vṛtti.vaicitrya-vakratva ', once again a further variety of ' pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā ', (on p. 31), wherein he finds beauty in the speciality of linguistic structure. Out of a number of possibilities of linguistic structure like compounds, poets are seen to prefer only a few with a view to their speciality.[26] The illustrations reveal a mixed beauty of both expression pure and simple, and also suggestion. similar is the case with his yet another variety of 'pada-purvardha-vakratā ', viz., ' liṅga-vaicitrya-vakratvaṃ ' where we have ' speciality in gender. '[27] At times the poet pitched upon only the feminine form of a word because of its tenderness, though it admits of other genders (Trans. K. K. p. 318). All this is beauty of pure expression coloured with beauty of suggestion. Similarly, his ' kriyā-vaicitra-vakratva ' is beauty in speciality of verbs, where poets offer usage full of charm brought about by artistic expression while describing the speciality in verbs. All this is beauty of pure expression tinged with that of suggestion as well. The illustration cited is ' ratikeli ' etc. (verce no. 58, p.32) wherein the verb ' jayati ' occurs. K. observes that here, the verb ' jayati ' i.e. ' triumphs ', has a striking beauty. Then he quotes an illustration which forms the famous maṅgala-śloka of the Dhvanyāloka, viz., 'svecchā-kesarinah ' etc., in which observes K., the poet has attributed a

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25. *Vṛtti, on I.* 19 ; p. 31 : ' triṣvapyeteṣu viseṣaṇa-vakratvaṃ pratiyate

26. *vṛtti, on I.* 19; p. 31 yatra samāsādivṛttināṃ kaṣāṃcid vicitrāṇāmeva kavibhiḥ parigrahaḥ kriyate. (trans. K.K.p. 317).

27. *vṛtti, on I.* 19; *p.* 31 : aparaṃ liṅga-vaicitryam nāma pada-pūrvārdha-vakratāyāḥ prakārāntaraṃ dṛśyate. yatra bhinnaliṅgānāmapi śabdānāṃ vaicitryāya sāmānādhikaraṇyopanibandhaḥ

unique activity, viz., the cutting away of the woes of devotees which is so different from [8] their cutting activity well-known to the people. But here also, the charm is caused by the suggestion it contains. So also, in the illustration drawn from Ānanda, and also in the illustration viz. 'Karṇotpaladala' etc., (p.33). At all these places, K. avoids any mentions of vyañjanā directly.

Then K. treats 'pratyaya-vakratā, '(p.33). with all its varieties. It is clear that in many of these the special charm is due more to the element of suggestivity. K. illustrates them and tries to bring out the source of beauty which for him is either due to 'saṅkyā-vaicitrya', or 'kāraka-vaicitrya', or 'puruṣa-vaicitrya', It is needless to say that all these charming expressions look all the more charming by virtue of the touch of suggestivity in them. Otherwise, it pure expression is equated with and placed on the same footing as an expression containing charms of suggestion, then this certainly is no doing of a ture dhvanivādin, and it is in this sense that K.'s position can be questioned.

After discussing these varieties, K.goes to observe that only a few important forms of artistic beauty have been presented here to sreve as examples. But thousands of them [9] are possible in the plentiful usage of master-poets and they mey be discovered by men of taste on their own. Ānanda also has passed the same remark.

Under I.20, (p.35) K. treats vākya-vakratā and tries to subsume all alaṇkāras here under. Ānanda has placed them under guṇ.bhūta-vyaṅgya, but in K. all 'vakratā' is of an identical nature, and has to placed on the same footing. This is exactly where he violates the fundamentals of the dhvanivāda. The 'Vākya-vakratā' is illustrated (verse no. 70, p.36) in 'upasthitāṃ pūrvaṃ upasya' etc. Actually this can very well serve as an illustration of vastu-dhvani which is not named as such by K. On the contrary K. wants to put this under the same banner which also covers all the point arthālaṃkāras.

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28. *vṛtti on I* 19; *p.* 32 : atra nakhānāṃ sakala-loka-prasiddhacchedana-vyatirekī-kimapyapūrvameva prapannarti-ccheda-lakṣaṇam kriyā-vaicitryaṃ upanibaddhams- could K. have read locana ?

29 *vṛtti, on I.* 19 ; (*p.* 35) : etc ca mukhyatayā vakratā-prakārāḥ katicinnidars'anārthaṃ pradarsitāḥ, S'iṣṭās'ca sahasras'aḥ saṃbhavanti iti mahākavipravāhe sahṛdayaiḥ svayamevotprekṣaṇīyāḥ.

K. treats of 'prakaraṇa-vakratā' or beauty of section', and 'prabandha-vakratā' or 'beauty of work', in I.21. We know that Ānanda has already discussed the 'prabandha-vyañjakatva' and it is clear that here too, K. derives his inspiration from Ānanda. K. promises to discuss in greater details the six-fold vakratā in due course. But here we will repeat once again that the 'prakaraṇa-vakratā' and 'prabandha-vakratā' are but shades of Ānanda's vyañjanā. The illustration from kirāta is an instance in point.[30]

Then K. proceeds to discuss the nature of 'bandha' or 'diction'. under I.22 (p. 35). While dealing with 'sukumarā-mārga' (I.25–29) K. observes that this style is such which master poets follow like beas roving along the grove of full-blown blossom. (Trans. K. K'. p.329) He further observes that by this simile the author intends to suggest elegance about the style which is comparable to the natural loveliness of flowers (Trans K. K'. p. 330). The word used here is 'dyotyate'[31] which exactly means 'vyajyate'. The illustration viz., 'pravṛddhatāpaḥ etc., (p. 88), has an element of suggestivity. Says he : "The words, 'heated up' and 'glender', are so used as to bring out essentially the charming nature of the two and cannot directly signify any other shade of meaning. But the poet's artistic skill has succeeded in making them fit for signifying the other meaning also by keeping them in tune with it ; and this compels admiration from critics." (Trans. K. K'. p. 330)[32] All this comes very close to cases wherein multiple meaning is restricted to one particular meaning and later on with the help of vyañjanā the suppressed meaning again comes to surface.

K'. concept of 'lāvaṇya' (I.32, p. 49) and 'ābhijātya' (I.33,p.50) could hardly be distinguished separately from pure varṇa-dharmas and

30 *vrtti, on* 21, p. 39 : yathā vā kirātarjun ye kirāta-puruṣo–krāntam. vastutaḥ punah arjunena saha *tatparyartha-paryalocana-ya* vigraho vākyārthataṃ nitaḥ.

31 *vrtti, on I.* 29 ; *p.* 44 : Vikasita-kusuma-kānana-sāmyena tasya kusuma-sankumārya–Sadṛs'aṃ ābhijātyaṃ dyotyate.

32 *vrtti. on I.* 29 ; p. 44 : tathā ca pravṛddhatāpaḥ' 'tanvī' iti vācakan sunder-svabhāva-mātra-samarpaṇa-paratvena vartamānau arthāntara-prat ty-anurodha-paratvena pravṛttiṃ na sammanyete, kavi-vyakta-kaus'ala–samullsi-tasya puraḥ prakarāntarasya pratitau ānuguṇya-mātreṇa tadvidāhlāda-kāritāṃ pratipadyete.

s'abda-dharmas, i.e. qualities of letters and words. It is just that, pure and simple. Under I.33, p.51, we have a cross reference to Ānanda, wherein K. suggests that when Ānanda equates 'pratiyamā-na' or implicit sense with the beauty in the limbs of a lady, i.e. lalanā-lāvaṇya, he only wants to convey that this beauty is something quite different from the normal limbs such as hands, feet. etc., Here K. does not criticise Ānanda, who according to K. here wants to emphasise that the implicit sense is quite different from the explicit one.[33]

K. defines vicitra-mārga in I. 34–43 (p.52–3). This is one in which, 'artistic beauty appears to be radiating brilliantly, from within, in respect of both word and meaning.' (Trans K.K'. p. 338). This comes to the beauty caused by word and meaning, s'abdabhidheyayoḥ' (I. 34). This is also a style, "wherein the 'adorned' is made to acquire brilliance by virtue of the tropes brilliant in themselves and reflecting it through their own excessive beauty" (I.37. Trans. K. K'. p. 339). This is again a style (I. 40), " wherein, further, the intended purport of the whole is communicated by a suggestive use of language which is distinct from the two well-known uses, viz., the communicative use of meanings and the denotative use of words. " (Trans. K.K.' p.339) We may quote the whole kārikā here, which is almost a clear acceptance of Ānanda's rule, but without his clarity of mentioning vyañjana very clearly'.

" Pratīyamānatā yatra vākyārthasya nibadhyate vācya-vācaka-vṛttibhyām vyatiriktasya kasyacit. What harm is there, we may ask K., if direct mention is made of vyañjanā, which alone for a dhvanivādin, is capable of conveying the implicit sense ? Surely, K. cannot admit 'anumiti' here. If he does not accept vyañjanā, should he accept 'lakṣaṇā' or 'dīrghtara-abhidhā-vyāpāra', or 'tātparya' ? And *in all these cases we refuse to call him a dhvanivādin*.

While dealing with the 'vicitra-mārga' i.e. the brilliant style, K. refers to the striking aspect of beauty both in words and meaning which will appear as natural and not involving a special effort on the part of the poet, as in, 'koyaṃ bhā. etc., (Verse no. 89, under I.43, p.54). He goes

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33 *vṛtti, on I.* 33 : *p.* 52 : yasmādanena dṛṣṭāntena vācyavācaka lakṣaṇa-prasiddhāvayava-vyatiriktatvenā-stitvamā-traṃ sādhyate pratīyamānasya, na punaḥ sakala-loka-locana-saṃvedyasya lalanālāvaṇyasya.

to observe that, "The main purport of this verse it vicarious reference", a figure of speech. The whole passage is designed by the author to convey a suggested meaning, other than the referential one, Further as a result of the effective use of artistic word and meaning due to the inventive genius of an accomplished poet, even the suggested meaning is made to appear as if it were the directly denoted meaning. Since it is grasped at the first instance itself, no paronomasia can be said to be involved merely because the words convey a double meaning; *in fact both the meanings retain equal importance*-such a usage of words with double meaning as a view to illuminating a clear, suggested, meaning; will carry an extremely delightful effect." (Trans K. K., p.340).[34] This is nothing else but vyañjanā not expressly admitted by K., who again equates 'pratīyamāna' and 'vācya' in 'aprstuta-praśaṃsā'. which then caeses to be an 'alaṃkāra' and is included in the fold of dhvani.

In the same vein K. without an express mentioning or acceptance of vyañjanā vṛtti, continues to explain a further illustration viz., he helājita-bodhisattva' etc., '(verse no. 90, p.52) K. holds that, "Here also, keeping in mind a different meaning altogether, i.e. of a person whose character is most censurable, as his implicit meaning, the poet has explicitly described the ocean whose conduct is similar. This in essence, is of the nature of the figure of speech, viz., 'vicarious reference', (or 'indirect narration'). Further, the sentence which implicitly conveys even a censurable idea becomes capable of causing delight to the connoissefurs when it is couched in a language which is explicitly beautiful. Hence, 'vicarious refernce' may be reckoned as a figure of speech which is, in its turn, adorned by another figure, viz. 'veiled praise'. Neither is there any scope here for the conjoint merger of both the figures since the two do not have an equally important status. The two are not to be classed as independent figures of expressed

34. *Vṛtti, on I.*43 ; *p.* 55 : atrā-prastuta-praśaṃsā-lakṣaṃ alaṃkāraḥ prādhānyena vākyārthaḥ, pratīyamāna-padāntaratvena prayuktatvāt, tatra ca vicitra-kaviśakti-sallikhita-vakra- śabdārthopa-nibandha-māhātmyāt. pratiyamānamapi abhidheyatāmiva prāpitam. prakrama eva prabhāsamānatvānna cārthāntara-pratīti-kāritvena padārtha-śleṣa-vyapadeśaḥ śakyate kartum, vācyasya sama-pradhāna bhāvenānavasthānāt. arthāntara-pratīti-kāritvaṃ ca padānāṃ pratīyamānārtha–sphuṭatāvabhāsanārthaṃ upanibadhyamanaṃ ativa camatkaritāṃ pratipadyate.

sense because their scope is really different (and not identical) ". (Trans. K. K., p.340–1).[35] K. refers to 'alaṃkāra' and 'alaṃkārya', while explaining an illustration '(verse 92, 93, p.55, 56) of the 'vicitra-mārga', says he,[36] " The upshot is this : The efficacy of the figure of speech itself, when it is at its best, is responsible for the impression of beauty surrounding the subject described " (trans. K. K., p. 342). It is clear that here the 'alaṃkārya' is of the form of 'vastu-vyaṅgya' only, but K. does not refer to vyañjanā. Under verse no. 95 (p. 57) K. observes that,[37] " and this fact is instanced in many a figure of speech such as 'veiled praise' and 'euphemism' (Trans. K. K., p. 343)." We know that Ānanda had observed implicit sense present in these figures. He had also observed that if the connoisseur feels that the implicit element is predominantly charming, as in some cases of 'paryāyokta', such instances should be classed under dhvani and if it is felt that the expressed sense is comparatively more charming, they should be styled as 'guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya', But K. seems to hold that the implicit is always more charming in all these figures. But here also, he does not make any reference to vyañjanā through which the implicit sense is arrived at.

In I. 38 K. observers that, 'vicitramārga' or the brilliant style is such wherein[38] all things existing in their own way are transformed

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35. *Vṛtti, on I.*43 ; p. 55 : attrātyanta-garhaṇīya-caritaṃ padārthāntaraṃ *pratīyamonatayā cetasi nidhāya* tathāvidha-vilasitaḥ salila-nidhirvācyatayopakrāntaḥ tadetāvadevālaṃkṛte-ra-rastutapraśaṃsayāḥ svarūpam —garhaṇīya–pratīyamāna-padārthāntara–paryavasānamapi vakyaṃ śrutyupakrama-ramaṇīyatayopanibadhyamānaṃ tadvidāhlādakāritāṃ āyāti. tadetat vyājastuti-pratirūpaka- prāyaṃ alaṃkārāṇāntaraṃ aprastuta-praśamsīyā bhūṣaṇatvenopāttam. na cātra saṃkarālaṃkāra–vyavahāro bhavituṃ arhati, pṛthag atiparisphuṭatvenavabhāsalāt, na cā'pi saṃsṛṣṭi-saṃbhavaḥ samapradhāna-bhāvena ana-asthiteḥ. na ca dvayorapi vācyālaṃkāratvaṃ, vibhinna-viṣayavāt.

36 *Vṛtti, on I.*43 ; *p.* 56 : tadidaṃ atra tātparyam-tadalaṃkāra mahimaiva tathāvidhótra bhrājate tasyātyantodrikta-vṛttcḥ svaśobhātiśayāntagatamalaṃkāryaṃ prakāśyate.

37. *Vṛtti, on I.*43 ; *p.* 57 : etacca vyājastuti-paryāyoktaprabhṛtīnām bhūyasā vibhāvyate.

38. *vṛtti, on I.* 38, *p.* ५७ : Yadapi vastu vācyaṃ anūtanollekhaṃ anabhinavatvena ullikhitaṃ tadapi yatra yasminnalaṃ kāmapi kāṣṭhām nīyate, lokottarātiśaya-koṭiṃ – adhiropyate. katham–uktivaicitryamātreṇa, bhaṇitivaidagdhyenaivetyarthaḥ.

into new shapes at the poet's will. The whole order of nature is made to appear in a new perspective altogether. K.'s observation is influenced by Dhvanyāloka IV. 1–4. K. borrows wholesale from Ānanda and yet fights shy of mentioning vyañjanā openly and recognising it as a separate function of word, independent of abhidhā. On illustration no. 97 (p.५७-८), viz. 'uddeśòyaṃ' etc., which also occurs in the Dhvanyāloka, K. observes (p.५८) that, 'bhaṇitivaicitryamātraṃ evātra kāvyārthaḥ, na tu nūtanollekhaśāli vācyavijṛmbhitam. etacca bhaṇiti-vaicitryaṃ, sahasra-prakāraṃ saṃbhavatītī svayamevotprekṣaṇiyam'. Needless to say that K.'s 'bhaṇiti-vaicitrya' of a thousand-fold nature is nothing else but Ānanda's dhvani. Observes Ānanda at Dhvanyāloka IV.2,–"By a mere touch of even a single variety of suggestion, (among the many that have been enumerated), the poet's expression will acquire novelty though it might perhaps embody only a trite idea (IV–2)." The expression of a poet will appear quite novel though it might embody an idea already found in an earlier poet, if it is adorned by at least a single variety of suggestion from among the many varieties that have been mentioned.[39] (Trans. K.K., Dhv. p. 265). K. brings out the implicit sense in verse no. 99 (p. ५८.९), without mentioning vañjanā by name.

In I. 40 (p.५३) K. almost accepts vvañjanā says he :

"pratīyamānatā yatra vākyārthasya nibadhyate,
vācya–vācaka-vṛttibhyāṃ vyatiriktasya kasyacit."

"The mainly intended purport therein," K. goes on to observe[40] in his vṛtti thereon, "is conveyed by force of implication (i.e. suggestion) only in as much

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39. *dhv. IV. 2, and vṛtti thereon : (p.264, Echi. K. K.) :*

atohyanyatamenāpi prakāreṇa vibhūṣitā |
vāṇī navatvamāyāti Pūrvār hānvayavatyapi ||

ato dhvanerukta-bheda-madhyādanyatamenāpi prakāreṅa vibhūṣitā satī vāṇī purātana-kavi-nibaddhārtha-saṃsparśavatyapi navatvamāyāti.

40. *vṛtti, on I.40, p.५७* : Vicitrameva prakārāntareṇo nmīlayati pratīyamānetyādi. yatra yasmin pratīyamānatā gamyamānatā vakyārthasya mukhyatayā vivakṣitasya vastunaḥ kasyacidanākhyeyasya nibadhyate-kayā yuktyā-vācya-vācaka-vṛttibhyaṃ śabdārtha—śaktibhyaṃ. vyatiriktasya tadatirikta vṛtteranyasya vyaṅgya-bhūtasya abhivyaktiḥ kriyate. 'Vṛtti' śabdòtra, śabdārthayostat-prakāśana-sāmarthyaṃ abhidhatte. eṣa ca 'pratīyamāna' vyavahāro vākya-vakratā-vyākhyāvasare sutarāṃ samunmīlyate.

as it defies direct denotation. What is the exact process involved ? The process involved is implication (or suggestion) which is distinct from the two well-known uses of language, viz. the communicative use of meanings and the denotative use of words. The word 'process' is used here in the sense of the latent power in words and meanings towards signification". This directly leads K. in the camp of Ānanda and at his feet too ! Precisely because of this we may call him a dhvanivādin'. even-though here also he does not name 'vyañjanā' clearly. Perhaps because of this also, K. who looks to be a 'pracchanna-dhvani-vādin' is spared the onslaughts of Ānanda's great followers, and he is hardly heard of and quoted in later works because he has nothing fresh to offer. He is almost neglected, for he wrongly tries to project his 'vicitrā-abhidhā' theory which proposes to subsume even vyañjanā under it. K. says that this 'pratīyamāna-vyavahāra' will be elucidated while dealing with vākya-vakratā lateron. Illustration no. 100 (५९-६०) viz. 'vakrendor na haranti.' etc., is also explained by K. with the help of the 'pratīyamāna' in it, which is 'other than the expressed.'[41] K. holds that 'vicitra-mārga' also operates when an object's real nature is so described as to be brimming with the intended flow of sentiments.[42] This is clearly under the influence of Dhvanyāloka IV. 4.

K. then comes to what he calls the 'madyama-mārga' (I.49.51. p.६४). He discusses the qualities of 'aucitya' or propriety and saubhāgya' or splendour under I. 55.56, and 57 (p.69–70). In I. 56, he holds that this 'saubhāgya' is 'kāvyaika-jīvita'. This is rather surprising. K. does not seem to be clear, as is Ānanda, in exactly defining the relation between 'guṇa' and 'rasa'.

K. speaks of second variety of 'varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā' at II.2. (p. ७५), which is three-fold. The letters used are prastutaucitya-s'obhinaḥ' i.e. they shine by their harmony with the theme, which necessarily is not of the type of rāsadi. We know that Ānanda had insisted on letters being condusive to 'rasa' only (Dhv.III.3,4;......tena varṇāḥ rasaścyutaḥ). As

41. *vṛtti, on I.*40, *p.* ६० : ...iti vācya-vyatirikta-vṛtti dūtyukti tātpryam pratīyate.

42. *vṛtti, on I.*41 ; *p.* ६० : yatra yasmin bhāvānām svabhāvaḥ parispandaḥ sarasakūtaḥ rasanirbharābhiprāyaḥ padārthānām nibadhyate, niveśyate-kīdṛśaḥ......etc.

compared to that K.'s approach is wider and therefore commendable. By this, K. tries to cover the concept of guṇas, rītis, and vṛttis as advanced by others. However, Ānanda's over all stamp continues as in II.4 (p.७८). K. says that this particular vakratā concerning letters should not be brought about by any extra effort on the part of the poet. By 'effected without extra effort'-what is implied is the unmerited and excessive craze of poets.[43] Ānanda hints at the same point at II. 16, 17, etc., and wants an alaṃkāra including the śabdalaṃkāra, to be 'apṛthag-yatna-nirvartya', and, wants the poet to ristrict himself-'nātinirvahaṇaiṣitā.' In II. 5 K. correlates varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā with the concept of guṇas and vṛttis of the ancients. Says he, "The ancients spoke of it in their own independent way as characterised by, 'beauty of literary mode'.[44] (Trans. K. K. 25, p. 367) K. thus deals with anuprāsa, the first variety of his varṇavinyāsa-vakratā. The second variety, viz. 'yamaka' is dealt with in II. 6 and 7. Here also 'aucitya' or 'propriety' is broad-based as it touches the best manifestation of the subject, which goes beyond mere rasādi.

After having dealt with ten varieties of varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā, K. picks up what he calls 'pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā', having eight sub-varieties. He talks of it in II. 8 and 9. The first variety is 'rūḍhi-vaicitrya-vakratā'. The definition contains words such as 'garbhatā' and 'garbhatva', showing direct relation with the implicit sense, but without any mention of vyañjanā. K. observes that,' the reason underlying the poet's activity in all this is : An intention to shower extra-ordinary, belittlement or extra-ordinary glorification of the theme.' The poet might desire to present his subject far too less or far too more than it actually is. The 'subject' here meant is the one denoted by the conventionally used word. Such an art is designated

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43. *vṛtti, on II.4 p.* ७८ : nātinirbandhavihitā-'nirbandha' śabdo 'tra vyasanitāyām vartate. tenātinirbandhena punāḥ punāḥ āvartana-vvasanitayā na vihitā, aprayatna-viracitā ityarthaḥ.

44. *vṛtti, on II.* 5 : *p.* 80 : cirantanāḥ punah saiva svātantyreṇa vṛtti-vaicitrya-yukteti proktā. vṛttīnām upanāgarikādinām yad vaicitryam vicitra-bhāvaḥ svaniṣ ha-saṃkhyā-bheda-bhinnatvam tena yuktā samanvitā iti cirantanaiḥ pūrvasūribhiḥ abhihitā.

as art in beautifying conventional sense', because a denotative word gets artful extension of sense in all this.' (Trans. K. K., p. 370).[45]

All this is full of Ānanda's implicit sense. The first illustration cited viz. tāla jāanti' etc., is also from Dhvanyāloka (p. 38). *And it is here that K. clearly mentions the 'dhvanikara'* and 'vyaṅgya-vya jaka-bhāva'. says he, "The predicate, 'is seen to expand', in the kārika has special significance. In all such instances the verbal function involved is not ordinary denotation but suggestion which can signify a world of extending connotative meanings. This conclusion is indeed reasonable, but we are not concerned with that question here, so refrain from devoting space to its consideration. he learned author of the Dhvanyāloka has established at length the relation of word and meaning in such instances to be that of 'suggestor' and 'suggested'; there is no point served in our repeating the same.'[46] (Trans. K. K. p. 371).

K. is so much under the spell of Ānanda that very often he turns to him even for illustrations. He illustrates ruḍhī-vaicityra vakratā, which is here two-fold and seems to be modelled on Ānanda's 'arthāntara-saṃkramita-vācya-dhvani', with the help of an illustration also borrowed from Ānanda, viz. 'snigdha-s'yāmala. kānti' etc. (p. 83-8). The same beauty of 'rāmapada' is brought out but is branded here as a particular type of vakratā. But once again, what can we say to K. who equates 'varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā', having the charm of var as, i.c. expression only, with 'rūdhi-vaicitrya-vakratā' having the charm of pure vyañjanā and places them on the same footing? We are reminded of the famous verse viz., kācaṃ ma . iṃ kāñcana-mekasūtre mūrkhā nibadhnanti kimatra citram; vicāravān pāṇinirekasūtre s'vnamyuvānam maghavānamāha'. Illustrations after illustrations prove the

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45. *vṛtti, on II.* 8, 9; *p.* 82–3 : kena hetunā-lokottara-tiraskāra-ślāgyotkarṣābhidhitsayā. lokottaraḥ sarvātiśāyi yastiraskāraḥ khalkaraṇaṃ ślāghyacśa spṛhaṇīyo ya utkarṣaḥ, sātiśayatvaṃ tayorabhidhitsā abhidhātuṃ icchā, vaktukāmatā, tayā, kasya vācyasya. rūḍhiśabdasya vācyo yo' bhidheyo' rthastasya. socyate kathyate kāpyalaukikī rūḍhi-vaicitrya-vakratā. rūḍhiśabdasyaivaṃvidhena vaicitryeṇa vakratā vakrabhāvaḥ.

46 *vṛtti, on II.* 9; *p.* 83 : pratīyata iti kriyāpada–vaicitrya-syāyaṃ abhiprāyo yadevaṃvidhe visaye śabdānāṃ vācakatvaṃ na vyāpāraḥ, apitu vastvantaravat pratītikāritvamātre ṇa iti yukliyuktamapī etadiha nātipratanyate. yasmāt *dhvani kārena vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāvotra sutarām samarthitastat kim paunaraktyena.*

supreme dominance of vyañjanā. In ājñyā śakraśikhāmaṇi ' etc., (verse 29, p. 84) we have, 'syāccedeṣa na *rāvaṇaḥ*', an expression charged with vyñjanā. Ānanda, would call it, ' arthāntara-saṃkramita-vācya dhvani. same is the case with the next one, viz. ' rāmo'sau ' etc. an illustration borrowed from Ānanda, and the still next, and the still next. K. Says that this ' rūḍhi-vaicitrya-vakratā ' has many varicties on account of the implicit sense in it.[47]

Even here, K. keeps silent over whether this implicit sense is arrived at through vyañjanā or not.

K. then proceeds to deal with what he terms as paryāya-vakratā (at II. 10–12.) which is six-fold. We can easily see through these and stamp them onlyas 'vyañjanā-vilasita'. He almost mentions' vyañjanā. ' K. obtserves –yasmāt paryāya-śabdatve satyapyantaraṅgatvāt sa yathā vivakṣitaṃ vastu *vyanakti* tathā nānyaḥ kaściditi (p. 86).

The illustrations nos, 32, 33, etc. (on p. 86) prove the point. Our point is that if all this is ultimately the charm caused by vyañjanā, what purpose is served by just giving it a new name. What's in a name ? call it ' vyañjanā ' –dhvani ' or call it by any other name.

The next variety of paryāya-vakratā is illustrated by the verse no. 35, viz. itthaṃ jaḍe etc., (p. 88) He clearly exhibits his knowledge of Ānanda's theory and his scheme of śabda-vṛttis while discussing this illustration Howwever he resents to call it by the name of vyañjanā / dhvani. Says he, " The word ' mataṅga ' in this context directly refers only to the elephant paronomastically, it can also denote the non-contextual meaning, viz., ' butcher ', the two came to be metaphorically identified, after the analogy of ' the punjabi is a bull ', because here also there is similarity justifying metaphorical identification. Thus we have here anew aspect of beauty in the use of a synonym. In all such places the relation between the direct (lit contextual) and the indirect, (lit. non-contextual) meaning may be either one of metaphor or of simile. One might say " that is this " or " that is like this." This itself has been spoken of (by Ānandavardhana) as an instance of suggestion in word coming under the class ' śabda-śakti-mūla-anuraṇana-rūpa-vyaṅgya '-wherein there is a paranomastic power in the word giving

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47. *vṛtti. on II.9* ; *p.* 85 : eṣā ca rūḍhi-vaicitrya-vakratā pratīyamāna-dharma-bāhulyāt bahuprakārā bhidyate

rise to two meanings which come into relation with each other as metaphor etc. and resembhing resonant sound "((Trans. K.K. p. 376).[48]

He clearly, mentions 'vākyadhvani.' also and draws, illustrations viz. kusuma-samaya-yuga.' etc., and 'vṛtte'smin' etc. from the Dhvanyāloka (p. 78, p. 110, K.K.edn. 74). We fail to understand his effort in naming Ānanda's dhvani differently. Only point to his credit is that he has specifically mentioned and illustrated many varieties, or say, sub-varieties of dhvani left out by Ānanda to the good sense onour part. But thereby K.'s work becomes only complementary to the Dhvanyāloka. *It may be called a useful appendix,* at the most to Ānanda's great Dhvanyāloka. *K.'s effort to name it differently is just quilbling.* Yes, just so, and nothing more. For he has to admit that, in the particular illustration viz. Vṛtte'smin. etc. (p.८९). though the word 'yuga' (era and twin month's) etc. are used overtly to refer to the subject on hand, they are capable of suggesting another meaning indirectly and reveal a special kind of poetic charm which has been, designated by the name 'suggested figure of speech (by Anandavardhana)". (Trans. K. K. p.377).[49]

What pains us is not just this naming the things differently, but it is only when K. places different varieties of vakratā on the same footing, we feel that *he violates the basic principles of dhvani and renders confusion worse confounded.* For example, his fourth variety of 'paryāya-vakratā' viz. 'svacchāyotkarṣa-pes'ala' (p.८९.९०) at the most comes closer to what we call 'parikara-alamkāra'. Surely, this can never be equated with other 'vakratā' as above, which is 'dhvani' pure and simple.

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48. *vṛtti, on II.*10; p.८८-९ : atra 'mātaṅga 'śabdaḥ prastute vāraṇamātre pravartate. Śliṣṭayā vṛttya cāṇḍāla-lakṣaṇasya aprastutasya vastunaḥ pratītiṃ ulpādayan rūpakālamkāracchāyā-samsparśād gaurvāhīka ityanena nyāyena sādṛśyanibandhanasyopacārasya sambhavāt prastutasya vastunaḥ tattvamadhyāropayan paryāyat vakratām puṣṇāti. yasmād evamvidhe viṣaye prastutasyāprastutena sambandhopanibandho rūpakālamkāra-dvāreṇa kadācidupamāmukhena va. yathā sa evāyam sa ivāyam iti vā. eṣaeva ca śabda-śaktimūlāmuraṇana-rūpa-vyaṅgyasya padadhvane-rviṣayaḥ, bahuṣu caivamvidheṣu satsu vākya-dhvanervā.

49. *vṛtti.. on II.* 10 ; verse 37, *p.* ८९ : atra yugādayaḥ śabdāḥ prastutābhidhāna paratvena prayujyamā ıāḥ santo' pyaprastuta-vastu-pratīti kāritayā kāmapi kāvyacchāyām samunmīlayantaḥ pratiyamānālamkāra-vyapades'abhājanam bhavanti.

K. then treats (p. ९०) yet another variety wherein ', asambhāvyārtha-pātratva-garbham yaścābhidhīyate ', i.e. 'which hints at a meaning having inconceivable elements '. (Trans. K. K., p. 378). After citing apt illustrations (viz. verses nos. 40, 41, on p. 91) K. makes the following observations, ' apart from this surface meaning, there is also the hint of another intent '.[50]

The variety called, ' alaṃkāropa-saṃskāra-manohārinibandhana ', i.e. ' that which contains embellishing figurative elements condusive to beauty (p. 92) has beauty caused by figures. The compound is to be treated as both ' tṛitīyā-samāsaḥ ' and ' ṣaṣṭhī-samāsaḥ ' and while dealing with the latter K. cites an illustration of utprekṣā which is only suggested. *Thus he jumbles up once again,* contrary to the expectations of a pure dhvanivādin, the two different charms resulting from the use of normal figures of speech and others that are only suggested. The particular illustration, viz. ' devitvanmukha-pankajena. ' etc. (verse no.44, p. 92) may be classed as one of ' alaṃkāra-dhvani ' wherein utprekṣā is only implicit.[51]

Now K. comes to treat ' upacāra-vakratā ', the third variety of ' pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā ', under II-13, 14 (p. 93) : ' upacāra-vakratā ' is ' beauty of metaphorical expression '. It is clear that he intends to cover up all usages having metaphor at its root. Alamkāras such as rūpaka, and such usages having ' lakṣanā ' as their basis and also such other figures of speech which belong to the ' expressed ' class are all taken up here. K. also covers up what the dhvanivādin would call ' lakṣaṇā-mūla-dhvani '. Thus, without disc imination worthy of a true follower of Ānanda, he puts on par both the ' expressed ' and the ' principally suggested '(He herein includes also cases which a dhvanivādin would designate as–' atyanta - tiraskṛta. vācya-dhvani '. Anyoktis are also covered up under this vakratā '.

We have an illustration of anyokti in verse no. 50, (p.96) viz. ' anarghaḥ ko'pyantaḥ ' etc. K. observes " Furthermore, poets are often seen describing outwardly objects different from the ones that they have

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50. *vṛtti, on II.*11 ; *p.*91 : tadevam yadyapi suspaṣṭa-samanvayo ' yam vākyārthha tathāpi tātparyāntaram atra pratīyate.

51. *vṛtti, on II.*12 ; p.92 : tvanmukha-paṅkajena punaḥ śaśitāni santi vicchāvatām gacchantīveti ' *pratiyamānsya utprekṣā-lak saṇasyālaṃkārasya śobhātiśayaḥ* samullāsyate.

in mind primarily because of some fancied similarity in the qualities of the two."[52]

K. does not seem to bother whether the implied sense is principal or subordinate in relation to the expressed. He seems to hold that the implicit is principal in 'aprastuta-pras'aṃsā,' as against rūpaka in which the expressed is principal[53]

At II 15 (p.96) K. deals with viśeṣaṇa-vakratā, which is three-fold, and is itself the fourth variety of pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā. He observes: "If as a result of the excellence of epithet, beauty is added to the verb or the noun (in a sentence), it is to be classed as beauty in epithet" (Trans. K. K. p. 384).[54] This comes closer to normal 'parikarāla ṃkāra', and seems to be more a charm connected with pure expression i.e. 'abhidhā-vilasita', only. II..16 (p. 98) talks of 'saṃvṛti-vakratā', which is manifold and has an element of implied sense which is either principal or subosdinate source of charm. In short, it could be placed either with 'dhvani' or 'guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya' as the case may be. Says he: "In order to achieve excellence of expression, when the subject of description is screened as it were by the use of pronouns and so forth, we have what is designated as, 'beauty of concealment". (Trans. K. K., p.385).[55] We feel that Ānanda's vastu-dhavani can be accomolated in the second and third and fourth, fifth and sixth varieties of saṃvṛti-vakratā'. The illustration, for example, viz., 'tat-pitar-yatha' etc. (verse, no. 58, p.99) is explained by K. as, "In this example, it was certainly plossible for the poet to state that Śantanu's son (Devavrata, alias Bhīṣma) displayed incredible self-restraint in forswearing all sensual allurements because of his extra-ordinary magnanimity, his devout good

52. *vṛtti, on II*.14 ; p.96 *:* tathā vā kimapi padārthāntaram pratīyamānatayā cetasi' nidhāya tathāvidha-lakṣaṇa-sāmya-samanvayam samāśritya padārthāntaram abhidhīyāmānatam pārpayantaḥ prāyaśah kavayaḥ dṛśyante.

53. *vṛtti, on II*-14 ; verse, 50, p. 96 : tathā ca etayord-vayorapyalamkāra-yostulye' pyupacāra- vakratā- jīvitve vācyatvamekatra pratīyamānatvam aparasmin svarūpabhedasya nibandhanam.

54. *VJ. II* 15 ; *p.* 96 : Viśeṣaṇasya māhātmyāt kriyāyāḥ kārakasya vā yatrollasati lāvaṇyam sā viśeṣaṇa-vakratā.

55. *VJ. II* 16 ; 98 : yatra saṃvriyate vastu vaicitryasya vivaṣayā sarvanāmādibhiḥ kaiścid soktā saṃvṛti-vakrtā

behaviour and boundless regard for elders But the poet has avoided this straight-forward satatement, and he has allowed it to be concealed by a pronoun (he) with general significance. In the second half of the verse, he proceeds to give us a relative clause, which describes some other action and yet succeeds by this very manoeuvre in suggesting it strikingly and forcefully." (Trans. K. K. p. 388).[56] This is just 'vastu-dhvani'. The next illustration viz. 'yāte dvāravatīm' etc., (verse, 59, p. 99).[57] also proves the point when K. observes." Here what she sang is concealed by the pronoun 'that' (in the original) and at the same time the concealed idea is revealed by another clause which wins the hearts of critics with taste." (Trans. K. K. p.387).[58]

The next variety of 'pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā' is 'pada-madhyāntar-bhūta pratyaya vakratā, which is taken up at II. 17 (p.101). K. observes "The affix in the middle of a word often adds to the beauty of decorum in the subject described, by virtue of its own excellence. This may be regarded as another type of poetic beauty." Some affixes like kṛt occurring in the middle of words are seen enhancing the unique poetic beauty in the passage. They serve to increase the beauty of decorum in respect of the subject described. This increase is brought about by its own excellence." (Trans K. K. p. 388)[59] These are charms of both expression, and suggestion. For example, in 'snihyat kaṭākṣe dṛśan' (verse not p. 101). "the affix forming the present participle brings" out beautifully the speciality of the subject shining in its present splendour and devoid of graces attached to it in the

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56. *Vṛtti, on II.* 16 ; *p.* 99 : atra sadācāra-pravaṇatayā guru bhakti-bhāvitāntaḥ karano lokottaraudārya-guṇa-yogāt vividha-viṣayopabhoga-vitṛṣṇamanā nijendriya-nigraham asambhāvanīyamapi śāntanavo vihitavāniti abhidhātum śakyamapi sāmānyābhidhāyinā sarvanāmnā-cchadyottarā dhena karyāntarābhiddāyinā vākyāntareṇa pratītigocaratāmānīyamanam kāmapi camatkāra-kāritam āvahati.

57. Also quoted in the Dhvanyāloka-locana on Dhvanyā. I. iv by Abhinavagayta.

58. *Vṛtti. on II.* 16 ; *p.*99 : atra sarvanāmnā ṣamvṛtam vastutatkāryā-bhidhāyinā vākyāntareṇa samunmīlya sahṛdahṛdaya-hāritām prāpitam.

59, *Vṛtti, on II.*17 ; p. 101 : kas'cit pratyayaḥ kṛdādiḥ pada-madhya-vṛtti-ranyāmapūrvām vakratāmullāsayati vakrabhāvamuddipayati. kim kurvan -prastutasya varṇyamānasya vastuno yadaucityam ucitabhāvaḥ tasya vicchittimupas'obhām vikāsayan sammlulāsayan. kena-svamahimnā nijotkarsena.

past and attributable to it in the future. This charm of the affix is indeed very appealing to the minds of sensitive critics." (Trans. K. K. p.389).[60] This has charm operating at level of abhidhā only. Once again, K. places all of them on the same footing without caring in the least for what Ānanda would feel about it. The illustrations (viz. verses, 69, 70, 71, on p. 102) prove the point. K. says : "The augments like 'mum, in the words, 'subhagam-manya', prasṛtim-paca', and so forth, add extraordinary stylistic charm showing off the linguistic construction to best advantage". (Trans. K. K. , p. 389).[61]

Then follows 'vṛtti-vakratā' in II-19 (p.103) which takes note of beauty revealed through various types of compounds, and also taddhita and 'sub-vṛttis This includes charm caused due to pure expression i.e. abhidhā, and also 'upacāra' or metaphorical expression and then vyañjanā also. The illustrations go to prove this. However, the main source of charm is only abhidhā. The illustration viz. ā svarlokād uraga-nagaram' etc., (verse 73, p. 103). has the word 'pāṇḍimānam' which contributes to a unique beauty of vṛtti, a beauty which would be missed if its synonyms like, pāṇḍutva', 'pāṇḍutā', and pāṇḍbhāva' were used.

Then comes bhāva-vakratā', further variety of 'pada-pūrvrādha-vakratā'. K. takes it up at II.20 (p.108) K. makes the point clear when he suggests that here pure expression at abhidhā level, makes for the charm regardless of any acquaintance with the implicit element. Ānanda would refuse to equate it with vyañjanā. II 2, has 'liṅga-vaicitrya-vakratā', also a charm at the abhidhā level. II 22 (p. 106) says that when strī-liṅga' is used even when other genders are possible, it contributes to beauty, since even the name of a woman is pleasing.[62] II. 23 (p. 106) also

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60. *Vṛtti, on II.*17 ; *p.*102 : atra vartamānakālābhidhāyī s'atṛ-pratyayaḥ kāmapyatītānāgata-vibhrama- virahitām tādkā-lika-parispanda- sundarīṃ prastu-taucitya-vicchittiṃ ullāsayan sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-hāriṇīm pratyaya-vakratāṃ āvahati.

61. *vṛtti, on II.*18 - p. 102 : atra subhagam-manya-bhāva-prabhṛtiṣu s'abdeṣu mumādi-parispanda-sundaraḥ sanniveśa cchāyā-vidhāyinīm vācaka-vakratām pratyayāḥ puṣṇanti.

62. Dr. K. K. (p. XV, Introduction to his VJ.) tries to suggest here that this shows K. as a predecessor of Abhinavagupta. This could be debated.

continues the same argument. II 24, 25 (p. 108, 109) give the eighth variety of pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā. This has 'kriyā-vaicitrya-vakratā', of five varieties, which has charm caused due to abhidhā, as well as upacāra, but all this is placed on the same fo‹ting. There is a touch of vyñjanā also as in the illustration viz. 'prapannārti-cchido nakhāḥ' (verse 88, p. 110) from Ānanda. In the variety. viz. 'sva-vis'esaṇa-vaicitrya', (p. 110) also there is vyañjanā element, when an attribute causes charm. *K. does accept charm due to vyañjanā eventhough he does not name it so, but he includes it in his wider scheme of kavi-vyāpāraivakratā* without distinguishing between charms caused by abhidhā, laksaṇā and vyañjanā. This would be a difficult pill to be swllowed by a pure dhvanivādin. He talks of 'upacāra-manojñatā' (on p. 111) which proves the above observation. Then he talks of 'karmādisaṁvṛti' wherein 'karma' remains 'vyaṅgya' (p. 112).

After discussing 'pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā in case of both 'subanta' and 'tinganta' padas in eleven varieties, K. now proceeds to discuss pada-parārdha-vakratā i.e. pratyaya-vakratā, with reference to the same. First is taken up 'kāla-vaicitrya-vakratā' at II 26 (p. 113). The illustrations reveal the charm of vyañjanā only. K. gives a different level. The 'kārakavakratā' at II.27.28 (p. 115) speaks of vakratā caused due to reversal of status in instruments in action. Some of the illustrations reveal the charm caused by expression pure and simple, as in, yāñcāṁ...dhāvati" etc. (verse no. 97, p. 116), while there is a tinge of vyañjanā also somewhere. Similar is the case of 'saṃkhyā-vakratā' (II. 29, p. 116), or 'transposition of numbers, K. observes,[63] The upshot' is this-when either the singular or the dual number should have been used in a context, if we find that another number is used, or it we find that two different numbers are brought into a relation with an identical case-termination, we have this type instanced ; e.g., 'kapole patrālī' etc.' '(Trans. K. K., p. 403). This verse is from Amaruśataka (no. 85) and is also quoted by Ānanda under Dhv. II. 16 (p. 58, line 10 ; K.K.'s edn.'74). He quotes it to illustrat proper use of alaṃkāra as a rasāṅga. K. deals with what he calls 'puruṣa-vakratā' i,e. oblique beauty of person', at II.30 (p. 118). He observes : "The purport is as

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63. *Vṛtti. on II.*29 ; p.117 : tadayamatrārthaḥ-yadeka vacane dvivacane prayoktavye vaicitryārtham vacanāntaraṁ yatra prayujyate, bhinna-vacanayorvā yatra samānādhi karaṇyaṁ vidhīyate, yathā, kapole patrālī etc.

follows : In a literary context where the first or second person is required to be used, the poet may prefer to use the third person instead. For the same reason, since pronouns are as good as nouns, the transposition of a noun (i.e. the third person) in place of a pronoun also becomes a proper example of this type of oblique charms. " (Trans. K. K., p. 404).[64]

Ānandavardhana has practically hinted at all these varieties of so called vakratā, under III.16 (p. 146, line 7, 8,) Edn. K. K., '74), when he says, " Case-termitions, conjugational terminations, number, relation, accidence, primary affixes, secondary affixes, and also compounds–all these become conveyers of suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality.–The essence of suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality, i.e. sentiment etc., is conveyed even by the speciality in case-terminations and conjugal, terminations, in number, relation and accidence, in primary affixes, secondary affixes, and compounds. The conjugation ' also ' in the text indicates that even prepositions and tenses might become suggestive. "[65]

K. simply borrows from Ānanda without showing due recognition. K. seems, to cover some more sub-varieties such as upagraha-vakratā (II.31, p. 118). and 'pratyayāntara–vakratā (II.32, p 119) which pertain to charm caused by pure expression at abhidhā level. K. equates this without discrimination, with other varieties involving vyañjanā. This a dhvanivādin cannot accept.

K. then comes to yet another variety of pada-vakratā at II. 33 (p. 120). This is very interesting, for he says: " In a poem where the prepositions and indeclinables are employed *only to suggest rasas* as the whole

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64. *vṛtti. on II.* 30 ; p. 118 : tadayamatrārthaḥ–yadanyasminuttame madhyame vā puruṣe prayoktavyó vaicitryāya anyat kadācit prathamaḥ prayujyate. tasmācca puruṣaika yoga-kṣematvād aśmadādeh prātipadika- mātvasya ca viparyāsaḥ paryavasyati.

65. *Dhv. III.*16, *and vṛtti. thereon,* (*p.*146. K. K.'*sedn*'74) : "sup.tiṅ-vacana-saṃbandhaiḥ tathā kāraka-śaktibhiḥ !

kṣt–taddhita-samāśaisca dyotyòlakṣya-kramaḥ kvatit. (III.16). alakṣya-krama dhvanerątmā rasādiḥ sub-viśeṣalḥ tiṅ-viśeṣaiḥ vacanariśeṣaiḥ sambandha-viśeṣaiḥ kāraka-śaktibhiḥ kṛd-viśeṣaiḥ samąsaiśca iti ca śabdānnipātopasarga-kālādibhiḥ prayuktai-rabhivyajyamāno dṛśyate.

essence of a poem as a whole. we have what may be called another type of 'word-beauty' (Trans. K. K. p. 406).[66]

K. speaks of 'dyotana' in the sense of 'vyañjana' of rasa. *It is clear, K. cannot refuse vyañjanā and here he accepts it, but without being vyanjanā-biased.* Similarly he accepts 'pratīyamāna' through vyañjanā, but is himself not 'pratīyamāna-biased; i.e. he would not hesitate to put the abhidhārtha and pratīyamānārtha in the same category. He has illustrations which are also found in the Dhvanyāloka-Like Dhv. III 16, as quoted above K. also suggests in II. 38, (p. 122) that many sub-varieties can be found together at a single place, as in 'tarantīva iti' (verse, no 113, p. 122). *Actually, K. does not seem to be an opponent of vyañjana,* i.e. he is not a vyañjanā-virodhin', *but perhaps, he seems to be an 'antarbhāvavādin'. Vyañjanā forms but an aspect of 'kavi-vyāpāra', or 'vicitrā-abhidhā'.* He also mentions 'vyañjakatva' by name while dealing with II. 35 (p. 123), wherein he observes : "Poetic speech is a veritable creeper, with words as leaves, forming the bases for (symmetrical) beauty striking with artistic turn adding to the wealth of feelings and sentiments in a most striking manner. May the bee-like connoisseurs appreciate it and collect the profusely fragrant and sweet honey, from the sentence-blossoms, and enjoy it with ever-increasing gest". (Trans K. K. p. 409).[67] K. goes to add, "such is the purport. The juiciness alluded in the verse has two connotations : The first relates to the luscious exuberance manifest in creepers seasonally during spring. In the second place, *it suggests erotic feelings* and so forth.[68] K. dealt with vācaka-vakratā in the second chapter. He proceeds with vākya-vakratā, beginning with vācya- vakratā in the next chapter.

K. observes (VJ. III. 1, p. 125) when the subject matter is described in a way conducive to beauty by virtue of its own infinite natural charm

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66. *VJ. II.* 33.*p.* di-dyo 100 : "rasātanam yasyāmupasarga-nipātayoḥ, Vākyaikya-jīvitatvena sāparā pada-vakratā."

67. *VJ. II.*35 ; *p.* 123 : "Vāgvallyāḥ pada-pallavāspadatayā yā vakrat-odbhāsiṁ vicchittiḥ sarasatva-saṁpaducitā kāpyujjvalā jṛmbhate, tāmālocya vidagdha-satpada-gaṇaiḥvākyaprasūnās'raya, sphārāmoda-manoharaṃ madhu navotkaṇṭhākulaṁ pīyatām'

68. *Vṛtti, on II.*35 ; *p.* 128 : atraikatra sarasatvaṃ svasamayavambhavī rasārdratvam, anyatra s'ṛṅgārādi-vyañjakatvaṃ.

and by means of exclusively artistic expressions, we may take it as an instance of creative beauty relating to content ". (Trans. K. K., p. 411). He seems to touch both abhidhā an vyañjanā here by the term, " vakra-s'ab-daika-gocaratvena ", i.e. " by means of exclusively artistic expressions. " The artistic expression may not be necessarily either abhidhā or vyañjanā alone. It could be both. He goes to observe further, " The description intended is poetic treatment. Its manner is conveyed by the epithet– " by means of exclusively artistic expressions ". That is to say out of a number of charming expressions the intended content as designated by the creative poet as his main subject matter. *The word ' yielding ' is used instead of ' signifying ' because communication of meaning is possible in a suggestive way also. The sum*[69] and substance is this :

"In all such cases involving the natural charm of the content described, there will not be much scope for the use of plain figures of speech, simile and so on, because their use would spoil their exquisitely delicate natural charm ". (Trans. K. K. p. 411).

This shows that K. is not apethetic to vyañjanā and is at times prepared to accept the charm caused by the same. *What he seems to do is that he gives a larger connotation to Ānanda's expression* : viz , tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ ' (Dhv. I. 8). For Ānanda these ' śabdarthau ' were exclusively ' vyañgya–vyañjakau '. For, Ānanda specifically observes under I.8 (Dhv.p' 14, K. K.'s edn.), " that meaning ' refers to the implicit and ' that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it points out *that it is not any and every word* (recorded in dictionary). Such a word and such a meaning–only these two deserve the careful recognitaion of a first-rate poet. The status of first-rate poets is achieved only by the effective employment of suggested meaning and suggestive expressions, and not by

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69. *VJ.III.* 1 (*p.* 125) *and vṛtti. thereon :* " udāra-svaparispanda-sundaratvena varṇanam vastuno vakra-Śabdaika-gocaratvena-vakratā varnanam pratipādanam, katham–vakra śabdaika-gocaratvena. varko yo'sau nānā-vidha-vakratā-viśiṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ kaścideva vācaka-viseṣo vivakṣitārthasamarpaṇa samarthaḥ tasyaivaikasya kevalasya gocaratvena pratipādyatayā viṣayatvena, *vācyatveneti noktam–vyangyatvenāpi pratipādana saṁbhavāt.* tadidaṁ uktaṁ bhavati–yadevaṁvidhebhāva-svabāva-saukumārya-varṇana-prastāve būyasām nav ācyālaṁ kāraṇāṁ upamādīnāmupayoga-yogyatā saṁbhavati, svabhāva-saukumāryātiśaya-mlānatā-prasaṅgāt.

a mere use of conventional meanings and conventional words." (Trans. K. K., p. 17. Dhv.).[70]

Not that Ānanda on his part does not recognise the charm of the expressed content, but he feels that this charm of the expressed content will shine out only in the association of sentiment which is necessarily suggested. Says Ānanda, "This infinitude of poetic themes *is brought about not only by way of suggested content, but also by way of expressed content.* This is set forth in the following : Infinitude is achieved by the expressed content also even when it remains in its pure and natural state by reason of considerations of circumstance, place, time, etc......This has indeed been strikingly declared in my work (Viṣama-bāṇa-līlā) :

"There is no limit to them
And they will never look like repetitions;
The graces of sweet-hearts
And the meanings of the words of good poets." (Trans. K. K.,p. 283–5 ; Dhv. edn'74).[71] But he further adds, "we find in plenty examples of utilizing the expressed content with variations of circumstances etc. But it will shine out only in the association of sentiment." (Trans. K. K., p. 293).[72]

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70. *Dhv. I.* 8, (*p.* 14, *K.K.'s edn.* 74) *and vṛtti thereon* :

'so 'rthas tadvyaktī-sāmarthya-yogī śabdaśca kaścana

yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ –sa vyaṅgyārthaḥ tadvyakti-sāmarthya-yogī śabdaśca kaścana, na sarvaḥ, tāveva śabdārthau mahākaveḥ pratyabhijñeyau. vyaṅgya-vaynjakābhyāmeva hi suprayuktābhyām mahākavitvalābho mahākavīnām, na vācya-vācaka-racanā-mātreṇa.

71. *Dhv. IV.* 7, *p.* 282, *and vṛtti. thereon* (*edn. K. K.* '74): "na cārthānantyam vyañgyārthapekṣayaiva yāvad vācyārthāpekṣaya'pīti pratipādayitum ucyate—

"avasthā-des'a-kālādī-viśeṣairapi jāyate.
ānantyam eva vācyasya śuddhasyāpi svabhāvataḥ (9).

...[na ca teṣām ghaṭate'vadhiḥ, na ca dṛs'yante kathamapi punaruktāḥ ye vibhramāḥ priyāṇām arthā vā sukavivāṇīnām]

72. *Dhv. IV.* 8, (*p.* 292, *K. K. edn.* 74) :

"avasthādi-vibhinānām vācyānām vinibandhanam.
bhūmnaiva dṛśyate lakṣye, tattu bhāti rasāśrayāt."

It is very clear that what very largehearted Ānanda grants by way of concession, has been seized upon by K., making an issue out of it. He is out to destroy the vyañjanā-bias of Ānanda. We may call K. a party dissident. For he does not totally negate vyañjana ; and that he cannot do, but he is not prepared to accept its supremeacy either. He does not leave the party of the dhvanivādin but he creates a separate block in the party itself !

K. holds that such use of alaṃkāra as would mar the beauty of 'artha-vastu-vakratā-' is unwelcome. This is done in the fashion of Ānanda. But Ānanda. recommends the use of alaṃkāras only as conducive to rasa-experience. The 'aucitya' is with reference to rasa in case of Ānanda. Here K. does not expressly say so, though he speaks of rasa-experience through proper delineation of vibhāvādis alone. Says he, "In particular we have to note this An experience becomes aesthetic only by reason of beauty to promotion of sentiments through the only means available viz., a proper mingling of constituents, ensuants, and accessories. Any other extraneous element therein would become detrimental to its natural beauty." (Trans. K. K., p. 413).[73] We may observe that K. partially submits to Ānanda's dictates. He also cites illustrations seen in the Dhvanyāloka.

K. talks of 'vākya-vakratā' in III. 3 and 4. This artistic beauty of a sentence touches the field of alaṃkāras also, says he, "An art in a whole sentence admits of a thousand varieties. In it is included the whole lot figures of speech." (Trans. K. K. p. 422)[74]. We know that Ānanda woluld include the figures under what he calls the 'gunībhūta-vyaṅgya Not so with K., who seems to include even instances of rasa also under 'vākya-vakratā' This is defiance, pure and simple !

K. proceeds to give 'svabhāvodāharaṇa' and 'rasodāharaṇa' in verses nos 21, 22, (on p. १३६) under vākya-vakratā Verse no. 21 viz. teṣām gopa-vadhū etc. is from Dhv. (p.48). K. does all this without any direct mention of vyañjanā. On rasodāharaṇa in verse no. 22, viz. loko yādṛśamāha etc.

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73. *vṛtti. on III.* १; p. १२७ : viśeṣatastu–rasa-pariposa-peśalāyāḥ pratīteḥ vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāryaucitya-vyatirekeṇa prakā rāntareṇa pratipattiḥ prastuta-s'obhā-kāritāmāvahati.

74. *verse* 20, *in vṛtti.on III.*3, 4, १३६ : "vākyasya vakra-bhavo'nyo bhidyate yaḥ sahasradhā, yatrālaṅkāra-vargo'sau sarvó pyantarbhaviṣyati".

(p.१३६), K. observes,[75] "Here the abiding emotion is heroism. The poet is concerned with endowing beauty to the appropriate person who happens to be the abode of that emotion. He is portrayed therefor as a great conqueror. Now the artistic mode of the sentence used raises the emotion to its highest point, so that it comes to be felt as the sentiment of valour. This reveals the poet's art in respect of composing a forceful and artistic sentence. The several examples already given in the previous section wherein artistic beauty relates to construct such sentences should also be considered in this light by the connoisseurs as further, instances. " (Trans. K.K., p. 423).

K. discusses 'vākya-vakratā' with reference to abhidhāna', 'abhidheya' and 'abhidhā', and then proceeds to classify the things described.[76] He does it under III.5, 6 7, . on p. 137–8). He classifies 'vastu' or things into 'cetana' i.e. sentient and 'jaḍa' i.e. insentient and again either into 'mukhya' or principal and 'amukhya' i.e. subordinate. He says (III.7) that the description of principal sentient gods, demons etc., should be natural. It is made beautiful by a spontaneous presentation of emotion like love. The second is rendered lovely by a description of the animals etc., in a way natural to their species. K. goes to observe that, 'the word spontaneous is used to indicate that the emotions like love should be free from banality and very striking by their fresh flavour. When so treated, the emotions are raised to the level of sentiments like the erotic : for the well-known rule states than the dominant emotion itself gets transformed into sentiment". (Trans. K.K., p.424).[77] That this rasa is arrived at through vyañjanā alone is a commitment of a confirmed dhvanivādin But K. does not make

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75. *vṛtti, on III.4, verse* 22, *p.* १३६.७ : atrotsāhābhidhānaḥ sthāyibhāi samucitālambana-vibhāva-laksaṇa-viṣaya-saundaryātiśaya-Ślāghāśraddhālutayā vijigīṣorvaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhaṇiti-vaicitryeṅa parām paripoṣa-padavimadhiropitaḥ san rasatām nīyamānaḥ kimapi vākya-vakratā--svabhāvam kavi-kauśalam āvedayati anyeṣām pūrva-prakārodāharaṇānām pratyekam tathābhihiti jīvita-lakṣaṇam vākya-vakratvam svayameva sahṛdayair vicāraṇīyam.

76. *Vṛtti, before III.5, p.*137 : evamabhidhānābhidheyābhidhā-lakṣaṇasya kāvyopayoginas tritayasya svarūpaṃ ullikhya varṇanīyasya vastunaḥ viṣaya-vibhāgaṃ vidadhāti.

77. *vṛtti, on III.* 7 ; (p.138) : akliṣṭaḥ kadarthanā-virahitaḥ pratyagratā-manoharo yo ratyādiḥ sthāyibhāvaḥ tasya paripoṣaḥ śṛṅgāra prabhṛti-rasavtāpādānam, 'sthāyyeva tu raso bhavediti nyāyāt.

such a categorical commitment. To that extent K. is far from being a pure dhvanivādin. He gives instances of rasa such as 'vipralambha-śṛngāra (verse 25, p. 138) and 'karuṇa rasa' (verse 27, p. 139). He holds that, 'Here the poet has fully displayed all the stimulants for the rise of the sentiment of pathos.[78] But he never says that these stimulant evokes rasa through the process of vyañjanā.

K. is fully aware of the fact of rasa-realisation through vibhāvādis. But he keeps quiet about the method of operation of these vibhāvādis.[79] In short, he does not clearly mention the relation of "vyaṅgya-vyañjaka". Thus far, K. has described how 'pradhānacetana' or the sentient principal object becomes the subject of poetic description. Now onwards K. discusses how the subordinate sentients such as birds and beasts etc., are described by the poet (p. 140). K. observes : In the same way the second category also mentioned above viz. relating to the behaviour of secondary sentients such as lion and so on, comes in for a poetic treatment under certain conditions. One condition is that only such nature as is appropriate to each species should be imagined brilliantly by the poet. Each species has its own individual character though coming under the genus which is a class. The behaviour described should be actually part of the nature of the specific animal in question. Description of such a natural quality in a realistic way itself conduces to brilliance i.e. contributes to the delight of the connoisseurs." (Trans. K. K., p. 426 7).[80] He cites two instances one of which is, 'grīvābaṅgābhirāmam. etc., the famous verse

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78. *vṛtti, on III.7, vrese* 27, p. 139 : atra rasa-paripoṣa-nibandhana-vibhāvādi-sampat-samudāyaḥ kavinā sutarām samujjṛm bhitaḥ

79. *Vṛtti, on III.7* ; *on verse* 29, *p,* 140 : evamvidhoddipava-xibhāvaika-jīvitatvena karuṇa rasaḥ kāṣṭhādhirūḍha- ramanīyatāma nīyat i. evam vipralambha-Śṛṅgāra-karuṇayoḥ' sankumāryād udāharana-pradars'anam vihitam rasāntarāṇāmapi svay amevotpreksaṇīyam.

80. *Vṛtti, on III.* 7; *p.* 140–1 : evam dvitīyam apradhāna-cetanasimhādi-sambandhi yatsvarūpam tadittham kavīnām varṇanā spadam sampadyate. kīdrśam–svjātyucita-hevāka-sammille-khojjvalam. Svā pratyekamātmīyā sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-vastu-svarupā yā jātistasyāḥ samucito yo hevākaḥ svabhāvānusārī parispan-daḥ tasya samullekhaḥ samyagullekhanam vāstavena rūpenopani-bandhaḥ tena ujjvalam bhrājiṣṇu, tadvidāhlādakārīti yavat.

from Abhijñānaśākuntalam (I.7) giving the hariṇa-svabhāvokti'. We use, the term 'svabhāvokti' here on purpose. K. elsewhere (I. 11, 12) had discarded 'svabhāvokti', which in his opinion is 'alaṃkārya' and not alaṃkāra But we may ask, what else is 'apradhāna-cetana-siṃhādi. saṃbandhi svarūpa-varṇana' discussed under III. 7. For other ālaṃkārikas it is 'svabhāvokti' alaṃkāra, pure and simple. Whatever K. puts by way of arguments disproving the case of 'svabhāvokti' as an alaṃkāra, is just quibbling. K. should know that at the most 'svabhāva' is 'alaṃkārya' and its 'ukti' i.e. 'svabhāvokti is, as imagined by other ālaṃkārikas, very much an alaṃkāra K. very often starts from the wrong end and is himself misled and causes others also to be misled. Similar is the case when he argues against the concept of rasādi alaṃkāras, so clearly established by Ānandavardhana.

K. at III. 8 observes that, 'the secondary sentient ones and non-sentient ones become sources of delight when they are so described that they promote the rise of sentiments'.[81] This exactly echoes the views of Ānanda expressed in IV. 8 Dhv., wherein he observes : "we find in plenty examples of utilizing the expressed content with variations of circumstances etc. But it will shine out only in association of sentiment". (Trans. K. K., p. 293, edn. '74).[82] It should be noted that such descriptions as referred to in III. 8, by K. are expected to promote rasa, but it is not made clear whether they promote rasa through vyañjanā or otherwise. K. simply observes : "Sentiments are the erotic and so forth. Their rise is nothing but their elaboration. Their capacity in this regard is dependent of the creative art of the poet and it leads in its turn to the delight of the connoisseurs." (Trans. K. K., p. 427).[83] He also observes : "The treatment of non-sentients should also conform mostly to the kindling

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81. *VJ. III.* 8 (*p.* 141) : "rasoddīpana sāmarthya-vinibandhana-bandhuraṃ cetanānḍāṃ amukhyānāṃ jaḍānāṃ cāpi bhūyasā."

82. *Dhv. IV* 8 ; p. 292, (*edn. K. K.,* 74) : "avasthādi-vibhinnānāṃ vācyānāṃ vinibandhanam bhūmnaiva dṛśyate lakṣye, tattu bhāti rasāśrayāt'.

83. *Vṛtti., on III.* 8; p. 141 : rasāḥ śṛṅgārādayaḥ teṣāmuddīpana mūllāsanaṃ pariroṣaḥ tasmin sāmarthyam śaktistayā vinibandhanaṃ niveśaḥ tena bandhuraṃ hṛdayahārī.

of sentiments. (Trans. K. K., p. 428).[84] K. holds that this body of content or subject-matter of description should be deemed worthy of adoption by the poets. This is described through 'abhidhā-vyāpāra'.[85] This abhidhā is K./ś 'vicitra-abhidhā', K. holds that when the content is thus endowed with natural beauty, it becomes worthy of embellishments, which, when they are added, give rise to a fresh type of beauty (upas'obhā' of their own.'[86]

He further observes : "Thus what is beautified and can be regarded as the body of all descriptive art can be only two-fold–containing either the prominence of naturalness or sentiment, both having their own beauty. Neither can even be regarded as an ornament". (Trans. K. K. p. 429).[87]

With this he picks up the discussion concerning the nature, of what Ānanda and others have designated as 'rasādi alaṃkāras'. He rejects the case of alaṃkāras such as rasavat, and the like, at the outset. K. observes. of the two, how the first i.e. naturelness of the subject cannot be regarded as ornament has already been established earlier. Now, how the second also, i.e., the subject involving sentiments of primarily sentient beings in their actions, cannot be ever regarded as an ornament is taken up for consideration. The position of the other writers who declare that it is also an ornament is refuted." (Trans. K. K. p. 429-'30).[88]

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84. *Vṛtti., on III.* 8; p. 142 : jaḍānāṃ acetanānāṃ salila-taru-kusumasamaya prabhrti na mevamvidham svarūpam rasoddīpana-sāmarthya-vinibandhana bandhuraṃ varnanīyatām avagāhate.

85. *Vṛtti. on III.* 9 ; *p.* 142 : kavīnāmetadeva yasmād varṇanāspadamabhidhāvyāpāragocaram.

86. *vṛtti, on III.* 9, p. 143 : evamvidhasyāsya svarūpa s'obhātis'aya-bhrāji. śnorvibhūṣaṇani upas'obhāntaramārabhante

87. *Vṛtti, on III.* 10 ; *p.* 143 : tadevaṁvidhaṁ svabhāvā-prādhānyena rasa-prā-dhānyena ca dvi-prakāram sahaja-saukumārya-sarasaṁ svarūpaṁ varṇanā-viṣaya-vastunaḥ śarīramevālaṁkāryatoṁ arhati.

88. *Vṛtti, on III.* 10, *p.* 143 : tatra svābhāvikaṁ padārthā-svarūpaṁ. alaṁkaraṇaṁ yathā na bhavati tathā prathamameva pratipāditam. idānīṁ rasātmanaḥ pradhāna-cetana-parispanda-varṇyamānavṛtteḥ. alaṁkārakārāntarāntarābhimatāmalaṁkāratāmīṅgkaroti

K. holds that, " Rasavat " is not an ornament because there is nothing palpable apart from it which is adorned by it, and because the literal meaning of that word itself is contradicted. " (Trans. K. K. p. 430).[89]

K. holds that 'rasādi' can never be an ornament for it is never observed as a separate entity apart from all the subject-matter described. "The upshot is this : whatever the instance of poetry chosen, one and 'all the connoisseours have a clear distinction in their minds regarding the two divisions, the 'adorned', and the 'ornament'. But in the expression," a poem with rasavat-alaṁkāra", we cannot understand this fundamental distinction itself, despite our best attention and endeavour." (Trans. K. K,. p. 430).[90]

He continues : " Further more, if the adorned is regarded as the primarily described sentiment itself like the erotic, then reason demands that something else should be present there as adornment. If perchance its (=of the adorned) own nature is described as adornment because it causes deight to critics, in such a contingency too the onus of indicating another adorned apart from it lies on the rhetorician. Such a clearcut discrimination is not to be had at all even slightly, either in the way the ancient rhetoricians have defined rasavat alaṃkāra or in the way they have illustrated them ".[91] (Trans. K. K. p. 430).

K. discusses the whole topic to his satisfaction. Actually the whole discussion looks like unnecessary quibling, especially when he takes up Ānanda's

89. *VJ. III.* 11 ; p. 188 : " alaṁkāro na rasavat parasyāpratibhāsanāt, svarūpādatirīktasya śabdārthāsaṅaterapī ".

90. *Vṛtti, on III.* 19 ; p. 188 : tadidamatra pātpavyam–yat sarveṣāmeva satkavi-vākyānām idaṁ alaṁkāryaṁ idaṁ alaṁkaraṇaṁ ityapoddhāravihito viviktabhāvaḥ sarvasya yasya kasya pramātuścetasiparisphuradrasavadala ṁkāravadityasmin vākye punaḥ avahitacetaso'pi na kiṁcideva budhyāmahe.

91. *Vṛtti, on III.* 19, *p.* 188 : pathā ca–yadica śṛṅgārādireva prādhānyena lamkāraḥ tatastadanyena kenacidalaṁkaranena bhavitavyamvā tatsvarūpameva tadvidāhlādanibandhanatvāt alaṁkāratathāpi tadvyatiriktaṁ anyadalaṁ kāryatayā parkāsaṁ yaṁ vidho na kaścidapi vivekaś cirantanālaṇkāra kārābhimate rasavad. alamkāra-laksanodāharan amārge manāgapi vibhāvyate.

case whom he refers as an 'abhiyukta' (p. 149). K. tries to refute Ānanda theoretically, but what he actually achieves is a semblance of refutation to his satisfaction only of an illustration cited by Ānanda.

K. believes that in both the illustrations cited by Ānanda, viz. 'kṣipto hastāvalagnaḥ...etc. (verse no 43, p. 150) and 'kiṁ hāsyena' etc. (verse 44, p. 151), we have karuṇa as the principal rasa and there is no chance of its being subordinate and acting as an ornament as imagined by Ānanda.

Be it as it is. One point clearly emerges and it is that here K. does not refute the theoretical position as advanced by Ānanda. Moreover, it is here that we become all the more aware of the fact that between the two, it is Ānanda who seems to be more open, catholic and pragmatic. Ānanda is clear-headed enough to accept that the whole analogy of rasa or dhvani being, the soul, and guṇas or excellences being 'qualities' and simile and the like being alamkāras or ornaments, and 'śabdārthau' or 'word and sense' or 'form and content' being 'śarīra' or body of poetry, is just a working hypothesis, an instrument, a way of understanding poetic charm which is by itself an 'amūrta' or an abstract phenomenon to be grasped only as a whole,–'akhaṇḍa-buddhi-samāsvādya ; rasa, or dhvani or any other entity for that matter is a means to the end viz. grasping of poetic beauty. 'Dhvani' is dubbed as 'soul' only metaphorically. Actually the whole metaphorical use of terminologies is not an end in itself. And therefore, Ānanda was catholic enough to accept a position when even 'rasa' could play the role of an 'alaṃkāra' ! He shows that theoretically this is possible. K. on the other hand takes up an orthodox stand, we may say, a comparatively narrow approach much closer to the one taken up by Mahimā, that rasa, which is only vyaṅgya or suggested, could be only principal and never subordinate !

Actually Ānanda had very critically and carefully streamlined the whole issue and K.'s gesture of opposing the case of rasavat etc. as imagined by Ānanda falls flat and sounds unconvincing. However, one good point emerges and it is that K. too accepts that 'rasa' could be always and only 'suggested' i.e. 'vyaṅgya'. Thereby he accepts the ruling of Ānanda and recognises the force of vyañjanā. K.'s treatment of this topic requires a fuller discussion which for want of space we avoid in the present context. For the present we will once again underline the arthodox and narrow approach of K.who observes with regard to the two illustrations,

that, " Or else, it might be imagined that eulogy of the hero alone is primary; and since pathos is calculated to serve that end as a means, it is designated as an ornament. That statement again, is not without fault. For, in both the above examples', the import primarily intended is pathos alone in its variagated manifestations. As in the case of the figures of speech 'paryāyokta' (euphemism) and 'anyāpadeśa' (indirect statement) those meanings which are other than referential, i.e., suggested, will be such that they too could be plainly stated if one wished to do so ; and pathos, being a rasa, can in no wise be reduced to as referential meaning, once we accept that it exists. For can it be taken as an example of subordinated suggestion (guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya) because the rasa of pathos is felt as primarily suggested? The two rasas cannot both be regarded as suggested because then they cannot have the relation of primary and secondary between themselves (since both would have to be equally primary). All these alternative explanations of 'rasavat' alṁkarā' in the given examples have been imagined by us and refuted ; the analogy of the said figures (viz. paryāyokta and aprastuta-praśaṃsā) does not hold good here. With these words we close this discussion". (Trans. K.K. p. 440,1).[92]

As already observes above, K. seems to take a position that whatever is 'vyaṅgya' can never be subordinate, and rasa, which is always vyaṅgya, is necessarily 'pradhāna' or principal. This is as good or bad as the view

92. *Vṛtti, on III.*11 ; *p.* 152–3 : Yadi vā preyasaḥ prādhānye tadaṅgatvāt karuṇa–rasasyalaṃkaraṇatvaṃ ityabhidhīyate tadapi na niravadyaṁ, yasmat dvayorapi etayorudāharaṇayor mukhyabhuto vākyārthaḥ karuṇātmanaiva vivartamānavṛttirupanibaddhaḥ. Paryāyoktānyāpades'a-nyāyena vācyatāvyatiriktayoḥ pratāyamānatayā, na karuṇasya rasatvāt vyangyasya sato vacyatvamupapannam. ṇapi gunibhuta-vyangyasya viṣayaḥ, vya (ṅgyasya pradhṛanyena ka) ruṅatmanaiva pratibhasanat. na ca dvay orapi vyamqyatvam, angangibhavasyanupapatteh. etacca yatha-sambhavam asmabhirvikalpitam. na punasta (nnyayamatra prayojakami yalam Vi) starena.

taken by Mahimā also. The entire approach when compared with Ānanda's much too catholic approach, is basically narrow. Similarly, K.'s concept of 'paryāyokta' is also narrow in the sense that for him 'paryāyokta' occurs only when a different statement is used for something which can be conveyed normally in a different way. So, for K., here it is a different statement at 'vācya' level conveyed by yet another statement at 'vācya' level only. It is not 'vyangya' that is conveyed differently as imagined by Ānanda, Mammaṭa Jagannātha and others. The hollowness of K.'s arguments is brought about in the last remark regarding 'rasavat', when he observes : Further more, the declaration that 'rasa etc.' itself constitutes an adornment in poems', virtually designates 'rasa' itself by the term 'alaṃkāra' and not 'rasavat' or that which possesses rasa. And once again the incongruity between the term rasavat and the meaning connoted by it stares us in the face as before and leaves us in endless confusion." (Trans. K.K. p. 441).[93] Yes, confusion for K. alone !

K. finally seems to explain and accept the concept of 'rasavat alaṃkāra' in his own unique way which seems to be quite useless and elementary when compared with the consideration of various alaṃkāras by such masters as Ruyyaka, S'obhākaramitra, Appayya, and Jagannātha. After citing such illustrations as 'lagna-dvirephāñjana' etc. (verse no. 7, p.169), K. observes : Here also the metaphor (rūpaka) involving the attribution of the behaviour of a lady in love to spring with the assistance of paronomasia should be regarded as 'rasavat alaṃkāra' because it closely imitates the behaviour of sentients with love". (Trans. K.K., p. 459).[94] *All this causes instantaneous and hearty laughter* !

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93 *Vrtti, on III.*11 ; *p.* 153 : Kim cai, kavye tasmin alamkarofrasadih' iti rasa evalamkarah kevalah, na turasavat iti matup-pratiayasya jivitam na kincit abhihitam syat. evam sati śabdarthasangaterabhavat anavasthaiva tisthatiti etadqpi na kimcit.

94. *Vrttion. III.*16 ; *verse* 71 ; *p.* 199 : *d*tra samaropita-nayika-vrttantasya s'lesa-cchayasahayasya rupa (kasya tadvada) caranat rasavadalamkara tvam.

While dealing with 'rūpaka', K. talks of 'pratīyamāna-rūpaka' at *III*.24, p.179-'80. This is a virtual acceptance of vyañjanā. Similarly, he talks of vyājstuti at *III*.28, p. 185, having, 'stutiḥ Vyaṅgyatayā' and 'pratīyamānaḥ vyatirekaḥ' at III. 48, p. 220. All this amounts to his virtual acceptance of vyañjanā, without of course, clearly naming it as such. In verse no. 183, p. 221-2, Viz., 'prāptaśrīḥ eṣa kasmāt' etc., K. feels that here 'vyatireka' is suggested and not 'rūpaka' as observed by Ānanda. All this is quibbling which virtually ends in indirect acceptance of the all powerful vyañjanā. K. quotes (p.222) the definition of dhvani, viz., 'yatrārthaḥ' śabdo vā' etc. (Dhv. I. 13) to no purpose.

In the fourth unmeṣa of the VJ., K. deals with 'prakaraṇa-vakratā' which is six-fold. In IV. 1, 2 (0.245) he deals with the first variety which is having the charm of abhidhā. So also is the case with the second variety as explained in IV. 3 and 4 (p.248). Third variety is explained at IV-586, on p. 252, and has its charm caused due to vyañjanā also. IV. 7, 8, on p. 255, have the fourth variety consisting of newer and newer descriptions which have a mixed charm of abhidhā and vyañjanā, while the fifth variety as explained at IV. 9, on p. 622, has mostly the charm of abhidhā. IV. 10 talks of a new variety (on p. 266) which has the charm of pure vyañjanā. IV, 11-14, have further varieties (no. 5, 7, 8, 9) of mixed charm. All told, the different varieties of 'prakaraṇa-vakratā' exhibit the charm of vyañjanā to a greater or lesser extent. This becomes clear as we rush through kārikās IV. 10 to IV. 26.

With this, we come to the end of this prolonged consideration of the problem viz. that shall we call K. a dhvanivādin or not ? The answer, as suggested in the beginning, is both in the affirmative and negative. He is a dhvanivādin without naming dhvani as dhvani.' He accepts vyañjanā without naming it as such. He tries to place poetic criticism on a wider and more pragmatic canvass, but ends as shown earlier, in a miserable condition. He

does not have a heart to accept the whole scheme of śabda-vṛttis as suggested by Ānanda, though he seems to hold the latter in very high esteem. K.'s was a half-hearted approach which caves in when pitched against the giants who followed, upheld and established the sovereignty of Ānandavardhana. He is a lone traveller, who gets lost in the desert of his own creation. He is not much remembered by posterity, and is pitied and forgiven for his misadvanture, simply because he is a dhvanivādin at heart. He was in a way, a dissident in the camp of the dhvanivādins, a martyr for no great cause. He is almost burried and forgotten and only at times remembered as a weak follower of the great Ānanda. In trying to look a more practical and liberal critic, he chooses to be less scientific.

'शब्दशास्त्रे समासवाक्यार्थयोः समासतो विमर्शः'

डॉ. भगवतीप्रसाद पण्ड्या
संस्कृत विभाग, भाषा साहित्य भवन,
गुजरात युनिवर्सिटी, अहमदाबाद-९.

संस्कृतवाङ्मये शब्दशास्त्रे शाब्दिकैः समास-समासार्थ-वाक्य-वाक्यार्थविषयमधिकृत्य महीयान् विचारो विहितो दरीदृश्यते। तत्र प्रथमं समासविषये पाणिनिदृष्ट्या विचार्यमाणे अधोलिखितानि 'समर्थ' पदसंवलितानि सूत्राणि अस्मद्दृष्टिपथमवतरन्ति। (१) प्रोपाभ्यां समर्थाभ्याम् (१,३.४२), (२) समर्थः पदविधिः (२/१/१), (३) व्यवहृपणोः समर्थयोः (२/३/५७), (४) उताप्योः समर्थयोर्लिङ् (३/३/१५२), (५) समर्थानां प्रथमाद्वा (४/१/८२), (६) एकान्याभ्यां समर्थाभ्याम् (८/१/६५).

अत्र समर्थः पदविधिः, समर्थानां प्रथमाद्वेति सूत्रद्वयवर्जं अन्येषु सूत्रेषु समर्थपदस्य तुल्यार्थ—समानार्थ—एकार्थवाचकत्वं केवलमस्ति। तत्र 'समर्थः पदविधिरि'ति सूत्रस्यायमाशयो यत् समासविधायकानि सूत्राणि मिथोऽर्थसम्बद्धेषु पदेष्वेव प्रवर्तन्ते। क्रमेण एकैकानन्तः पदानि समर्थानि न, किन्तु परस्परमर्थदृष्ट्या संगतानि एव पदानि समर्थान्युच्यन्ते। राज्ञः पुरुष इत्यत्र अर्थदृष्ट्या संयुक्तं राजेति पुरुषेति पदद्वयं समर्थम्, तर्हि भार्या राज्ञः पुरुषो देवदत्तस्येत्यत्र राज्ञः पुरुष इत्युभे क्रमदृष्ट्या अव्यवहितेऽपि अर्थदृष्ट्या न सम्बद्धे इतीत्येतादृशस्थले राज्ञः पुरुष इत्यत्र समासो भवितुं नार्हति।

समर्थः पदविधिरित्यत्र विधिशब्दः कर्मसाधनः, विधीयत इति विधिः, अत्र विपूर्वकाद् धाञ् धातोः कर्मसाधनः किः, ततश्च पदविधिर्नाम समासानां विधिः पदसम्बद्ध इति। तथा च यत्र व्याकरणसूत्रसिद्धानां सुबन्ततिङन्तपदानां निर्दिष्टः कोऽपि विधिर्भवतिचेत्तर्हि अर्थदृष्ट्या परस्परं संगतानां पदानां भवतीति।

समर्थः पदविधिरिति सूत्रे कात्यायन निर्दिष्टं अर्थपरिवर्तनम्

समर्थः पदविधिरिति सूत्रे समर्थपदे वार्तिककारः (कात्यायनः) किञ्चित् परिवर्तनं विधाय, ततश्च समर्थेत्यस्य स्थाने समर्थानामिति न्यासं सूचयति। तेन अर्थदृष्ट्या परस्परं सम्बद्धानां पदानां विधिः (समासः) भवतीति एवं सूत्रार्थो विधीयते। किन्त्वत्र 'समर्थानाम्' इति समर्थपदानां बहुत्वे दर्शिते एकस्य द्वयोर्वा पदयोः समासो न भविष्यतीत्यनिष्टापत्तौ,—अथ च मूलसूत्रगतसमर्थ इति पदस्य स्थाने समर्थानामिति विपर्यासे सूत्रभेददोषो जायते इति कृत्वा कात्यायनोऽत्र 'एकशेषनिर्देशाद्वा' इति वार्तिकमुपन्यस्यति, भाष्यकारश्चैतत्समर्थयति।

महाभाष्यकारो भगवान् पतञ्जलिः पदविधिरिति पदस्य त्रिविधं विग्रहं करोति, पदस्य विधिः, पदयोः विधिः, पदानां विधिरिति पदविधिः। अत्रैतेषु त्रिष्वपि षष्ठी तत्पुरुषः।

ततोऽप्यूर्ध्वं सः पदविधिरिति शब्दं पुनर्द्विधा व्याख्याति । तद्यथा पदात् विधिरिति पञ्चमी तत्पुरुषः, पदे च विधिरिति सप्तमी तत्पुरुषः । तत्र पदाद् विधिरित्यस्य वाक्ये पूर्वपदादुत्तरं विद्यमानस्य कोऽपि विधिस्तत्र व्याकरणसम्बन्धी विधिः प्रवर्तते तद्यथा–'अग्निमीडे' इति । अत्र हि 'अग्निम् ईडे' इत्यत्र 'तिङ्ङतिङः' (पा. ८/१/२८) सूत्रेण 'ईडे' इत्युत्तर-पदस्यानुदात्तस्वरो भवति । पदे विधिरित्यस्योदाहरणम् 'कुत्सने सुप्यगात्रादौ' (८/१/६९) इति सूत्रम् । अनेन हि सूत्रेण कुत्सनार्थवाचकं उत्तरपदं यदि स्यात्तर्हि गात्रवाचकपदं वर्जयित्वा पूर्वपदस्यानुदात्तः स्वरो भवतीति ।

समर्थः पदविधिरिति सूत्रं केषाञ्चन स्पष्टं न प्रतिभाति, यतो हि अत्र 'समर्थ' इति पदं 'पदविधेः' प्रथमासामानाधिकरण्येन विशेषणम् । परन्तु वस्तुतो विचार्यमाणे समर्थ-पदस्यान्वयः पदविधिरित्यनेन सह न, किन्तु पदविध्यन्तर्गतपदेन सह उचितः, अतोऽत्र महा-भाष्यकारो विधिमात्रं पदं समर्थेन साकं योजयति, ततश्च समर्थानां विधिरिति समर्थ इति विग्रहं कुरुते । ईदृशः 'समर्थानां विधिः समर्थः' इति समासः आश्चर्यमुत्पादयति, यतो ह्येतादृश समासविधायकपाणिनिप्रमाणस्याविदितचरत्वम् । समासान्तर्गत पाणिनिसूत्रेषु समर्थानां विधिरित्यत्र विधिरूपस्योत्तरपदस्य लोपकारकं किञ्चिद्विधानं सूत्रं वा नोपलभ्यते । तदेष **कात्यायनः**, योऽत्र एकं विशिष्टं वार्तिकं विनिर्मिमीते 'समानाधिकरणाधिकारे शाकपार्थिवादीनामुपसंख्यान-मुत्तरपदलोपश्च' (क्तेन नञ् विशिष्टेनानञ् (२१'/६०). एतत्सूत्रगतेनानेन वार्तिकेन अयं लोपः सिद्ध्यति । इति समर्थानां विधिः इति 'समर्थः' एतादृशं पदं **सिध्यति** ।

तत्रभवान् **भट्टोजिदीक्षितः** समर्थः पदविधिरितिसूत्रे 'पदसम्बन्धी यो विधिः' सः समर्था-श्रितो बोध्य इत्याटीकते । अत्र च लक्षणया 'समर्थ' इति शब्दः समर्थाश्रित सामर्थ्यस्य वाचकः ।

तदेवं समर्थः पदविधिरिति सूत्रस्यायमाशयो यत् यत्र यत्र पदविधिर्दर्शितस्तत्र समर्थ इति पदेन अर्थदृष्ट्या परस्परं सम्बद्धः पदोच्चयोऽवगम्यते ।

व्यपेक्षारूपं सामर्थ्यम्

समर्थः पदविधिरित्यत्र भाष्ये समर्थपदवाच्यं सामर्थ्यमेकार्थीभावरूपं व्यपेक्षारूपमिति द्विधा।

तत्र तावद् व्यपेक्षारूपसामर्थ्यस्य किं स्वरूपमित्यपि विचारणीयम् । अत्र वार्तिककारः 'परस्परव्यपेक्षायां सामर्थ्यमेके' (**पातञ्जलमहाभाष्यम्**, द्वितीयोऽध्यायः, सम्पादकः श्री गुरुप्रसाद शास्त्री, १९३९, पृ. ३५) । एतदेवाटीकमानो भाष्यकारो व्यपेक्षारूपं सामर्थ्यं यथा विशदयति तथा 'परस्परव्यपेक्षां सामर्थ्यमेक इच्छन्ति । का पुनः शब्दयोर्व्यपेक्षा ? न ब्रूमः शब्दयोः, किं तर्हि अर्थयोः । इह हि राज्ञः पुरुष इत्युक्ते राजा पुरुषमपेक्षते ममायमिति, पुरुषोऽपि राजानमपेक्षते अहमस्येति' तयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य (स्वस्वामिभावस्य) षष्ठी वाचिका भवतीति (महाभाष्य० गुरुप्रसाद, पृ. ३६). अत्र वाक्ये आकांक्षादिवशाद् विशिष्टार्थ उपस्थितो भवति, यतो हि वाक्ये समागतानि पृथगर्थानि पदानि परस्परस्यापेक्षां कुर्वन्ति । तदेवं स्वपृथगर्थयुक्तानि पदानि आकांक्षादिवशेन विशिष्टार्थमुपस्थापयन्तीति ।

व्यपेक्षालक्षणं ब्रुवन् तत्रभवान् न्यायकोशकार उल्लिखति यद् 'व्यपेक्षा च स्वार्थ-पर्यवसायिनां पदानां आकांक्षादिवशात् परस्परं सम्बन्धवत्त्वे सति एकोपस्थित्यजनकत्वमिति

(न्यायकोशः, पृ. ९२८). तदेवं सिद्धं यत् 'स्वार्थपर्यवसायिनां' परस्पर संबन्धरूपं अन्वयापरपदाथ व्यपेक्षारूपं सामर्थ्यं भवतीति, 'विशिष्टा अपेक्षा व्यपेक्षेति' व्युत्पत्तेः।

व्यपेक्षारूपसामर्थ्याय भाष्यकारः समर्थः पदविधिरिति सूत्रे समागतसमर्थपदस्येत्थं व्याख्यानं वितनुते यद् 'यदा व्यपेक्षा सामर्थ्य तदेवं विग्रहः करिष्यते 'सम्प्रेक्षितार्थः, समर्थः सम्बद्धार्थः समर्थ इति (महा० गुरु०, पृ. ३७–३८).

एतस्यैव व्यपेक्षारूपसामर्थ्यस्य व्यापकता सर्वत्रैव वाङ्मये गद्यपद्यमये च काव्यादौ दण्डान्वयरूपेण खण्डान्वयरूपेण च शब्दतत्त्वविद्भिः किल दरीदृश्यतेऽनुभूयते च।

एकार्थीभावरूपं सामर्थ्यम्

एकार्थीभावरूप सामर्थ्यस्य समर्थनाय भाष्यकृदित्थं ब्रूते यत् 'तद् यदा एकार्थीभावः सामर्थ्य तदा एवं विग्रहः करिष्यते 'सगतार्थः समर्थः संसृष्टार्थः समर्थ इति। तद्यथा 'सगतं घृतं' 'संगतं तैलमित्युच्यते, एकीभूतमिति गम्यते। संसृष्टार्थः समर्थ इति [तद्यथा] संसृष्टोऽग्नि-रित्युच्यते एकीभूत इति गम्यते। महाभाष्य, गुरु० २/१ १, पृ. ३८).

तदेतस्मिन्नेकार्थीभावे पृथगर्थाः पांसूदकवदेकत्रिता भवन्ति। तत्र पांसुः, उदकञ्च भिन्ने इति प्रतीतिर्न भवति किन्तु तदुभयमिश्रं पिण्डान्तरं भवति, एवम्पृथगर्थोऽपि स्थितेरूपोऽय-मेकार्थीभावः। तदाह भाष्यकारो वार्तिकद्वारेण यत् 'पृथगर्थानामेकार्थीभावः समर्थवचनम्' इति। (महाभाष्य, गुरु. २ १/१, पृ. ३५). अत्र एकार्थीभावे अवयवार्थापेक्षया विलक्षणः समुदायार्थः प्रत्येति। एतादृशी च विलक्षणा प्रतीतिः एकार्थीभावरूपसामर्थ्यमन्तरा कथमपि नोपपद्यते। तस्मात् समासादिवृत्तौ शाब्दिकैरेकार्थीभाव उररीकृतः।

एकार्थीभावस्वीकारादेव ऋद्धस्य राजपुरुष इत्यभिप्रायेण ऋद्धस्य राजपुरुष इति शिष्टप्रयोगो न भवति, 'पदार्थः पदार्थेनान्वेति न तु पदार्थैकदेशेन' इति न्यायेन राजपुरुष इति समासे विशिष्टस्यैकपदार्थत्वेन राजपदार्थैकदेशतया पुरुषविशेषणे राजनि ऋद्धस्य विशेषण-स्यान्वयासम्भवात्। यदि समासादिवृत्तौ एकार्थीभावो नाङ्गीक्रियते तर्हि राज्ञि ऋद्धस्य विशेषणान्वयतात्पर्येण पुरुषेण सह राज्ञा समासस्थले ऋद्धस्य राजपुरुष इत्यापद्येत।

यदि एतदापत्तिनिरासाय 'सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्न वृत्तस्य वा विशेषणयोगो' इति वचनद्वयमङ्गीक्रियते तदा एतद्वचनद्वयाङ्गीकाररूपगौरवापत्तिः स्यात्।

व्यपेक्षा-एकार्थीभावरूप सामर्थ्यविषये कैयटोऽपीत्थमालोकते यत् 'पृथगर्था येषां पदानां तानि (पदानि) पृथगर्थानि पदानि। वाक्ये हि राज्ञःपुरुष इत्यत्र राजशब्दो राजार्थमेवाचष्टे, पुरुषशब्दोऽपि पुरुषार्थमेव। वृत्तौ तु राजपुरुष इत्यत्र राजशब्दोऽपि पुरुषार्थमेवाचष्टे इति द्वयोरेकार्थीभावो भवति। अथवाऽन्य एव अत्रावयवार्थव्यतिरिक्तः समुदायार्थः प्रादुर्भवति इति तदपेक्षया एकार्थीभाव उच्यते, पांसूदकवदेकभावापन्नत्वाद् इति।

तदेवं व्यपेक्षा-एकार्थीभावरूपसामर्थ्ययोः क्षेत्रे निरीक्ष्यमाणेऽयं सिद्धान्तः समुदेति यत् 'वृत्तौ पृथगर्थानि पदानि यदा समुदितानि भवन्ति तदा तत्र समुदायशक्तिः एका विशिष्टार्थशक्ति (अयमेवैकार्थीभावः). वाक्यादपि विशिष्टार्थप्रतीतिस्तु भवत्येव किन्त्वत्र कारणं भिन्नम्, एकत्र वाक्ये आकांक्षा, अपरत्र वृत्तौ समुदायशक्तिः कारणमिति।

अस्मिन् विषये भर्तृहरिरपीत्थं व्याचष्टे यत् 'एकार्थीभाव एवात समासाख्या विधीयते। (वाक्यपदीय वृत्ति समुद्देश: ३/१४/४४ . स एव अग्रे कथयति यत् तथा 'वाक्यव्यपेक्षायां, समासोऽन्यत्र शिष्यते' (वाक्य, ३ १४ ४५).

अमुमेव एकार्थीभावं समुदिताथ प्रतिपादयन् तत्रभवान् भूषणकारोऽपि भट्टोजिकारिका-मुद्धरति यत् 'समासे खलु भिन्नव शक्तिः पंकजशब्दवत्। बहूनां वृत्तिधर्माणां वचनरेव साधने। स्यान्महद्गौरवं तस्मादेकार्थीभाव आश्रितः। (वैयाकरणभूषणसारः भट्टोजिकारिका ४अ, ५). सं. प. श्रीबालकृष्ण पञ्चोली; बयाकरणभूषणसार:, समासशक्तिनिर्णय : पृ. २७७). अत्रव च भूषणसारकरो भणति यत् 'व्यपेक्षाविवक्षायां वाक्यस्य, एकार्थीभावे समासस्येति स्वभावत एव प्रयोगनियम संभवात्' (सं. पं. बालकृष्ण वै-भू. सारः प्रभाटीकासयुतः पृ. २८२).

एतस्मिन्विषये तत्रभवान् बालमनोरमाकारोऽपि 'एकार्थीभावरूपसामर्थ्यविषये' इत्थं आटीकते यत् 'तत्र स्वार्थपर्यवसायिनां पदानामाकांक्षादिवशाद् यः परस्परान्वयस्तद् व्यपेक्षाभिधं सामर्थ्यम्, एकार्थीभावलक्षणसामर्थ्य तु प्रक्रियादशायां प्रत्येकमर्थवत्त्वेन पृथग् गृहीतानां पदानां समुदायशक्त्या विशिष्टार्थप्रतिपादकतारूपम्। (पा. २'१ १, **सिद्धान्त कौमुदी, बालमनोरमा टीका,** काशी संस्कृत सीरिज, १९४१, पृ. १३६).

अधुनाऽयं प्रश्नः समुदेति यत् 'व्यपेक्षायां वाक्ये, एकार्थीभावे वा समासादिवृत्तौ समेतानि पदानि विभिन्नमर्थमभिदधति इति कथनमयोग्यम्। एतदेवायोग्यत्वं प्रश्नत्वेन स्थापयन् पतञ्जलिः कथयति यत 'यावता राज्ञःपुरुषः आनीयतां इत्युक्ते राजपुरुष आनीयते),' (अथ राजपुरुष आनीयतामित्युक्ते) राजपुरुष एव आनीयते। तर्हि अर्थदृष्ट्या भाषाशास्त्र-दृष्ट्या च एकस्मिन्नेवार्थे सिद्धे एकार्थीभावाङ्गीकारे व्यपेक्षातः को विशेष इति विषये भाष्यकृता स्वयमेव प्रश्न उत्थापितः कस्तर्ह्येकार्थीभावकृतो विशेष इति ! ततश्च 'सुबलोपो व्यवधानं-यथेष्टमन्यतरेणाभिसम्बन्ध' इति वार्तिकेन प्रयोगदृष्ट्या समासवाक्ययो भेदो दर्शितस्ततश्च 'संख्याविशेषो व्यक्ताभिधानमुपसर्जनविशेषणं च योगः, इति (महाभा गुरु. पृ. २०) अर्थ-दृष्ट्याऽपि समास वाक्ययोभदो भाष्यकृता प्रादर्शि।

तदेवं एकार्थीभाव-व्यपेक्षारूपं सामर्थ्यचिन्तनमस्माभिश्चिन्तितम्। एतद्धि चिन्तनं कात्यायन एव सर्वप्रथम करोति। तत्रभवान् कात्यायनः अर्थविज्ञानदृष्टिमभिलक्ष्य दार्शनिक दृष्टिं चाङ्गीकृत्य समर्थपदवाच्यस्य सामर्थ्यस्य सर्वप्रथम विवेचन कृतवान्। एकार्थीभावो-व्यपेक्षेति नामद्वयं पाणिनेरविदितचरम्। तदस्योभयविधसामर्थ्यस्य विशिष्टा चर्चा कात्यायनादारभ्यते। सामर्थ्योपयोगितायाश्च प्रश्नः पतञ्जलिना उत्थाप्यते। अत्र विषये तत्र भवान् **एस. डी. जोषी** महोदयोऽप्यमुमेवार्थं प्रस्तौति यत् 'कात्यायन maintains the tradition of पाणिनि so far its technique is concerned but tries to improve upon that tradition by means of its philosophical interpretation. He defines सामर्थ्य in terms of semantics as एकार्थीभाव and व्यपेक्षा the concepts which seem to have been unknown to पाणिनि (पतञ्जलि's व्याकरण महाभाष्य समर्थाह्निक, Introduction P. XI. Edited with translation and explanatory notes by S. D. Joshi, Publication of the centre of Advanced study in Sanskrit class No. 3, University of Poona, Poona 1968).

सामर्थ्यसंदर्भे इदमपि विशेषतो निभालनीयं यत् यदा 'पाणिनिसूत्राणि केवलं समासादिरूपरचनापरायणानि सन्ति तदा कात्यायनः तत्र अर्थदृष्ट्या यद् विविनक्ति तत् खलु नितान्त मौलिकं विवेचनम्। तदनु च तदिदं पतञ्जलेरपि इदं अपूर्वं कौशलं यत् स (पतञ्जलिः) पाणिनिनिरूपितां भाषाशास्त्रसम्बद्धां सरणिं कात्यायननिहितां च दार्शनिकीं सरणिमिति एतयोः सरण्योः समन्वयं कुर्वन् स्वीयमपूर्वं कौशलमभिव्यनक्ति। अत्र विषये तत्रभवान् एस. डी जोशी महोदयो यल्लिखति तदत्यन्तं महत्त्वपूर्णम्। 'It will be seen that पतञ्जलि seeks to steer clear of the two extreme approaches namely, that of descriptive linguistic adopted by पाणिनि and that of philosophical linguistics adopted by कात्यायन, (पतञ्जलि's महाभाष्य. एस. डी. जोशी. Introduction P. XVIII).

तदेतत्सामर्थ्यं व्यपेक्षारूपमेकार्थीभावरूपं च समासादिवृत्तौ निरूप्यते। तत्र परार्थाभिधानं वृत्तिरिति समर्थसूत्रे भगवान् भाष्यकारः। 'परो विशिष्टो योऽर्थः तदभिधानं शक्त्या लक्षणया आकांक्षादिवशात् संसर्गमर्यादया वा सा वृत्तिः इति कौण्डभट्टः। ततश्च यत्र समासे प्रधानशब्देन अप्रधानशब्दार्थविशेषणकस्यैव स्वार्थस्याभिधानं तत्परार्थाभिधानम्। वाक्यावस्थायां विद्यमाने राज्ञः पुरुष इति वाक्ये राजन् इत्यस्योपसर्जनत्वं, पुरुष इत्यस्य च प्राधान्यं निर्देष्टुं न शक्यते किन्तु राजपुरुष इति समासस्थले उपसर्जनीभूतराजविशिष्टप्रधानभूतपुरुषरूपो योऽर्थो गम्यते स वृत्तिरूपः।

ततश्च परार्थाभिधायकपञ्चवृत्तिनिष्पादकसूत्राणां, यत्रैकार्थीभावरूपं सामर्थ्यं तत्रैव प्रवृत्तिरिति। तेन—

(१) पश्य कुम्भं, करोति घटम् इत्यत्र कर्मण्यण् न (कृद्वृत्तौ) (२) वस्त्रं उपगोः, अपत्यं चैत्रस्येति तद्धितवृत्तौ तस्यापत्यमित्यण् न (३) पश्य कृष्णं, श्रितो ग्राममित्यत्र समासवृत्तौ द्वितीयाश्रितेति तत्पुरुषः (समासो) न (४) आगच्छ राम, रामः तिष्ठति इत्येकशेषवृत्तौ सरूपाणामिति सूत्रेण एकशेषो न (५) पश्य पुत्रम्, इच्छति धनम् इति नामधातुवृत्तौ (सन्नन्तादिवृत्तौ पुत्रशब्दात् क्यच् न।)

तदेवमेकार्थीभावरूपं सामर्थ्यं समासादिपञ्चवृत्तिष्वेवानुभूयते, न तु वाक्ये।

जहत्स्वार्था—अजहत्स्वार्थावृत्तिः—

अधुना तावत्प्रसङ्गवशाद् इदमपि विचारणीयं यत् एकार्थीभावरूपा वृत्तिः (एकार्थीभावरूपं सामर्थ्यं वा) या पूर्वत्र दृष्टा, सा वृत्तिः जहत्स्वार्था—अजहत्स्वार्थेति द्विधा। (१) तत्र जहत्स्वार्थावृत्तिः—जहति (शत्रन्तं वर्तमान कृदन्तं) स्वानि पदानि, यं (अर्थम्) सः जहत्स्वः। जहत्स्वः अर्थः यस्यां वृत्ताविति बहुव्रीहिगर्भो बहुव्रीहिः (२) अथवा जहति पदानि स्वार्थं यस्यां सा जहत्स्वार्था वृत्तिरिति व्यधिकरणत्रिपदबहुव्रीहिः।

अत्र प्रथमं तावद् जहत्स्वार्थवृत्तिविषये भाष्यकृदित्थं विचारयति यत् यदि जहत्स्वार्था वृत्तिः (स्यात्), राजपुरुषमानयेत्युक्ते पुरुषमात्रस्यानयनं भवति, औपगवमानयेत्युक्तेऽपत्यमात्रस्य।

अथ अजहत्स्वार्थावृत्तिः, उभयोर्विद्यमानस्वार्थयोर्द्वयोर्द्विवचनं प्राप्नोति, का पुनर्वृत्तिर्न्याय्येति। जहत्स्वार्था। बाढं युक्तम्, एवं हि दृश्यते लोके पुरुषोऽयं परकर्मणि प्रवर्तमानः स्वं कर्म जहाति। तद्यथा 'राजकर्मणि प्रवर्तमानः स्वं (तक्ष) कर्म जहाति। एवं युक्तं यद् राजा पुरुषार्थे वर्तमानः स्वमर्थं जह्यात्। उपगुश्चापत्यार्थे वर्तमानः स्वमर्थं जह्यात्। ननु चोक्त राजपुरुषमानयेत्युक्ते पुरुषमात्रस्यानयनं प्राप्नोति, औपगावमानयेत्युक्तेऽपत्यमात्रस्येति। नैष दोषः। जहदप्यसौ स्वार्थ नात्यन्ताय जहाति, यः परार्थविरोधी स्वार्थस्तं जहाति। तद्यथा 'तक्षा राजकर्मणि प्रवर्तमानः स्वं तक्षकर्म जहाति, न तु हिक्कित श्वसित हसित कण्डूयितानि। न चायमर्थः परार्थविरोधी विशेषणं नाम, तस्मात्तन्न हास्यति। (महाभाष्य, गुरु, २।१।१, पृ. २९–३०).

पृथगर्थवदेकार्थीभावरूपे सामर्थ्यवति जहत्स्वार्थवृत्तिपक्षे हि पूर्वं राज्ञः पुरुष इति व्यपेक्षावाक्ये राज्ञःपुरुष इत्येतत्पदद्वयं स्वीयमर्थं बिभृते, किन्तु एकदा समासे जाते, एकार्थीभावे वा संवृत्ते राजन्, पुरुष इतिपदद्वयस्यैकार्थीभावो जायते, अत्र हि पुरुषशब्दः पुरुषार्थं तु ब्रूत एव, किन्तु राजन् शब्दोऽपि पुरुषार्थं ब्रूते, तद्यथा कैयटः 'वाक्ये हि राज्ञःपुरुष इत्यत्र राजशब्दो राजार्थमेवाचष्टे, पुरुष शब्दोऽपि पुरुषार्थमेव, वृत्तौ तु राजपुरुष इत्यत्र राजशब्दोऽपि पुरुषार्थमेवाचष्टे इति द्वयोरेकार्थीभावो भवति। (महाभा० कैयट (प्रदीप) पृ. १७।) अत्र नागेशोऽप्युद्योते भणति यथा 'पांसूदकयोर्मिलने पिण्डाख्यान्तम् एव द्रव्यम् (महा० पृ.१७), तथा च एकार्थीभावे जाते जहत्स्वार्थे च संपन्ने नावयवानां स्वतंत्रा प्रतीतिः, किन्तु समुदितार्थस्यैव प्रतीतिः इति।

अत्र हि जहत्स्वार्थवृत्तिपक्षे तत्रभवान् भर्तृहरिरपि व्याचष्टे यत् 'अन्वयाद् गम्यते योऽर्थः विरोधी वा निवर्तते। द्व्यर्थमर्थान्तरे वापि तत्राहुरुपसर्जनम्' (वाक्यपदीय-वृत्तिसमुद्देशः का. ९७). (वाक्यपदीयम्. सं. के. वी. अभ्यङ्कर, वी. पी. लीमये; University of Poona Sanskrit and Prarkrit Series, Vol. II, Poona, 1965 अस्यायमाशयो यत् 'समासे हि समुदायगतप्रधानार्थेन विरोधी उपसर्जनपदस्य स्वीयः प्रधानार्थो निवर्तते अन्यथा समासे उभयो पदयोः प्राधान्यं चेत्परस्परमन्वये सम्बन्धो न भविष्यति, ततश्च विशिष्टस्य प्रधानार्थस्योपस्थितिर्न भविष्यति, अतः उपसर्जनपदस्य प्राधान्यं स्वत एव निवर्तते।

तदेवं जहत्स्वार्थवृत्ति-अजहत्स्वार्थवृत्तिविषयगतं एकार्थीभावरूपसामर्थ्यं तदेतद्वृत्तिद्वयञ्च पतञ्जलित आरभ्यते। इदं वृत्तिद्वयं कात्यायनस्य न विदितचरम्। कामं पतञ्जलिना तदेतद् वृत्तिद्वय कस्माच्चित् वैयाकरणात् तदीय नाम अनिर्दिश्य गृहीतं स्यादिति चेत् स तर्को न दूरापास्तः। अत्र तत्रभवान् एस. डी. जोशी महादेयोऽपि लिखति यत् 'These two interpretations of एकार्थीभाव seem to date from पतञ्जलि's time and are not known to कात्यायन, It is of course, not impossible that पतञ्जलि has derived them from some other grammarian whom he does not quote. पतञ्जलि's महाभाष्य सं. S. D. Joshi. Introduction, P. XI)

तदेवं पतञ्जलिः जहत्स्वार्थाजहत्स्वार्थेति वृत्तिद्वयस्य स्वीयं मौलिकं प्रदानं व्याकरणशास्त्रे कुरुते। अत्रापि श्रीमान् एस. डी. जोशी महोदयो लिखति यत्। He (पतञ्जलि) makes his

own contribution to the system by introducing the theories relating to the types वृत्तिs, जहत्स्वार्था and अजहत्स्वार्था. (पतञ्जलि's महाभाष्य, S. D. Joshi. Introduction. P. XVII).

जहत्स्वार्था - भेदः संसर्गो वा

तदेवं वृत्तेर्जहत्स्वार्थत्वप्रतिपादनतात्पर्येण भेदसंसर्गौ वा सामर्थ्यम् इत्यपि निर्देशो लभ्यते। तदेवं भाष्यकृत् कथयति 'अथवा समर्थाधिकारोऽयं वृत्तौ क्रियते' (महाभाष्य गुरु० २/१/१ पृ. ३२. अत्र 'वृत्तौ क्रियते' इत्यंशं टीकमानः कैयटो लिखति यत् 'यदि च भेदसंसर्गौ न स्यातां तदा सामर्थ्यमेव न स्यात्, तदात्मकत्वात् सामर्थ्यस्येत्यर्थः। 'अत्र च **नागेशोऽपि** लिखति यद् 'एवं च भेदसंसर्गप्रतिपादकत्वमेवैकार्थीभावसामर्थ्यम्' (महा० गुरु० उद्योत पृ. ३२).

तदेवं भाष्यकारः भेदः संसर्गो वा सामर्थ्यमिति व्याहृत्य एकं प्रश्नमुपस्थापयति यद् 'कः पुनः भेदः संसर्गो वा' इह राज्ञ इत्युक्ते सव स्वं प्रसक्तम्, पुरुष इत्युक्ते सर्वः स्वामी प्रसक्तः। इहेदानीं राजपुरुषमानयेत्युक्ते राजा पुरुषं निवर्तयत्यन्येभ्यः स्वामिभ्यः, पुरुषोऽपि राजानमन्येभ्यः स्वेभ्यः। एवमुभयतो व्यवच्छिन्ने यदि स्वार्थं-जहाति तर्हि कामं जहातु, न जातुचित् पुरुषमात्रस्यानयनं भविष्यति' (महाभाष्य, गुरु० २।१।१। पृ. ३३).

आङ्कारिकेष्वपि तत्रभवान् भोजराजः एतदेव सामर्थ्य विवृण्वन् कथयति यत् 'किं पुनरिदं सामर्थ्यं नाम। भेदः संसर्गः उभयं वा। तत्र राज्ञः पुरुष इत्यत्र तावद् एतावदवधृत-परायत-वृत्तिरयं पुरुषः न स्वतंत्रः, तदा स्वामिसंसर्गस्यावगतत्वात्। स्वामिविशेषज्ञानोपादीयमानो राजशब्देभ्यः स्वाम्यन्तरेभ्यः पुरुषं व्यावर्तयति। सोऽयं स्वाम्यन्तरव्यवच्छेदो भेद इत्युच्यते। (**शृङ्गारप्रकाशः** अ. ३४ Quoted in **व्याकरण दर्शन** by **रामसुरेश त्रिपाठी.** पृ ३९४).

अत्र भेदसंसर्गविषये **भूषणसारकारः** कौण्डभट्टोऽपि लिखति यत् 'भेदस्य वृत्त्यर्थत्वेन, राजपुरुष इत्यादौ अराजकीयभिन्न इति बोधः। अस्यावाच्यत्वे च राजपुरुषः सुन्दर इतिवत् राजपुरुषो देवदत्तस्येत्यपि स्याद् इति। अथवा संसर्गस्यैव वृत्तिवाच्यत्वेन राजसम्बन्धवानित्येव शाब्दं भानम्, भेदस्तूत्तरकालमुपतिष्ठत इति पक्षान्तरम्।

वस्तुतस्तु (यथा भूषणसारकारो निवेदयति तथा) विनिगमनाविरहादस्वामिकेऽपि पुरुषे राजभिन्नस्वामिकस्य भेदस्य सत्त्वेन 'राजपुरुष' इत्यादिप्रयोगापत्तेश्च। तदुभयमेव वृत्तिवाच्यमिति स्थितम्। अतो भूषणसारकारो लिखति यत् 'तथा च अराजकीयभिन्न राजसम्बन्धवांश्चायम् इति बोधः (**वै. भू. सार.** संपा. पं बालकृष्ण पञ्चोली. पृ. २७५).

भेदसंसर्गविषये भर्तृहरिपि लिखति यत् 'उपायमात्रं नानात्वं समूहस्त्वेक एव सः। विकल्पाभ्युच्चयाभ्यां वा भेदसंसर्गकल्पना। (**वाक्य** ३/१४/९८).

अथ च जहत्स्वार्थाजहत्स्वार्थवृत्तिद्वयसन्दर्भेऽपि भर्तृहरिर्भणति यत् 'वृत्तिं वर्तयतामेवं अबुधप्रतिपत्तये। भिन्नाः सबोधनोपायाः पुरुषेष्वनवस्थिताः। (**वाक्य.** ३/१४/९७). ततश्चेदं भर्तृहरिमते सिध्यति यत् 'राजपुरुष' इत्येष समूहस्तु उपेय एक एव, किन्तु तं संबन्धं व्याख्यातुं जहत्स्वार्थाजहत्स्वार्थवृत्तिद्वयं केवलमुपायभूतमिति।

गच्छता कालेन तत्रभवता कौण्डभट्टेन भाष्यकृद्-भर्तृहरि चिन्तनमेव मनसिकृत्य समासशक्तिनिर्णय इति एकम्प्रकरणमलेखि। अत्र च कौण्डभट्टस्य मुख्यं लक्ष्यं गौतमजैमिनीयवचोव्याख्यातृदूषितवैयाकरणसिद्धान्तपुनरुज्जीवनस्य वर्तते।

चित्रगुः, राजपुरुषः, प्राप्तोदको ग्रामः, इत्यादीनि प्रधानान्युदाहरणान्यादाय पूर्वपक्षेण व्यपेक्षावादस्वीकारे, तदर्थं च लक्षणास्वीकारे कियाननर्थो भवतीति, व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पना च कर्तव्या भवतीति भूषणसारेण दर्शितम्।

समासादिवृत्तौ व्यपेक्षारूपमेव सामर्थ्यमिति नैयायिकमीमांसकादीनां मतं नोपादेयम्। तथा हि ऋद्धस्य राजपुरुष इत्यादि प्रयोगापत्तिवारणाय सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्न वृत्तस्य वा विशेषणयोगो नेत्यादिवचनारम्भे, विशिष्य च 'विभाषा' वचनारम्भे महद्गौरवमापद्येत। शाब्दिकानां नये तु नैतदपूर्व वचनम्, अपि तु फलितार्थकथनपरतयाऽनुवादकमेवेति महल्लाघवम्।

किञ्च-धवखदिरौ, निष्कौशाम्बिः, गोरथः, घृतघटः, गुडधानाः, केशचूडः, सुवर्णालङ्कारः, द्विदशाः, सप्तपर्ण इत्यादौ इतरेतरयोग-अतिक्रान्त-युक्त-पूर्ण-मिश्र-संघात-विकार-सुच् प्रत्ययलोप वीप्साद्यर्थानां वाचनिकत्वेन वाच्यतया व्यपेक्षापक्षेऽपि गौरवं तेषामापतति इति भूषणकृद् भट्टोजिकारिकामत्र स्थापयति 'चकारादिनिषेधोऽथ बहुव्युत्पत्तिभंजनम्। कर्तव्यं ते न्यायसिद्धं त्वस्माकं तदिति स्थितिः (वै. भू. सा. का. (बालकृष्ण, का. ३३). ततश्च मीमांसानिगदित 'वर्षासु रथकारोऽग्निमादधीत' इत्यत्र रथकारपदेऽपि समुदायशक्तिः साधिता। समासे एकार्थीभावमतस्वीकारादेव 'वषट्कर्तुः प्रथमभक्ष' इत्यत्र न भक्षमुद्दिश्य प्राथम्यविधानं, मिलितार्थबोधजनकतारूपा या एकप्रसरता (एकार्थीभावात्मका शक्तिः) तस्याः भगः, तद्बाधरूपो यो वाक्यभेदस्तस्यापत्तेः। 'ऋत्विजो हविःशेषं भक्षयन्ति' इति वाक्यान्तरेण भक्षणमनूद्य वषट्कर्तुः अप्राप्तं प्राथम्यं विधीयते। एतत्सर्वं समुदायशक्तिपक्षेणैव उपपन्नं भवति। एवमेव 'त्र्यङ्गैः स्विष्टकृतं यजतीत्यादौ' समुदायशक्तिपक्ष एव ज्यायान्। अरुणया पिंगाक्ष्या एकहायन्या गवा सोमं क्रीणातीत्यादौ अरुणाधिकरणन्यायोऽपि समुदायशक्तिपक्षे सुसंगतः। गुणेन न क्रयणम्, क्रयणे प्रकृष्टोपकारकं हि द्रव्यमिति अरुणेतिगुणपदं-गुणविशिष्टगुणिनं बोधयतीति। तदेवं मीमांसकादिमतं कौण्डभट्टेन खण्डयित्वा एकार्थीभावः स्थापितः।

इतः पूर्वं नैयायिकैः उपकुम्भम्, अर्धं पिप्पलीत्याद्युपपत्तये व्यपेक्षापक्षं स्वीकृत्य तत्र जघन्या या लक्षणावृत्तिः स्वीक्रियते, तस्यापि खण्डनं महता युक्तिवैभवेन कौण्डभट्टेन विहितम्। एतद्विषये च भट्टोजिदीक्षितकारिकाऽपि कौण्डभट्टेनोद्धृता यत् समासे खलु भिन्नैव शक्तिः पङ्कजशब्दवत्। बहूनां वृत्तिधर्माणां वचनैरेव साधने। स्यान्महद्गौरवं तस्मादेकार्थीभाव आश्रितः (वै. भू. सारः सं. पं. बालकृष्ण पञ्चोली, ३१ अ, ३२).

अस्य कौण्डभट्टस्यैव प्रायो वाचोयुक्तीः समाश्रित्य तत्रभवता सर्वतंत्रस्वतंत्रेण नागेश भट्टेनापि एकार्थीभावस्य स्थापना कृता। परमलघुमंजूषायां हि समासशक्तिप्रकरणे बहवस्तादृशा अपि सन्दर्भाः, ये कौण्डभट्टसन्दर्भैः सह साम्यमाकलयन्ति। विद्वद्भिस्तत्र तत्र दृष्टे सति इदं स्पष्टीभवतीति।

कुत्रचिद्नागेशस्य विशिष्टं मतमप्यत्र सन्दर्भे दृश्यते। नागेशश्च कुत्रचित् कौण्डभट्टमतं खण्डयति तद्यथा कौण्डभट्टमतानुसारं जहत्स्वार्थैव एकार्थीभावः अजहत्स्वार्था च व्यपेक्षापक्षः, तद्यथा कौण्डभट्टो लिखति यत् 'समर्थः पदविधिरिति सूत्रे भाष्यकारैरनेकधोक्तेप्वपि पक्षेषु जहत्स्वार्थाऽजहत्स्वार्थपक्षयोरेव एकार्थीभाव-व्यपेक्षारूपयोः पर्यवसानं लभ्यते,' एतत्कौण्डभट्टमतं समीक्षमाणः तच्च खण्डयन् नागेशः एकार्थीभावरूपसामर्थ्यस्यैव जहत्स्वार्था अजहत्स्वार्थरूपौ द्वौ पक्षौ इति व्यवस्थापयति। 'एतेन जहत्स्वार्थतैव एकार्थीभाव इति भूषणोक्तमपास्तम्। अनेन हि एकार्थीभावमुपक्रम्योक्तेः तत्रैव पक्षद्वयमिति लभ्यते' (लघुमञ्जूषा पृ. १४०९-१०, सं. कपिलदेव शास्त्री; वै. सि. परमलघु० पृ. १०८ तः उद्धृतम्).

अत्र नागेशमतेन सदृशमेव मतं पूर्वं कैयटेनापि प्रदीपे दर्शितम्। तद्यथा 'यत्र पदानि उपसर्जनीभूतस्वार्थानि, निवृत्तस्वार्थानि, प्रधानार्थोपादानाद् व्यर्थानि अर्थान्तराभिधायीनि वा स एकार्थीभावः (महा. कैयट, २/१/१)। नागेशेन स्वीयोद्योतटीकायां कैयटस्यैवेमाः पङ्क्तयः सविस्तरं व्याख्याताः। किन्तु स एव नागेशः परमलघुमंजूषायामस्मिन् संदर्भे किञ्चिदपि स्पष्टत्वं न वितनुत इति दिक्।

सेयं समासप्रणाली संस्कृतभाषायाः प्रचारार्थं लोकप्रियतार्थं, तदीय गौरववर्द्धनार्थञ्च महान्तमुपकारं वितन्वानाऽऽस्ते। अत्र खलु समासपद्धतौ दीर्घप्रदीर्घविचारशृंखला एकेनैव समासेन सरलतयाऽभिव्यञ्जयितुं शक्यते।

यत्रान्यभाषायां तत्तद्विचाराणां दर्शनाय, गुम्फनाय च बहूनि मिश्रवाक्यानि, उपवाक्यानि च नूनं शिरोवेदनाजनकानि भवन्ति तत्समये समाससरण्यानया सुदीर्घविचारः सुचारुरूपेण विना कष्टं साध्यते। अत्र च लाघवं भवति। विदितचरं हि विदुषां यत् 'अर्धमात्रालाघवेन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते वैयाकरणाः' (परिभाषेन्दुशेखरः १२२) संपा. भगवतीप्रसाद पण्ड्या; युनि. ग्रन्थनिर्माण बोर्ड, १९८४।

'समासव्यासविन्यासः सैष शिष्यहिताय नः,' इति हि काव्यमीमांसायां तत्र भवान् राजशेखरः।

वैदिकब्राह्मणनिरुक्तसूत्रग्रन्थेषु वर्णलाघवार्थं, गभीराभिप्रायस्यापि प्रायः समाससुखेनाभिव्यक्तये चिरन्तनात्कालाद् इयं समासप्रणाली प्रेयसी संपन्ना। लौकिकसंस्कृतवाङ्मये समासभूयस्त्वं तु ओजोगुणविशिष्टाया गौडीरीतेः प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशकरं संजातम्।

इमामेव समासप्रणालीमाश्रित्य आलंकारिका अपि रीतिशैलीभेदं दर्शयामासुः। तत्रभवता रुद्रटेन (प्रायः प्रथममेव) पदानां समस्तामसमस्तां च रीतिं अभिलक्ष्य रीतिभेदा अपि दर्शिताः। तद्यथा 'पाञ्चालीलाटीयागौडीया चेति नामतोऽभिहिताः। लघु-मध्य-आयत विरचन समासभेदादिमास्तत्र'। द्वित्रिपदा पाञ्चाली लाटीया पञ्च सप्त वा स्यात्। शब्दाः समासवन्तो भवन्ति यथाशक्ति गौडीया" (रुद्रटः, काव्यालङ्कारः, अध्याय २।४।५) काव्यमाला, निर्णयसागर प्रेस, बम्बई, १९०९).

संस्कृत साहित्ये 'गद्यं कवीनां निकषं वदन्ति' इति सूक्तिप्रथितस्य गद्यबन्धस्याधाररूपामिमामेव समासप्रणालीमाश्रित्य संस्कृतगद्यस्य चत्वारो विभागा अपि आलङ्कारिकैः परिदर्शिताः। तद्यथा (१) उत्कलिकाप्रायगद्यम्, (२) वृत्तिगन्धि पद्यम्, (३) मुक्तकं, (४) चूर्णकञ्चेति। तत्र च विकटाक्षरबन्धप्रबद्धं दीर्घसमासपरम्पराभिव्यक्तौ उत्कलिकाप्राय गद्यम्, तद्यथा विश्वनाथः साहित्यदर्पणे 'ओजः प्रकाशकैर्वर्णैर्बन्ध आडम्बरः पुनः। समासबहुला गौडी (सा. दर्पण) ९।४) / सुबन्धु-बाणादीनां रचनायां इयं शैली विशिष्टरूपेण दृश्यते।

इदमेव ओजः समासभूयस्त्वं प्रशंसितवता दण्डिनाप्युक्तम् यत् 'ओजः समासभूयस्त्व मेतद् गद्यस्य जीवितम्। पद्येऽप्यदाक्षिणात्यानामिदमेकं परायणम् इति (**दण्डी, काव्यादर्शः**, प्रथमपरिच्छेदः, का. ८०. संपा. पं. रंगाचार्य रेड्डी; भाण्डारकर ओरियण्टल रिसर्च इन्स्टिट्यूट, पूना, 1938)।

संस्कृतगद्य-पद्यपाठन समये पञ्च साधनान्यपेक्ष्यन्ते / 'पदच्छेदोऽन्वयोक्तिश्च समासादि विवेचनम्। पदार्थबोधस्तात्पर्यं व्याख्यावचनपञ्चकम्' इति। अत्रापि संस्कृतशिक्षणप्रणाल्यां समासपाठनाय सविशेषं आवश्यकता प्रदर्शिता।

समासो नाम 'विभक्तिर्लुप्यते यत्र तदर्थस्तु प्रतीयते। पदानां चैकपद्यं च समासः सोऽभिधीयते' (व्याकरणचन्द्रोदयः, पं. चारुदेवशास्त्री, प्रथमखण्ड. पृ. ७९)।

समासे खलु पदानां निश्चितः क्रमः, सामर्थ्यवत्पदानां मिथोऽव्यवहितता भवति। समासेन इन्द्रशत्रुर्वर्धस्वेत्याद्युदाहरणे कीदृशमर्थपरिवर्तनं जातं, समासे विहिते रूपरचनासु दश-अङ्गुलितो दशाङ्गुलम्, युधिष्ठिर इत्युलुक, समासे षत्वे जाते ध्वनिगतं परिवर्तनम्, समासे च सति जातौ सख्यायां च यत्परिवर्तनम्; तद्यथा अहश्चरात्रिश्चेत्यस्य पुंल्लिङ्गान्तत्वम्, पाणी च पादौ चेत्यस्यैकवद्भावे नपुंसकत्वम्, त्रिलोकीति समाहाद्वन्द्वे स्त्रीत्वमिति नवनवा प्रक्रिया जायते।

कुत्रचित्समासेन या अर्थाभिव्यक्ति र्भवति, न तथा सा व्यासवाक्येन, तद्यथा–कृष्णसर्पः, त्रिफला, त्रिकटु, चतुष्पदम्, चतुःशालम्, खट्वारूढ इत्यादयः शब्दाः। कुत्रचिच्च गद्यबन्धे व्यासवाक्यमेव शोभते–यतो हि व्यासेन यद् वैशद्यं निष्पाद्यते, न तत्समासेन। अत एव निरुक्तकारः 'विशयवत्यो हि वृत्तयो भवन्ति' (**निरुक्त**, (यास्क) अ. २।१।१).

साहित्यपाठनसमये समासविग्रहपदार्थकथनादिकञ्च संयुक्तरूपेणावश्यकम्। यावता न समासार्थगतबोधः न तावता समासान्तर्गतपदार्थस्य बोधः, यावता च न सुदीर्घसमासस्य विग्रहयोजना, न तावता तद् वाक्यर्थस्यावबोधः अतः समासाध्ययनाध्यापनलेखनादिविधौ सुधीभिः सावहितैर्भवितव्यमिति दिक्।

PLOT CONSTRUCTION OF THE MĀLATĪMĀDHAVA —A REAPPRAISAL—

PROF. VIJAY PANDYA

Head of the Sanskrit Deptt.,

Shree Lunawada Arts, Science & Commerce College,

Lunawada–389 230.

Panchmahals.

At present

U. G. C. Teacher Fellow,

Sanskrit Deptt.,

School of Languages,

Gujarat University, Ahmedabad–380 009.

'PLOT-CONSTRUCTION OF THE MĀLATĪMĀDHAVA' —A REAPPRAISAL*

Recently Prof. A. K. Warder, a distinguished addition to the luminous galaxy of the connoisseurs of the Sanskrit Literature[1] has regretfully averred that Bhavabhūti has fared badly at the hands of the modern writers on Indian Literature.[2] What follows is a vindication of the perceptive critics opinion and a modest attempt to set matters right within the prescribed limit.

Mālatīmādhava has proved to be a handy rod in the hands of the modern scholars and critics to beat Bhavabhūti with, and hence much has been imperceptively and insensibly written about the plot–construction of the Mālatīmādhava. What is more regrettable is that some of the criticism offered by these stalwarts has stemmed from an inaccurate study of the

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* Paper read at the Fifth Word Sanskrit Conference held at Varanasi from 21st to 26th of October, 1981.

(1) Dr. De, Dr. A. W. Ryder, Dr. G. K. Bhat, Dr. J. A. B. Van Buitenen, Dr. Henry Wells and Dr. Gerow are some of them. Dr. Umashanker Joshi, and Dr. Harivallabha Bhayani have done some valuable work in Gujarati towards this end.

(2) Sanskrit Ranga Annual Vol. VIII 72–79, p.130

original text of the drama. Modern scholars have, in fact, failed to take cognisance of an artistic awareness which has gone into making the drama an organic whole, and not a mumbo-jumbo of weird and strange incidents which the drama does not lack either ! Perhaps on the part of the critics, this seems to be a hang-over from those insipid old days when Bhavabhūti, from his contemporaries yearned for recognition which eluded him.

The Mālatīmādhava is indeed a long cry from Bhavabhūti's generally believed to be an earlier play, Mahāvīracaritam which turned out to be an episodic, in turns jerky and prolonged narration of the Rāmāyaṇa story without allowing the characters to emerge from their hoary past. In the Mālatīmādhava, Bhavabhūti has deftly handled the plot comprising of so many incidents and characters. Bhavabhūti has very skilfully executed the plot as can be seen from the artistic results achieved in the drama.

In constructing the plot of the Mālatīmādhava, Bhavabhūti has introduced many surprising elements in the story which give sudden twists and turns. In fact, in some respects, Mālatīmādhava is a unique drama as far as its plot structure goes. Bhavabhūti shunned the beaten track and blazed a new trail, of which, alas, there were few takers (appreciators as well !) in the Sanskrit Literature.

The dramatist has woven the plot and developed the incidents in such a way that up to the end of the drama, suspense is maintained and the doings of the various characters in the drama keep the reader engrossed ! Now to be fair, a word of caution may be inserted here. In a story where everything is unreal and chaotic the suspense would indeed be kept up till the end as it would be difficult, nay impossible, to predict the progress and outcome of the story. In such a story everything goes berserk. Exactly this has happened in the drama according to the critics. But let us not run away with the critics. Whatever the shortcomings one may find in the structure of the play, nothing has been allowed to run berserk except the tiger ! Everything has happened as the dramatist willed it. Many a time it has been observed that the writer loses control over the characters and incidents of the story (not metaphorically as the modern-day writers gleefully claim !), and somehow getting exhausted or helpless brings the work to a close, in a hurried manner. This is not the case with the Mālatīmādhava. At the very commencement of the drama, the writer has dropped

hints, the significance of which unfolds only as the drama progresses; and hence, one can confidently say that this was the development of the plot intended by the playwright.

In setting up the plot to be developed gradually, the writer has placed these words in the mouth of Kāmandakī. " At that time in the presence of Saudāminī and myself, Bhūrivasu and Devarāta had made a solemn avowal to join their offsprings in wedlock ". Further, in what can be called a tete-a-tete (in which the Sanskrit dramatist excels) a piece of information is dropped that Saudāminī is at present leading the life of a Kāpālika on the Śrīparvata mountain, and a lady-disciple of Aghoraghaṇṭa, Kapāla-Kuṇḍalā daily visits the shrine of the goddess Karālā who rejoices in the offerings of living beings, in the cemetery-ground in the city. Now these bits of information which now seem to be insignificant assume their own significance as the plot progresses.

This Kapālakuṇḍalā abducts Mālatī, the jewel among ladies, in order to sacrifice her to the goddess Karālā. Frustrated in her pernicious attempt by Mādhava, she again kidnaps Mālatī. This time Saudāminī comes to her rescue and saves her and other characters' lives. All this has happened according to the design of the dramatist. Moreover, the dramatist has very artistically suggested some events in the drama. In the second act, Mālatī is informed of her proposed betrothal to Nandana, a close confidante of the king by her father Bhūrivasu. Mālatī is in deep anguish and utters the sentence –"Katham upahārīkṛtā'smi rājñas tātena." Has my father sacrificed me to the king ?[3] These words, as one commentator aptly points out, suggest the future events in which Aghoraghaṇṭa attempts to offer her to the goddess Karālā. At the end of the eighth act, we have. "Prāyeṇa bāndhavasuhratpriy asaṅgamādi saudāminīsphuraṇacañcalameva saukhyam."

Generally, happiness arising out of the company of kinsfolk, friends, and dear ones is as fleeting as the flash of lighting. Here the employment of the word Saudāminī is meaningful. The word suggests that the lady disciple of Kāmandakī, Saudāminī, who had been referred to in the first act plays an important part in the subsequent acts. This is Bhavabhūti's artistic flash too ! So it can be seen that Bhavabhūti has taken care to construct the plot in the most meticulous and artistic manner.

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3. Mālatīmādhava, p. 55; for textual references here and hereafter M. R. Kale's third edition of the Mālatīmādhava 1967 is utilized.

But all this has been ignored by the critics. One after the other has lambasted the playwright by pointing out the so called flaws in the plot-construction of the play. The great indologist Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar made the following observations regarding the plot of the Mālatīmādhava: " Notwithstanding originality of conception involved in the plot of Mālatīmādhava, the poet does not show such a skill in the arrangement of his incidents and in the denoument as is displayed by the author of the Mṛcchakaṭika and even of the Mudrārākṣasa. The incidents subsequent to the scene in the cemetery look like clumsy appendages and not like parts of a whole. Kapālakūṇḍala is represented to have taken away Mālatī to give an opportunity to the poet to display his power of depicting the feelings of a man in viraha, and the incident appears by no means to harmonise with or to arise naturally out or the previous story."[4] These remarks do not seem to be justified on a close perusal of the plot. The reason of re-abduction of Mālatī by Kapālakūṇḍalā lies in the fifth act itself, the act of the first abduction. Her sire has been slughte ed by Mādhava and she is on the look out to take revenge on Madhava and hence she kidnaps Mālatīmādhava's love, again. Of course, thereby the poet gets an opportunity to delineate the pathetic conditions of Mādhava in separation. But the fifth act itself furnishes the ground for re-kidna ping Mālatī by Kapālakūṇḍalā. In the sixth act. Mālatī and Mādhava get married. In the seventh, impersonating Mālatī, Makaranda goes to Nandana and elopes with Madayantikā. In the eighth, on the way only, an encounter between Makaranda-Mādhava and the guards of the king ensues. In the ninth, Mādhava's mental anguish in separation from Mālatī who has been carried away by Kapāla kūṇḍalā is portrayed. The tenth is finis, tying the knot of the threads of the story, as Dr. H. W. Wells so happily puts it.[5] So one can observe even while running that not a single act is removable without damaging the structure of the plot. So it is not just to level a charge that in order to portray the condition in separation the poet has manufactured all these incidents from the sixth act onwards. In the same way it can be insinuated that the fifth act is set in the cemetery-ground in order to delineate the grotesque sentiment. And to bring an argument to a logical culmination, it can also be stated that the dramatist has written the whole of the drama in order to brandish

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4 Preface to the Mālatīmādhava Pp. 11–12.

5. The Classical Drama of India, p. 146 (1963).

his literary flourish. The reasoning, like the tiger in the drama, sometimes goes berserk ! So it would be singularly inappropriate, to use the mildest term, to criticise the poet on this count.

In the same context, Prin. R. D. Karmarkar has stated that, Saudāminī should have prevented Kapālakuṇḍalā from abducting Mālatī in the eighth act itself by arriving in the nick of time. Thus, the drama would have come to a happy end at the eighth act itself.[6] This is a pure example of hindsight which as in life, so in literature, does not help. It is no use talking in the language of 'had that been so, it would have been so.' Pray, why should Saudāminī come to the city leaving her place of penance Śrīparvata which also happens to be the field of Kapālakuṇḍalā's activity. Hence, in the most natural manner, Saudāminī would per chance see Kapālakuṇḍalā, and save Mālatī from her clutches. From Mālatī, she would come to know about Mādhava-Makaranda's plight. Now as she is in the know of things she cannot remain unconcerned. Hence exercising her yogic powers she would divine Mādhava-Makaranda's whereabouts and save them. In this way, the ninth and the tenth acts are the most natural denoument of the play.

It has also been observed that the Mālatīmādhava play has rather a liberal sprinkling of accidents. The tiger escaping from the cage brings about an accidental meeting between Makaranda-Madayantikā. Mādhava reaching in time saves Mālatī from the clutches of Aghoraghaṇṭa. Saudāminī also arrives in time in order to save the lives of Mālatī, Mādhava, Makaranda, and a host of others. All these events seem to be pure flukes, and hence critics charge that coincidence has been given too much free play to disfigure the structure of the plot. Now let us examine the validity of this charge.

It is no use, as is wont with the apologists of the Sanskrit literature to plead that accidents as in life do take place in literature which to some extent, claims to portray it. So we do not intend to avail of this usage-sanctified plea. Now the incident of the tiger breaking the chain and escaping from a cage is an accident in the real sense of the term. This is the

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6 Bhavabhūti 1963 p. 40.

Ramji Upadhyaya also follows suit and says the same thing in his Sanskrit Sāhityakā Alocanātmaka Itihāsa p. 421.

tradition-hallowed motif of literature wherein, generally, an elephant is being shown to be running amuck. Here, the poet just for the sake of a change, has replaced it with a tiger. Bhavabhūti has furthered the plot with the help of this admittedly accidental incident. But here, one has to make a subtle distinction between an accident, and an accident. The accident which does not even further the plot is the 'worst' crime a writer can be accused of. That accident which comes at the end of a work to bring the work to a close, is a 'worse' one because without it the writer finds it difficult to bring an end to the work. A 'bad' type of accident occurs in the beginning when the plot is just unfolding. Our author Bhavabhūti is guity of the third type of an accident which furthers the plot. The incident that Mādhava arrives to save Mālatī from Aghoraghaṇṭa is not a co-incidence. The dramatist has prepared the ground for it. On hearing the news of the proposed betrotl al of Mālatī to Nandana, heart-broken Mādhava, reckless now about his life, has taken to the life of a mutton-vendor in the cemetery ground and there hearing the wailings of Mālatī reaches the spot to save Mālatī's life.

As explained above, Saudāminī and Kapālakuṇḍalā both practise penance on the same mountain, Śrīparvata, and hence ther is nothing unnatural or accidental about Saudāminī's saving of Mālatī. Yes, it would have been an out and out accident had, as Prin. Karmarkar suggested, Saudāminī arrived in the city at the time of the second abduction of Mālatī by Kapālakuṇḍalā. Why should Saudāmini come to the city leaving her usual field of activity i.e. Śrīparvata ? That would have been an ideal dues ex machina. But luckily out author has not taken a cue from Prin. Karmarkar in anticipation.

Regarding the characterisation also a serious type of imbalance in the plot-structure has been noticed by scholars. Prin. Karmarkar observes, " But on account of the very important part played by Makaranda and the extemely arresting character of Madayantikā, the main action is put into the shade to a certain extent. Makaranda steals a march over Mādhava in rescuing his beloved from a tiger and the rescue of Mālatī by Mādhava coming after that event suffers on that account as it looks like an imitation"[7]

7. Op Cit. pp. 40-41.

This stricture passed against the structure of the drama is not borne out by the textual circumstantial evidence. There is a subtle design on the part of the dramatist which the learned critic has failed to perceive. That love does not depend upon external causes[8] seems to be the most sacrosanct philosophy with Bhavabhūti. The honour of concretising this philosophy has been bestowed upon the loving couple Mālatī-Mādhava, the heroine-hero of the piece. The dramatist does not want the love between Mālatī-Mādhava to sprout depending upon some external incident. To wit, generally the heroine is beholden to the hero on account of some good turn done to her by the hero, say a heroine is rescued from a wild elephant chase or a demon as in the Avimārakam by Bhāsa or Vikramorvaśīyam by Kālidāsa. In fact, this would run counter to his (Bhavabhūti's) philosophy of love, so fervently and exquisitely expressed by him. So the inception of the love between Mālatī-Mādhava is not shown to be arising out of some external incident. Bhavabhūti seems to be placing this philosophy of love in bold relief, by providing a contrast in the couple Madayantikā-Makarand whose love depends upon external factors. Madayantikā is saved from the tiger by Makaranda and love springs in the heart of Madayantikā. Madayantikā's love is extremely gross and at times wallowing in vulgarity.[9] The reason is this : The love which has to depend upon external causes cannot be pure and platonic. This has been epitomised by the couple Madayantikā-Makaranda. Hence the difference between these two couple characters viz. Mālatī-Mādhava and Madayantikā-Makaranda. Still, keeping aside all these subtleties so artistically woven in the texture of the plot, the argument that Mādhava's rating as a character is poor compared to that of Makaranda has to be met with at its own level. If Makaranda saves Madayantikā from a ferocious tiger, Mādhava saves Mālatī from the clutches of a much more ferocious Aghorghaṇṭa. In this way this incident is in no way a pale imitation of the earlier similar tiger-incident. Moreover, Mādhava is all intensity in love. Madhava being an extremely sensitive character would naturally respond to a situation differently from Makaranda, and hence his reckless wanderings in the cemetery ground after he came to know about his beloved's

8. Mālatīmādhava 1-24 ab, p. 28.
9. Ibid p. 155.

prospective marriage to someone else. The character of Makaranda is conceived from a different plane. Makaranda is placed on the higher pedestal of friendship. The Mālatīmādhava is a drama of love for the young, by the young and of the young, to be appreciated by all !

Prin. Karmarkar further points out, "Mādhava takes the place of Lavaṅgikā in the temple and is able to hear Mālatī's confession of love for him. But this episode charming as it is, is completely overshadowed by the excellently conceived and cleverly depicted scene where Makaranda (in the garb of Mālatī) imposes upon Madayantikā".[10] Now this criticism is rather ill-conceived. One more thing noticeable is that both the incidents–one which has been discussed and the present one–are akin in conception and repeated. To explain, Makaranda saves Madayantikā from the tiger and Mādhava saves Mālatī from Aghoraghaṇṭa. Here is a repetition, and hence Prin. Karmarkar branded the later incident as an imitation as it comes after that event i.e. Makaranda saving Madayantikā. But here ! First Madhava listens to the confessions from Mālatī about her love for him. Then Makaranda impersonating Mālatī listens to the out-pourings of Madayantikā. Prin. Karmarkar states that the incident of Makaranda–Madayantikā taking place in the seventh act, foreshadows the earlier one taking place in the sixth act. Here he has changed his measures ! Apart from the different standards adopted by the critic, the opinion also seems to have been formed rather hurriedly. First of all Mālatī is an extremely coy girl and she feels terribly despondent on account of the prospects of her getting married to Nandana. She despairs of life and gives a last embrace to her dear friend Lavaṅgikā. But, meanwhile Lavaṅgikā is replaced by Mādhava and taking him to be Lavangika, she embraces him as well as garlands him with that very wreath, Bakulamālā, first gifted by Mādhava himself to Mālatī. The whole scene is hillarious and would be a hit one on the stage. On the other hand Makaranda in the garb of Mālatī listens to Madayantikā's love-declarations. But these declarations are rather long and monotonous, and set in the same situation wherein Makaranda under the guise of Mālatī continues to listen to Madayantikā in a stretched out position on the bed. Hence this incident of Makaranda–Madayantikā lacks that dramatic verve of the Mādhava–Mālatī scene. But Prin. Karmarkar

10. Op. Cit., p. 38

has to say quite a contrary thing ! There is a world of difference in the nature of Mālatī and Madayantikā. Mālatī is extremely bashful and hence, this scene, in which the most bashful heroine unknowingly embraces her lover Mādhava, would elicit more boisterous guffaws from the audience than the incident of Makaranda-Madayantikā which at the most, would draw out whistles from the gallery as it panders to their taste for vulgarity. The earlier scene of Mādhava-Mālatī is incomparable and gives a lie to the charge that Bhavabhūti lacks in sense of humour. (Another canard spread about Bhavabhūti by the critics.)

How this later incident appealed more to the learned critic is incomprehensible. (Of course, if the scene depicting the meeting between Makaranda in the garb of Mālatī and Nandana were shown on the stage, then Bhavabhūti would have gifted one more remarkable dramatic scene to Sanskrit literature. What prevented him is something more than one can explain because he is not the man to docilely obey the prevalent literary conventions !).

The character of Mādhava has been severely indicted for his ever-sentimentality leading him not infrequently to swoons by the critics. According to Dr. De when the life of his friend Makaranda was in peril, instead of running to his rescue Mādhava fainted.[11] This indictment contains a little discrepancy which when noticed makes quite a difference in the evaluation of the character of Mādhava. Mādhava does fall in swoon, but after he has seen that the tiger has been slain by Makaranda and not before Mādhava comes out of the groove to run to the succour of Makaranda. Meanwhile Makaranda slays the tiger and Kāmandakī and Mādhava both utter simultaneously—" Dṛḍhaṁ ca paśunā hato pramathitaśca daṁṣṭrāyudhah,"[12] Animal struck him fiercely and he too killed it. Then Makaranda faints and then Mādhava too falls into swoon. Thus after the peril has been dispelled, Mādhava allows himself to have the luxury of fainting away. The poet has a subtle purpose in view in making the hero fall into swoon. Mālatī is extremely bashful to a fault, but when her lover is in danger, she casts aside her coyness and takes soothing care of her fainted lover

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11. (*i*) History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 283.
    (*ii*) Prin. Karmarkar Op. Cit., p. 41.
12. Mālatīmādhava, pp. 81-82.

and thus the bonds of love are strengthened. At this opportune time, Kāmandakī grabs the opportunity of making the bonds stronger. She asks Mādhava to offer a gift of affection (prītidāna) to Mālatī and accordingly Mādhava offers his heart and life to Mālatī. All this time Madayantikā has been made a witness of Mādhava-Mālatī's expressed bonhomie. In this way, the dramatist in a subtle manner, opened the way for Madayantikā to get reconciled in future when the marriage between Nandana, her brother and Mālatī does not come off. Criticising Mādhava in this context, Prin. Karmarkar has stated that, instead of running to the rescue of his friend, Mādhava indulges in a poetic description—'Aviralam iva dāmnā pauṇḍa-rīkeṇa naddham' etc.[13] of his beloved. This description, quite poetic in itself, appears to be rather out of place according to Prin. Karmarkar especially when there is an impending calamity from the tiger.[14] But let us try to understand the situation. Mādhava is behind the bush surre-ptiously observing his beloved and eavsdropping the chitchatting among the friends. Then there is a declaration to the effect that the tiger has escaped from the cage and immediately, he comes out of the bush. His sudden bursting upon the scene causes a pleasant surprise to Mālatī along with fear from the tiger. Mālatī charmingly blurts out, "Aho eṣo'py atraiva!"—Ah this one is here too! Mādhava in his moment of ecstasy realises that he has been the cause and object of her endearing and bewitching surge of feelings. Now this tender moment in the life of a youth has been turned into an eternity by Bhavabhūti in the verse referred to above and criticised by Prin. Karmarkar. There is nothing inappropriate here. Many a time, man experiences contrary feelings simul-taneously. Here Mādhava should feel heroic as the external circmustance demands it, but at the same time he has the feeling of tenderness and Bhavabhūti has captured this, one of those rare moments in a human life which make it cherishable, with his supreme artistic sense.

A charge is also levelled against Mālatī-mādhava that the hero-heroine Mādhava-Mālatī are rather feebly drawn. Makaranda-Madayantikā, the hero-heroine of the sub-plot overshadow the hero-heroine of the main

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13 Ibid, p. 80

14. Op. Cit., p 41.

plot Mādhava–Mālatī. Madayantika is more lively and vivacious than the annoyingly coy Mālatī. Similarly Mādhava being made of sentimental stuff, appears rather pale before Makaranda who always maintains his composure even in adverse circumstances. This could be regarded as a serious defect in the plot–structure.[15] As we have seen above, this criticism originates from a wrong impression regarding the behaviour of Mādhava in the tiger–episode. In respect of valour, he is no less valiant than Makaranda but being of a brooding nature, his response to a situation would be imbued with feelings. Friendship is a cherished value to both of them. So to compare both these characters will indeed be an inviduous task. Conceded that Madayantikā is a bit loquacious and Mālatī is given to taciturnity. But the art of characterisation is a very complex process and the playwright Bhavabhūti has mastered it and put it to advantageous use. Characters of a creative writer can never be categorised into black and white. The most predominant trait of Mālatī's character is her extreme bashfulness. But see how the author has unfolded the complexity of her character ! In the presence of Mādhava, Mālatī keeps her lips sealed and would never give expression to her love for him. So adamantly she observes her silence ! But in the 'last' moments of her life, in the cemetery ground temple she utters the name of her lover Mādhava. Then again Mālatī who would not open her mouth to talk to her lover would in his absence, express her intensity for Mādhava thus " Madhava is tarrying ! When shall I behold him ! I shall entreat him to offer me a double embrace ! "[16] This type of characterisation entails creativity of a very high order ! Moreover, if we take into account the distribution of acts allotted to these two couples, it would be clear that Mālatī–Mādhava have been advantageously placed and weightage of acts goes in their favour. The first two acts, most of the third and fourth acts, the fifth and sixth acts, a considerable portion of the eighth act, Mādhava's lamentation with reference to Mālatī in the ninth act and most of the tenth act are taken up by Mālatī–Mādhava. Only the seventh act is solely devoted to Madayantikā–Makaranda. Thus the charge that Mālatī–Mādhava are feebly drawn in favour of Madayantikā–Makaranda does not stand a textual scrutiny of the drama.

15. (*i*) Prin. Karmarkar, Op. Cit., p. 38.
    (*ii*) De, Op. Cit., p. 282.
16. Mālatīmādhava, p. 163.

Bhavabhūti has been accused of artificially raising the number of acts to ten according to the specification of a Prakaraṇa. The first and the second acts, the third and the fourth acts, the ninth and the tenth acts—these three twin acts do not have any interval as such between them and hence they could be made into one each and in this way, three acts could be reduced.[17] In the first act, Mādhava talks about his meeting with his lady love Mālatī in a Makaranda garden. In the second act, the influence of love upon Mālatī and Kāmandakī's psychological treatment to Mālatī have been described. So these two acts shall not meet ! In the third act, Kāmandakī pleads on behalf of Mādhava, and Lavangikā, a friend of Mālatī, holds brief for Mālatī in the presence of Mālatī. Meanwhile, the escape of the tiger is announced and Makaranda saves Madayantikā from the claws of the tiger, but he himself gets hurt in the process, and falls unconscious, Mādhava too is in a similar plight ! The fourth act is indeed a continuation of the third one. But the poet has a definite object in view in arranging the acts in this way. The fourth act is an exploration of the after–effects of an attack by the tiger. So the third and fourth acts could not be amalgamated into one. The ninth delineates the love lamentations of Mādhava and the tenth act brings the drama to a happy end and thus these two viz. the ninth and tenth could not be unified into one. Regarding the distribution of the acts, one more opinion is to be noted ![18] According to this, one act could be made out of the third and the fourth acts, and two acts out of the sixth, seventh and eighth acts. That the third and the fourth acts could not be unified into one, we have seen above. In the sixth act a clandestine marriage takes place. The seventh one is taken up by the Makaranda–Madayantikā affair, and in the eighth act, there is an encounter between Mādhava–Makaranda - and the guards of the king, and abduction of Mālatī by Kapālakuṇḍalā. So these three acts, viz., sixth, seventh and eighth cannot be reduced to two. Every act has its own raison detre and hence the distribution system of acts as envisaged by Bhavabhūti cannot be disturbed. All these hazy notions about the acts would be cleared if we take into account the concept of acts as enunciated by H. W. Wells.

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17. Prin. Karmarkar, Op. Cit., p. 32.
18. M. R. Kale in his introduction to Mālatīmādhava, p. 31.

He writes, "the word 'act' may really be more misleading than helpful. Each act exhibits a distinct 'sentiment'."[19]

Prin. Karmarkar has poked fun at the ill-proportioned portrayal of love by pointing out some incongruities in the process. According to him love between Mādhava-Mālatī sprouts when Mādhava repeatedly passes by Mālatī's mansion and looks at Mālatī probably sitting in a gallery. Prin. Karmarkar says that Mādhava must have been gifted with a very keen eyesight so as to be able to look at Mālatī from such a distance! "Such long-range love makes the whole thing ridiculous".[20] Really the picture drawn by the Principal is very funny and evokes admiration for his sense of humour. But it is in the wrong place. This picture has no support from the text. First of all, Mādhava has not been attracted to Mālatī by repeatedly ogling at Mālatī perched in the gallery of the mansion. Mādhava for the first time meets Mālatī in the garden and there he misses his heart-beats. Yes Mālatī often saw this handsome youth passing by his mansion and felt attracted! So there is nothing ridiculous or objectionable.

But one may pooh-pooh the whole foregone criticism of the criticism against Bhavabhūti by branding it as one dealing only with trifle points. But here one has to invoke Chesterton's dictum that though life may consist of trifles, life is not a trifle. Similarly to deal with this extremely sensitive writer Bhavabhūti is also not a trifle thing. But when all these venerable stalwarts level some criticism howsovever trifle it may be, it sticks and gains currency. The criticism made by them is lapped up by our ever-eager lesser critics who in a parrot-like fashion go on reproducting ad nauseum these misleading remarks either in their histories or in their editions.

If this happens to be the undesirable fate of one of our most celebrated dramatists, what must have happened to the less known writers of our classical Sanskrit literature.

In this respect, our olden day commentators seem to have fared better than our present-day well-equipped critics. Tripurāri's Bhāvapradipikā tikā is indeed a delight to the lover of Bhavabhūti.

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19. Henry Wells in the Classical Drama of India, pp. 132, 134.
20. Op. Cit., p. 41.

For that matter, even Pūrṇasarasvatī has done a commendable job of appreciating Bhavabhūti. Tripurāri particularly by his critical acumen lays bare the suggestive sense with which the Mālatī–mādhava is laden. Pūrṇasarsvatī has interpreted the Mālatī–mādhava in a metaphorical and symbolical manner. He takes the Mālatī–Mādhava to be an allegorical play. But this can take up another article.

The present article may be evaluated as an attempt at dispelling the mist caused by ill–conceived criticism by the modern critics which hampers the true appreciation of the author and putting an aspect of the work i.e. plot–construction in a proper perspective and thus a sort of rehabilitation of Bhavabhūti within the scope an article can afford.

समर्थः पदविधिः । (पा. सू. २।१।१) સૂત્રનું અર્થઘટન

ડૉ. વસન્તકુમાર મનુભાઈ ભટ્ટ,
ભાષા-સાહિત્ય ભવન,
ગુજરાત યુનિવર્સિટી,
નવરંગપુરા, અમદાવાદ—૯.

૦.૦ મહર્ષિ પાણિનિકૃત અષ્ટાધ્યાયીના પહેલા પાદનું પહેલું સૂત્ર પ્રસ્તુત અધ્યયનનો વિષય છે. પાણિનીય વ્યાકરણ શાસ્ત્રના અધ્યેતાઓ જાણે છે કે અષ્ટાધ્યાયીના બીજા અધ્યાયનો પહેલો અને બીજો પાદ સામાસિક શબ્દો કેવી રીતે બનાવવા તથા દ્વન્દ્વાદિ સમાસમાં કયા પદનો પૂર્વ-નિપાત કરવો (સમાસમાં કયા પદને પૂર્વપદ તરીકે મૂકવું અને કયા પદને ઉત્તરપદ તરીકે મૂકવું?) વગેરેની વિધિઓ બતાવે છે.[૧] પરંતુ આ બધાં સૂત્રોની પૂર્વે આવેલું समर्थः पदविधिः । २-१-१ સૂત્ર ખૂબ જ મહત્ત્વનું છે. વ્યાકરણ-મહાભાષ્યમાં આ એક જ સૂત્ર ઉપરના વ્યાખ્યાને પૂરા એક આહ્નિકનો વિસ્તાર રોકયો છે.[૨] બીજું, આ સૂત્રનો પ્રવૃત્તિ-પ્રદેશ ઘણો મોટો છે. સમાસ-વિધાન ઉપરાંત તે કૃત્--તદ્ધિતાદિ વૃત્તિઓમાં પણ પ્રવૃત્ત થાય છે.

પ્રસ્તુત સૂત્રના અર્થઘટન માટે મુખ્યત્વે વ્યાકરણ--મહાભાષ્ય અને તેની બે પ્રમુખ ટીકાઓ 'પ્રદીપ' અને 'ઉદ્દ્યોત'નો ઉપયોગ કરીશું. પ્રાસંગિક રીતે 'વાકયપદીય', કાણ્ડ : ૩ના 'વૃત્તિસમુદ્દેશ'ની પણ સાહાય્ય લઈશું.

૧.૦.૦

समर्थः पदविधिः । २-१-१ સૂત્રમાં બન્ને પદો પ્રથમા વિભકિતમાં હોવાથી પ્રશ્ન થાય છે કે અહીં ઉદ્દેશ્ય (Subject) કોણ છે અને વિધેય (Predicate) કોણ છે? તદુપરાંત, समर्थः પદનો શો અર્થ કરવો અને पदविधिः પદનો શો અર્થ કરવો ? કાશીની વૈયાકરણ પરંપરાએ समर्थःનો અર્થ લક્ષણાથી समर्थाश्रितः કર્યો છે,[૩] અને समर्थाश्रितःમાંના समर्थः શબ્દમાં

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૧. अव्ययं विभक्तिसमीपसमृद्धि० । २-१-६,
राजदन्तादिषु परम् । २-२-३१.

૨. આને 'समर्थाह्निक' એવું નામ આપવામાં આવ્યું છે.

૩. ६४८ समर्थः पदविधिः । २-१-१ पदसम्बन्धी यो विधिः स समर्थाश्रितो बोध्यः ।
—वै०सि०कौ०भा-२, पृ० १.

ફરીથી લક્ષણા માનીને સામર્થ્યાશ્રિતઃ એવો અર્થ કર્યો છે.[૪] પરંતુ આવો અર્થ શા માટે કરવામાં આવ્યો છે તે મહાભાષ્ય (૨-૧-૧)ના પરિપ્રેક્ષ્યમાં તપાસીએ.

૧.૧.૦

પ્રસ્તુત (૨-૧-૧) સૂત્રમાં સમર્થ ગ્રહણનું પ્રયોજન વિચારતાં ભાષ્યમાં પ્રશ્ન કર્યો છે કે શા માટે સમર્થ ગ્રહણ કરવામાં આવ્યું છે? ભાષ્યકારે આનો જવાબ આપતાં જણાવ્યું છે કે द्वितीया श्रितातीतपतितगतात्यस्तप्राप्तापन्नैः। ૨-૧-૨૪ એવા સૂત્રથી 'દ્વિતીયાન્ત-સુબન્ત-પદનો શ્રિતાદિ સુબન્તપદોની સાથે સમાસ થાય છે' એવું કહેવામાં આવશે. તેનાથી कष्टं श्रितः >कष्टश्रितः। नरकं श्रितः > नरकश्रितः । એવા સમાસ થશે, પરંતુ ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં સમર્થઃનું ગ્રહણ કર્યું હોવાથી पश्य देवदत्तः कष्टं, श्रितो विष्णुमित्रो गुरुकुलम्। એવાં બે વાક્યોમાં પાસે પાસે આવેલા कष्टम् અને श्रितः પદોનો સમાસ થશે નહીં.[૫]

આ ભાષ્યચર્ચાને આધારે સમજાય છે કે समर्थः એટલે '(માત્ર પાસે પાસે આવેલાં નહીં, પણ) અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર સંકળાયેલા–Semantically connected (પદોનો સમાસ થાય છે.)'

૧.૧.૧.

પરંતુ સમર્થઃનો આવો અર્થ કરીશું તો महत् कष्टं श्रितः। એવા વાક્યમાં પણ कष्टम् અને श्रितः અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર સંકળાયેલા હોઈ महत् कष्टश्रितः એવો સમાસ થવા આવશે, જે અનિષ્ટ છે. કેમકે कष्टम् એવું પદ સાપેક્ષ છે (બીજા શબ્દોમાં કહીએ તો महत् એવા વિશેષણની સાથે પણ તે જોડાયેલું છે). આમ कष्टम् એવું પદ श्रितःની સાથે અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ સંકળાયેલું હોવા છતાંય, તે कष्टम्નો महत्ની સાથે પણ સંબંધ છે. આથી તે સાપેક્ષ પદનો श्रितःની સાથે પહેલાં સમાસ કરવાથી ઈષ્ટ રૂપની પ્રાપ્તિ થતી નથી.[૬] આમ समर्थः પદની સાથો સાથ જ सापेक्षमसमर्थं भवति। એવું વિશેષવિધાન ઉમેરવું પડતું હોઈને समर्थः પદનો 'અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર સંકળાયેલા' એવો અર્થ અપર્યાપ્ત જણાય છે.

હવે समर्थः પદની સાથે ઉમેરવામાં આવતું सापेक्षमसमर्थं भवति। એવું વિશેષવિધાન પણ પર્યાપ્ત છે કે નહીં?—તે અહીં સમીક્ષ્ય છે: 'સાપેક્ષ પદો અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર સંકળાયેલાં

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૪. वृत्ति में समर्थाश्रितः। इस समर्थाश्रित में भी समर्थ पद सामर्थ्य में लाक्षणिक है।
—वैं०सि०कौ०भा–२, हिन्दी 'रत्नप्रभा' टीका, पृ० १.

५. अथ समर्थग्रहणं किमर्थम्। वक्ष्यति द्वितीया श्रितादिभिः समस्यते। कष्टश्रितः नरकश्रित इति। समर्थग्रहणं किमर्थम्। पश्य देवदत्त कष्टं श्रितो विष्णुमित्रो गुरुकुलम्। समर्थः। २-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्। पृ. ३५९ कीलहोर्न आवृत्तिः।

૬. અહીં ઈષ્ટ રૂપ છે: महाकष्टश्रितः। પરંતુ એવા રૂપની સિદ્ધિ કરવા માટે પહેલાં महत् અને कष्टम्નો સમાસ કરવો પડશે. महत् कष्टम् > महाकष्टम्। અને ત્યાર પછી તેનો श्रितःની સાથે સમાસ કરવાનો રહેશે. महाकष्टं श्रितः। महाकष्टश्रितः॥ कष्टं અને श्रितःનો પહેલાં સમાસ કરી લઈશું તો महत् અને कष्टश्रितःની વચ્ચે સામાનાધિકરણ્ય નહીં રહેવાથી आन्महत०। ૬-૩-૪૬ સૂત્રથી આત્વની પ્રવૃત્તિ થશે નહીં.

ગણાતાં નથી' એમ સ્વીકારીશું તો राजपुरुषोऽभिरूपः । એ ઉદાહરણમાં જે સમાસ થયેલો છે તે ન થવો જોઈએ. કેમકે ત્યાં पुरुष પદ સાપેક્ષ છે. અર્થાત્ पुरुष પદનો राजन् અને अभिरूप એ બન્ને પદો સાથે સંબંધ છે, પરંતુ આવો સમાસ થાય છે અને તે સાધુ પણ છે. કારણ કે અહીં महत्कष्टं श्रितः। કરતાં જુદા પ્રકારનું સાપેક્ષપણું છે, राजपुरुषोऽभिरूपः। માં पुरुष એવું પ્રધાનપદ अभिरूप સાથે જોડાયેલું છે. જ્યારે महत्कष्टं श्रितः ।માં તો कष्टम् એવું ઉપસર્જન (ગૌણ) પદ અન્ય પદ (महत्) સાથે સંકળાયેલું હતું. આથી सापेक्षमसमर्थं भवति । એ વિધાનને સુધારવું પડશે. જેમકે, प्रधानस्य सापेक्षस्यापि समासः भवति। અર્થાત્ સાપેક્ષ પદોનો સમાસ થતો નથી, પણ જ્યાં પ્રધાન--પદ સાપેક્ષ હોય ત્યાં તો સમાસ થાય છે.

પરંતુ આ વ્યવસ્થા પણ પર્યાપ્ત જણાતી નથી. કેમ કે આ વિશેષ વ્યવસ્થાથી જ્યાં અપ્રધાન--પદ સાપેક્ષ હશે ત્યાં સમાસ થશે નહીં. પણ देवदत्तस्य गुरुकुलम् । જેવાં કેટલાંક ઉદાહરણો લોકમાં પ્રચલિત છે કે જેમાં गुरुकुलम्માંનું गुरु એવું અપ્રધાન--પદ સાપેક્ષ છે, તથાપિ સમાસ થયો છે. અહીં देवदत्त પદને ષષ્ઠી વિભક્તિનો પ્રત્યય લાગ્યો છે, તે સમુદાય(गुरुकुलम्)ની અપેક્ષાએ લાગ્યો છે, કેવળ गुरुની અપેક્ષાએ નહીં એમ જો કોઈ કહે તો તે પણ દૂષિત છે. જેમ કે,

(૧) किमोदनः शालीनाम् । એવા ઉદાહરણમાં, કે જેમાં ષષ્ઠી વિભક્તિ સમુદાયાપેક્ષ નથી.[૭] ત્યાં સમાસ ન થવો જોઈએ; છતાંય થાય છે અને તે સાધુ પણ ગણાય છે.

(૨) देवदत्तस्य गुरुकुलम् । એ વાક્યમાંથી 'દેવદત્તનો જે ગુરુ, તે(ગુરુ)નું કુળ' એવો ચોક્કસ અર્થ મળે છે.[૮] આથી गुरु એવું અપ્રધાન-પદ સાપેક્ષ જ (અર્થાત્ દેવદત્તની સાથે સંબંધિત) છે એમ કહેવાશે. આ સ્થિતિમાં गुरुकुलम् સમાસ ન થવો જોઈએ.

માટે 'અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર સંકળાયેલા' એ અર્થવાળા समर्थः પદને અપર્યાપ્ત ગણીને, તેને બદલે सापेक्षमसमर्थं भवति। प्रधानस्यापि सापेक्षस्य समासः भवति । વગેરે જે કહ્યું તે પણ પર્યાપ્ત નથી. અર્થાત્ समर्थः પદમાં ઉપર્યુક્ત વિશેષવિધાનો ઉમેરવાં છતાંય ઈષ્ટ વ્યવસ્થા પ્રાપ્ત થતી નથી.

૧.૧.૨

આ સ્થિતિમાં समर्थः કે सापेक्षमसमर्थम्। ઇત્યાદિ કહેવાને બદલે જો सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्न वृत्तस्य वा विशेषणं न प्रयुज्यतेऽगुरुकुलपुत्रादीनाम् । એવું કહેવામાં આવશે તો (૧) महत्कष्टं श्रितः । માં महत् વિશેષણથી વિશિષ્ટ એવા कष्टम् નો श्रितः સાથે સમાસ થશે નહીં; (૨) राजपुरुषः એવો સમાસ થઈ ગયા પછી राज्ञः (રાજા)નું ऋद्धस्य એવું વિશેષણ જોડાશે નહીં; અને (૩) देवदत्तस्य गुरुकुलम् ।માં અપ્રધાન (गुरु) સાપેક્ષનો પણ સમાસ થઈ શકશે.

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૭. किमोदनः शालीनाम् । નો અર્થ केषां शालीनाम् ओदनः । એવો થાય છે. અહીં किमोदनः એવા સમુદાયની અપેક્ષાએ (शालीनाम् એ પદમાં) ષષ્ઠી આવેલી નથી. કેવળ અપ્રધાન किम् ની અપેક્ષાએ આવેલી છે. એ સ્થિતિમાં સમાસ ન થવો જોઈએ.

૮. નહીં કે અચોક્કસ અર્થ, જેમ કે "કોઈ પણ અ. બ. ક. ગુરુનો પુત્ર તે દેવદત્તનો કાંઈક છે" એવો અચોક્કસ અર્થ મળતો નથી.

પરંતુ ભાષ્યકારે સૂચવ્યું છે કે જેવી રીતે समर्थः ને બદલે सापेक्षमसमर्थम्। વગેરે કહેવું વ્યર્થ છે, એવી રીતે સવિશેષણાનાં वृत्तिर्न वृत्तस्य वा विशेषणं न प्रयुज्यतेऽगुरुकुलपुत्रादीनाम्। એવું કહેવાની પણ જરૂર નથી. કેમ કે લેાકમાં પ્રચલિત ગમકત્વનો સિદ્ધાંત સ્વીકારવાથી महत्कष्टं श्रितः। વગેરેમાં 'અગમકત્વ'ને કારણે જ સમાસ થશે નહીં. અહીં ગમકત્વ એટલે વૃત્તિ (સમાસ) અને વાકયનો અર્થ સમાન હોવો. અર્થાત્ महत्कष्टं श्रितः। (મોટા કષ્ટને પામેલો) એવા વાકયથી જે અર્થ સમજાય છે તે महत्कष्टश्रितः। એવો (અનિચ્છનીય) સમાસ કરવાથી પ્રાપ્ત થતો નથી.[९] અને જ્યાં ગમકત્વ છે ત્યાં સમાસ થાય છે. જેમ કે देवदत्तस्य गुरुकुलम्।

હવે 'વૃત્તિ અને વાકયનો અર્થ સમાન હોય' એને જો ગમકત્વ કહીશું અને એ ગમકત્વાગમકત્વને આધારે જ અમુક સમાસ થશે કે નહીં એનો નિર્ણય કરીશું તો ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં समर्थः પદની જરૂર નથી.[१०] આપણે અગાઉ જોયું છે કે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં समर्थः પદ મૂકવાથી पश्य देवदत्तः कष्टं, श्रितो विष्णुमित्रो गुरुकुलम्। भार्या राज्ञः, पुरुषो देवदत्तस्य। જેવાં વાકયોમાં कष्टम् અને श्रितः તથા राज्ञः અને पुरुषः પદો પાસે પાસે આવેલાં હોવા છતાંય, તેઓ અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર સંકળાયેલાં નહીં હોવાથી તેમનો સમાસ થઈ શકતો નથી. પરંતુ હવે જો ગમકત્વાદિને આધારે જ કામ લેવાનું હશે તો (પણ) ઉપરનાં વાકયોમાં कष्टम् અને श्रितः તથા राज्ञः અને पुरुषः ના સમાસ થશે નહીં, કેમ કે અહીં पश्य देवदत्तः कष्टं, श्रितो विष्णुमित्रो गुरुकुलम्। भार्या राज्ञः, पुरुषो देवदत्तस्य। એ વાકયોથી જે અર્થ સમજાય છે તે पश्य देवदत्तः कष्टश्रितो विष्णुमित्रो गुरुकुलम्। भार्या राजपुरुषो देवदत्तस्य। થી સમજાતો નથી. આમ ગમકત્વના અભાવમાં (એટલે કે વૃત્તિ અને વાકયનો અર્થ સમાન નહીં હોવાથી) સમાસ થશે નહીં; અને પરિણામે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં समर्थः પદનું ગ્રહણ કરવાની જરૂર રહેશે નહીં.

समर्थः ગ્રહણ વ્યર્થ છે એમ સ્વીકારતાં પહેલાં સ્થૂણાનિખનનન્યાયે તે (समर्थः ગ્રહણ)નું પ્રયોજન વિચારી લઈએ: अकिञ्चित्कुर्वाणम्। अमावं हरमाणम्। अगाधादुत्सृष्टम्। જેવા ગમક નઞ્-સમાસો કે જે અસમર્થ છે તેમનું સાધુત્વ ન થઈ જાય એ માટે समर्थःનું ગ્રહણ કર્યું હશે?

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९. अगमकत्वात्। इह समानार्थेन वाक्येन भवितव्यं समासेन च। यश्चेहार्थो वाक्येन गम्यते महत्कष्टं श्रित इति न जातुचित्समासेनासौ गम्यते महत्कष्टश्रित इति।
—समर्थः० । २-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६१।

१०. From Patañjali's discussion it appears that another term, namely *gamaka*, was current among the grammarians to express more or less the same idea as conveyed by the word *Samartha*. But it seems that the word *gamaka* belongs to the non-teachnical language. *Gamakatva* : 'ability to express (the same meaning)', as the non-technical principle underlying compound-formation in daily usage must have been silently assumed by grammarians also.

(Joshi S. D., Vyā. M. Bhā. Samarthāhnika, Introduction ; 4.3 (*ii*), page-*vi*-*vii*)

ના, આ પ્રયોજન ન હોઈ શકે, કેમ કે પાણિનિએ सुड् अनपुंसकस्य । १-१-४३ એવા સૂત્રમાં અસમર્થ નઞ્-સમાસનો, કે જે ગમક છે તેનો પ્રયોગ કર્યો છે તે નિયમાર્થ બની રહેશે. એટલે કે असूर्यं पश्यानि मुखानि। अपुनर्गेया श्लोकाः । अश्राद्धभोजी ब्राह्मणः। अलवणभोजी ब्राह्मणः। એ અસમર્થ નઞ્-સમાસો કે જે ગમક છે તેમનું જ સાધુત્વ ગણાશે. (પરંતુ બીજા अकिञ्चित्कुर्वाणम् । વગેરે પૂર્વોક્ત અસમર્થ નઞ્-સમાસો કે જે ગમક છે તેમનું સાધુત્વ ગણાશે નહીં.[11] માટે "ગમક, પરંતુ જે અસમર્થ નઞ્-સમાસો હોય તેમનું સાધુત્વ ન થઈ જાય માટે समर्थः પદનું ગ્રહણ કર્યું હશે" એવું પ્રયોજન દર્શાવવું પણ અસંગત બની જાય છે.

૧.૨.૦

'વાક્ય રચનામાં સહાયક બનતા વિભક્તિપ્રત્યયોથી સૂચવાતો બે પદો વચ્ચેનો અર્થગત સંબંધ—समर्थः પદથી અપેક્ષિત છે' એમ કહેવા જતાં सापेक्षमसमर्थम् । વગેરે વિધાનો ઉમેરવાં પડે છે. सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्न वृत्तस्य वा विशेषणं न प्रयुज्यतेऽगुरुकुलपुत्रादीनाम् । એવું વચન કરવા વિષે પણ ભાષ્યકારે અરુચિ બતાવી છે, કેમ કે તેમના મતે ગમકત્વ—અગમકત્વને કારણે જ સમાસ થાય છે કે નથી થતો. અહીં समर्थः નો અક્ષરશઃ અર્થ समः अर्थः यस्य । એવો થાય છે.[12] અને ગમકત્વનો અર્થ પણ ભાષ્યકારે એ જ લીધો છે : इह समानार्थेन वाक्येन भवितव्यम्, समासेन च । (२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम् पृ. ३२०) આમ નાગેશના સૂચવ્યા પ્રમાણે ભાષ્યકારે જો લોકમાં પ્રચલિત એવો ગમકત્વનો સિદ્ધાંત જ અંતે સ્વીકાર્યો હોય[13] તો સૂત્રકારે જે समर्थः ગ્રહણ કર્યું છે તે વ્યર્થ બની જશે. કારણ કે भार्या राज्ञः, पुरुषो देवदत्तस्य । એવાં વાક્યોનો જે અર્થ છે તે भार्या राजपुरुषः देवदत्तस्य । એવા સમાસથી સૂચવાતો નથી, માટે તે राज्ञः અને पुरुषःનો સમાસ થવાનો જ નથી, અને તેમનો સમાસ ન જ થવાનો હોય તો તેને રોકવા માટે समर्थः પદની જરૂર રહેવાની નથી.[14]

આમ લોકપ્રચલિત ગમકત્વ--અગમકત્વના સિદ્ધાંતને આધારે શબ્દવ્યવહારમાં જો અમુક સમાસ થતા હોય કે ન થતા હોય તો સૂત્રકારે કેવળ અબુધ--બોધનાર્થ समः अर्थः यस्य । એ અર્થમાં

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૧૧. આ ઉદાહરણોમાં ગમકત્વનો સિદ્ધાંત કામ કરતો નથી.

૧૨. प्रोपाभ्यां समर्थाभ्याम् । १-३-४२ एवं, व्यवहृपणोः समर्थयोः । २-३-५७ આ સૂત્રોમાં समर्थ શબ્દ 'તુલ્યાર્થ', 'સમાનાર્થ'માં પ્રયોજાયો છે.

૧૩. कृतेऽपि क्वचित्परम्परोपदेशगम्यगमकत्वादिनैव सर्वप्रयोगनिर्वाह इति बोध्यम् । (उद्द्योतः, पृ. ३२१) । "સૂત્રમાં 'સમર્થ' શબ્દ વાપર્યો હોય કે ન વાપર્યો હોય, બધા સાધુ પ્રયોગો ગમકત્વ-અગમકત્વનો વિચાર કરીને જ આ શાસ્ત્રમાં પરંપરાથી પ્રાપ્ત બને છે." —(નાગેશ)

નાગેશે કરાવેલું આ અર્થદર્શન પાણિનિએ સૂત્રમાં 'સમર્થ' શબ્દ વાપર્યો છે એ હકીકત ઉપર ભાર મૂકતું નથી, પરંતુ ગમકત્વના મુદ્દા ઉપર ભાર મૂકે છે. એટલા પૂરતું આ અર્થદર્શન કૈયટથી વેગળું અને સ્વતંત્રપ્રજ્ઞ છે.—ડૉ. જે. એમ. શુકલ (ભાષાવિમર્શ, પુસ્તક ૧, અંક ૧, જાન્યુ. ૧૯૭૮). (પૃ. ૬૪).

૧૪. अथ समर्थग्रहणं किमर्थम् । એવો પ્રશ્ન કરીને પ્રારંભે ભાષ્યકારે જે પ્રયોજન બતાવ્યું છે, તે હવે ગમકત્વથી જ સિદ્ધ થશે.

અહીં (૨–૧–૧)માં સમર્થઃનો પ્રયોગ કર્યો હોય એવું ન બની શકે. અર્થાત્ અહીં સમર્થઃ શબ્દનો કોઈ ગૂઢ આશય અથવા તો કોઈક પારિભાષિક અર્થ હોવો જોઈએ.

વાર્તિકકારે આનો જવાબ આપતાં જણાવ્યું છે કે ૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રમાં સમર્થઃ શબ્દ 'સામર્થ્ય'નો વાચક છે. આ સામર્થ્યના બે પ્રકાર છે: (૧) એકાર્થીભાવરૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને (૨) વ્યપેક્ષાભાવરૂપ સામર્થ્ય.[૧૫] આમાંથી પહેલા પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય વૃત્તિ (સમાસ)માં જોવા મળે છે અને બીજા પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય વાક્યમાં જોવા મળે છે. બીજું, સૂત્રકારને આ બન્ને પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય સમર્થઃ પદવિધિઃ । ૨–૧–૧ એવા એક જ સૂત્રથી અભિપ્રેત છે.

૧.૨.૧

વાર્તિકકારના મતે "પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળાં પદોના એકાર્થીભાવને 'સમર્થ' કહે છે (૨–૧–૧, વા–૧)" વાક્યમાં પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળાં પદો હોય છે. જેમ કે राज्ञः पुरुषः । અહીં राजन् શબ્દ રાજાર્થને કહે છે અને पुरुष શબ્દ પુરુષાર્થને કહે છે. આવાં પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળાં પદોનો વૃત્તિ (સમાસ)માં 'એકાર્થીભાવ' જોવા મળે છે. જેમ કે राजपुरुषः। અહીં पुरुष શબ્દ તો પુરુષાર્થને કહે જ છે, પણ राजन् શબ્દ પણ પુરુષાર્થને જ કહેનાર છે.[૧૬] આમ વૃત્તિમાં બે પદોનો 'એકાર્થીભાવ' થાય છે.[૧૭] અથવા તો અહીં (વૃત્તિમાં) અવયવાર્થો જેમાં અન્વિત થયેલાં છે તેવો એક અલગ જ સમુદાયાર્થ પ્રાદુર્ભાવ પામે છે;[૧૮] એ સન્દર્ભમાં 'એકાર્થીભાવ' કહેવાયો છે. અહીં પૃથગ્ અર્થો પાંસુ-ઉદકવત્[૧૯] એક થયેલા હોય છે.[૨૦] અર્થાત્ વૃત્તિમાં અર્થોની અપૃથગ્ ઉપસ્થિતિ થાય છે, આવું એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય ૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રસ્થ સમર્થઃ પદથી વાચ્ય છે.

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૧૫. (૧) पृथगर्थानामेकार्थीभावः समर्थवचनम् । एवं
(२) परस्परव्यपेक्षां सामर्थ्यमेके । २–१–१, वा. १ एवं ४ भाष्यम्–पृ. ३६१ एवं ३६५.

૧૬. અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિપક્ષમાં. અહીં राजन् શબ્દ વિશેષણ રૂપ અર્થ આપ્યા પછી પુરુષાર્થને કહેનાર બની રહે છે. અહીં राज શબ્દ 'રાજસંબંધવાન'એ અર્થમાં ઊભો છે એમ કહેવાનું તાત્પર્ય છે.

૧૭. આમ બન્ને પદોના એકાર્થકતા બની રહે છે. અર્થાત્ બે પદો ભેગાં મળીને એક જ (સમાન) અર્થને કહેનારાં બને છે.

૧૮. જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિપક્ષમાં. અહીં राज्ञन् અને पुरुषના અર્થો સમુદાર્થમાં ભળી ગયા હોઈ અલગ અલગ અર્થની ઉપસ્થિતિ કરતા નથી. વળી આ સમુદાયાર્થમાંથી કોઈ એક ભાગનો અર્થ અલગ પાડી શકાતો નથી. જેવી રીતે કાદવમાં માટીને કે પાણીને અલગ અલગ જોઈ શકાતા નથી.

૧૯. એટલે કે એકવાર પાંસુ અને ઉદકનું સંમેલન થઈ ગયા પછી પાંસુની કે ઉદકની અલગ અલગ પ્રતીતિ થતી નથી, પણ 'પિંડ' નામનું દ્રવ્યાંતર જ પ્રતીત થાય છે, તેવી રીતે એકાર્થીભાવ(સમાસ)માં અવયવાર્થોની અલગ પ્રતીતિ થતી નથી, પણ સમુદાયાર્થની જ પ્રતીતિ થાય છે, આ અપૃથગ્ ઉપસ્થિતિનું નામ જ એકાર્થીભાવ છે.

૨૦. पृथगर्था येषां पदानां तानि पृथगर्थानि पदानि । वाक्ये हि राज्ञः पुरुष इत्यत्र राजशब्दो राजार्थमेवाचष्टे, पुरुषशब्दोऽपि पुरुषार्थमेव । वृत्तौ तु राजपुरुष इत्यत्र राजशब्दोऽपि पुरुषार्थमेवाचष्टे इति द्वयोरेकार्थीभावो भवति । अथवान्य एवावयवार्थान्वितः समुदायार्थः प्रादुर्भवतीति तदपेक्षयैकार्थीभाव उच्यते पांसूदकवदेकभावापन्नत्वात् ॥ प्रदीपः, पृ. ३२१,

વાર્તિકકારે બીજો મત પણ નોંધ્યો છે: "કેટલાક વૈયાકરણો પરસ્પરની વ્યપેક્ષાને સામર્થ્ય કહે છે (૨-૧-૧ વા. ૪)" અર્થાત્ ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાંના **समर्थः** પદથી વ્યપેક્ષા રૂપ સામર્થ્ય સમજવાનું છે. ભાષ્યકારે આ વ્યપેક્ષા—સામર્થ્યને વિશદ કરતાં લખ્યું છે કે **राज्ञः पुरुषः ।** એમ કહેતા રાજા પુરુષની 'આ મારો છે' એમ અપેક્ષા રાખે છે અને પુરુષ પણ રાજાની 'હું આનો છું' એમ અપેક્ષા રાખે છે. આ બંનેના (સેવ્ય—સેવકભાવ રૂપ) સંબંધની ષષ્ઠીવિભકિત વાચિકા બને છે.[21] આમ વિશિષ્ટ અપેક્ષાને વ્યપેક્ષા કહે છે. આવી વ્યપેક્ષા વાકયમાં જોવા મળે છે.[22]

અહીં 'વાકયમાં પદો પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળાં હોય છે' અને 'વૃત્તિમાં પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળાં પદોનો એકાર્થીભાવ હોય છે' એમ કહેવાથી કોઈને શંકા થાય કે જો વાકયમાં પદોનું પૃથગર્થત્વ હશે તો વિશિષ્ટાર્થની (એટલે કે **राज्ञः पुरुषः** માંથી 'રાજ સંબંધી પુરુષ' એવા અર્થની) પ્રતીતિ થશે નહીં; તથા વૃત્તિમાં એકાર્થીભાવ હશે (એટલે કે સંખ્યાની દૃષ્ટિએ એક અર્થની પ્રતીતિ થતી હશે) તો **राजपुरुषः ।** માંથી પુરુષમાત્રની પ્રતીતિ થશે. પરિણામે ત્યાં પણ વિશિષ્ટાર્થની પ્રતીતિ થશે નહીં. પરંતુ આ શંકા ઉચિત નથી, કેમ કે (क) અહીં વાકયમાંથી પણ વિશિષ્ટાર્થની પ્રતીતિ થાય છે. જેમ કે વાકયમાં 'પદો કેવળ પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળાં હોય છે' એટલું જ નથી કહ્યું, બલકે પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળાં પદોને પરસ્પરની અપેક્ષા હોય છે એમ કહ્યું છે. આમ પોતપોતાના પૃથગ્ અર્થો આપી ચૂકેલાં પદોનો આકાંક્ષાદિવશાત્ જે પરસ્પર સંબંધ તેને વ્યપેક્ષા કહે છે. અહીં (વાકયમાં) આકાંક્ષાદિવશાત્ વિશિષ્ટાર્થની પ્રતીતિ થાય છે.[23] (ख) 'એકાર્થીભાવ'નો શંકાકારે ઉપર જે અર્થ કર્યો છે તે વિકૃત અર્થ છે. અહીં 'એકાર્થીભાવ' શબ્દથી પૂર્વોક્તાર્થ જ અભીષ્ટ છે. વૃત્તિમાં જુદા જુદા અર્થોવાળાં ભેગાં થયેલાં પદોના સમુદાયમાંથી–સમુદાયશકિતથી વિશિષ્ટાર્થની પ્રતીતિ થાય છે. આમ વાકય અને વૃત્તિ એ બન્નેમાંથી વિશિષ્ટાર્થની પ્રતીતિ થાય છે પણ તે બન્નેમાં કારણ અલગ અલગ છે. એકમાં આકાંક્ષાદિવશાત્ એ અર્થ મળે છે અને બીજામાં તે અર્થ સમુદાયશકિતથી પ્રાપ્ત થાય છે.[24]

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૨૧. इह राज्ञः पुरुष इत्युक्ते राजा पुरुषमपेक्षते ममायमिति पुरुषोऽपि राजानमपेक्षतेऽहमस्येति । तयोरभिसंबन्धस्य षष्ठी वाचिका भवति । —२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६५.

૨૨. राज्ञः पुरुषः । राज्ञः પદ 'રાજાનો' એવો અર્થ અને पुरुषः પદ 'માણસ' એવો અર્થ પહેલે તબક્કે આપે છે. પરંતુ राजन् શબ્દની પરમાં આવેલી સંબંધ-વાચિકા ષષ્ઠીવિભકિત સંબંધી પદાર્થની આકાંક્ષા રાખે છે. તેથી આકાંક્ષા થાય કે राज्ञः किम् ? આ આકાંક્ષા पुरुषः પદથી સંતોષાય છે. એ જ પ્રમાણે, पुरुषः કહેતાં પ્રશ્ન થશે કે कस्य ? તેની આંકાક્ષા राज्ञः પદથી સંતોષાય છે. આમ પદો પરસ્પરની જે અપેક્ષા રાખે છે તેને વ્યપેક્ષા કહે છે; આવી વ્યપેક્ષા વાકયમાં રહે છે.

૨૩. જુઓ : પાદટીપ--૨૨.

૨૪. અહીં કોઈને પ્રશ્ન થાય કે વાકયમાં કલ્પેલી અવયવશકિતથી જ વૃત્તિમાં પણ વિશિષ્ટાર્થની પ્રતીતિ થઈ જશે, તો પછી શકત્યન્તર(સમુદાયશકિત)ની કલ્પના શા માટે કરવી જોઈએ? 'વૈયાકરણભૂષણસાર'માં આની ચર્ચા કરવામાં આવી છે :

समासे खलु भिन्नैव शक्तिः पङ्कजशब्दवत् ।
बहूनां वृत्तिधर्माणां वचनैरेव साधने ।
स्यान्महद्गौरवं तस्मादेकार्थीभाव आश्रितः ॥ ४ ॥ (३१) —समासशक्तिनिर्णयः ।

૧.૨.૨

અહીં એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યનો ભેદ વિચારવા માટે એક પ્રશ્ન કરવામાં આવે છે: પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળાં અસામાસિક પદોનો અર્થ અને સામાસિક પદનો અર્થ એક જ જોવા મળે છે. દા.ત., राज्ञः पुरुषमानय । કહો કે राजपुरुषमानय । એમ કહો પણ એક ચોક્કસ વ્યક્તિને જ લાવવામાં આવે છે. આમ અર્થબોધની દૃષ્ટિએ તો કશો ફરક પડતો નથી. આ સ્થિતિમાં જો વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યથી એક જ અર્થ પ્રતીત થતો હશે તો સામર્થ્યભેદ (બે પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય છે એમ) કેવી રીતે કહેવાશે? કૈયટે આનો પ્રત્યુત્તર આપતાં જણાવ્યું છે કે વાક્યમાં પદોનું પૃથગર્થત્વ હોવા છતાંય આકાંક્ષાદિવશાત્ વિશેષ્ય-વિશેષણભાવથી વિશિષ્ટાર્થની પ્રતિપત્તિ થાય છે. તથા વૃત્તિમાં राजपुरुषः । શબ્દમાંથી (સમુદાયશક્તિથી) વિશિષ્ટાર્થની જ પ્રતિપત્તિ થાય છે. આ સ્થિતિમાં અન્યનું આનયન કેવી રીતે થાય? અર્થાત્ राज्ञः पुरुषः । કહો કે राजपुरुषः । કહો, પણ એક ચોક્કસ વ્યક્તિનું જ આનયન થશે. પરંતુ આટલા માત્રથી વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યનું એકાર્થત્વ છે એમ ન કહી શકાય. જેવી રીતે ब्राह्मणानां शतं भोज्यताम् । शतं ब्राह्मणा भोज्यन्ताम् । ('બ્રાહ્મણોમાંથી સો જમાડો' અને 'સો બ્રાહ્મણો જમાડો') એમ કહેતાં અમુકને જમાડવાનું કાર્ય એકનું એક હોવા છતાંય તે બન્ને વાક્યોનો શબ્દાર્થ જુદો પડે છે, તેમ અહીં પણ આનયન કોઈ એક ચોક્કસ વ્યક્તિનું થાય છે તોપણ राज्ञः पुरुषः । (રાજસંબંધી પુરુષ) અને राजपुरुषः । (રાજ સંબંધવાન પુરુષ) એ બન્નેનો શબ્દાર્થ જુદો જુદો જ પ્રાપ્ત થાય છે.[25]

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૨૫. (क) नापि ब्रूमः–अन्यस्यानयनं भवतीति । वाक्ये पृथगर्थत्वेऽपि पदानामाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतावशाद्विशेषणविशेष्यभावाद्विशिष्टार्थप्रतीतिः । वृत्तावपि विशिष्ट एवार्थो राजपुरुषशब्दाभ्यामभिधीयत इति कुतोऽन्यस्यानयनम् । यथा ब्राह्मणानां शतं भोज्यताम्, शतं ब्राह्मणा भोज्यन्तामिति सत्यपि कार्यस्याभेदे शब्दार्थौ भिद्यते तथेहापीत्यर्थः । —प्रदीपः, पृ. ३२२

(ख) કૈયટના 'शब्दार्थौ भिद्यते' એ વચનને સમજવા માટે (किञ्च पिक पदशक्तिग्रहवतः 'अयं कोकिलः' इत्यनुव्यवसायापत्तिः, तव पिकत्वकोकिलत्वयोरभेदात् । मम तु तत्तत्पदभानान्न दोषः। ..... शाब्दज्ञाने शब्दभानस्याङ्गीकाराच्च ।...... साहचर्यञ्च शब्दानुविद्धस्यैवार्थस्यावगमाद् इति । किञ्च प्रत्यक्षादावपि विषयताभाननियमनिर्वाहाय पदभानमावश्यकं, यज्ज्ञानं यत्पदादिविषयं तत् तज्जन्यबोधविषयतासमानविषयताकमिति नियमात् ॥ बौद्धार्थनिरूपणम्, पृ. ३३०–३३५)
વૈયાકરણસિદ્ધાંતલઘુમંજૂષા જોવી. ત્યાં સ્પષ્ટ કર્યું છે કે શાબ્દબોધમાં શબ્દભાન પણ થાય છે.

(ગ) અહીં વૃત્તિ-વાક્યનો અર્થબોધ એકસરખો છે પણ અગાઉ જોયું તેમ તે અર્થબોધ કરાવવાની રીત જુદી જુદી છે. બીજું, આપણે (૬.૦.૦માં) જોઈશું કે વૃત્તિ અને વાક્ય પરસ્પરના પર્યાય નથી. કેવળ સાદૃશ્યને કારણે જ વૃત્તિ અને વાક્ય એક જ છે એવી ભ્રાંતિ થાય છે. સિદ્ધાંતપક્ષે તો વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યનો અત્યંત ભેદ છે જ.

ભાષ્યકારે પણ સ્વીકાર્યું છે કે राज्ञः पुरुषमानय। કહો કે राजपुरुषमानय કહો, પણ અન્યનું આનયન થતું નથી; રાજપુરુષનું જ આનયન થાય છે. આથી વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યનો ભેદ અહીં બીજી રીતે વિચારવાનો છે: પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળા પદોથી બનેલા વાક્ય કરતાં સમાસ બે રીતે જુદો પડે છે. આ સન્દર્ભમાં 'એકાર્થીભાવકૃત વિશેષ કયા કયા છે?'—એવો પ્રશ્ન કરીને ભાષ્યકારે જણાવ્યું છે કે (क) सुबलोपो व्यवधानं यथेष्टमन्यतरेणाभिसम्बन्धः स्वर इति। અર્થાત્ (૧) વાક્યમાં સુપ્ વિભક્તિનો લોપ થતો નથી. જેમ કે राज्ञः पुरुषः। પરંતુ સમાસમાં તેનો લોપ થાય છે. જેમ કે राजपुरुषः। (૨) વાક્યમાં બે પદોની વચ્ચે ત્રીજા પદનું વ્યવધાન આવી શકે છે. જેમ કે राज्ञः ऋद्धस्य पुरुषः। પરંતુ સમાસમાં આવું શક્ય નથી. જેમ કે राजपुरुषः। (૩) વાક્યમાં ઇચ્છા મુજબ પદોનો એકબીજા સાથે સંબંધ થઈ શકે છે. જેમ કે राज्ञः पुरुषः। પણ કહેવાય અને पुरुषो राज्ञः પણ કહી શકાય. પરંતુ સમાસમાં આમ થઈ શકતું નથી. (અર્થાત્ ત્યાં પૂર્વપદ કોણ અને ઉત્તરપદ કોણ તે નિશ્ચિત હોય છે.). જેમ કે राजपुरुषः। (૪) વાક્યમાં બે પદોના બે સ્વરો હોય છે. જેમ કે राज्ञः पुरुषः। પરંતુ સમાસમાં એક જ સ્વર હોય છે. જેમ કે राजपुरुषः। (ख) संख्याविशेषो व्यक्ताभिधानमुपसर्जनविशेषणं च योगः इति। અર્થાત્ (૧) વાક્યમાં સંખ્યા વિશેષનું ભાન થાય છે. જેમ કે राज्ञः पुरुषः। राज्ञोः पुरुषः। राज्ञां पुरुषः। પરંતુ સમાસમાં સંખ્યાવિશેષનો અર્થબોધ થતો નથી. જેમ કે राजपुरुषः। (૨) વાક્યમાં સ્પષ્ટ અભિધાન થઈ શકે છે. જેમ કે ब्राह्मणस्य कम्बलस्तिष्ठति। પરંતુ સમાસમાં આવું સ્પષ્ટ અભિધાન થઈ શકતું નથી. જેમ કે ब्राह्मणकम्बलतिष्ठति। અહીં સંદેહ થાય છે કે ब्राह्मण પદ સંબોધન હશે કે ષષ્ઠીસમાસ? (૩) વાક્યમાં ઉપસર્જન પદને વિશેષણ લાગી શકે છે. જેમ કે ऋद्धस्य राज्ञः पुरुषः। પરંતુ સમાસમાં આવું શક્ય નથી. જેમ કે राजपुरुषः। અહીં ऋद्धस्य राजपुरुषः। એવું વિશેષણ મૂકી શકાતું નથી. (૪) વાક્યમાં પ્રધાન-પદ અને ઉપસર્જન-પદ એ બન્ને પદોને च કારનો યોગ થઈ શકે છે. જેમ કે राज्ञो गौश्चाश्वश्च पुरुषश्च અને देवदत्तस्य च यज्ञदत्तस्य च विष्णुमित्रस्य च गौः। પરંતુ સમાસમાં च કારનો યોગ થતો નથી. જેમ કે राज्ञो गवाश्वपुरुषाः। અને देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्राणां गौः।

અહીં વાક્ય અને સમાસના શબ્દસ્વરૂપમાં જે જે જુદાપણું છે તે બે પ્રકારનું છે: (क)માં જે ઉદાહરણો છે તે વ્યાકરણની દૃષ્ટિએ અસામાસિક અને સામાસિક પદોમાં જે જુદાપણું છે તેને વર્ણવે છે. તથા (ख)માં જે ઉદાહરણો છે તે અર્થવિજ્ઞાન (Semantics)ની દૃષ્ટિએ અસામાસિક અને સામાસિક પદોમાં જે જુદાપણું છે તેને વર્ણવે છે.

૧.૨.૩

વાર્તિકકારે ૨-१-१ સૂત્રમાંના समर्थः પદથી (૧) એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને (૨) વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય સમજવાનું છે—એવું દર્શાવ્યું છે. આથી પ્રશ્ન થાય છે કે અહીં એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય એ બંનેનું શું આ એક જ સૂત્રથી ગ્રહણ થઈ શકે છે કે બીજા પક્ષમાં નવું સૂત્ર કરવું પડશે? ભાષ્યકારે જ આ પ્રશ્ન ઊભો કરીને તેનો જવાબ આપતાં જણાવ્યું છે કે હા, આ એક જ સૂત્રથી બંને પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય લઈ શકાય છે. सम् નો अर्थ શબ્દની સાથે સમાસ થયો છે, અને सम् એ ઉપસર્ગ છે. હવે જેવી રીતે ધૂમાડાને જોઈને 'અહીં અગ્નિ હશે' એવું અનુમાન થાય છે તેવી રીતે અહીં सम् ઉપસર્ગ હોય તો તેની સાથે કોઈક ક્રિયાવાચી શબ્દનો પ્રયોગ પણ હોવો જોઈએ. તેથી પ્રશ્ન થાય છે કે सम् ની સાથે

કયા શબ્દનો પ્રયોગ હોવો ઘટે? તો—સંગતાર્થને પણ સમર્થ કહી શકાય, સંસૃષ્ટાર્થને પણ **સમર્થ** કહી શકાય. સંપ્રેક્ષિતાર્થને પણ સમર્થ કહી શકાય અને સંબદ્ધાર્થને પણ સમર્થ કહી શકાય. **હવે** જ્યારે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાંના **समर्थः પદથી એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય** લેવું હશે ત્યારે संगतार्थः समर्थः, **संसृष्टार्थः समर्थः** । એવો વિગ્રહ કરવામાં આવશે. જેવી રીતે 'ઘી સંગત થયું છે' કે 'તેલ સંગત થયું છે' એમ કહેતાં ઘી કે તેલ એકીભૂત થયું છે એમ સમજાય છે. એ જ રીતે 'અગ્નિ સંસૃષ્ટ કર્યો' એમ કહેતાં અગ્નિ ભેગો કર્યો એમ સમજાય છે. હવે જ્યારે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રસ્થ સમર્થ પદથી **વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું હશે ત્યારે संप्रेक्षितार्थः समर्थः**, संबद्धार्थः समर्थः । એવો વિગ્રહ કરવામાં આવશે. અહીં રજ્જૂ કે લોખંડથી ખીલે બંધાયેલાને સંબદ્ધ કહે છે.[26] અથવા તો 'અમારે ગર્ગોની સાથે સંબંધ છે' એમ કહેતા सम् ઉપસર્ગપૂર્વક **बध** ધાતુનો 'સંયોગ' એવો અર્થ પણ મળે છે.[27]

આમ ભાષ્યકારે समर्थः શબ્દના સંગતાર્થ, સંસૃષ્ટાર્થ, સંપ્રેક્ષિતાર્થ અને **સંબદ્ધાર્થ**—એવો અર્થ કરી બતાવીને આ ૨-૧-૧ એક જ સૂત્રથી બંને પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય લઈ શકાય છે એમ સાબિત કર્યું છે. આથી સમાસ કરવા માટે એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું હોય ત્યારે **समर्थः** પદના **संगतार्थः** કે **संसृष्टार्थः** એવા અર્થો કરવા, અને વાક્યની સિદ્ધિ કરવા માટે વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું હોય ત્યારે **समर्थः** પદના **संप्रेक्षितार्थः** કે **संबद्धार्थः** એવા અર્થો કરવા.

૧.૩.૦

ઉપરની સુદીર્ઘ-ચર્ચામાં આપણે પ્રસ્તુત ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાંના એક **समर्थः** પદની **અર્થ**-વિચારણા કરી. પરંતુ આ વિચારણાનો (૨-૧-૧) સૂત્રમાંના અન્ય (**पदविधिः**) પદ સાથે અન્વય કરતાં સમગ્ર સૂત્રનો શો અર્થ પ્રાપ્ત થાય છે? —તે આપણી ગવેષણાનો મુખ્ય વિષય છે. અહીં **समर्थः** અને **पदविधिः** એવાં બે પદોનો સમુદિતાર્થ ધારીએ એટલો સરળ નથી. અન્ય સૂત્રોના અર્થની સરખામણીમાં આ સૂત્રનો અર્થ દુઃસાધ્ય છે કારણ કે, **समर्थः पदविधिः** । ૨-૧-૧ —સૂત્રમાં બંને પદોનો એક જ (પ્રથમા) વિભક્તિમાં નિર્દેશ છે. એથી ઉદ્દેશ્ય-વિધેયભાવનો નિર્ણય થઈ શકતો નથી. આ સન્દર્ભમાં જ વાર્તિકકારે "સમર્થાધિકારનો વિધેયની સાથે સામાના-ધિકરણ્ય હોવાથી (**समर्थः** એવો) નિર્દેશ અનર્થક છે"[28] એવું વાર્તિક **રજૂ કર્યું** છે. આ મુશ્કેલીને દૂર કરવા ત્રણ રીતે સૂત્રાર્થ કરવાનો પ્રયત્ન થયો છે, હવે પછીની ચર્ચામાં તેનો વિચાર કરીશું.

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૨૬. અર્થાત્ દોરીથી બાંધીને બે પદાર્થને સંબદ્ધ કરવામાં આવે છે ત્યારે તે બે પદાર્થો પરસ્પર ભિન્ન છે એવું સ્પષ્ટ દેખાય છે. આમ પૃથગ્ પૃથગ્ અર્થોની ઉપસ્થિતિને વ્યપેક્ષા સામર્થ્ય કહે છે.

૨૭. अथ यद्येवैकार्थीभावः सामर्थ्यमथापि व्यपेक्षा सामर्थ्यं क्व गतमेतदियता सूत्रेण..... अस्ति नो गर्गः संबन्धः । अस्ति नो वत्सैः संबन्ध इति । संयोग इत्यर्थः । २।१।१, वा–४, इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६५

૨૮. समर्थाधिकारस्य विधेयसामानाधिकरण्यान्निर्देशानर्थक्यम् । २।१।१, वा. १७, पृ. ३६९

૧.૩.૧

ઉપર જણાવ્યું તેમ વાર્તિકકારે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં વિધેયની સાથે સમર્થાધિકારનું સામાનાધિકરણ્ય હોવાથી (समर्थः એવા) નિર્દેશનું આનર્થક્ય કહ્યું છે. અહીં વિધેય पदविधिः છે. पदविधिः શબ્દમાંનો વિધિ શબ્દ કર્મસાધન છે.[२९] આથી 'પદસંબંધી સમાસ વગેરે' તે (વિધિ)નો અર્થ થશે. સૂત્રકારે આ 'સમાસ'ના સામાનાધિકરણ્યમાં (સમાનવિભક્તિવચનાદિમાં) समर्थः પદનો ઉપન્યાસ કર્યો છે. પરિણામે समर्थः समासः। (સમાસ સમર્થ છે) એવો સૂત્રાર્થ થશે. આવા સૂત્રમાંના समर्थः પદથી અસમર્થ પદોનો જે સમાસ થયો હશે તેની નિવૃત્તિ થઈ શકશે નહીં. કેમ કે "સમાસ સમર્થ છે" એમ કહેવાથી અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ જોડાયેલાં પદોનો જે સમાસ થયો હશે, દા.ત. राज्ञः पुरुषः राजपुरुषः। તે સમર્થ કહેવાશે અને અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર નહીં જોડાયેલાં પદોનો જે સમાસ થયો હશે, દા.ત. भार्या राज्ञः पुरुषो देवदत्तस्य > भार्या राजपुरुषो देवदत्तस्य। તે પણ સમર્થ કહેવાશે. અહીં અસમર્થ (અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર નહીં જોડાયેલાં) પદોનો જે સમાસ થયો હશે તેની નિવૃત્તિ પ્રસ્તુત સૂત્રના समर्थः પદથી થઈ શકશે નહીં. કોઈ એમ કહે કે આવાં અસમર્થ પદોનો સમાસ થઈ ગયા પછી તે સમાસની ભલે નિવૃત્તિ ન થઈ શકે, પણ તેના સાધુત્વની નિવૃત્તિ કરવા માટે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રસ્થ समर्थः પદ કામે લાગશે, તો આ પણ શક્ય નથી. કારણ કે અસમર્થપદોનો સમાસ એકવાર થઈ ગયા પછી असूर्यललाटयोर्दृशितपोः। ૩-૨-૩૬ જેવા સૂત્રાન્તરથી[३०] તેનું સાધુત્વ પણ કહેવાઈ જશે. એ જ પ્રમાણે अकिञ्चित्कुर्वाणम्। ઇત્યાદિ અસમર્થ नञ् સમાસોને પણ सुडनपुंसकस्य। ૧-૧-૪૩ એવા સૂત્રનિર્દેશને નિયમાર્થ ગણીને નિવૃત્ત કરી દેવામાં આવ્યાં છે.[३१] એથી એમની (अकिञ्चित्कुर्वाणम् વગેરેની) નિવૃત્તિ કરવા માટે समर्थः પદ કામે લાગશે એવું પણ નહીં કહી શકાય.[३२] આમ ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં समर्थः અને पदविधिः એ બંને પદો પ્રથમાન્ત હોવાથી ઉચિત સૂત્રાર્થની કે ઇષ્ટવ્યવસ્થાની પ્રાપ્તિ થતી નથી.

આ મુશ્કેલીને દૂર કરવા માટે વાર્તિકકારે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રના समर्थः પદમાં समर्थानाम् એવો ફેરફાર સૂચવ્યો છે.[३३] આથી समर्थानां पदविधिः। એવો સૂત્રન્યાસ થતાં "સમર્થ (અર્થની

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૨૯. विधिरिति कोऽयं शब्दः। विपूर्वाद्धाञः कर्मसाधन इकारः। विधीयते विधिरिति। २।१।१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३५७

૩૦. असूर्यम्पश्या राजदाराः।...असूर्य इति चासमर्थसमासोऽयम् दृशिना नञः संबन्धात्। सूर्यं न पश्यन्तीति॥ ३।२।३६ इत्यत्र काशिकावृत्तिः।

૩૧. જુઓ : ૧.૧.૨

૩૨. विधिशब्द इह कर्मसाधन एव उपात्तः, तस्य पदसंबन्धी समासादिरर्थो वाच्यः॥ तत्समानाधिकरणं च समर्थ इत्युपात्तम्। तत्र असमर्थानां पदानां समासस्यानिवर्तितत्वात्समर्थवचनेन न किंचित् कृत्यमित्यर्थः। तथा हि समर्थानां यः समासः स समर्थ एव। योऽप्यसमर्थानां भार्या राज्ञः पुरुषो देवदत्तस्येत्यादौ सोऽपि नियमाभावान्निर्वृत एव। तस्यासमर्थस्यापि अनेन समर्थवचनेन न किंचित्क्रियते। निष्पन्नत्वाल्लक्षणान्तरेण साधुत्वव्यवस्थापनाच्च। अकिंचित् कुर्वाणमित्यादयोऽप्यसमर्था नञ्समासाः परिगणनेन निरस्ता इति तदर्थमप्येतन्न भवति॥ प्रदीपः, पृ. ३४०-३४१

૩૩. सिद्धं तु समर्थानामिति वचनात्॥ २-१-१, वा—१८, पृ. ३६९

દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર જોડાયેલાં) પદોનો વિધિ (અર્થાત્ સમાસ વગેરે) થાય છે" એવો ઇષ્ટ સૂત્રાર્થ પ્રાપ્ત થાય છે.

પરંતુ વાર્તિકકારે (૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં) સૂચવેલા ફેરફારમાં समर्थानाम् એવું બહુવચન વપરાયું છે, તેથી એક કે બે સમર્થ પદોને વિધિ થશે નહીં. કેમ કે જેવી રીતે पशुना यजेत । એ વાક્યમાં સંખ્યા વિવક્ષિત છે તેવી રીતે અહીં समर्थानाम् પદમાં પણ બહુત્વની વિવક્ષા રહેલી છે. આથી વાર્તિકકારે વા-૧૮ માં આપેલું સમાધાન સ્વીકાર્ય બનતું નથી. વળી, આ સમાધાન સ્વીકારી લેવાથી સૂત્રભેદ (પાણિનિએ રજૂ કરેલા સૂત્રમાં ફેરફાર) પણ કરવો પડે છે, એ બીજી મુશ્કેલી છે.[34]

આ સન્દર્ભમાં, પૂર્વોક્ત મુશ્કેલીને દૂર કરવા માટે एकशेषनिर्देशाद्वा । (૨-૧-૧, વા.૧૯) 'અથવા, એકશેષ-નિર્દેશ માનવાથી' એવું વાર્તિક રજૂ કરવામાં આવ્યું છે. પતંજલિએ આ સમાધાન સ્વીકાર્યું છે. તેમણે આ વાર્તિકને આધારે જણાવ્યું છે કે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં समर्थः એવું પદ એકશેષથી પ્રાપ્ત થયેલું છે એમ માનવાથી ઇષ્ટ સૂત્રાર્થની પ્રાપ્તિ થાય છે.[35] પતંજલિએ समर्थः અને पद શબ્દનો विधि શબ્દની સાથે સર્વવિભક્ત્યન્ત સમાસ માન્યો છે: एवं तर्हि समर्थपदयोः विधिशब्देन सर्वविभक्त्यन्तः समासः । समर्थस्य विधिः समर्थविधिः समर्थयोर्विधिः समर्थविधिः । समर्थानां विधिः समर्थविधिः । समर्थाद्विधिः समर्थविधिः । समर्थे विधिः समर्थविधिः । पदस्य विधिः पदविधिः । पदयोर्विधिः पदविधिः । पदानां विधिः पदविधिः । पदाद्विधिः पदविधिः । पदे विधिः पदविधिः । समर्थविधिश्च समर्थविधिश्च समर्थविधिश्च समर्थविधिश्च समर्थविधिश्च समर्थविधयः । पदविधिश्च पदविधिश्च पदविधिश्च पदविधिश्च पदविधिश्च पदविधयः । समर्थविधयश्च पदविधयश्च समर्थः पदविधिः । २-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६१ અહીં समर्थविधयःમાં ઉત્તરપદનો લોપ કરીને તેને યાદૃચ્છિકી (દા.ત. પ્રથમા) વિભક્તિ લગાવીને समर्थः એવો એકશેષ નિર્દેશ સૂત્રકારે કર્યો છે.[36] ૨-૧-૧, વા. ૧૭ માં બતાવેલી (પ્રસ્તુત મુદ્દા-૧.૩.૧—ને પ્રારંભે વર્ણવેલી) મુશ્કેલી દૂર થઈ જાય છે.

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૩૪. આપણે જાણીએ છીએ કે પતંજલિ સૂત્રભેદ કરવા મહદંશે તૈયાર હોતા નથી
प्रमाणभूत आचार्यो दर्भपवित्रपाणिः शुचावकाशे प्राङ्मुख उपविश्य महता यत्नेन सूत्रं प्रणयति स्म तत्राशक्यं वर्णेनाप्यनर्थकेन भवितुं किं पुनरियता सूत्रेण ॥ १-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३९

૩૫. અહીં કોઈને એમ થાય કે વા-૧૯ એ તો વા-૧૮ના સમર્થનમાં જ છે. (અર્થાત્ વા-૧૯ એ કોઈ નવું સમાધાન આપનાર નથી) તો એ ઉચિત નથી કેમ કે એમ કરવાથી વા-૧૯માંનું વા પદ અનર્થક બની જશે. બીજું, વા-૧૮ના જ સમર્થનમાં વા-૧૯ છે એમ માનવાથી વા-૧૮માં સૂચવેલો સૂત્રભેદ માન્ય રાખવો પડશે. (પણ આપણે ઉપર જોયું તેમ પતંજલિને મહદંશે સૂત્રભેદ કરવો કે સ્વીકારવો ગમતો નથી.)

૩૬. અહીં समर्थः એવા નિર્દેશને ઇષ્ટાર્થનો વ્યવસ્થાપક સાબિત કરવા માટે પતંજલિએ બધાં વચનો અને બધી વિભક્તિઓનો એકશેષ કરી બતાવ્યો છે; એ ખેંચી-તાણીને કરેલું સમાધાન છે એમ કેટલાક વિદ્વાનોને લાગ્યું છે. જુઓ :
Joshi, S. D., Vyā. M. Bhā. Samarthāhnika, Introduction : 4.12 (*i*), Page—XV.

૧.૩.૨

૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રમાં समर्थः અને पदविधिः એ બન્ને પદો પ્રથમાંત હોઈ સમગ્ર સૂત્રનો શો અર્થ કરવો? તેવો પ્રશ્ન ઊભો થયો છે અને આપણે જોયું તેમ વાર્તિકકારે અને ભાષ્યકારે તેનું સમાધાન કરવા માટે ક્રમશઃ સૂત્રભેદ સૂચવ્યો, અને ઘણા આયાસપૂર્વક समर्थ અને पद્નો विधि શબ્દની સાથે સર્વવિભક્ત્યન્ત સમાસ કરી બતાવ્યો. પરંતુ ડૉ. એસ. ડી. જોશીએ તેનું સરળ સમાધાન સૂચવ્યું છે : समर्थः ને બદલે समर्थानाम् એમ સૂત્રભેદ કરવાના વાર્તિકકારના સૂચનથી આરંભીને (આજદિન સુધીના) બધા જ વ્યાખ્યાતાઓનું વ્યાખ્યાન એમ માનીને ચાલે છે કે ૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રમાં पदविधिः શબ્દ વિધેય (Pradicate) છે અને समर्थः શબ્દ ઉદ્દેશ્ય (Subject) છે. એકવાર સૂત્રનું આ પ્રમાણે પૃથક્કરણ કર્યા પછી समर्थ પદને समर्थानाम् રૂપે ફેરવ્યા સિવાય સૂત્રમાંથી અર્થ કાઢવાનો બીજો કોઈ રસ્તો રહેતો નથી. પરંતુ જો समर्थः શબ્દને વિધેય રૂપે લઈએ અને पदविधिः શબ્દને ઉદ્દેશ્ય રૂપે લઈએ તો સૂત્રનો અર્થ આ પ્રમાણે થશે : यत्र पदविधिः तत्र समर्थः इति उपतिष्ठते । "જ્યાં જ્યાં પદવિધિ કહેવામાં આવે છે ત્યાં ત્યાં समर्थः (અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર જોડાયેલાં) (Semantically Connected) એવું પદ ઉપસ્થિત થાય છે." આ રીતે ૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રમાંના समर्थः પદનું અર્થઘટન કરવા માટે વાર્તિકકાર દ્વારા સૂચવાયેલ સૂત્રભેદ અને ભાષ્યકાર પતંજલિને કરવું પડેલું વિસ્તૃત વ્યાખ્યાન અનાવશ્યક બની જાય છે.[૩૭]

समर्थः पदविधिः ૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રનો અર્થ કરવા માટે ડૉ. એસ. ડી. જોશીએ સૂચવેલો ઉપર્યુક્ત ઉપાય યોગ્ય છે; પરંતુ નવીન નથી. કેમ કે બૃહચ્છબ્દેન્દુશેખરમાં નાગેશ ભટ્ટે એનો સ્પષ્ટ ઉલ્લેખ કર્યો છે.[૩૮]

૧.૩.૩

કાશીની વૈયાકરણ—પરંપરામાં પ્રસ્તુત ૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રમાંનું समर्थः પદ લાક્ષણિક માનવામાં આવ્યું છે. ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે આ સૂત્રનો આ પ્રમાણે અર્થ કર્યો છે : पदसम्बन्धी यो विधिः स समर्थाश्रितो बोध्यः।[૩૯] અહીં समर्थः શબ્દનો समर्थाश्रितः અર્થ કર્યો છે; તેને સમજાવતાં નાગેશ ભટ્ટ લખે છે કે—સૂત્રમાં 'પદવિધિ' શબ્દ વડે તેના સહચરિત વિધિનું પણ ગ્રહણ થાય છે. આથી સન્નન્તાદિવિધિઓમાં પણ એકાર્થીભાવનું પ્રતિપાદન કરનાર ભાષ્ય સંગત બની રહે છે. (પણ) અહીં અર્થાત્ સમજાય છે કે પદવિધિ એટલે સમાસ-સંજ્ઞા વગેરે. પરંતુ सामर्थ्यम् એવું પદ તે (સમાસ)નું સાક્ષાત્ વિશેષણ થઈ શકતું નથી. કેમ કે (समासः અને सामर्थ्यम्—એમ બંને શબ્દો વિભિન્ન લિંગમાં હોવાથી) તે શક્ય જ નથી. માટે ભટ્ટોજિએ समर्थाश्रितः એમ કહ્યું છે. ટૂંકમાં, ૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રમાં समर्थः શબ્દ લાક્ષણિક છે,[૪૦] એમ કહેવાનું તાત્પર્ય છે.[૪૧] આપણે અગાઉ

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૩૭. See Joshi S. D., Vyā M. Bhā. Samarthāhnika, Introduction 4·12 (*ii*), Page—XVI and Notes, page 142.

૩૮. यत्र शास्त्रे पदसम्बन्धिविधिस्तत्र समर्थ इत्युपतिष्ठते इत्यर्थ इत्यन्ये ॥
—बृ. श. शे. भा. २, पृ. ९४९

૩૯. ६४७ समर्थः पदविधिः २–१–१ । वै. सि. कौ. इत्यस्य वृत्तिः ।

૪૦. લક્ષણાથી समर्थः નો અર્થ समर्थाश्रितः થાય છે.

૪૧. अत्र पदविधिशब्देन तत्सहचरितो विधिरपि गृह्यते । अत एव सन्नन्तादावेकार्थीभाव-

(૧.૨.૦)માં જોયું છે કે समर्थः શબ્દ બે પ્રકારના સામર્થ્યનો નિર્દેશ કરે છે. આ સન્દર્ભમાં, હવે समर्थाश्रितः એવા લાક્ષણિક શબ્દનો સામર્થ્યાશ્રિતઃ અર્થ થશે. આથી 'પદસંબંધી વિધિ સામર્થ્યાશ્રિત છે' એટલે કે પદ સંબંધી વિધિ=સમાસાદિ એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યને આશ્રયે રહેનાર હોય છે—એવો સૂત્રાર્થ મળે છે. राजन्+ङस्+पुरुष+सु। એવી અલૌકિક વિગ્રહ વાકયની અવસ્થામાં એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય રહે ત્યારે અર્થાત્ પૃથગ્ અર્થોવાળાં પદો એકત્ર થઈને વિશિષ્ટ—એકાર્થકની ઉપસ્થિતિ કરાવનારાં બને છે ત્યારે राजपुरुषः એવો સમાસ થાય છે. અહીં વિશેષ્ય અને વિશેષણભાવથી જોડાયેલાં પદોની 'રાજ સંબંધવાન પુરુષ' એમ એકાર્થક ઉપસ્થિતિ થાય છે. જ્યાં જ્યાં આવી વિશિષ્ટૈકાર્થકત્વની ઉપસ્થિતિ કરાવવા માટે પદો શકિતમાન ન હોય ત્યાં સમાસ થતો નથી. કાશીની વૈયાકરણ પરંપરામાં ભટ્ટોજિએ જ્યારે 'પદસંબંધી વિધિ=સમાસાદિ એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યને આશ્રયે રહેનાર હોય છે' એવો સૂત્રાર્થ કર્યો ત્યારે ત્યાં પણ 'પદવિધિ' એ ઉદ્દેશ્ય છે અને 'સામર્થ્યાશ્રિત' એ વિધેય છે એમ જાણવું.

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समर्थः પદને વિધેય ગણવું અને पदविधिः પદને ઉદ્દેશ્ય ગણવું એ બાબતમાં તો ઉપર્યુક્ત મત અગાઉના (૧.૩.૨માં દર્શાવેલા) મત કરતાં જુદો પડતો નથી. પરંતુ ત્યાં જે અર્થ (यत्र पदविधिस्तत्र समर्थः इति उपतिष्ठते।) કહેવાયો છે તે વાકયાવસ્થાને ધ્યાનમાં રાખીને કહેવાયો છે. અને ત્યાં समर्थः નો અર્થ "અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પદો પરસ્પર જોડાયેલાં હોવાં જોઈએ. (Semantically Connected)" એવો થાય છે. બીજી તરફ, ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે ૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રનો पदसम्बन्धी यो विधिः स समर्थाश्रितो बोध्यः। (પદસંબંધી જે વિધિ તે એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યને આશ્રયે રહેનારો હોય છે) એવો જે અર્થ કર્યો છે તે અલૌકિકવિગ્રહ વાકયાવસ્થાને ધ્યાનમાં રાખીને કર્યો છે.[૪૨] તેમણે અહીં समर्थः નો પૂર્વોકત[૪૩] અર્થ છોડી દઈને 'સામર્થ્યાશ્રિત'[૪૪] અર્થ કર્યો છે એનું કારણ એ છે કે समर्थः નો પૂર્વોકત અર્થ કરવાથી सापेक्षमसमर्थम् भवति। વગેરે અનેક વચનો કરવાં પડે છે. અને 'આવાં અનેક વચનો કરવાની જરૂર નથી, તે માટેની વ્યવસ્થા તો ગમકત્વના સિદ્ધાંતથી જ થઈ જશે' એમ કહીને ભાષ્યકારે સૂત્રકારનો ગૂઢ આશય સ્પષ્ટ કરતાં 'એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને/અથવા વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય' એવો (समर्थः પદનો) પારિભાષિક અર્થ બતાવ્યો છે, આમ ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે કરેલો અર્થ વધુ ભાષ્યસમ્મત છે.

प्रतिपादकं भाष्यं सङ्गच्छते। स चार्थात्समाससंज्ञादिः। तस्य च न सामर्थ्यं साक्षाद्विशेषणम्, असम्भवादित्याशयेनाऽऽह—समर्थाश्रितः इति। सूत्रे च 'समर्थ'—शब्दो लाक्षणिक इति भावः।

बृ. छ. शे; भा. २. पृ. ९४९

४२. एकार्थीभावसामर्थ्यकल्पना चाऽलौकिकविग्रहवाक्ये एव द्रष्टव्या।

बृ. छ. शे. भा. २, पृ. ९५५

४३. Semantically connected.

४४. एकार्थीभाव means 'Single integrated meaning', literally it means 'emergence of single meaning'.

૨.૦.૦

૨–૧–૧ સૂત્રમાં આવેલા पदविधिः શબ્દનો અર્થ પણ અહીં વિચારણીય છે. આ શબ્દમાંના पद ગ્રહણનું પ્રયોજન અને તેનો અર્થ ધ્યાનમાં લીધા પછી જ નક્કી થઈ શકશે કે (૧) समर्थः એવી શરત 'પદવિધિ' પૂરતી મર્યાદિત કેમ રાખવામાં આવી છે? અને (૨) આ (૨–૧–૧) સૂત્રની પ્રવૃત્તિ કયા કયા પ્રકારની પદવિધિઓમાં થશે? पद ગ્રહણના પ્રયોજનની ચર્ચા તો ભાષ્યમાં કરેલી જ છે, પરંતુ અહીં पद શબ્દનો અર્થ સવિશેષ સમીક્ષ્ય છે.

૨.૧.૦

આપણે જાણીએ છીએ કે પાણિનિએ सुप्तिङन्तं पदम्। ૧।૪।૧૪ સૂત્રથી સુબન્ત અને તિઙન્ત શબ્દસ્વરૂપોની 'પદ' સંજ્ઞા કરવામાં આવી છે. હવે વાર્તિકકારે पद ગ્રહણનું પ્રયોજન દર્શાવતાં કહ્યું છે કે વર્ણાશ્રિત કાર્યોમાં અને આનન્તર્ય માત્રથી જ કામ થઈ શકે એ માટે સૂત્રકારે પદવિધિમાં 'સમર્થ'નો અધિકાર કર્યો છે.[૪૫] ઉદાહરણ તરીકે, तिष्ठतु दधि, अशान त्वं शाकेन। એવી સ્થિતિમાં इको यणचि। ૬–૧–૭૭ સૂત્રની પ્રવૃત્તિ થઈને तिष्ठतु दध्यशान त्वं शाकेन। એવી સન્ધિ થઈ શકે છે. એ જ પ્રમાણે, तिष्ठतु कुमारी, छत्त्रं हर देवदत्त। એવી સ્થિતિમાં दीर्घात्, पदान्ताद्वा। ૬–૧–૭૫–૭૬ સૂત્રેક્ત तुक् આગમની પ્રવૃત્તિ થઈને तिष्ठतु कुमारीच्छत्त्रं हर देवदत्त। એવી સન્ધિ પ્રાપ્ત થાય છે. આ બંને ઉદાહરણોમાં यण् આદેશ અને तुक् આગમ રૂપ કાર્યો વર્ણાશ્રિત છે, વર્ણવિધિ છે. હવે જો ૨।૧।૧ સૂત્રમાં पदविधि શબ્દનું (અર્થાત્ पद શબ્દનું) ઉચ્ચારણ ન કર્યું હોત તો ઉપર્યુક્ત વર્ણવિધિઓમાં પણ समर्थ–Semantically connected–એવી શરત પ્રવૃત્ત થાત. અને પરિણામે પૂર્વોક્ત ઉદાહરણોમાં, કે જ્યાં दधि અને अशान, તથા कुमारी અને छत्त्रम् એવા શબ્દો અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર જોડાયેલા નથી, ત્યાં (ઇષ્ટ એવા) यण् આદેશ અને तुक् આગમની પ્રવૃત્તિ ન થઈ શકી હોત. આમ વર્ણાશ્રિત કાર્યોમાં (phonological operations) માત્ર આનન્તર્યની (વર્ણો પાસે પાસે આવેલા હોય એટલાની) જ જરૂર છે, ત્યાં અર્થગત જોડાણ અપેક્ષિત નથી–એ સૂચવવા માટે સૂત્રકારે पद શબ્દનું ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં ગ્રહણ કર્યું છે.[૪૬]

૨.૨.૦

હવે આપણે પહેલાં पदविधिः શબ્દનો અર્થ વિચારીને पद શબ્દથી શું અભિપ્રિત છે?–તેની ચર્ચા કરીશું : ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્ર ઉપર ભાષ્યકારે પ્રારંભે જ પ્રશ્ન કર્યો છે કે विधि શબ્દ કયા પ્રકારનો છે?[૪૭] 'વિધિ' શબ્દને ભાવવાચક માનીશું તો पदानां विधानम् (Prescription of finished words) એવો અર્થ થશે. અને પરિણામે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્ર જ્યાં સિદ્ધ

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૪૫. पदविधौ समर्थवचनं वर्णाश्रये शास्त्र आनन्तर्यविज्ञानात् ।

—૨-૧-૧, वा–૧૬, पृ.-३६९

૪૬. બીજા શબ્દોમાં કહીએ તો પદવિધિ(Syntactic operation)માં જ સામર્થ્યની જરૂર છે; વર્ણવિધિ(Phonological operation)માં નહીં–એમ સૂચવવા માટે સૂત્રકારે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં पद ગ્રહણ કર્યું છે.

૪૭. તે શબ્દ ભાવસાધન છે કે કર્મસાધન છે? એવો પ્રશ્ન થાય છે.

પદોનું વિધાન હશે (દા.ત. ૨-૧-૧૭ વગેરે નિપાતન સૂત્રો હશે) ત્યાં જ લાગુ પડશે, પરંતુ ભાષ્યકારે કહ્યું છે કે वि ઉપસર્ગપૂર્વક धाञ् ને કર્મ અર્થમાં (उपसर्गे घोः किः । ૩-૩-૯૨ સૂત્રોક્ત) कि > इ પ્રત્યય લાગીને 'વિધિ' શબ્દ બન્યો છે.[48] पदानां विधिः पदविधिः ।[49] આમ વિધિ શબ્દને કર્મવાચક માનવાથી 'જેનું વિધાન થાય તે' એવો અર્થ થશે. આ સન્દર્ભમાં 'પદવિધિ'નો અર્થ 'પદકાર્ય' (Grammatical operation) થશે. આવું પદકાર્ય સમાસાદિમાં કે જ્યાં સુબન્ત પદોને કાર્ય થતું હોય છે ત્યાં જોવા મળે છે. અહીં पदानां विधिः એટલે पदानां कार्यम् એવો થાય છે.

पदविधिः માંના વિધિ શબ્દનો અર્થ જોયા પછી पद શબ્દનો અર્થ જોઈશું: અગાઉ જણાવ્યું છે તેમ પાણિનિએ सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् । ૧-૪-૧૪ સૂત્રથી સુબન્ત અને તિઙન્ત શબ્દ સ્વરૂપની पद એવી સંજ્ઞા કરી છે તેથી અહીં ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં પણ તેનું જ ગ્રહણ થશે એમ કોઈને થાય. દા.ત., ડૉ. એસ. ડી. જોશીએ पद એટલે finished word અર્થાત્ સુબન્ત કે તિઙન્ત 'પદ' એવો અર્થ કર્યો છે.[50] પરંતુ આ અર્થ ચિન્ત્ય છે. કારણ કે ભાષ્યકારે 'વિધિ' શબ્દના અર્થનો નિર્ણય કર્યા પછી પ્રશ્ન કર્યો છે કે—"શેનું વિધાન કરવામાં આવે છે? —સમાસ, વિભક્તિવિધાન અને પરાઙ્ગવદ્ભાવ"[51] અર્થાત્ ભાષ્યકારે આ ત્રણેને પદકાર્યોનાં ઉદાહરણો ગણ્યાં છે. પરંતુ જો पद એટલે 'સુબન્ત' કે 'તિઙન્ત' એવો માત્ર પારિભાષિક અર્થ કરીશું તો અહીં પ્રશ્ન થશે કે વિભક્તિવિધાનને પદકાર્ય કેવી રીતે ગણવું? કેમ કે પ્રાતિપદિક અને ધાતુને અનુક્રમે સુપ્ વિભક્તિના અને તિઙ્ વિભક્તિના પ્રત્યયો લાગ્યા પછી જ તે અનુક્રમે સુબન્ત અને તિઙન્ત થશે અને તેમની 'પદ' સંજ્ઞા (૧-૪-૧૪)થી થશે. આમ (વિભક્ત્યન્ત શબ્દ-સ્વરૂપને જ પદત્વની પ્રાપ્તિ થતી હોઈ) વિભક્તિવિધાનને પદકાર્ય ('પદ'ને ઉદ્દેશીને થનાર વિધિ) ગણી શકાય એમ નથી. આ સન્દર્ભમાં નાગેશે એક સમાધાન નોંધ્યું છે તે સૂચક છે. તેમણે જણાવ્યું છે કે કેટલાકના મતે 'પદ'ને ઉદ્દેશીને થનાર વિધિ અને પદત્વની પ્રાપ્તિ

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૪૮. આ જવાબથી √ विध विधाने ઉપરથી સાધિત ઔણાદિક इन् પ્રત્યયાન્ત શબ્દની નિવૃત્તિ થાય છે.

૪૯. અહીં શેષ ષષ્ઠી (૨-૩-૫૦) થઈ છે. 'વિધિ' શબ્દ જો ભાવવાચક હોત તો કર્મ અર્થમાં (૨-૩-૬૫) ષષ્ઠી આવી હોત.

૫૦. '(Wherever) an operation concerning a finished[1] word (is prescribed), (the word) *samarthaḥ* : 'Semantically connected' (is to be supplied)'.

Foot Note : 1. The term 'finished' is used of those words which end either in a case-termination or in a finite verb ending, i.e. those words which have undergone the complete process of grammatical derivation (See P.1.4.14)–Joshi S. D., Vyā. M. Bhā. Samarthāhnika ; Translation and Explanatory Notes : page 1.

૫૧. किं पुनर्विधीयते । समासो विभक्तिविधानं पराङ्गवद्भावश्च ।

—२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ.-३५९

કરાવનાર બધા જ વિધિઓ પદસંબંધી વિધિઓ હોઈને પદવિધિ જ કહેવાય છે.[52] આમ પદાનાં વિધિઃ > पदानां कार्यम् = पदसम्बन्धि कार्यम् । એવો અર્થ થશે.[53] બીજું, નાગેશ ભટ્ટે ઉપર્યુક્ત ભાષ્યોક્તિમાંના 'સમાસ' શબ્દને વૃત્તિમાત્રનું ઉપલક્ષણ ગણ્યો છે.[54] આથી પણ સાબિત થાય છે કે ૨ ૧-૧ સૂત્રમાંના પદનો અર્થ 'પદસંબંધી' એવો કરવાનો છે. અન્યથા, ક્યારેક કોઈક (દા. ત. એકશેષ) વૃત્તિમાં ૧-૪-૧૪ સૂત્રોક્ત પદત્વ નથી હોતું ત્યાં પદવિધિ ગણાશે નહીં અને પરિણામે ત્યાં ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રની પ્રવૃત્તિ થશે નહીં. અને તેની પ્રવૃત્તિ નહીં થાય તો એકશેષને 'વૃત્તિ' જ કહેવાશે નહીં. એવી સ્થિતિમાં નાગેશે 'સમાસ પદ વૃત્તિમાત્રનું ઉપલક્ષણ છે' એવું જે કહ્યું છે તે અસંગત બની જશે.

આમ પદવિધિ શબ્દથી પદોદ્દેશ્યક અને પદત્વસંપાદક એવા બધા જ પદસંબંધી વિધિઓ સમજવાના હોય તો હવે એ વિચારવાનું પ્રાપ્ત થાય છે કે કયા કયા પ્રકારની પદવિધિઓમાં આ સૂત્રની પ્રવૃત્તિ થાય છે? બીજા શબ્દોમાં આ પ્રશ્નને રજૂ કરીએ તો પૂર્વોક્ત ભાષ્યોક્તિમાંનું જે 'સમાસ' પદ વૃત્તિમાત્રનું ઉપલક્ષણ ગણાવાયો છે તે વૃત્તિઓ કઈ કઈ છે? વૃત્તિઓ[55] પાંચ છે : (૧) કૃત્ (૨) તદ્ધિત (૩) સમાસ (૪) એકશેષ અને (૫) સનાદ્યન્ત ધાતુઓ. આ પાંચેય વૃત્તિઓમાં समर्थः पदविधिः । ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રની પ્રવૃત્તિ થાય છે. દા.ત. कुम्भं करोति । આ સ્થિતિમાં બે પદો અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર સંકળાયેલા હોઈ कर्मण्यण् । ૩-૨-૧ની પ્રવૃત્તિ થતાં कुम्भकारः । એવી વૃત્તિ થઈ શકે છે. પરંતુ જ્યાં પદો અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ પરસ્પર જોડાયેલાં નહીં હોય ત્યાં વૃત્તિ થશે નહીં. જેમ કે, पटं करोति, कुम्भं आनय । અહીં कर्मण्यम् । ૩-૨-૧ની પ્રવૃત્તિ થઈ શકે નહીં. એ જ પ્રમાણે, ऋद्धस्य उपगोः अपत्यम् । અહીં तस्यापत्यम् । ૪-૧-૯૨ની પ્રવૃત્તિ થઈ શકશે નહીં.

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૫૨. केचित्तु पदोद्देश्यकः पदत्वसंपादको वा सर्वोऽपि पदसम्बन्धित्वात्पदविधिरेवेति वदन्ति ॥ उद्द्योतः, पृ. ३१३ ।

૫૩. 'વૈયાકરણસિદ્ધાંતકૌમુદી'માં પણ पदसम्बन्धी यो विधिः स समर्थाश्रितो बोध्यः (२-१-१ इत्यत्र वृत्तिः) એવો અર્થ કરવામાં આવ્યો છે.

૫૪. समासपदं वृत्तिमात्रोपलक्षम् । उद्द्योतः, पृ. ३१३, વૃત્તિઓ પાંચ છે : કૃત્, તદ્ધિત, સમાસ, એકશેષ અને સનાદ્યન્ત ધાતુઓ.

૫૫. वर्तनम् वृत्तिः । तथा—

The term *Vṛtti* literally means 'turning something into something else'. It is used with regard to the process of word-formation in which a meaningful unit of a structurally higher order is built up from meaningful elements, i.e. integration. The term *Vṛtti* is also used to denote the resulting integrated form. See Siddhānta-kaumudī, p. 209. Sarvasamāsapraveśa

—Joshi S. D., Vyā. M. Bhā. Samarthāhnika.
Translation and Notes : Page 9, (Foot Note-19).

કૃત્ તદ્ધિતાદિ પાંચ વૃત્તિઓમાંથી એકશેષને બાદ કરતાં બીજા બધા પદવિધિઓ 'વૃત્તિ' કહેવાશે એમ સમજવામાં મુશ્કેલી પડતી નથી. પરંતુ એકશેષને કેવી રીતે વૃત્તિ કહેવાશે? એવો પ્રશ્ન કોઈને થઈ શકે. તેનો જવાબ આ પ્રમાણે છે: દ્વન્દ્વ સમાસને પદવિધિ ગણવામાં આવી છે. અને "અનવકાશ એકશેષ દ્વન્દ્વનો બાધ કરશે" એવું ભાષ્યવચન છે.[૫૬] આથી દ્વન્દ્વ સમાસ ઉત્સર્ગ થયો અને એકશેષ અપવાદ થયો ગણાય. હવે ઉત્સર્ગ અને અપવાદની સમાનવિષયતા હોય છે એમ સૌ જાણે છે. આથી બાધ્ય—ઉત્સર્ગ દ્વન્દ્વ સમાસ એ જો પદવિધિ ગણાતો હોય તો બાધક—અપવાદ એકશેષને પણ પદવિધિ કહેવો પડશે અર્થાત્ એકશેષને પણ વૃત્તિ ગણાશે.

આમ પદવિધિ=પદસંબંધી કાર્યો અર્થાત્ પાંચ વૃત્તિઓ ૨ ૧-૧ સૂત્રનો પ્રર્વત્તિ-પ્રદેશ છે એમ નક્કી થાય છે.

3.0.0

ઉપરની ચર્ચામાં આપણે समर्थः पदविधिः । ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રનો અર્થ જોયો. તે અર્થ મુજબ સમાસાદિ પદસંબંધી કાર્યો કરનારાં દા.ત., द्वितीया श्रितातीत० । ૨-૧-૨૪ સૂત્રોમાં समर्थः એવા પદની ઉપસ્થિતિ થાય છે. તેથી ૨-૧-૨૪ સૂત્રનો અર્થ આ પ્રમાણે થશે: "દ્વિતીયા વિભક્ત્યન્ત (સુબન્ત) પદ અર્થની દૃષ્ટિએ શ્રિતાદિની સાથે જોડાયેલું હોય ત્યારે સમાસ થાય છે". આમ જોઈ શકાય છે કે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્ર પોતે કોઈ ચોક્કસ વિધિ કે કાર્ય કરનારું નથી. કેવળ તે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્ર પરસૂત્રોને ઉપકાર કરવા માટે છે; અર્થાત્ તે સૂત્ર પરાર્થ છે. એથી એક શંકા થાય છે: છ પ્રકારનાં[૫૭] સૂત્રોમાંથી બે પ્રકારનાં સૂત્રો, જેવાં કે—અધિકારસૂત્ર અને પરિભાષાસૂત્રમાં પરાર્થત્વ હોય છે.[૫૮] તો આ સૂત્રને અધિકારસૂત્ર ગણવું કે પરિભાષાસૂત્ર ? ભાષ્યકારે આ પ્રશ્નની વિચારણાની સાથે સાથે જ બીજો પ્રશ્ન પણ વિચારણીય ગણ્યો છે. જેમ કે આ સૂત્રથી એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું કે વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું?—ભાષ્યકારે આ બન્ને પ્રશ્નોની સાથે વિચારણા કરીને પ્રસ્તુત સૂત્રનો મુખ્ય પ્રવૃત્તિપ્રદેશ અને સૂત્રનો પ્રકાર નક્કી કરી આપ્યાં છે.

3.1.0

જો આ સૂત્રને અધિકારસૂત્ર ગણીશું તો તે (૨-૧ ૧ પછીનાં) દરેક સૂત્રમાં અર્થાત્ પાદ કે અધ્યાયની સમાપ્તિ પર્યન્તનાં સૂત્રોમાં ઉપસ્થિત થશે. અને જો તેને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર ગણીશું તો તે પોતાના (૨-૧-૧) સ્થાને રહીને જ સમગ્ર શાસ્ત્રમાં પ્રકાશ ફેલાવશે અર્થાત્ ઇષ્ટ વ્યવસ્થા કરી આપશે.[૫૯] પરંતુ આને અધિકારસૂત્ર ગણવાથી समर्थः પદ ઉપર સ્વરિતની નિશાની

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૫૬. अनवकाश एकशेषो द्वन्द्वं बाधिष्यते ॥ १-२-६४, वा-१२, १९ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. २३६ एवं २३८ ।

૫૭ संज्ञा च परिभाषा च विधिर्नियम एव च ।
अतिदेशोऽधिकारश्च षड्विधं सूत्रमुच्यते ॥

૫૮. સંજ્ઞાસૂત્રોમાં પણ પરાર્થત્વ હોય છે. તથાપિ સંજ્ઞાસૂત્ર રૂપે આ ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રનો ક્યાંય પ્રયોગ થતો નથી; માટે એ પક્ષ અહીં પ્રસ્તુત નથી.

૫૯ परिभाषा पुनरेकदेशस्था सती सर्वं शास्त्रमभिज्वलयति प्रदीपवत् ।
तद्यथा । प्रदीपः सुप्रज्वलित एकदेशस्थः सर्वं वेश्माभिज्वलयति ॥
—२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३१४.

કરવી પડશે,[૬૦] અને **पदविधिः** શબ્દને સૂત્રમાં લખવાની જરૂર રહેશે નહીં, (એટલું લાઘવ થશે). પણ જો તેને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર ગણીશું તો સ્વરિતની નિશાની નહીં કરવી પડે, (એ લાઘવ ગણાશે). અને **पदविधिः** એવા શબ્દને સૂત્રમાં લખવાની જરૂર રહેશે. આમ લાઘવની દૃષ્ટિએ તો બન્ને પક્ષ સરખા છે. માટે આ પ્રશ્નની વિચારણા પૂર્વોક્ત બીજા પ્રશ્નના અનુસંધાનમાં કરવી પડશે. એટલે કે—

(૧) આ સૂત્રથી એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું અને તેને અધિકારસૂત્ર ગણવું?
(૨) આ સૂત્રથી એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું અને તેને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર ગણવું?
(૩) આ સૂત્રથી વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું અને તેને અધિકારસૂત્ર ગણવું?
(૪) આ સૂત્રથી વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું અને તેને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર ગણવું?
(૫) આ સૂત્રથી બન્ને પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય લેવું અને તેને અધિકારસૂત્ર ગણવું? કે
(૬) આ સૂત્રથી બન્ને પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય લેવું અને તેને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર ગણવું?

આમ કુલ છ પક્ષો ઊભા થાય છે.[૬૧] હવે શાસ્ત્રીય દૃષ્ટિએ આમાંથી કયા પક્ષનો સ્વીકાર કરવો ઇષ્ટ છે તે વિચારણીય છે: (૧) પહેલો પક્ષ લેવાથી સમાસવિધિનું ગ્રહણ થાય છે. પણ વિભક્તિ-વિધાન[૬૨] અને પરાઙ્ગવદ્ભાવનું[૬૩] ગ્રહણ થતું નથી. (૨) ત્રીજો પક્ષ લઈશું તો વિભક્તિ-વિધાન અને પરાઙ્ગવદ્ભાવનું ગ્રહણ થશે, પણ સમાસવિધિનું ગ્રહણ થશે નહીં. (૩) ચોથો પક્ષ લઈશું તો સમગ્ર શાસ્ત્રમાં જે કાંઈ પદવિધિ સંબંધી હશે તેનું ગ્રહણ થશે, પણ સમાસવિધિનું ગ્રહણ થશે નહીં. (૪) પાંચમો અને છઠ્ઠો પક્ષ લેવાથી અર્થાત્ ઉભયવિધ સામર્થ્ય લેવાથી અર્થ-ભેદ થાય છે અર્થભેદ થવાથી સૂત્રભેદ (સૂત્રાક્ષરમાં ફેરફાર) કરવો પડશે.[૬૪] માટે (૫) બીજો પક્ષ એટલે કે, "આ સૂત્રથી એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું અને આ સૂત્રને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર ગણવું" એ પક્ષ લેવાથી સૂત્રભેદ કરવાની જરૂર પડતી નથી. આમ ભાષ્યકારે **तत्रैकार्थीभावः सामर्थ्यं परिभाषा चेत्येवं सूत्रमभिन्नतरकं भवति।** (અહીં એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર

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૬૦. स्वरितेनाधिकारः । १-३-११ स्वरितेनेति इत्थंभूतलक्षणे तृतीया ।
'स्वरितो नाम स्वरविशेषो वर्णधर्मः तेन चिह्नाधिकारो वेदितव्यः ।
अधिकारो विनियोगः । स्वरितगुणयुक्तं शब्दरूपमधिकृतत्वादुत्तरत्रोपतिष्ठते ॥
(काशिकावृत्तिः).

૬૧. અહીં છેલ્લા બે પક્ષો ભાષ્યકારે કંઠરવથી ઉચ્ચાર્યા નથી. તે કૈયટે બતાવ્યા છે:
एकार्थीभावः सामर्थ्यमधिकारः इत्येकः पक्षः । व्यपेक्षा सामर्थ्यमधिकार इति द्वितीय पक्षः ।
द्विविधं सामर्थ्यमधिकार इति तृतीयः । एवं परिभाषायामपि त्रयः पक्षा इति ।
—प्रदीपः, पृ. ३१५.

૬૨. २-३-४.

૬૩. २-१-२.

૬૪. उभयविधे सामर्थ्ये आश्रीयमाणेऽर्थस्य भेदात्सूत्रस्य भेदः स्यात् ।
भिन्नेन सामर्थ्येन भिन्नेषु वाक्येषूपस्थानात् ॥ —प्रदीपः पृ. ३१५.

ગણવાથી ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્ર પૂર્ણપણે યથાવત્ રહે છે.) એવો નિર્ણય જાહેર કર્યો છે. કૈયટ સ્પષ્ટ કરે છે કે આ સૂત્રથી વ્યપેક્ષા રૂપ સામર્થ્ય (અને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર) લેવાથી પણ સૂત્ર અભિન્ન રહે છે, તથાપિ એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યમાં દોષનો અભાવ હોઈને પ્રકર્ષ પ્રયોગને કારણે ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્ર 'અભિન્નતરક' રહેશે એમ (ભાષ્યકારે) કહ્યું છે.[૬૫]

આ સૂત્રથી એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવું અને તેને પરિભાષા પ્રકારનું સૂત્ર ગણવું—એવો ભાષ્યકારે નિર્ણય જાહેર કર્યો છે.[૬૬] પરંતુ આ પક્ષમાં કોઈને પ્રશ્ન થાય કે એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય લેવાથી સમાસનો સંગ્રહ થાય છે, પણ પરાઙ્ગવદ્ભાવ અને વિભકિતવિધાનનો સંગ્રહ કેવી રીતે થશે? આનું સમાધાન કરતાં કૈયટે જણાવ્યું છે કે—

(૧) પરાઙ્ગવદ્ભાવ કરનાર સૂત્ર (૨-૧-૨) ઉપર વાર્તિકકારે **तन्निमित्तग्रहणं वा।** (વા. ૨) એવું વાર્તિક રજૂ કર્યું છે. તેથી દોષનો અભાવ રહેશે.

(૨) વિભકિતવિધાનનો સંગ્રહ થતો નથી, છતાંય કોઈ દોષ આવશે નહીં; કારણ કે—

(क) કારકવિભકિતઓમાં ક્રિયા અને કારકનો વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સંબંધ અવિનાભાવે રહેતો હોવાથી ત્યાં (કારક વિભકિતઓના વિધાનમાં) ૨-૧-૧ ની અનુપસ્થિતિ રહેશે તોપણ કોઈ વાંધો નથી.

(ख) ઉપપદ વિભકિતઓમાં **युक्त** કે **योग** એવા શબ્દોનું સૂત્રકારે ગ્રહણ કર્યું હોવાથી[૬૭] અને કયારેક તૃતીયા વિભકિતનો પ્રયોગ કર્યો છે, તેથી અમુકના યોગનો આક્ષેપ થઈ જતાં ત્યાં (ઉપપદ વિભકિતઓના વિધાનમાં) ૨-૧-૧ની અનુપસ્થિતિ રહેશે, તોપણ કોઈ દોષ આવશે નહીં.

વિશેષમાં કૈયટ ઉમેરે છે કે ભાષ્યકારે આ સૂત્રને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર ગણ્યું હોવાથી સુપ્ ધાતુ વગેરે બધી (પૂર્વોકત પાંચ) વૃત્તિઓનો પણ સંગ્રહ થઈ જાય છે.[૬૮] વળી, એકાર્થીભાવનું આશ્રયણ કર્યું

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૬૫. व्यपेक्षायामपि सामर्थ्ये यद्यपि सूत्रमभिन्नं भवति, तथाप्येकार्थीभावे सामर्थ्ये दोषाऽभावात्प्रकर्षयोगादभिन्नतरकमित्युच्यते ॥ —प्रदीपः, पृ. ३१९.

૬૬. આપણે અગાઉ (૧.૨.૩) જોયું છે કે 'આ ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રથી બંને પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય લઈ શકાય છે' એવું ભાષ્યકારે સાબિત કર્યું છે. તેની સાથે આ વિધાન વિરોધમાં આવીને ઊભું રહે છે. પરંતુ અહીં ભાષ્યકારે નોંધેલો આ મત (આ ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રને પરિભાષાસૂત્ર ગણવું અને તેનાથી એકાર્થીભાવ સામર્થ્ય લેવું—એ) જ સિદ્ધાંત પક્ષે સ્વીકાર્ય ગણાયો છે.

૬૭. (૧) नमःस्वस्तिस्वाहास्वधा...योगाच्च। २-३-१६
(૨) सहयुक्तेऽप्रधाने। २-३-१९

૬૮. પાંચ વૃત્તિઓમાં આ સૂત્રની પ્રવૃત્તિ થાય એ માટે નાગેશે (પાદટીપ: ૫૪) 'સમાસ' પદને વૃત્તિમાત્રનું ઉપલક્ષણ ગણ્યા છે. બીજી તરફ, કૈયટે આ સૂત્ર પરિભાષાસૂત્ર હોવાથી તે ઇષ્ટ કાર્યની સિદ્ધિ થશે એમ માન્યું છે.

હોવા છતાંય અન્યત્ર युक्त (૮-૧-૨૪) ગ્રહણ કે समर्थः (૮-૩-૪૪) ગ્રહણ છે (તેથી) ત્યાં પણ કશો દોષ નથી.[૬૯]

૪.૦.૦

કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓ વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યનો સમાન અર્થ હોય છે એમ માને છે. તેમના મતે વાક્યનો નાશ કરીને વૃત્તિ (સમાસ) કરવામાં આવે છે.[૭૦] આથી તેઓ समर्थः પદનો समः अर्थः यस्य। (સમાન છે અર્થ જેનો) એવો અર્થ કરે છે.

૪.૧.૧

આ મતના સમર્થનમાં તેઓએ પાણિનિના विभाषा। ૨-૧-૧૧ એવા અધિકારસૂત્રને આગળ ધર્યું છે. વૈયાકરણ પરંપરામાં આ સૂત્રને 'મહાવિભાષા' ગણવામાં આવે છે. આ સૂત્રથી વાક્ય (राज्ञः पुरुषः) અને વૃત્તિ (राजपुरुषः) બન્નેનું સાધુત્વબોધન થાય છે. અર્થાત્ બંનેનો અર્થ એક જ છે અને બન્ને વૈકલ્પિક રૂપો વ્યવહારમાં સ્વીકાર્ય છે એમ સૂત્રકારે સૂચવ્યું છે. આ મહાવિભાષાને આધારે કહી શકાય કે समर्थः पदविधिः। ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રનો અર્થ "પદવિધિ (અર્થાત્ વૃત્તિ) સમાન અર્થવાળી (વાક્યના જેવા જ અર્થવાળી) હોય છે" એવો થાય છે.

૪.૧.૨

કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓ બીજું પણ પ્રમાણ રજૂ કરે છે: પાણિનિએ नित्यं क्रीडाजीविकयोः। ૨-૨-૧૭ એવું સૂત્ર રચ્યું છે, તેનાથી उद्दालकपुष्पभञ्जिका। दन्तलेखकः। જેવાં રૂપોનું સાધુત્વબોધન થાય છે. અહીં પાણિનિએ સૂત્રમાં नित्यम् એવો શબ્દ મૂક્યો હોઈ વાક્યની નિવૃત્તિ થાય છે. જેમ કે, उद्दालकस्य पुष्पाणि भज्यन्ते यस्यां क्रीडायाम्। કે दन्तानां लेखनेन जीवति। એવાં વાક્યો થતાં નથી.[૭૧] અન્યથા પૂર્વોક્ત મહાવિભાષાને કારણે આવાં વાક્યોની પણ પ્રાપ્તિ થતી હતી. આમ नित्यम् ગ્રહણથી સાબિત થાય છે કે અન્યત્ર વૃત્તિ અને વાક્ય બંને સમાન અર્થમાં થાય છે.

૪.૨.૦

આપણે અગાઉ (૧.૧.૨) જોયું છે કે ગમકત્વનો સિદ્ધાંત સ્વીકારતાં સમર્થ ગ્રહણ અનર્થક છે એમ માનવાની સ્થિતિ ઊભી થાય છે.[૭૨] ત્યારે વાર્તિકકારે સૂચવ્યું છે કે, ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં

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૬૯. तत्र पराङ्गवद्भावे तन्निमित्तग्रहणाद्दोषाभावः। विभक्तिविधानेऽपि कारक-विभक्तिषु क्रियाकारकयोर्व्यपेक्षाऽविनाभावित्वादुपपदविभक्तिषु युक्तयोगग्रहणसद्भावात् क्वचित् तृतीयया योगस्याक्षेपादेतदनुपस्थानेऽपि न दोषः। परिभाषायां च सुब्धातुप्रभृतयः सर्वा वृत्तयः संगृहीता भवन्ति। एकार्थीभावे चेहाश्रितेऽन्यत्र युक्तग्रहणं समर्थग्रहणं च कृतमेवेति तत्रापि न दोषः॥ —प्रदीपः, पृ. ३१९

૭૦ समसनं समासः, भावे घञ्। अनेकस्य पदस्य एकपदीभवनमित्यर्थ इत्येके॥ ६४७ समर्थः पदविधिः। २-१-१ वै. सि. का., तत्त्वबोधिनी, भा—२, पृ. ३.

૭૧. અહીં વૃત્તિથી 'અમુક ક્રીડા' અને 'જીવિકા' અર્થો મળે છે, પણ વાક્યથી મળતા નથી. માટે સૂત્રકારે नित्यम् ગ્રહણ કરીને મહાવિભાષાથી વિકલ્પે પ્રાપ્ત થયેલાં વાક્યોની નિવૃત્તિ કરી છે.

૭૨. કારણ કે સૂત્રકારને समर्थः પદથી 'વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યનો સમાન અર્થ હોય છે' એટલું જ જો કહેવાનું હશે તો તે કહેવાની જરૂર નથી. કેમ કે લોકમાનસમાં ગમકત્વનો જે સિદ્ધાંત કામ કરી રહ્યો છે તેને આધારે જ ઈષ્ટ વ્યવસ્થા થશે.

समर्थः શબ્દનો કોઈ ગૂઢ પારિભાષિક અર્થ છે: અહીં समर्थः પદથી એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય સમજવાનું છે. આમ સમર્થઃ એટલે 'સમાન છે અર્થ જેનો'—એમ નહીં, પણ 'એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય.' આ એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યને આશ્રયે રહેનારી વૃત્તિ દ્વારા સ્વાભાવિક રીતે જ અર્થાભિધાન થાય છે, એવો વાર્તિકકારનો અભિપ્રાય છે,[73] આથી તેમણે કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓએ રજૂ કરેલાં પૂર્વોક્ત બંને પ્રમાણોનું ખંડન પણ કર્યું છે.[74]

૪.૨.૧

समर्थः પદથી એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અભીષ્ટ હોય તો મહાવિભાષા અનર્થક બની જાય છે; કેમ કે જો સૂત્રકારને આવો અર્થ અભિપ્રેત હોય તો મહાવિભાષાની જરૂર નથી.[75] કેમ કે જ્યાં વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય હશે ત્યાં સમાસ થશે નહીં અને જ્યાં એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય હશે ત્યાં વાક્ય થશે નહીં—આમ બંનેનો વિષય અલગ અલગ હોવાથી તે બેની વચ્ચે બાધ્યબાધકભાવ ઊભો થશે નહીં. આ સન્દર્ભમાં વિકલ્પની (મહાવિભાષાની) પણ જરૂર રહેશે નહીં. કેમ કે એકાર્થક (સમાનાર્થક)નો જ વિકલ્પ હોઈ શકે.[76]

૪.૨.૨

કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓએ અમુક સૂત્રનાં नित्यम् ગ્રહણને વાક્યની નિવૃત્તિ અર્થે વર્ણવ્યું છે. પરંતુ વાર્તિકકારે જેમ મહાવિભાષાનું ખંડન કર્યું છે તેમ આવા नित्यम् ગ્રહણોનું પણ ખંડન કર્યું છે. દા.ત. नित्यं कौटिल्ये गतौ । ३–१–२३ અને लुपसदचरजपजभदहदशगृभ्यो भावगर्हायाम् । ३–१–२४ એ બંને સૂત્રોમાં नित्यम् ગ્રહણ કરવાની જરૂર નથી. કારણ કે, चङ्क्रम्यते એવી વૃત્તિમાંથી જે અર્થ મળે છે તે कुटिलं क्रामति । એવા વિગ્રહ વાક્યમાંથી મળતો નથી.[77] એ જ

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૭૩. अर्थैतस्मिन्नेकार्थीभावकृते विशेषे किं स्वाभाविकं शब्दैरर्थाभिधानमाहोस्विद्वाचनिकम् । स्वाभाविकमित्याह ।......... वाचनानर्थक्यं च स्वभावसिद्धत्वात् । (वा. २) २-१ १ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६३ एवं ३६४

૭૪. આ (૪.૦.૦) ચર્ચાનો પ્રારંભ કર્યો ત્યારે આપણે જોયું હતું કે કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓ 'વાક્યનો નાશ કરીને સમાસ કરવામાં આવે છે' એમ માને છે. આના સમર્થનમાં अथ समर्थग्रहणं किमर्थम् १. वक्ष्यति द्वितीया श्रितादिभिः समस्यते । એવું જે ભાષ્યવચન (૨–૧–૧) છે, તેમાં समस्यते એટલે 'બે પદોનું એકપદ થવું' એવો કોઈ કાર્યશબ્દવાદી અર્થ કરે તો તે ઉચિત નથી. કારણ કે કૈયટ જણાવે છે કે અહીં (द्वितीया श्रितातीत० २–१–२४ સૂત્રોથી) કેવળ સમાસસંજ્ઞાનું વિધાન થાય છે. તથાપિ અબુધોના બોધ માટે 'બે ભિન્ન શબ્દોનો પ્રક્રિયામાં સંશ્લેષ કરવામાં આવે છે' એ અર્થમાં समस्यते કહ્યું છે. (જુઓ : પ્રદીપ, પૃ. ૩૧૬)

૭૫. वाचनानर्थक्यं च स्वभावसिद्धत्वात् । २-१-१, वा २, पृ. ३६४

૭૬. वाचनानर्थक्यं चेति । इह व्यपेक्षायां समासो न भवति, एकार्थीभावे वाक्यं नेति विविक्तविषयत्वादनयोर्बाध्यबाधकभावो न भविष्यतीति नार्थो विकल्पेन । एकार्थानां विकल्पनात् ॥ प्रदीपः, पृ. ३२७

૭૭. उत्तरयोर्विग्रहेण विशेषासंप्रत्ययान्नित्यग्रहणानर्थक्यम् ।

—३-१-२२, वा. ६, कीलहोर्न, भा. २, पृ. ३०

પ્રમાણે, नित्यं क्रीडाजीविकयो ।। ૨-૨-૧૭ સૂત્રસ્થ 'नित्य' ગ્રહણનું પણ પ્રત્યાખ્યાન કરવું જોઈએ.[७८]

૪.૩.૦

ભર્તૃહરિએ ઉપર્યુક્ત ચર્ચાના અનુસંધાનમાં જણાવ્યું છે કે—(૧)

(१) सामर्थ्यमविशेषोक्तमपि लोकव्यवस्थया ।
वृत्त्यवृत्त्योः प्रयोगज्ञैर्विभक्तं प्रतिपत्तृभिः ।। (वा. प., वृत्तिसमुद्देशः, का-४३)

સૂત્રકારે समर्थः पदविधिः । ૨-૧-૧ એવા સૂત્રમાં અવિશેષપણે સામર્થ્યનો ઉલ્લેખ કર્યો છે. તથાપિ પ્રયોજને જાણનારા પ્રતિપત્તાઓએ લોકવ્યવસ્થાને આધારે વૃત્તિ અને અવૃત્તિનો વિષયવિભાગ કર્યો છે. અર્થાત્ સૂત્રકારે તો સામાન્યપણે જ સામર્થ્યનો નિર્દેશ કર્યો છે. પરંતુ વાર્તિકકારે તે સામર્થ્યના બે ભેદ કરી બતાવ્યા છે: (૧) એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય (૨) વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય. આમાંથી પહેલા પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય રહે ત્યાં વૃત્તિ થાય છે અને બીજા પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય રહે ત્યાં વાક્ય થાય છે.

(२) व्यवस्थितविभाषा च सामान्यं कैश्चिदिष्यते ।
तथा वाक्यं व्यपेक्षायां, समासोऽन्यत्र शिष्यते ।। (वा. प., वृत्तिसमुद्देशः, का-४५)

સૂત્રકારે पदविधिः । ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં સામાન્યપણે સામર્થ્ય કહ્યું છે માટે કેટલાક વૈયાકરણોના મતે विभाषा। ૨-૧-૧૧ એવા (મહાવિભાષા) સૂત્રને 'વ્યવસ્થિત-વિભાષા' માનવું જોઈએ. જેથી વ્યપેક્ષા સામર્થ્યમાં વાક્યનું અને અન્યત્ર (અર્થાત્ એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યમાં) સમાસનું અનુશાસન થશે. અહીં મહાવિભાષાને વ્યવસ્થિતવિભાષા માનવાથી વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યનું સમાનાર્થકત્વ દૂર થઈ જાય છે. અને ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રથી જ બંને પ્રકારનું સામર્થ્ય આપણને સમજાશે છતાંય કોઈ વિપ્રતિપત્તિ ઊભી નહીં થાય, કેમ કે હવે વિકલ્પ (મહાવિભાષા) વ્યવસ્થિત-વિષયવાળો થઈ જશે એવી ચોક્કસ વ્યવસ્થા પ્રાપ્ત થશે કે (ક) એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યમાં સમાસ થશે અને (ખ) વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યમાં વાક્ય થશે.

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ભર્તૃહરિની ઉપર્યુક્ત બંને કારિકાઓ નોંધપાત્ર છે કારણ કે—

(क) ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્રમાં समर्थः પદનો Sameness of meaning કે Semantically connected એવા અર્થ અભિપ્રેત નથી, પણ એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને/અથવા વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય જ અભિપ્રેત છે—એ પૂર્વપ્રતિપાદિત મુદ્દાનું સમર્થન થાય છે.

(ख) प्रमाणभूत आचार्यो दर्भपवित्रपाणिः शुचावकाशे प्राङ्मुख उपविश्य महता यत्नेन सूत्रं प्रणयति स्म, तत्राशक्यं वर्णेनाप्यनर्थकेन भवितुं किं पुनरियता सूत्रेण । १-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३९

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७८. क्रीडायां जीविकायां च वाक्येनावचनात्तथा ।
न नित्यग्रहणं युक्तं कौटिल्ये यङ्विधौ यथा ।।
—वाक्यपदीयम्, वृत्तिसमुद्देशः, का-४०

એવા ભાષ્યકારના વચનનું ભર્તૃહરિએ જાણે કે અનુસરણ કર્યું છે. જેમ કે,

૧. ડૉ. એસ. ડી. જોશીએ સૂચવ્યું છે કે અર્થવિજ્ઞાનની દૃષ્ટિએ કાત્યાયને પહેલ-વહેલાં સામર્થ્યના એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય અને વ્યપેક્ષાભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય એવા બે ભેદો પાડયા છે. આ ભેદો પાણિનિને જ્ઞાત ના હતા[૭૯]. પરંતુ ભર્તૃહરિએ આ વાતને બીજી રીતે રજૂ કરી કે 'સૂત્રકારે સામર્થ્યનો અવિ-શેષપણે ઉલ્લેખ કર્યો છે'!

૨. વળી, વાર્તિકકારે 'વા વચનનું આનર્થક્ય છે' એમ કહીને સૂત્રકારે રજૂ કરેલ મહાવિભાષાનું ખંડન કર્યું છે. પરંતુ ભર્તૃહરિએ "મહાવિભાષાને વ્યવસ્થિત-વિભાષા ગણવી અને 'એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યમાં વૃત્તિ થશે અને વ્યપેક્ષા-ભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યમાં વાક્ય થશે." એવો વિષય-વિભાગ કરી બચાવ્યો છે. આમ ૨-૧-૧૧ સૂત્રનું ખંડન કરવું પડતું નથી.

ટૂંકમાં ભર્તૃહરિએ મૂળ સૂત્રકારના સૂત્રોમાંથી જ સકલ ઇષ્ટસિદ્ધિ કરી આપી છે.

૧.૦.૦

પ્રસંગત: ૨-૧-૧ નીં સાહાય્યથી પ્રાપ્ત થતા સમાસમાંથી કેવી રીતે અર્થબોધ થાય છે તેની કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓ અને નિત્યશબ્દવાદીઓની દૃષ્ટિએ વિચારણા કરી લઈએ. કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ અને અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિથી અર્થબોધ થાય છે. નિત્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે વાક્ય કરતાં વૃત્તિપદ તદ્દન જુદું (અન્ય) જ છે. જેવી રીતે **गौः ।** અને **अश्वः ।** એ બંને જુદા જુદા શબ્દો છે, તેવી જ રીતે અહીં વાક્ય અને વૃત્તિ એ બંને પરસ્પરથી તદ્દન ભિન્ન છે. બીજું, વૃત્તિ વડે સ્વાભાવિકપણે જ અર્થાભિધાન થાય છે. આ વિષયનો ઊહાપોહ આપણને ૨-૧-૧ સૂત્ર ઉપરના ભાષ્યમાં અને 'વાક્યપદીય'ના વૃત્તિસમુદ્દેશમાં પ્રાપ્ત થાય છે.

કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે પ્રક્રિયા-અવસ્થામાં વાક્યનો નાશ કરીને વૃત્તિ વ્યુત્પન્ન કરવામાં આવે છે. આવી વૃત્તિ વાક્યપ્રકૃતિકા (વાક્ય છે પ્રકૃતિ જેની) કહેવાશે. વૃત્તિમાં ઉપસર્જન પદ વડે પર=અન્ય પ્રધાન પદના અર્થનું બોધન થાય છે.[૮૦] આથી કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓએ વૃત્તિનું લક્ષણ

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૭૯. 5.1 From the foregoing discussion it will be clear that Kātyāyana maintains the tradition of Pāṇini so far its technique is concerned but tries to improve upon that tradition by means of its philosophical interpretation. He defines *Sāmarthya* in terms of semantics as, *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā*- the concepts which seem to have been unknown to Pāṇini.

Joshi, S. D., Vyā. M. Bhā. Samarthāhnika Introduction : 5.1, page *xvii.*

૮૦. राजपुरुषः । એવી વૃત્તિ (સમાસ)માં, વાક્યાવસ્થામાં અનુક્ત એવો 'पुरुष' રૂપ અર્થ राज શબ્દથી કહેવાય છે. આથી राज શબ્દ વૃત્તિમાં પરાર્થ (પુરુષ રૂપ અર્થ)નું અભિધાન કરે છે એમ કહેવાશે.

આ પ્રમાણે આપ્યું છે: परार्थाभिधानं वृत्तिः। આ પરાર્થનું અભિધાન કરનારી વૃત્તિ બે પ્રકારની છે. (૧) જહત્‌સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ અને (૨) અજહત્‌સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ.૮૧

૫.૧.૦

વાક્યાવસ્થામાં રહેલા (પોતાના) અર્થનો ત્યાગ કરીને ઉપસર્જન પદ વૃત્તિમાં પરાર્થ (અન્યાર્થ)ને કહે છે. જેવી રીતે કોઈ એક કળશમાં દહીં ભરેલું હોય તો તેને કાઢી નાખીને તેમાં દૂધ ભરવામાં આવે છે. અહીં દહીં રહેલું હોય એ જ અવસ્થામાં દૂધ ભરી શકાતું નથી. આને જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ કહે છે.૮૨ જો કે શબ્દાર્થસંબંધ અપૌરુષેય (નિત્ય) છે, માટે 'વાક્યગત પદોના અર્થનો ત્યાગ થાય છે' એમ તો નહીં કહી શકાય. એટલે અહીં 'ત્યાગ થાય છે'—નો અર્થ 'અનુપાદાન—અગ્રહણ' એવો જ કરીશું. આ સંદર્ભમાં, ભાષ્યમાં જે ઉદાહરણ આપ્યું છે તે જોઈએ: तक्षा राजकर्मणि प्रवर्तमानः स्वं कर्म जहाति। २-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्। રાજ્યની તિજોરીમાં પૈસા એકઠા કરવા વગેરે રાજકાર્યોમાં વ્યાપૃત કરવામાં આવેલો तक्षा (સુથાર) પોતાનું લાકડું કાપવું વગેરે અન્ય ક્રિયાઓનો ત્યાગ કરે છે. કેમ કે પોતાની એ અન્ય ક્રિયાઓનો ત્યાગ કર્યા વિના તેને માટે રાજકર્મો કરવા શક્ય નથી. આમ સ્વાર્થનું અનુપાદાન કરીને વૃત્તિમાં ઉપસર્જન પદો પદાન્તરાર્થનું ઉપાદાન કરે છે એમ કહી શકાશે.

૫.૧.૧.

આ જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિના સ્વીકારમાં કેટલાક દોષ રહેલા છે. જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ પક્ષમાં राजपुरुषमानय। એમ કહેવાથી પુરુષ માત્રનું આનયન થશે અથવા તો औपगवमानय। એમ કહેવાથી કોઈ પણ વ્યકિતના અપત્યનું આનયન થશે. કેમ કે જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિપક્ષમાં અવયવો પોતાના અર્થનો ત્યાગ કરે છે એમ માનવામાં આવ્યું છે.

અહીં કોઈ એવો પણ દોષ બતાવી શકે કે જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ પક્ષમાં ઉપસર્જન પદો જો અર્થત્યાગ કરતાં હોય તો તે (ઉપસર્જન) પદોનો વૃત્તિ (સમાસ)માં પ્રયોગ જ શા માટે કરવામાં આવે છે? પરંતુ આ પ્રશ્ન યોગ્ય નથી. કેમ કે यावः। यावकः॥ वृषः। वृषभः॥ गजः मतङ्गजः॥ એવા બંને પ્રયોગો સમાન અર્થમાં વપરાય છે, તેની જેમ पुरुषः અને राजपुरुषः એવાં બંને

૮૧. આ બે પ્રકારની વૃત્તિઓના સન્દર્ભમાં ડૉ. એસ. ડી. જોશીએ જણાવ્યું છે કે એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યના બે અર્થઘટનો—જહત્‌સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ અને અજહત્‌સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ—પતંજલિના સમયથી પ્રચલિત થયા લાગે છે. આ અર્થઘટનો કાત્યાયનને વિદિત ન હતા. પતંજલિએ તેમના કોઈ પુરોગામી વૈયાકરણ પાસેથી વૃત્તિના આ બે પ્રકારો પ્રાપ્ત કર્યા હોય એમ બનવા સંભવ છે. અલબત્ત, એ પુરોગામી વૈયાકરણનું નામ પતંજલિએ આપ્યું નથી. (જુઓ: Joshi S. D., Vyā. M. Bhā. Samarthāhnika, Introduction : 4.7 (*vii*), page : *xi*.

૮૨. जहति पदानि स्वार्थं यस्यां सा जहत्स्वार्था। અહીં जहति એવું રૂપ લડન્ત (વર્તમાન કાળ) ક્રિયાપદ નથી, પણ શત્રન્ત વર્તમાનકૃદન્ત છે. सप्तमी विशेषणे। २-२-३५ એવા સૂત્રમાં સપ્તમીગ્રહણ કર્યું છે. તેથી જ્ઞાપિત થાય છે કે ક્યારેક વ્યધિકરણ-પદોનો પણ બહુવ્રીહિસમાસ થાય થાય છે. એ રીતે કેટલાકના મતે "જહત્સ્વાર્થા"માં વ્યધિકરણ બહુવ્રીહિ સમાસ થયો છે.

પ્રયોગો પર્યાય રૂપે ઉપસ્થિત થઈ શકે. તથાપિ **राजपुरुषः** એવો ઉપસર્જન પદ સહિતનો પ્રયોગ હશે તો એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્યને આધારે 'સમાસ' સંજ્ઞા પણ થઈ શકશે, એ માટે ઉપસર્જન પદની ગેરહાજરીવાળો કેવળ **पुरुषः** એવો પ્રયોગ કરવામાં આવતો નથી.

જો કે ભાષ્યમાં, જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ પક્ષના ઉપર્યુક્ત પ્રથમ દોષનું નિરાકરણ સામાન્યપણે આ પ્રમાણે કરવામાં આવ્યું છે : **जहदप्यसौ स्वार्थं नात्यन्ताय जहाति।... अथवाऽन्वयाद् विशेषणं भविष्यति।** (२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६४) અર્થાત્ ઉપસર્જન પદ પોતાના અર્થનો ત્યાગ કરે છે, તથાપિ આત્યંતિકપણે અર્થનો ત્યાગ કરવામાં આવતો નથી. અથવા તો અન્વયને કારણે ઉપ-સર્જનાર્થ વિશેષણ બનશે. એટલે કે જેમ અગ્નિસંયોગથી પરમાણુઓમાં જે વિશેષની ઉત્પત્તિ થાય છે તે અગ્નિસંયોગ નિવૃત્ત થયા પછી પણ ચાલુ રહે છે. એ જ રીતે ઉપસર્જન પદોનો અર્થ, પ્રધાનાર્થને વિશેષિત કરીને નિવૃત્ત થાય છે પણ ઉપસર્જન પદે જે વિશેષનું નિધાન કર્યું તેના અનુગમથી વિશિષ્ટ પુરુષની પ્રતીતિ થાય છે, કેવળ પુરુષની નહીં. ભાષ્યકારે આ સન્દર્ભમાં **मल्लिकापुटः।** એવું દૃષ્ટાંત આપ્યું છે. અહીં કુસુમોના સંપર્કને કારણે ગન્ધવિશેષનો અનુભવ થાય છે. પરંતુ તે પુટમાંથી કુસુમો કાઢી લીધા પછી પણ તે પુટ "**मल्लिकापुटः**" એવા (વિશેષણથી યુક્ત) શબ્દ દ્વારા વ્યવહૃત થાય છે.

હજી કોઈને વિશેષ પ્રશ્ન થાય કે અર્થનો ત્યાગ થવા છતાંય 'અર્થનો આત્યંતિક ત્યાગ થતો નથી' એમ કેવી રીતે કહી શકાય? કેમ કે અંશતઃ અર્થનો ત્યાગ થાય અને અંશતઃ ચાલુ રહે એવું ન બની શકે.[83] ભર્તૃહરિએ આનું સમાધાન કરતાં જણાવ્યું છે કે ઉપસર્જનનો પોતાનો પ્રધાનભૂત અર્થ, કે જે સમુદાયગત પ્રધાનાર્થનો વિરોધી છે તે નિવૃત્ત થાય છે. કેમ કે સમાસમાં બંને પદોનું પ્રાધાન્ય હશે તો તેમનો પરસ્પર સંબંધ નહીં થઈ શકે અને પરિણામે વિશિષ્ટ એવા પ્રધાનાર્થની પ્રતીતિ થશે નહીં. માટે ઉપસર્જન પદનું પોતાનું પ્રાધાન્ય નિવૃત્ત થાય છે એમ કહી શકાય.[84] અને આથી જ તે ઉપસર્જન પદ (राजपुरुषः માં राजन् < राज्ञः એવું પદ) પોતાના **ऋद्धस्य** ઈત્યાદિ વિશેષણોની સાથે અન્વિત થતું નથી. પણ પ્રધાનાર્થને ઉપકાર કરવા માટેનું તે (ઉપસર્જન)નું પોતાનું જે વિશેષણતાત્મક રૂપ છે તે અવિરોધી હોવાને કારણે નિવૃત્ત થતું નથી. આ સંદર્ભમાં જ ભાષ્યકારે **नात्यन्ताय जहाति।** એમ કહ્યું છે. જો ઉપસર્જન પદ સર્વથા સ્વાર્થનો પરિત્યાગ કરતું હોત તો પોતાના અર્થની (સ્વ-પદાર્થથી) પ્રધાનાર્થને કોઈ રીતે ઉપકારક નહીં બની

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૮૩. હવે પછીની ચર્ચામાં '**अथवाऽन्वयाद् विशेषणं भविष्यति।** એવા પૂર્વોક્ત ભાષ્યોક્ત સામાન્ય સમાધાનથી આગળ વધીને ભર્તૃહરિ વિશેષ સમાધાન કરે છે.

૮૪ अन्वयाद् गम्यते सोऽर्थो विरोधी वा निवर्तते ।
द्व्यर्थमर्थान्तरे वापि तत्राहुरुपसर्जनम् ॥ ९५ ॥
(हेलाराजस्य वृत्तिः)......द्वयोर्हि प्राधान्ये परस्परसंबन्धाभावाद् विशिष्टोऽवच्छिन्नः प्रधानार्थो न प्रतीयेतेति स्वप्राधान्यमुपसर्जनस्य निवर्तते । अत एव स्वविशेषणेन समृद्धादिना न युज्यते । प्रधानोपकाराय तु यद्रूपं विशेषणतात्मकं तन्नापैत्यविरोधादिति नात्यन्ताय जहातीत्युक्तिः ॥

—वा. प., वृत्तिसमुद्देशः, का. ९५

શકતાં ઉપસર્જનપદ સ્વરૂપનો જ ત્યાગ કરી બેસશે. વળી, ઉપસર્જન પદ જો પરોપકાર ન કરતું હોય તો ઉત્તરપદ (પુરુષ માત્ર)થી જ પ્રધાનાર્થની પ્રતીતિ થઈ જતાં તેનું પ્રયોગવૈયર્થ્ય આવી પડે. બીજું, ઉપસર્જન પદ જો તદ્દન અનર્થક હોય તો તેનો અન્ય પદ સાથે સંબંધ જ ન થઈ શકે અને પરિણામે સામર્થ્યને કારણે થનારી 'સમાસ' સંજ્ઞા પણ ન થાય. માટે ઉપસર્જન પદ સકલ અર્થનો ત્યાગ કરે છે એમ તો ન કહેવાય. જેવી રીતે રાજકર્મોમાં નિયુક્ત થનાર તક્ષા (સુથાર) હેડકી ખાવી, હસવું વગેરે પ્રાણીકર્મો પણ રાજકર્મની સાથોસાથ જ કરે છે; ત્યજતો નથી.[૮૫] આમ જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિમાં પ્રાપ્ત થતા દોષોનું નિરાકરણ થઈ જાય છે.

૫.૨.૦

બીજા કેટલાકના મતે ઉપસર્જન પદોમાં પોતાનો (વાક્યાવસ્થાવાળો જૂનો) અર્થ રહેવાની સાથે જ અર્થાન્તરનો ઉમેરો થાય છે; આ અર્થાધિકયને પરાર્થ કહે છે. દા.ત. જેવી રીતે માટી ભરેલા કળશમાં જળ રેડવામાં આવે તો તે રહી શકે છે. અથવા તો જેવી રીતે તન્તુઓના કાર્ય (પટ)માં લાખ વગેરેથી જન્મેલો રાગાતિશય—કોઈ રંગ—રહી શકે છે. એ જ પ્રમાણે અહીં ઉપસર્જન પદોના સ્વાર્થમાં અર્થાન્તરનું ઉપાદાન (ઉમેરો) થઈ શકે છે. આ સન્દર્ભમાં ભાષ્યમાં કહ્યું છે: ભિક્ષુક બીજી ભિક્ષા મળ્યા પછી, પૂર્વે મેળવેલી ભિક્ષાનો ત્યાગ કરતો નથી, પણ બંને ભિક્ષાઓનો સંગ્રહ જ કરે છે.[૮૬] આને અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ કહે છે.

૫.૨.૧

આ અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિમાં પણ કેટલાક દોષ રહેલા છે. પહેલા તે દોષોનું ઉદ્ભાવન કરી પછી તેનો પરિહાર કરીશું: राजपुरुषः । એવા વૃત્તિ (સમાસ) પદમાં રાજાર્થ પુરુષાર્થનું વિશેષણ બન્યો હોઈ વિશિષ્ટ—અર્થની પ્રતીતિ થાય છે. પરંતુ અહીં શંકા થાય છે કે જો વૃત્તિમાં પ્રધાન પુરુષની સાથે રાજાર્થ પણ રહેતો હોય તો धवखदिरौ ।ની જેમ राजपुरुषः । એવા પદમાં દ્વિવચનની પ્રાપ્તિ થવી જોઈએ.

આ શંકા ઉચિત નથી. (ઇતરેતર) દ્વન્દ્વ સમાસમાં તો બન્ને (પૂર્વોત્તર) પદોનું સરખું પ્રાધાન્ય હોઈ બન્ને પદોના એ સમુદાયમાં અવયવો જુદા જુદા છે એવું જ્ઞાન થાય છે, માટે ત્યાં દ્વિવચન યોગ્ય છે. પરંતુ અહીં राजपुरुषः । માં વિશેષણ—વિશેષ્યભાવથી અવચ્છિન્ન એવા જે અર્થાન્તરનું બોધન થાય છે, તેનું સમુદાયથી ઉપાદાન થયું છે, જુદા જુદા અવયવોથી તે કહેવાયું નથી. આવાં ઉદાહરણોમાં સમુદાયથી પરમાં આવનારી વિભક્તિ સમુદાયાર્થમાં રહેલી સંખ્યાનું ઉપાદાન કરે છે. એટલે કે राजपुरुषः । વગેરેમાં સમુદાયગત એકત્વને ધ્યાનમાં લઈને એકવચનનો જ

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૮૫. यः परार्थविरोधी स्वार्थस्तं जहाति । तद्यथा । तक्षा राजकर्मणि प्रवर्तमानः स्वं तक्षकर्म जहाति, न हिक्कितहसितकण्डूयितानि ॥

—२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६४.

८६. एवं हि दृश्यते लोके । भिक्षुकोऽयं द्वितीयां भिक्षामासाद्य पूर्वां न जहाति संचयाय प्रवर्तते ॥ —२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६५

પ્રયોગ થાય છે. આ સન્દર્ભમાં, મહાભાષ્યમાં પણ (અવયવાર્થ નહીં, પણ) સમુદાય અર્થવાન્ હોઈ દ્વિવચન કે અનેકવચનની પ્રાપ્તિ થશે નહીં એમ જણાવ્યું છે.[૮૭]

બીજું, અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિમાં તો ઉપસર્જન પદનો અર્થ સર્વથા હોય છે જ, અને તે પોતે વિશેષણ બનીને પ્રધાનાર્થને વિશેષિત કરી વિશિષ્ટાર્થને કહે છે. આમ આ પક્ષમાં (અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ પક્ષમાં) ઉપસર્જન પદ દ્વ્યર્થને કહે છે. અહીં પ્રધાનાર્થમાં ઉપસર્જન પદનો અર્થ પાંસૂદકવત્ અભિન્ન થઈ ગયો હોવાને કારણે તેમની વચ્ચે વિવેક થઈ શકતો નથી. અને આથી જ ત્યાં ઉપસર્જન પદ પોતાના વિશેષણ(ऋद्धस्य ઇત્યાદિ)ની સાથે જોડાતું નથી.

૫.૩.૦

કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓએ वर्तनं वृत्तिः। (turning something in to something else) એવો અર્થ લઈને તેના જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ અને અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ એવા બે ભેદ પાડયા. પરંતુ આ મતમાં પણ વૃત્તિ દરમિયાન समर्थः નો અધિકાર તો કરવામાં આવે જ છે. આથી અહીં કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે સામર્થ્યનો શો અર્થ કરવો તે જોઈશું: ભાષ્યકારે કહ્યું છે કે સામર્થ્ય એટલે ભેદ, સંસર્ગ કે ઉભય.[૮૮] અહીં કૈયટ જણાવે છે કે વૃત્તિમાં ભેદ અને સંસર્ગ નહીં હોય તો 'સામર્થ્ય' છે એમ નહીં કહેવાય. કારણ કે સામર્થ્ય (હમેશાં) ભેદસંસર્ગાત્મક જ હોય છે.[૮૯] અર્થાત્ ભેદ, સંસર્ગ કે ઉભયનું જ નામ સામર્થ્ય છે. ભાષ્યકારે ભેદ અને સંસર્ગને સમજાવતાં લખ્યું છે કે, राज्ञः (રાજાનો) એમ કહ્યા પછી રાજાની સાથે સંબંધ ધરાવતા ઘોડો, હાથી, મહેલ વગેરે અનેક સંબંધી પદાર્થ મનમાં ઉપસ્થિત થાય છે. એ જ પ્રમાણે, पुरुषः (સેવક) એમ કહેતાં સેવક પરતંત્ર હોવાથી રાજા, નગરપતિ એમ અનેક સ્વામીઓ(માલિકો)ની મનમાં ઉપસ્થિતિ થાય છે. હવે राजपुरुषमानय। એમ કહેતાં 'રાજા' એવો શબ્દ અન્ય સ્વામીઓ પાસેથી 'પુરુષ'ની નિવૃત્તિ કરે છે. અર્થાત્ શ્રોતાના મનમાં રાજા સિવાય અન્ય માલિકોની ઉપસ્થિતિ થતી નથી. 'પુરુષ' (સેવક) શબ્દ પણ સ્વામી(રાજા)ની અન્ય ઘોડો વગેરે વસ્તુઓ પાસેથી નિવૃત્તિ કરે છે. અર્થાત્ શ્રોતાના મનમાં પુરુષ (સેવક) સિવાય અન્ય ઘોડો, હાથી, મહેલ વગેરે સંબંધી પદાર્થની ઉપસ્થિતિ થતી નથી.[૯૦]

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૮૭. संघातस्यैकार्थ्यान्नावयवसंख्यातः सुबुत्पत्तिः। —२-१-१, वा-३, पृ. ३६५

૮૮. अथवा समर्थाधिकारोऽयं वृत्तौ क्रियते। सामर्थ्यं नाम भेदः संसर्गो वा। अपर आह। भेदसंसर्गौ वा सामर्थ्यमिति ॥ —२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६४

૮૯. यदि च वृत्तौ भेदसंसर्गौ न स्याताम्, तदा सामर्थ्यमेव न स्यात् तदात्मकत्वात् सामर्थ्यस्येत्यर्थः॥ —प्रदीपः, पृ. ३३०

૯૦. कः पुनर्भेदः संसर्गो वा। इह राज्ञ इत्युक्ते सर्वं स्वं प्रसक्तं, पुरुष इत्युक्ते सर्वः स्वामी प्रसक्तः। इहेदानीं राजपुरुष इत्युक्ते राजा पुरुषं निवर्तयत्यन्येभ्यः स्वामिभ्यः, पुरुषोऽपि राजानमन्येभ्यः स्वेभ्यः॥ —२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६४

કૌણ્ડ ભટ્ટે 'સમાસશકિતનિર્ણય' પ્રકરણમાં ભેદસંસર્ગાદિને આ પ્રમાણે વિશદ કરી બતાવ્યા છે: અહીં ભેદનો અર્થ અન્યોન્યાભાવ છે. જેમ કે, राजपुरुषः। એવા વૃત્તિપદથી 'અરાજકીય ભિન્ન'[૯૧] એવો અર્થબોધ થાય છે. 'વૃત્તિથી ભેદ વાચ્ય છે' એમ નહીં માનીએ તો राजपुरुषः सुन्दरः। ની જેમ राजपुरुषो देवदत्तस्य। એવો પણ પ્રયોગ થવા આવશે. પરંતુ અહીં राजपुरुषः એવી વૃત્તિથી ભેદ વાચ્ય હોઈ 'રાજાનો પુરુષ' એમ કહ્યા પછી 'દેવદત્તનો પુરુષ' એમ નહીં કહી શકાય. બીજા કેટલાક કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે राजपुरुषः। એવા વૃત્તિપદમાંથી 'રાજસંબંધવાન્' એવો પહેલા સંસર્ગાત્મક અર્થ મળ્યા પછી જ ભેદની પ્રતીતિ થાય છે; માટે 'વૃત્તિથી સંસર્ગ વાચ્ય છે' એમ માનવું જોઈએ. અહીં વૃત્તિથી પહેલા ભેદની પ્રતીતિ થાય કે સંસર્ગની—એ બાબતમાં કશું વિનિગમક (નિશ્ચાયક પ્રમાણ) નહીં હોવાથી એક ત્રીજો મત પણ ઉપસ્થિત થાય થાય છે: 'વૃત્તિથી ભેદ અને સંસર્ગ—એ બંને વાચ્ય છે.' આ મત મુજબ राजपुरुषः શબ્દથી 'અરાજકીય ભિન્ન રાજસંબંધવાન્ આ પુરુષ છે' એવો બોધ થાય છે.[૯૨]

અહીં ભેદ સંસર્ગનો અવિનાભાવી છે તથા સંસર્ગ પણ ભેદનો અવિનાભાવી છે. આથી જ્યારે વૃત્તિથી ભેદ વાચ્ય છે એમ માનીએ ત્યારે સંસર્ગ અનુમેય જાણવો. અને જ્યારે વૃત્તિથી સંસર્ગ વાચ્ય છે એમ માનીએ ત્યારે ભેદ અનુમેય જાણવો. આમ 'સામર્થ્ય ભેદસંસર્ગાત્મક છે' એમ કહેવાથી राज्ञः पुरुषोऽश्वश्च। राज्ञः पुरुषो, भार्यायाश्च। એની જેમ राजपुरुषोऽश्वश्च। राजपुरुषो भार्यायाश्च એવા પ્રયોગો થશે નહીં. આ ઉદાહરણોમાં अश्वश्च અને भार्यायाश्च પદો અનુક્રમે ભેદ અને સંસર્ગની પ્રતીતિમાં બાધક બને છે. માટે વૃત્તિ વડે ભેદ અને સંસર્ગવાળો જ અર્થ કહેવામાં આવે છે તથા ભેદ અને સંસર્ગવાળા અર્થનું પ્રતિપાદન કરવું એનું જ નામ એકાર્થીભાવ રૂપ સામર્થ્ય છે.

૫.૩.૧

કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે વૃત્તિપદ કેવી રીતે અર્થબોધ કરાવે છે એ સમજાવવા માટે જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ પક્ષ અને અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ પક્ષ—એવા વિભાગો પાડ્યા છે, આ સન્દર્ભમાં ભર્તૃહરિ જણાવે છે કે વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યને અભિન્ન ગણનારા કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓ પ્રકૃતિ રૂપ વાક્ય-માંથી વિકાર રૂપ વૃત્તિપદ તૈયાર થાય છે એમ માને છે, તેઓ અબુધ છે. वर्तनं वृत्तिः। એવું જે કહેવાય છે તે કેવળ અબુધ—પ્રતિપત્તિને અર્થે જ છે. આ વૃત્તિપદ તૈયાર કરતાં ઉપાયો જુદા જુદા સંબોધન (નામ)થી પુરુષોમાં વ્યવહૃત થાય છે. અર્થાત્ કોઈ આ વૃત્તિને જહત્સ્વા-

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૯૧. અર્થાત્ રાજાથી ભિન્ન બીજો કોઈ સ્વામી નથી જેનો એવો પુરુષ.

૯૨. भेदोऽन्योन्याभावः। तथा च राजपुरुष इत्यादावराजकीयभिन्न इति बोधः। अस्यावाच्यत्वे च राजपुरुषः सुन्दर इतिवद्राजपुरुषो देवदत्तस्य चेत्यपि स्यात्। वाच्यत्वे तद्विरोधान्नैवं प्रयोग इति भावः। राजसंबन्धवानित्येव शाब्दं भानं, भेदस्तूत्तरकालमुपतिष्ठते इत्याशयेनाऽऽह—संसर्ग इति। विनिगमनाविरहमस्वामिकेऽपि राजपुरुष इत्यादिप्रयोगापत्तिं च मनसि कृत्वोभयं वाच्यमित्याह-उभयं वेति। तथा चाराजकीयभिन्नो राजसंबन्धवांश्चायमिति बोधः॥

—वै. भू. सारः, समासशक्तिनिर्णयः, पृ. २५९-२६२

ર્થાવૃત્તિ કહે છે તો કોઈ અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ કહે છે. અહીં રુચિવૈચિત્ર્યને કારણે ઉપાયો હંમેશા અનવસ્થિત જ રહેવાના.[૯૩] આમ ભર્તૃહરિના મતે राजपुरुषः । એવો સમૂહ (ઉપેય) તો એકનો એક જ છે અને એને સમજાવવા માટે અલગ અલગ એવા જહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ અને અજહત્સ્વાર્થાવૃત્તિ—એ બે પક્ષો કેવળ ઉપાયભૂત છે.[૯૪]

૬.૦.૦

નિત્યશબ્દવાદીઓ વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યને પરસ્પરના પર્યાય ગણતાં નથી. તેઓના મતે વૃત્તિ અને વાક્ય વચ્ચે અત્યંત ભેદ છે. પરંતુ પ્રક્રિયા-અવસ્થામાં વાક્યનો નાશ કરીને सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः । ૨-૪-૭૧, उपसर्जनं पूर्वम् । ૨-૨-૩૦ ઇત્યાદિ સૂત્રોથી વૃત્તિનું અન્વાખ્યાન કરવામાં આવ્યું છે, એવી સ્થિતિમાં વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યની વચ્ચે અત્યંત ભેદ છે એમ કેવી રીતે માની શકાય? ભર્તૃહરિએ આનો જવાબ આપતાં જણાવ્યું છે કે राजपुरुषः । વગેરે વિશિષ્ટાર્થ વૃત્તિવાળા સંઘાતો (સમુદાયો) પરમાર્થતઃ નિરંશ જ છે, તથાપિ તેમાં અમુક પૂર્વપદ અને અમુક ઉત્તરપદ એવાં અવયવોની કલ્પના કરીને તેને વ્યુત્પન્ન કરવામાં આવે છે. આવે પ્રસંગે મન્દમતિવાળા લોકો શ્રુતિસારૂપ્યને કારણે ઉપાય (વાક્ય) અને ઉપેય(વૃત્તિ)નું ઐક્ય માની લે છે. હકીકતમાં તો રેખાગવય (ચિત્રમાંના ગવય)થી સાચા ગવયનું જ્ઞાન થાય છે ત્યારે ત્યાં ચિત્રમાંના ગવય અને વાસ્તવિક ગવય બંને ભિન્ન જ છે એમ પ્રતિપત્તા જાણે છે. આવી રીતે અહીં ધૂળમાં દોર્યા સમું પ્રક્રિયાવાક્ય અને સમાસ-બન્ને અલગ અલગ જ છે એમ જાણવું. અર્થાત્ વ્યપેક્ષાથી નિયત એવું વાક્ય એકાર્થીભાવના વિષયવાળા સમાસથી જુદું જ છે. વળી, એક નિયમ પણ છે: "અર્થભેદે શબ્દભેદ." અહીં સંખ્યાવિશેષાદિ અર્થભેદો (૧.૨.૨) પૂર્વે દર્શાવ્યા જ છે. માટે શબ્દાન્તર હોવાને કારણે વાક્ય અને સમાસ વચ્ચે અત્યંત ભેદ છે એમ સિદ્ધ થાય છે. કેવળ અબુધોની પ્રતિપત્તિ અર્થે અર્થાત્ કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓને માટે જ વિચિત્ર ઉપાયો દર્શાવવામાં આવ્યા છે. આ લોકો વાક્ય અને વૃત્તિમાં ભેદ સંસર્ગના લક્ષણવાળા પ્રધાનાર્થનો અભેદ માને છે તથા વૃત્તિને 'વાક્ય-પ્રકૃતિકા' કહીને વ્યુત્પન્ન કરે છે. આવા અબુધ લોકોની દૃષ્ટિએ વાક્યમાં વિભક્તિઓ રહેલી હોઈ પ્રક્રિયા અવસ્થામાં સમાસ કરતી વખતે लुग् વગેરેનું[૯૫] અન્વાખ્યાન કરવામાં આવ્યું છે.[૯૬]

વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યના અત્યંત ભેદને સમર્થિત કરતાં ભર્તૃહરિ વિશેષમાં જણાવે છે કે वृक्षः વગેરે પદોમાં વર્ણોનું આનર્થક્ય છે અને તેથી નિરંશ અને અવિભક્તાર્થનું પ્રત્યાયક તથા સ્ફોટના સ્વભાવવાળું 'પદ' જેવી રીતે પોતાની શક્તિથી અમુક અર્થને વિશે પ્રવર્તે છે, તેવી રીતે

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૯૩. वृत्तिं वर्तयतामेवमबुधप्रतिपत्तये ।
भिन्नाः संबोधनोपायाः पुरुषेष्वनवस्थिताः ॥ —वा. प., वृत्तिसमुद्देशः, का-९७.

૯૪. જિજ્ઞાસુએ... "Bhartṛhari on grammatical analysis (Apoddhāra)" by K. A. Subramania Iyer (Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal, Vol. xviii, Pts. i–ii, Hoshiarpur, 1980) એ લેખ જોવો.

૯૫ सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः । ૨-૪-૭૧

૯૬. अबुधान् प्रत्युपायाश्च विचित्राः प्रतिपत्तये ।
शब्दान्तरत्वादत्यन्तभेदो वाक्यसमासयोः ॥ —वा. प., वृत्तिसमुद्देशः, का-४१

नीलोत्पलम् । राजपुरुषः । વગેરે સમાસપદો પણ અવિભક્ત અવયવોવાળા અભિન્નસંવિત્ થી સિદ્ધ એવા (વિશિષ્ટ) એકાર્થના પ્રત્યાયક છે.[૯૭] પરંતુ જેમ वृक्षः વગેરે પદોમાં પ્રકૃતિ-પ્રત્યયનો (वृक्ष+सु એવો) વિભાગ વાસ્તવમાં નહીં હોવા છતાંય અન્વાખ્યાન અર્થે કલ્પવામાં આવે છે, તેમ વૃત્તિ-(સમાસ)માં પણ અવયવોના ભેદની કલ્પના કરવામાં આવે છે.

વૃત્તિ અને વાક્ય વચ્ચે અત્યંત ભેદ હોવા છતાંય ક્યારેક કેટલાક અંશોમાં દા.ત. राज्ञः पुरुषः । એવા વાક્યમાંના પહેલા અને બીજા પદ સાથે राजपुरुषः । માંના પૂર્વપદ અને ઉત્તરપદના સાદૃશ્યનો જે ભાસ થાય છે તે ભ્રમ છે. બીજું, राजपुरुषः । વગેરેમાં જેવો સાદૃશ્યનો ભાસ થાય છે તેવો બધે જ સ્થળે વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યના સાદૃશ્યનો ભાસ થતો નથી. જેમ કે, वासिष्ठः । गार्ग्यः । વગેરે તદ્ધિતવૃત્તિના વિષયમાં (અર્થાત્ તે તદ્ધિતાન્ત શબ્દોમાંથી) અન્વાખ્યાન અર્થે ઉપયોગમાં લીધેલ પ્રકૃતિ—પ્રત્યયનો બોધ થાય છે; તેવી રીતે श्रोत्रियः । क्षेत्रियः । વગેરે તદ્ધિતાન્ત શબ્દોમાંથી[૯૮] પ્રકૃતિ-પ્રત્યયનો બોધ થતો નથી. કારણ કે श्रोत्रियः । क्षेत्रियः । વગેરે વૃત્તિપદોમાંથી સીધો જ છન્દ્સ, પરક્ષેત્ર આદિ શબ્દોનો અનુગમ થતો નથી. અહીં વાક્યનું સ્વરૂપ જે પ્રકારનું છે તેનાથી જુદા જ સ્વરૂપનું વૃત્તિપદ છે. આવાં ઉદાહરણો વૃત્તિ-વાક્યનો અત્યંત ભેદ છે એ હકીકતમાં લિંગ બને છે. આમ नीलोत्पलम् । राजपुरुषः । ઈત્યાદિ સમાસોમાં અવયવાર્થોનું ગ્રહણ થતું નથી. તેમાં અવયવભેદોની કલ્પના કરીને કેવળ તેને અબુધપ્રતિપત્તિને અર્થે વ્યુત્પન્ન કરવામાં આવે છે. તાત્ત્વિક રીતે તો વૃત્તિ વાક્યથી ભિન્ન જ છે. આમ વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યનો અત્યંત ભેદ સિદ્ધ થાય છે.

૬.૧.૦

નિત્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે વૃત્તિ અને વાક્યનો અત્યંત ભેદ સિદ્ધ કર્યા પછી એક મહત્ત્વના પ્રશ્નની વિચારણા કરીશું: વૃત્તિ (સમાસ) પદથી અર્થાભિધાન સ્વાભાવિકપણે જ થાય છે કે તે વાચનિક (અર્થાત્ સૂત્ર દ્વારા તેનું—અર્થનું—અનુશાસન કરવામાં આવે) છે?[૯૯] કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે સૂત્રકારે પ્રકૃતિ પ્રત્યયના સંમેલનથીપ દસિદ્ધિ કેવી રીતે તૈયાર થાય છે તથા તે પદોના સંમેલનથી સમાસાદિ વૃત્તિપદો કેવી રીતે તૈયાર થાય છે એનું તો વર્ણન કર્યું જ છે, પણ તેની સાથે સાથે તે સમાસાદિ પદો કયા અર્થમાં વાપરવા તેનું પણ અનુશાસન કર્યું છે. દા.ત., अनेकमन्यपदार्थे । २-२-२४, चार्थे द्वन्द्वः । २-२-२९, तस्यापत्यम् । ४-१-९२,

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૯૭. पदं यथैव वृक्षादि विशिष्टेऽर्थे व्यवस्थितम् ।
नीलोत्पलाद्यपि तथा भागाभ्यां वर्तते विना ॥ —तदेव, का-५३

૯૮. (१) श्रोत्रियश्छन्दोऽधीते । ५-२-८४ ।.....श्रोत्रियो ब्राह्मणः । श्रोत्रियश्छन्दोधीते इति वाक्यार्थे पदवचनम्...... ।

(२) क्षेत्रियच् परक्षेत्रे चिकित्स्यः । ५-२-९२ क्षेत्रियजिति निपात्यते । परक्षेत्रे चिकित्स्य इत्येतस्मिन् वाक्यार्थे पदवचनम् ।...... परक्षेत्रं जन्मान्तरशरीरं, तत्र चिकित्स्यः क्षेत्रियः, असाध्योऽप्रत्याख्येयो व्याधिरुच्यते । —(काशिकावृत्तिः)

૯૯. अथैतस्मिन्नेकार्थीभावकृते विशेषे किं स्वाभाविकं शब्दैरर्थाभिधानमाहोस्विद्वाचनिकम् । —२-१-१ इत्यत्र भाष्यम्, पृ. ३६३

तेन रक्तं रागात्। ४-२-१ तेन निर्वृतम्। ४-२-६८ અર્થાત્ કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે સમાસાદિ પદોનું અર્થાભિધાન વાચનિક છે. પરંતુ પતંજલિ જણાવે છે કે આ મત યોગ્ય નથી. કેમ કે સમાસાદિ પદોથી અર્થાભિધાન સ્વાભાવિકપણે જ થાય છે. પાણિનિએ अनेकमन्यपदार्थे । ૨-૨-૨૪ જેવા સૂત્રોથી અર્થોનું અનુશાસન કર્યું નથી, પણ તેનું નિમિત્ત રૂપે અન્વાખ્યાન કર્યું છે. પતંજલિએ આને સમજાવવા માટે એક દૃષ્ટાંત આપ્યું છે. દા.ત., કોઈ કહે કે 'કૂવાને જમણે હાથે રસ્તો છે' અથવા 'વાદળમાં ચન્દ્રમાને જો' તો ત્યાં રસ્તાનું કે ચન્દ્રમાનું નવું વિધાન થતું નથી. પરંતુ કૂવા અને વાદળની નિશાનીઓની મદદથી તે ક્યાં રહેલો છે એ જ કહેવામાં આવે છે. એ જ રીતે 'चार्थ માં જે સમાસ હોય છે તે द्वन्द्व સમાસ છે, અન્યપદાર્થમાં જે સમાસ હોય છે તે બહુવ્રીહિ છે' એટલું સૂત્રકારને કહેવાનો આશય છે. આમ નિત્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે સમાસાદિ પદોથી અર્થાભિધાન સ્વાભાવિકપણે થાય છે એમ માનવામાં આવ્યું છે.

પતંજલિએ વિશેષમાં એ પણ જણાવ્યું છે કે, અર્થોનો આદેશ કરવો (અર્થોનું અનુશાસન કરવું) એ શક્ય જ નથી. કેમ કે अ નો અર્થ જણાવવા ब નો પ્રયોગ કરીશું તો ब નો અર્થ શો એવો પ્રશ્ન થશે. હવે ब નો અર્થ જણાવવા क નો પ્રયોગ કરીશું તો क નો અર્થ શો? એમ અનવસ્થા ઊભી થશે. માટે પાણિનિએ લાઘવાર્થે અર્થોનો આદેશ કર્યો નથી. બીજું, બધા જ શબ્દોના અર્થો બતાવવા શક્ય પણ નથી. ધાતુ, પ્રાતિપદિક, પ્રત્યય, નિપાતાદિના અર્થો બતાવવા કોણ શક્તિમાન હોય? વળી, કેટલાક એવા પણ શબ્દો છે દા.ત., जर्भरी । तुर्फरीतू । કે જેના અર્થો વિદિત નથી. એ સિવાય, ક્યારેક શબ્દ-પ્રયોગ કર્યા વિના પણ આંખના પલકારા, હાથ હલાવવો વગેરે અનેક આંગિક ચેષ્ટાઓથી પણ અમુક અર્થો કહી શકાય છે. તથા અમુક અર્થો સુવિદિત હોય એ અવસ્થામાં અર્થોનો ઉપદેશ કરવાનું કોઈ પ્રયોજન નથી. દા.ત., કોઈ કહે કે 'પૂર્વમાં સૂર્ય ઊગે છે, પશ્ચિમમાં આથમે છે', અથવા તો 'ગોળ મધુર છે' 'આદું તીખું છે'—તો આવાં વાક્યોનું કોઈ પ્રયોજન નથી. આમ નિત્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મતે સમાસાદિ પદોનું અર્થાભિધાન સ્વાભાવિક જ થાય છે; તે વાચનિક નથી.

પરંતુ આમ જો અર્થોનું અભિધાન સ્વાભાવિકપણે થતું હોય તો નિત્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મત મુજબ શું વ્યાકરણશાસ્ત્ર માત્ર સમાસપદોને વર્ણવે છે કે કાર્યશબ્દવાદીઓના મત મુજબ સમાસપદો તૈયાર કરે છે? એવો પ્રશ્ન થશે. પતંજલિ જણાવે છે કે બેમાંથી ગમે તે પક્ષ લો પણ 'અષ્ટાધ્યાયી'ની રચના નિરર્થક બની જતી નથી; किं पुनर्नित्यः शब्द आहोस्वित्यकार्यः । संग्रह एतत्प्राधान्येन परीक्षितं नित्यो वा स्यात्कार्यो वेति। तत्रोक्ता दोषाः प्रयोजनान्यप्युक्तानि। तत्र त्वेष निर्णयो यद्येव नित्योऽथापि कार्यं उभयथापि लक्षणं प्रवर्त्यमिति ॥ (व्याकरणमहाभाष्ये प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमे पादे प्रथममाह्निकम्, पृ. ६).*

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* આ સંશોધન કાર્યને માટે, "યુનિવર્સિટીમાં થતાં સંશોધનકાર્યને સાહાય્ય કરતી U.G.C. (V-Plan)ની ગ્રાન્ટ્સ' ૧૯૮૦-૮૧ના વર્ષમાં સ. પ. યુનિવર્સિટી, વલ્લભવિદ્યાનગર દ્વારા મળી હતી. લેખક U.G.C. અને સ. પ. યુનિવર્સિટીનો આભાર માને છે.

ग्रन्थ-सूचि

ग्रन्थ :

१. काशिकावृत्तिः । चौखम्बा संस्कृत सीरीझ आफ़िस, वाराणसी, १९५२ ।

२. बृहच्छब्देन्दुशेखरः । द्वितीयो भागः । सं० सीताराम शास्त्री, सरस्वती भवन ग्रन्थमाला-८७, वाराणसी, १९६० ।

३. वैयाकरणभूषणसारः (शाङ्करी टीकायुतः), आनन्दाश्रम संस्कृत ग्रन्थावलिः-१३५, पूना, १९५७ ।

४. वैयाकरणसिद्धान्तकौमुदी बालमनोरमाऽऽख्यव्याख्यया तत्त्वबोधिन्याख्यव्याख्यया च सनाथिता। भाग २, मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, १९७१ ।

५. वैयाकरणसिद्धान्तकौमुदी, 'रत्नप्रभा' हिन्दीव्याख्यासहिता । सं. श्रीबालकृष्ण पञ्चोली, चौखम्बा संस्कृत सीरीझ आफ़िस, वाराणसी, १९६९ ।

६. वैयाकरणसिद्धान्तलघुमञ्जूषा । पं. सभापतिशर्मोपाध्यायकृत-रत्नप्रभाख्यव्याख्यासंवलिता, (प्रथमावृत्तिः), गाजीपुरः, १९२९ ।

७. व्याकरणमहाभाष्यम् कैयटकृतप्रदीपेन नागेशभट्टकृतोद्द्योतेन च सहितम् । प्रथमः खण्डः, मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, १९६७ ।

8. *Pāṇini : A Survey of Research*, by George Cardona, University of Pensylvania, 1976. (Trends In Linguistics, state of the art reports-6, edited by W. Winter, University of Kiel Germany).

9. Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya Samarthāhnika* (P. 2.1.1.) Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S. D. Joshi, Publication of CASS, (Class C : No. 3), University of Poona, Poona, 1968.

10. *The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, Edited by F. Kielhorn, (Third Edition), Vol. I, II, BORI, Poona, 1962, 1965.

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1. Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal, (Punjab University, Hoshiarpur), Vol. *xviii*, pts. *i–ii*, 1980.

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IS THERE A CLIMATE OF CRITICISM IN OUR LITERATURES ?*

RAMANLAL JOSHI

Professor and Head, Department of Gujarati,
School of Languages and Literature,
Gujarat University, Ahmedabad-9.

Is there a climate of criticism in our literatures ? In setting forth to find an answer to this question, I would naturally turn for evidence to the one literature, I know a little closely : I am referring to Gujarati literature. I would like to add immediately that my answer is in its very nature tentative and limited by my personal response to the situation as it obtains in the field of creative and critical writings in Gujarati today.

Literary criticism as an activity consciously seeking to engage the creative impulse in the language, to examine its assumptions and to set up norms, is little over a century old in Gujarati. It was born in the middle of the last century as a by-product of what is called the Indian Renaissance. It largely drew its inspiration from the contact with Western Culture which was made possible by the setting up of the Universities in the country. This is a situation which is possibly shared by literatures in the other regional languages as well. I would admit therefore that, yes, literary criticism in Gujarati, especially during its initial formative phase was certainly derivative. The main point I would like to make here, in this paper, however, is : Gujarati Literary criticism is today in a flourishing state, and it has far outgrown its colonial character. Perhaps, it would be true to say that criticism is ahead of the creative impulse in Gujarati writing today. This is a situation which is a little suspect and I would not insist on it.

Instead of trying to present a historical survey of the growth of literary criticism in Gujarati, I would prefer to focus attention more on the

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present day critical scene. It was especially during the last decade, the seventees, that critical activity picked up momentum in Gujarati. One of the factors which probably contributed to this development was the emergence of a number of younger talents who has their base in the departments of Gujarati in Colleges and Universities. These younger men had a massive exposure to the most recent developments in modern western critical theories. By and large, the trend was towards a formalist outlook, and chiefly French Symbolist thinking as represented by Valery, Mallarme and others exercised a great influence on the minds of these younger critics. A chief exponent of this formalist veiw in Gujarati is Suresh Joshi. He varified literary concepts, emphasised (rather overemphasised) the formal aspect of a literary work, insisted on practical-textual criticism (as against Socio-cultural frame of reference), and conducted a campaign for removing the ambiguity in critical terminology. He is a formalist critic of the highest order. He conducted a re-examination of established opinions and evaluations.

Suresh Joshi was chiefly responsible for creating a climate in which younger critics could freely explore the newer approaches in practical as well as theoretical fields of literary criticism. As a result, today we have critics like Suman Shah, Chandrakant Topiwala, Radheshyam Sharma and others who try to import some of the more recent structuralist and even post-structuralist ideas in Gujarati. Suman Shah has already pub ished a monograph on structuralism, and he and Chandrakant Topiwala have tried to analyse some of the Gujarati poems and short stories along newer lines. Chandrakant Topiwala, particularly, is trying out to apply newer linguistic models in analysing Gujarati poetry. One might mention Radheshyam Sharma as yet another critical talent, belonging to the same group. These critics however belong to an extremely avante Grade Camp and their attempts, though well meaning, may yet be called only experimental and it would be premature to rate their contribution. One might mention yet another range of critical talents : Sitanshu Yasheschandra, Yashvant Trivedi, Digish Mehta, Prabodh Parikh, and numerous others, who while not being so intensively 'modern' in their outlook, are yet well informed in both Indian as well as Western Critical theories. Sitanshu especially has had his training in the States and he has specialised on one hand in Kantian aesthetics and on the other in aesthetic theory of Jagannath. These critics have a more

stable critical outlook and provide a sound basis to the formation of critical opinion and judgement, often their approach is interdisciplinary and comparative. An intriguing feature of the present day critical scene in Gujarati is the predominance of the theoretical and speculative branch leaning towards aesthetics. A major figure in this respect is that of Dr. Harivallabh Bhayani who is himself a linguist and who has cultivated an abiding interest in Prakrit and medieval literatures. He would prefer to have the approaches of traditional Sanskrit Poetics extended to modern Gujarati creative writings. As Dr. Bhayani puts it in a speach delivered on the occasion of his being presented a Sahitya Akademi Award for 1981 : "I may mention.........that I came to the theory of literature and literary criticism via philology and linguistics. Recent critical approaches to literature have been heavily leaning on the linguistics, structural and semiotic aspects of the literary work. To these approaches and to the consequent focus on the literary text (and, in some cases, on the reader's response), I found very significant parallels in the Indian theory of poetry and criticism. Numerous views of R. Jacobson, J. Culler, R. Sholes, M. Riffaterre, of Russian formalists and of the sponsors of stylistics, structuralism, semiotics, and Hermenentics can be looked upon as almost restatements of what was said very earlier by Bhamah, Vamana, Anandavardhana, Kuntaka, Abhinavagupta, Jagannatha and others. The treatment of the aesthetics of verbal structures in the Indian tradition seems in numberous cases more perceptive penetrating and sound, and the critical analysis, more systematic and thorough".

Dr. Bhayani's statement in a way answers the question how far Sanskrit poetics can help us formulate our Judgement of Literatures in the regional languages today. It is obvious that despite the optimism of Dr. Bhayani and I am sure, he has his counter-parts in other regional languages as well. I fear, Sanskrit Poetics will have to be given a lot of airing before its main principles could be made applicable to modern cerative writing in regional languages. In Gujarati for instance there have emerged creative talents whose writings are extremely experimental in character. I might mention the names of Labhshankar, Sitanshu who in their poems adopt symbolist and surrealist techniques. I wonder how far a traditional Poetic based on Abhinavgupta or Jagannatha or Kuntaka can be made applicable to the creative writing of today. I would not give up all attempts in this

direction, All I would like to submit is that I have my own reservations on this point.

Here I would like to add that the best examples of traditional criticism being written today is Umashankar Joshi, Sundaram, Vishnuprasad Trivedi and Niranjan Bhagat, other critics in this tradition are Jayant Pathak, 'Ushnas', Yashvant Shukla, C. N. Patel, Ramanlal Joshi, Bholabhai Patel, Raghuvir Chaudhari, Chandrakant Sheth, Jayant Kothari, Suresh Dalal, Harindra Dave, Pramodkumar Patel etc. etc.

In the field of philology and linguistics Harivallabh Bhayani, Shantibhai Acharya, Dayashankar Joshi and yogendra Vyas are notable. In the field of editing texts of medieval literature and of related Scholarship K. K. Shastri, Bhogilal Sandesara, K. B. Vyas, Bhupendra Trivedi, Ramalal C. Shah, Dhiru Parikh have done valuable work.

Periodicals like 'Sanskriti', 'Granth', 'Buddhiprakash', 'Forbes Sabha Traimasik' have been actively engaged in literary critiacism.

Ramanlal Joshi, besides his own books of criticism, has started editing the 'gujarati men of letters series' of which thirty five mangraphs have been published so far.

Thus in the course of a century we have tried different critical methods, sociological, philosophical, aesthetic, subjective, objective, practical and analytical.

One obvious feature of the present day critical scene in Gujarati is a lack of contact between the critical and the creative aspects of the Gujarati literary genius. The critics who really matter are experts at theorising at a high level, but either from prejudice or sheer illiteracy of a kind, these critics somehow refuse to comment on the large bulk of output in the creative field in Gujarati. They prefer to keep talking about Kafka or Camu or Sartre and do not even take notice of the creative writing produced by a large number of writers. To them these writers are either merely popular writers or professionals. Their chief complaint is that there is hardly a work in Gujarati creative writing which would bear the expert analysis which they are capable of performing.

This is a peculiar situation and I wonder whether it has its parallel in any of the other regional languages. This is a kind of elitism among Gujarati critics. A possible anti-dote is the presence of a marxist strand but in Gujarati we have hardly any critic of stature who has cared to look at literature from a marxist or even a Sociological point of view. It is note-worthy however that an approach of this kind was prevalent in the thirtees in Gujarati. But for some reason this critical movement lapsed during the subsequent years. Perhaps the over-riding impact of Gandhian ideology has something to do with this situation. After all Gandhiji himself is a major literary figure and writer in Gujarati in his own rights and may be his immense influence must have played its part in this phenomenon, which brings us back to the question which is almost a cliche namely the question of the Gujaratiness of Gujarati critical writing today. Very often we find that the younger critics like younger writers in Gujarati are too much fascinated by the glamour or the western critical models. This is not to ask for a total refusal to look at what the western critical genius has to offer but all I would emphasise is the point that we in Gujarati could be a good deal more independent in our critical approach. It would seem that an average Gujarati critic is ill at ease if he does not find himself in a position to quote a foreign critic in every third line of his writing. This dependence has to go. It shows that we have not attained a certain maturity. In absence of such an outlook sometimes the performance even the best among our critics looks little ridiculous at time. The average Gujarati critic cannot as if free himself from the apron strings of that Western Culture which he has historically inherited and which he keeps in imitating, almost out of sheer habit.

It would seem that the situation in Gujarati is no different from the situation in other regional language. There is the same need to shake off the traces of our ex-colonial status and to move forward to attain a new sense of identity for a better parallel, one might look even outside India to other Commonwealth Countries which had a similar past and which at present are engaged in a similar quest for identity. Thus a writer in Nigeria or in Kenya would easily appreciate the difficulties experienced by the younger Gujarati critics as well as writers today.

There is an interesting feature of the present day literary scene in Gujarati which may be noted. Actually Nissim Ezekiel, the well-known poet and critic, made a reference to it in a series of lectures he delivered at Gujarat University the other day. He referred to the fact that Gujaratis in large numbers have settled in various parts of the world today. These Gujarati speaking communities whether in England or in America or in Africa, live there as immigrants. As such they find themselves as if torn between two cultures. There are already signs of these Gujaratis abroad seeking to express themselves in creative terms. They have a new experience to convey. Perhaps this will help fill up the gap felt so far, and this writing will have that complexity and richness which is missed by the more advanced among critics in Gujarati today. This might help change the critical climate in favour of indigenous writing to a considerable extent.

One has to concede that the present phase in Gujarati writing, and this includes critical writing, appears to be one of stagnation in a way. There are a number of critics who courageously try to keep up the necessary sense of urgency for the right observance of critical norms. It is important however, these norms be ours and not borrowed from elsewhere. This is a difficult quest. A number of factors, literary as well as extra-literary, are involved here. The outcome will be governed by a tension of a number of opposed pulls. One could only hope that such a tension will work out effectively to lead to the emergence of a proper critical climate. It is a challenge to the newer critical talents, and such talents. I am glad to say, are not wanting in Gujarati today.

THE ORIGIN OF THE GU JARATIREFLEXIVE PRONOUN *POT* (पोत)

H. C. BHAYANI

L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad-380 009.

Sk. *ātman,* Pk. *appa–, appaṇa–,* Ap. *appaya–, appaṇaya–* continued in Old Gujarati as the reflexive pronoun in the form of *āpau, āpaṇau* etc. The abstract noun derived from *āpaṇay–*, viz., *āpaṇapau* was another variant in use besides the above two. But in Middle Gujarati we have quite a new form of the reflexive pronoun besides the three earlier forms. It it *potai,* the instrumental singular of a base *pota*, and this new form has ultimately driven out the others. In Modern Gujarati *pot* is the only form preserved out of the earlier set of four different forms.

Regarding the origin of the earlier *pota,* modern *pot* we have the view of Tessitori,[1] Turner, and Shastri that it is a special development from O. Guj. *āpopau* (derived from Ap. *appahu appau*) with loss of the initial vowel and change of the second *p–* to *–t–* Dave has, on the other hand proposed to derive *potau* from Sk. *ātmatva* and Shastri suggests *ātmātma–* as another likely source[2]. All these etymologies are untenable because most of the changes they presuppose run counter to the well-established patterns of phonetic changes in Middle Gujarati. Besides there are other quite obvious objections. This necessitates fresh efforts to find out the origin of *pota.*

In Modern Gujarati we have three homonyms with the form *pot* :

pot_1 : 'piece of cloth' etc. as in *pota, potuṃ, patḍi* etc.

pot_2 : 'self' etc. as in *pote, potīkuṃ* etc.

pot_3 : 'payment of revenue' as in *potuṃ, patdār* etc.

Of these three, pot_3 is a loan from Persian.

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1. Tessitori, L. P., *Notes,* § 92.
2. Tessitori, loc cit; Shastri, K. K., *Rūpracnā,* 1952, 156–157 ; *Pāramparik Vyākaraṇ,* 1960, 262.

pot$_1$ lies at the basis of the following words :

pot ' texture of cloth', ' stuff '.

potuṃ ' wet rag '.

potiyuṃ (diminutives : *potī, potḍī*) ' short *dhoti* '.

potāro ' wiping (of the floor etc.) with a wet rag '.

This *pot*$_1$ and some of its derivatives go back to Pk. *potta– pottaga–, pottī, pottiā* ' cloth ', ' piece of cloth ', ' garment '.

Now I suggest that the reflexive *pot* is the same as *pot* in the meaning of ' texture ', ' stuff ' used metaphorically[3]. *pot* ' texture (of a cloth)' contrasts with *bhāt* ' design of a cloth ' as for example in such a sentence: '*kəpḍā-nī bhāt sāri chɛ*, pəṇ *pot* həlk*uṃ* chɛ ' The design of the cloth is good, but its texture (or stuff) is inferior '. *pote* means ' by texture ', ' considered as stuff '. It is easy to see how this meaning can develop a secondary connotation of ' by nature '. Compare the metaphorical meaning of English ' stuff '. It should also be noted in this connection that in the expression *pot prakāśvuṃ* ' to reveal one 's true nature ', *pot* originally meant ' unvarnished basic stuff underlying quite a different exterior '.

Because the reflexive pronoun *āpṇuṃ* in Middle Gujarati started functioning as an inclusive first person plural pronoun, the gap created thereby was filled up with the metaphorically used *potai* (and other forms of *pota*), and later on in Modern Gujarati with *jāte* (instrumental of *jāt* ' self)', *khud* (a Persian loan) or *svayaṃ* (a Sanskrit loan), the last two being restricted to the educated or literary discourse.[4]

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3. Shastri denies any connection between *pot* ' texture ' and *pot* ' self '. On the ohter hand the authors of the *Joḍnī-kośa* ' believe in the reverse of the view put forth here : they take ' texture ' as a development of the original reflexive meaning. But the close semantic connection between Pk. *Pottā* ' cloth ' and Guj. *pot* ' texture ' is quite obvious. The semantic change, moreover, is usually from the concrete to the abstract, but the view that derives ' self ' from ' texture ' assumes the opposite. Compare also the semantic change involved in the development of the meaning ' self ' in the case of *paṁḍe*. See note 4.

4. In Gujaracti dialets *pəṁḍe, paṁḍ̃–nn* etc. are used instead of *pote, potā–nuṃ* etc. *paṁḍ* derives from Sk. *piṇḍa–* ' body '.

A NOTE ON THE PROBLEMS OF GUJARATI LEARNING OUTSIDE GUJARAT

YOGENDRA VYAS
School of Languages,
Gujarat University, Ahmedabad.

In January 1980 I visited nearly thirteen cities of Rajasthan, M. P. and Maharashtra states as a language expert appointed by WRLC (Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, Govt. of India) to evaluate Gujarati teaching carried out by the teachers trained by W.R.L.C.

I was told that more than three hundred fifty trained non-Gujarati teachers are busy in teaching Gujarati to non-Gujarati students all over India. Only those teachers are admitted to learn Gujarati whose first language is not Gujarati. In the beginning they are trained to teach Gujarati. After one year of stay at W.R.L.C. when they return to their respective schools they are expected to teach Gujarati to the students whose first language is not Gujarati. It is very interesting to note that wherever I visited, one third of the students who were learning Gujarati are from Gujarati migrants families. Because most of them have settled at repspective places since very long period and their first language is the language of the respective region. Because they want to earn their bread from the region, it is natural that they tend to merge with the majority or native people. But however still they have feelings that they are Gujarati and to retain their Gujarati culture they should learn Gujarati. I met a youngman who is a medical repretentative in Karad near Kolhapur. Since more than two hundred years, his family is settled there. His parents do not know Gujarati. His father is a small shop-keeper. His mother is a Maharashtrian lady. Still this youngman was ashamed of it that he doesn't know Gujarati. To learn Gujarati he wants to marry a girl from Gujarat who may be Gujarati or Maharastrian. He remarked, 'You see, after all Gujarati is my mother-tongue'. This feeling of acquiring 'mother tongue' or a language of one s forefathers is universal feeling. Out of this feeling so many migrants want to learn their so called mother-tongue as a second language.

The problems of learning Gujarati are different where there are Gujarati Schools and colleges outside Gujarat than that of non-Gujarati persons who want to learn Gujarati. Their motivations and goals are different so their problems are different. I want to focus on the problems of Gujarati children whose first language is not Gujarati and who have to learn Gujatati from non-Gujarati teachers. Particularly Gujarati Migrants' children are facing this peculiar problems.

In the first place these children are exposed to that variety of Gujarati which is written, i.e. so called literary or starndard language in the class-room. Their teachers also want them to learn this variety.

In the second place, their non–Gujarati teachers themselves use that variety of Gujarati which is purely influenced by their own first language.

In the third place, these children generally come in contacts with the language through their family members and relatives in Gujarat with the variety of Gujarati which is obviously some dialect. If their parents know Gujarati and if they converse in Gujarati at home, this variety, their parents use, is obviously some dialect.

When they have no cultural environment in the society, they have to struggle very hard to learn the language. Besides this their non–Gujarati teachers are not fully competent to teach standard Gujarati though they are well trained. Not only the pronunciations, but also the constructions like assigning gender, number or even tense, mood and voice ; their Gujarati is highly influenced by their first language. I may quote only one example. In one of the Government schools in M.P. all the students use 'maro Khamis meli che'– my shirt is dirty'. When I inquired, the teacher himself was using this sentence.

If there are well planned graded texts, centrally controlled practical evaluation tests and uniform clear syllabus the teaching of Gujarati may be well organized.

If teachers once trained to teach Gujarati language they should be kept frequently engaged in refresher classes arranged somewhere in Gujarati envinronment so that teachers can polish their knowledge of Gujarati.

If the teachers training centre is outside Gujarat, it is highly essential that it should be connected or linked with some linguistic department in Gujarat for their researches and for practical training to teachers.

DEVIANT ENGLISH

A Sample Study

P. K. THAKER
School of Languages
Gujarat University
Ahmedabad–9

I. Introduction

The writer of the present paper participated in a seminar on the teaching of English organized recently in a college in Gujarat. The use of English by the speakers at the seminar showed deviations from normal usage. The present paper is a modest attempt to study these deviations. Although the exercise necessarily required the writer to detach himself from the phenomenon studied, he, too, may, in all likelihood, be liable to the kinds of deviations recorded here.

II. Analytical Procedure

An example has been identified as 'deviation' by a reference to the *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English,* 11th impression, Indian rpt. (Delhi : OUP, 1981) (hereafter abbr. ALD). Other works referred to are listed in the Appendix. The different deviations are grouped according to the levels at which they occur : lexis, idiom and grammar.[1] Within each group the examples are listed alphabetically. In a few cases, an example contained more than one deviations. A separate treatment of each of them would have involved some repetition and taken more space. They have, therefore, been entered together, the first of the two or three deviations deermining the item's position in the alphabetical order. A few deviations had to be assigned to two levels, such as lexis and idiom or lexis and grammar. These have been listed separately.

1. It has not been possible to study phonological deviations, of which, understandably, a large number were seen to occur, because no tape-recorder was used on the occasion.

In each instance, the actual words of the speaker have been presented between single inverted commas. In some cases, a few words have been added to clarify, briefly and faithfully, the centext of the utterance. The element—a word, an idiom or a grammatical form—showing deviation has been italicized, and the "plausible reconstruction"[2] for it has been indicated within brackets alongside. The comments that follow each entry mainly describe the deviation. An attempt is also made to identify the likely sources of these deviations. Although a degree of speculation[3] cannot altogether be ruled out in such an attempt, linguistic evidence also is adduced, wherever possible, in support of the statement regarding sources. In all the instances where the speaker's mother tongue has been mentioned as a likely source, the language in question happens to be Gujarati.

III. Description and Explanation

A. Lexis

1. 'We *acquire* (learn) a word, but we are not aware of its *semantics* (meanings)'.

'Acquire' means 'gain by skill or ability, by one's own efforts or behaviour'. The word is commonly collocated with 'vocabulary' rather than the item 'word', perhaps because the learning of the vocabulary involves much greater effort than does that of a single word. A 'word' is 'learnt' rather than 'acquired', because the action involved is nearer 'knowing' than 'mastering'. Both 'acquire' and 'learn' are used with the word 'language',

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2. cf. Pit Corder : "When our data is written it may well be that we cannot consult the learner [in our case language user]. In that case we must attempt to infer the meaning intended by the learner from the surface structure of his text-sentence in conjunction with the information derived from its context......I shall call such interpretations *plausible interpretations* and the related reconstructions *plausible reconstructions.*" "Error Analysis" (ch.5), *Techniques in Applied Linguistics,* The Edinburgh Course in Applied Linguistics, Vol. 3, eds. J. P. B. Allen and S. Pit Corder (London : OUP, 1974), p. 128.

3. cf. ibid. p. 130 : "In the absence of a generally accepted theory of how people learn second languages (or first languages), explanation is still largely speculative".

with different theoretical implications of either usage. The deviation may thus be explained as the use of a lexical item in wrong collocation in place of another with which it shares collocational range elsewhere. However, the speaker perhaps used the uncommon word 'acquire' instead of the commoner 'learn' simply out of a preference for unusual, high-sounding words, as is borne out by the utterance as a whole, which, if simplified, should read : 'We learn a word, but do not know all its meanings'.

'Semantics' is defined as the 'branch of linguistics concerned with studying the meanings of words and sentences' (ALD). The noun is used with a singular verb. The speaker has used it to imply '(a cluster of) meanings', perhaps on the analogy of the word 'statistics', which, with a singular verb, indicates a science, in the same way as does 'semantics', but which can also occur with a plural verb, when it means a 'collection of information shown in numbers' (ALD). However, as noted above, the deviation in this case also seems to have been the result of the speaker's preference for big words.

2. Several experiments have been made. 'The *balance* (net result) is that' the students are confused.

The different meanings of the word 'balance' recorded in the ALD cluster around the sense of weighing, comparing or equalizing two sides. Although the SOED uses the words 'net result' while recording one of the meanings of the word, from 1774, as 'prepondering weight, the net result', the example cited (viz., 'The balance of evidence appears in favour of the due execution.') shows how the word conveys the sense of weighing the evidence between two sides, in a balance as it were. The speaker, on the other hand, has used it to refer to the outcome at the end of a series of experiments in succession. The established meaning that comes nearest to the speaker's is in the colloquial use of the word to suggest 'the remainder of anything, what is left' (ALD), although Fowler frowns upon this use and calls it 'slipshod extension'.[4] The deviation is thus a result of insufficient awareness of the meaning of the word on the speaker's part.

4. H. W. Fowler, *Modern English Usage* rpt. (London : ELBS and OUP, 1968), p. 47.

3. 'The *dignitaries* (prominent persons) who have come' to take part in the seminar.........

The noun 'dignitary' refers to a 'person holding a hign office' (ALD). The SOED limits the meaning further by adding 'esp. ecclesiastical'. The speaker has not only extended the use of the word, but also used it wrongly in a context where there was no reference to the offices held by the persons indicated. The word appears to have been chosen to refer to the experts participating in the seminar under an erroneous impression, formed through etymological association, that it conveys the sense of a person having 'dignity' or 'true worth, the quality that earns or deserves respect' (ALD).

4. We have to keep in mind the needs of 'the *fresh recruits* (students) in the college classes'.

The ALD explains the word 'recruit' as signifying a 'new member of a society, group, etc. esp. a soldier in the early days of training'. All but one uses of the noun listed in the SOED, too, have military association. The speaker here, as in the two preceding examples (nos. 2 and 3) has extended the use of the word to imply 'a member of any group'. This is also the reason, why he uses the adjective 'fresh' for 'recruits', a collocation which, in a correct use of the latter item, would become redundant, as the sense of newness is already conveyed by the noun itself.

5. It was 'one of the most *glaring* (brilliant) academic successes'.

The adjective 'glaring', in its figurative sense, means 'angry or fierce', when used of 'eyes', 'crude or gaudy', when used of 'colours' and 'gross or conspicuous', when used to describe actions or conditions. In all the three senses, the word has *pejorative* implications, derivaing from the meanings of 'glare' (n.) ('strong, fierce, *unpleasant* light') and 'glare' (v.) ('shine in a dazzling or disagreeable way') (ALD). The use of the adjective to describe 'academic successes' may be attributed to its literal equivalent 'dazzling', which, though used of light that is blinding, has also its association of 'brilliance' and splendour' (ALD), especially when used in a phrase like 'dazzling diamonds'.

6. 'There are *high–brow* (bright) students, *middle–brow* (average) students and......... '

The error in this example is twofold. The compound 'middle–brow' appears to be an idiolectal coinage on the analogy of the corresponding expressions 'high–brow' and 'low–brow'. The adjective, even when accepted, is, along with the compound 'high–brow', wrongly used to describe the students when the speaker merely wanted to categorize them into there classes : 'bright', 'average' and 'weak'. There was no reference to the students' intellectual or aesthetic tastes, interests or attainments. The deviations, thus, are the result of a hazy understanding of the meanings of the lexial items.

7. Dictation '*leaves* (makes) you passive, *mechanical* (dull), *disengaged* (uninterested)'.

This is a singular case of three deviations in one utterance. One of the meanings of the verb 'leave' is 'allow or cause to remain in a certain place or condition' (ALD). The use of the verb in the given context would suggest the effect of dictation *after* that activity is over, whereas the speaker was referring to what happens to the pupils *when* the teacher dictates a passage or note.

The adjective 'mechanical', when used 'of persons, their actions', means 'like machines, automatic, as if done without thought' (ALD). In this sense, the word is most commonly employed to describe the *actions* and not the condition of a person. The speaker, on the other hand, was referring to the condition of pupils as a consequence of the dictation exercise. Perhaps, the adjective is transferred from its correct use to describe the teacher's dictation or the pupils' writing it down, both of which could be done 'mechanically', 'as if without thought'.

'Disengaged' has the limited sense of 'free from engagements' (ALD), where the latter word 'engagement' stands for 'arrangement to go somewhere, meet someone or do something, at a fixed time' (ALD). The speaker had in mind the absence or lack of interest or active involvement on the part of the students when they are *engaged* in writing at their teacher's dictation.

In all the three cases, the speaker appears to have used the wrong words owing to a vague awareness of their meanings. The example

illustrates how even a person with a long experience of using the English language might, through inattention, use high–sounding words which, however, fail to convey any clear and coherent set of ideas.

8. English is 'the language in which our trade and commerce are *organized* (carried on)'.

The collocation of 'language' and 'organized' is unusual in the given context. The verb 'organize' means 'put into working order, arrange in a system, make preparations for (ALD). The SOED identities the meaning thus : 'To form into a whole with interdependent parts; to give a definite and orderly structure to; to systematize; to arrange or "get up" something involving united action'. In either case, 'organize' describes the activities pertaining to the preparatory stage of rome undertaking. The speaker used the verb to imply the conduct of everyday business in trade and commerce. The verb 'organize' appears to have been chosen through association with its derivational counterpart 'organization', which frequently collocates with 'trade and commerce'. The source of the deviation may also lie in the idea, in the speaker's mind, that it is only through communication in English that a network of trade or commerce is 'organized' in the country.

9. The distinguished '*personalities* (persons) who have come' to take part in the seminar.........

'Personality', as a countable noun, in its modern use, implies a 'person, esp. one who is well–known in certain circles (though perhaps quite unknown in other circles)' (ALD). The word is commonly found in journalistic writing. As in the case of items recorded at III. A. 2, 3 and 4 above, the speaker is unaware of the restricted sense in which the word is generally used,[5] and confuses it with 'person', because of the etymological links. He may also have preferred 'personality' to 'person', becasue the word has a more impressive sound. Perhaps, he used 'personalities' instead of 'persons' because he wants to flatter those who were contributing to

5. cf. Fowler, *Modern English Usage*, op. cit. p. 447 : "A *personality* (long established in the sense of a 'man of parts') is now popular applied, generally with an attributive noun, (*film, p., television p.*) to a person who has won his fame by his talents in the world of entertainments."

the seminar and finds the word 'person' to be too colourless, simple and neutral for the purpose. (esp. cf. 'dignitaries' at III. A. 3 above). The deviation also shows the speaker's insufficient mastery of different registers, as the word 'personality' even in its restricted sense is generally found in popular or journalistic writing.

10. There is such 'an *un*(in)decent haste.........

The speaker seems to have chosen the wrong prefix to form the opposite through false analogy with words, much larger in number, which have a comparable initial / di / sound and which are changed into their opposites by the prefix 'un–', such as 'undecided', 'undeserved' and 'undeveloped'.

B. *Idiomatic Expressions*

1. '*Come over* (Come) to the dais.'

The phrasal verb 'come over' is correctly used to refer to movement 'from a distance', such as from one country to another. It also means 'change sides or opinions' (ALD). In a very limited sense, the dais and the auditorium may be thought of as representing two sides. The speaker, however, had no such implication in mind when he was inviting someone to take his seat on the platform. Perhaps he thought of the dais as a higher level and felt it necessary to use the particle 'over' with the verb 'come', although it seems more likely that the use of the particle is an example of the habit of the Indian speaker often to insert superfluous particles like 'up' and out' after several verbs,[6] perhaps out of a feeling that the verbs by themselves are not expressive or powerful enough.

6. cf. Nihalani, Tongue and Hosali, *Indian and British English* (Delhi, OUP, 1979), p. 134. Commenting on the use of 'out', the authors observe: "This adverbial particle is frequently inserted by IVE (i. e., Indian Variant of English) speakers where it would be considered superfluous in BS (i.e., British Standard English)......... " No comments are, however, entered in the book on a siminar use of the particle 'over' by Indians.

2. You tend to forget this 'in the *heat and dust* (excitement and rush) of your classroom'.

The phrase 'heat and dust' appears to be an Indian coinage. 'Heat' is used in English, figuratively, to imply 'intense feeling' (ALD) in phrases such as 'in the heat of the debate'. Similarly, the word 'dust' is used to imply 'commotion', as in the expressions 'What a dust! or 'raise a dust'. However, the collocation of those nouns to convey the sense of 'rush and excitement' is not noted in the ALD or any of the other books on English idioms and usage, such as McMordie's, Fowler's, Partridge's or Swan's. The idiom seems to have originated in the title of the well-known Indo-English novel by Ruth Prawer Jhabvala : *Heat and Dust*,[7] brought out in 1975 and awarded the coveted Booker Prize.[7]

3. We *fall* (get) into a *kind of* rut'.

The word 'rut' meaning, figuratively, a 'way of doing something, behaving, living, etc. that has become established' (ALD) collocates with the verbs 'be (in)' or 'get (into)'. The deviant choice of the verb 'fall' to collocate in this idiom with 'rut' is perhaps due to comparable constructions with 'fall into' implying 'become, pass into' (ALD) in expressions like 'Don't fall into bad habits! 'or' They have fallen into poverty'. It is also unusual to premodify the word 'rut' in this idimoatic construction by phrase like 'a kind of', as the speaker has done in the example. Perhaps the inserted phrase reflects a certain conceptual looseness or vagueness on his part.

4. The evils of our examinations like '*mass copying* (large-scale use of unfair means), impersonation and *all that* (So on)'.........

The word copying 'in the compound 'mass copying' is used to describe the resort to forbidden means by candidates taking examinations

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7. The writer came across the following recent use of this idiom, with some difference, in an article by Inder Malhotra in *The Times of India* dated 13-10-83 : "There are good reasons for the heat and dust now being raised over the issue of the Governor's role......" Interestingly, Mr. Malhotra has kept the idiom syntactically closer to its pattern in English through the use of the verb, 'raise' which, as noted above, collocates with 'dust' in English, though semantically his use of the idiom implying 'commotion' is nearer to the sense of the deviation noted in the example studied here.

in schools and colleges in India. This is perhaps the one clear example in the corpus of a coinage peculiar to the Indian variety of English. It has originated from the nefarious practice of students to carry slips of paper into the examination hall and then stealthily 'copy' answers from them, or from scribblings on arms or benches, into the answerbooks. Given the coinage 'copying', the formation of the compound 'mass copying' is easily explained on the analogy of expressions like 'mass production', 'mass consumption' and 'mass killings'.

The SOED records an isolated use of the phrase 'and all that', implying 'and all the rest of it', where the word 'rest' conveys the sense of 'the remainder of something specified or implied in the context' (SOED), But neither the ALD nor the other works on English idioms mentioned in B.1 above records this use of 'all that', probably suggesting that the usage is not current. The examples in the ALD relate only to the use of 'all that' in negative constructions with adjectives and adverbs, in phrases such as 'not so rich as all that', where 'all that' implies 'to that extent' or 'in that degree', or in 'not all that cheap', which, according to the ALD, is a colloquial or vulgar expression meaning 'not cheap if all things are considered'.

Perhaps the phrase 'and all that' is one of the current 'Indian Variants of English',[8] as indicated by the well-known Indo-English poet Nissim Ezekiel's very recent use of it in his fortnightly column 'Art Talk' in *The Times of India* of 23-10-1983 : "There is genius and creative resourcefulness and all that but there is also a total betrayal of integrity, a surrender to consumerism in the arts." However, it is worth noting that Ezekiel is writing in an easy, colloquial style, and his use of the phrase has a subdued but unmistakable ring of irony. It is the speaker's use of the phrase on a serious occasion and in a tone of earnestness that makes it deviant. The use of the phrase 'and all that' following two examples (of 'evils of examinations') might support the assumption that the speaker had in mind the sense of 'so on', which the ALD identifies as 'other things of the same kind' rather than that of 'all the rest of it'. The deviation may be plausibly explained as an instance of literal translation of a phrase used in identical contexts in the speaker's mother tongue.

5. These courses 'are offered' *in option of* (as an option to) literature' courses.

The phrase 'in option of' provides one more example of direct translation from the speaker's mother tongue.

8. cf. Nihalani, Tongue, Hosali, *Indian and British English*, op. cit., p. 3.

6. If we '*search* our *souls* (hearts), we shall find that '.........

It is unusual to find the noun 'soul' collocated with the verb 'search'. The proper idiom is 'to search one's heart or conscience', implying to 'examine carefully one's own beliefs and conduct' (ALD). The use of the word 'soul' in place of 'heart' or 'conscience' perhaps shows a remote influence of the speaker's mother tongue, in which the equivalent for 'soul' is /a:tma:/, but the one-word equivalent of the expression 'search one's heart' is/a:tməpəri:k *ʃɛn*, where the element/a:tmə-stands for 'heart' or 'self'. This homonymy in Gujarati could possibly have resulted in the confusion between the words 'heart' and 'soul' in English.

7. All this 'insistence on drills has *slowed down* (grown weak)' now.

The phrasal verb 'slow down' means '(cause to) go at a slower speed' (ALD). Its use in collocation with the noun 'insistence', which suggests force, urgency or emphasis, is deviant, and could be the result of the speaker's vague awareness of the precise meaning of the latter word.

C. *Grammar*

1. ....' six *millions* (million) people......... '

The deviation displays the speaker's ignorance of the rule which states that 'the numeral nouns *hundred, thousand,* and usually *million* have zero plurals except when unpremodified ' (UGE). This rule forms an exception to the more general rule which requires a noun preceded by a cardinal numeral to be in the plural form. It is relevant to note that had the speaker's use of the English language been influenced by the patters of his mother tongue, he would have used the correct form because in Gujarati, too, the numeral nouns, when used in comparable structures, follow the same rule of 'zero plural'.[9]

9. cf. D. A. Wilkins, *Linguistics in Language Teaching* (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press, 1972), pp. 200-201. Wilkins cites an article by L. Duskov'a : 'On Sources of errors in foreign language learning', (*International Review of Applied Lingustics,* 7 / 1, 1969) and adds : " As Duskova says, her students produce the incorrect form *this workers* because it is a general rule in English that the adjective is not marked for plural. In the learning of a grammatical system, wrong generalizations of this sort seem inevitable.........it is not always true that differences between native and target language lead to error through transfer. Nor is it true that the native language is the sole source of error ".

2. (*a*) We find students 'stumbling *on* (over) the words they do not know'.

(*b*) When we look further, 'we stumble *on* (upon / across) what Chomsky calls the deep structure'.

The ALD explains the meaning of 'stumble' as 'strike the foot against something and almost fall'. The speaker might have used the word in this sense, metaphorically, to refer to the difficulty experienced by the students in using words. Or he may have had in mind the following meaning of the word recorded in the SOED : 'proceed, speak or act in a blundering or hesitating manner'. In either case, the verb is always followed by the preposition 'over'. The choice of the wrong preposition by the speaker could be explained as the result of the fact that the corresponding expression in his mother tongue has the equivalent of 'on' as the prepositional element. However, it seems more likely that the deviation has resulted through insufficient care on the speaker's part rather than through any interference from his mother tongue, because as shown in the example (*b*) above, the same speaker is found to be using 'stumble on', instead of the correct 'stumble upon / across', to imply finding, something 'unexpectedly or by accident' (ALD). In this case, too, the use of the wrong preposition shows the speaker's carelessness rather than any false analogizing on his part with verbs like 'play' or 'depend' after which the prepositions 'on' and 'upon' alternate freely without a change of meaning.

The collocation of the verb 'stumble upon', with its association of physical action, and a phrase like 'the deep structure', representing an abstract concept, strikes one as highly unusual and deviant. In fact, both the utterances, on the whole, give the impression that the speaker is hardly clear or careful in his use of words, and he confounds this vagueness further by a fondness for high-sounding phrases like 'stumble on' and 'deep structure'.

3. We should 'be *very* careful *enough*'.

Two different types of modifying adverbs have been used simultaneously in this example : an 'intensifier' (very) and a 'quantifier' (enough),

the former being, by rule, a premodifier and the latter a post-modifier.[10] Thus the two adverbs are opposed semantically as well as syntactically, though both of them, in different ways, indicate the degree of emphasis to be given to the adjective they modify. The speaker appears to have used them together perhaps out of a feeling that more words make for greater effect and that one adverb was not strong enough to convey the emphasis he wanted to place on the statement.

D. *Lexis and Grammar*

There is 'a breakdown *in* (of) communication'.

The compound 'breakdown' implies a 'failure in machinery, etc.' or a collapse or weakening' as in 'a nervous breakdown' (ALD). The figurative use of the word to suggest a failure of oral or visual—but not mechanical—mode of communication is not commonly found in English.[11] The linking of the nouns by the preposition 'in', instead of the correct 'of', shows the influence of the speaker's mother tongue.

E. *Lexis and Idiom*

This is the 'only way in which you can *win over* (overcome) your sense of frustration'.

The deviation appears to be twofold. First, there is the choice of a wrong lexical item from a semantically related set conveying the sense of 'victory', comprising items such as 'win', 'triumph', 'conquer', 'overcome' and 'defeat'. However, a person wins a battle, whereas he defeats or overcomes an enemy. The verb 'win' also implies 'getting' by means of hard work, perseverence, struggle, as the result of competition, gambling, etc.' (ALD). The outcome of the struggle, etc. remains with the winner, while the 'sense of frustration' in the example quoted has to be got rid of.

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10. cf. Quirk and Greenbaum, *University Grammar*, 2nd imp. (Harlow, Essex : ELBS and Longman, 1981). p. 127.

11. cf. McMordie, *English Idioms*, 3rd ed. (1909, rpt. London : OUP, 1955), p. 149 : "*Break-down* is to come to a stop through something breaking...The phrase verb would also be used of a series of interdependent *mechanical* arrangements, as of a postal service," (emphasis the present writer's).

Having chosen the wrong item, the speaker has gone on to use a wrong particle with it and thus change the meaning of the verb 'win', 'win over' implying to 'persuade somebody by argument, agin the fsvour of' (ALD). The speaker may have been led to use 'over' after 'win', to indicate victory, because of the parallel phrase 'triumph over', or he may have thought that he was intensifying the meaning of the verb by adding the particle. In that case, the present example would be similar to the one noted at III.B.1. above, containing the use of the superfluous particle 'over' after 'come'.

IV. **Conclusions**

Table 1 below gives the numerical breakdown of the deviations in the use of English studied in this paper into different levels of analysis.

Table 1

Level	*Total No.*
Lexis	15
Idiom	09
Grammar	05
Lexis & grammar	01
Lexis & idiom	01
Total	31

Predictably, the largest number of deviations occur at the level of lexis. In fact, if idiomatic expressions are treated as linguistically equivalent to lexical items,[12] and if prepositions are excluded from the range of closed grammatical systems,[13] there remain only 3 deviations occuring at the level of grammar. All the others can be subsumed under 'lexis'. This is but to be expected in view of the fact that most of the speakers at the seminar

12. cf. J. McH. Sinclair, "Beginning the study of Lexis" in *In Memory of J. R. Firth*, eds. C. E. Bazell et el. (London : Longmans, 1966), pp. 420–21. Sinclair identifies idioms as 'polymorphemic lexical items' and gives a brief analysis of their forms and functions.

13. cf. Michael Swan, *Practical English Usage*, 3rd imp. (London : OUP, 1981), p. 483 : "It is difficult to learn to use prepositions correctly...... There are not many rules to help you choose correctly in these cases, so you have to learn each expression separately".

were teachers of English with considerable experience of using the language. They, therefore, reveal a fairly good command of the rules of English grammar. It is at the level of lexis that they tend to deviate noticeably from the accepted 'code' of English, and choose items that are improper in terms of either their meanings or their collocation with other items.

It is sometimes suggested that deviations in the use of the English language could lead to the growth of a distinct Indian variety of English. This could perhaps be the case if the deviations are the result of a creative use of the English language through compelling needs to communicate values, concepts and experiences peculiar to the indigenous culture. However, as shown in Table 2 below

Table 2

Breakdown of deviations in terms of their sources

Probable source	*No. of deviations*
1. Hazy realization of lexical meanings	14
2. Preference for high-sounding words	05
3. " Indian variants "	04
4. Mother tongue interference	04
5. Use of redundant items	03
6. False analogizing	03
Total......	33*

(* The difference of 2 between this total and the total in Table 1 is due to the fact that 2 items are treated as 1 each in the last two entries in that table).

there are only four deviations that can be treated as instances of what Nihalani et el. call 'Indian Variants of English', and only four others could be attributed with a degree of plausibility to the speaker's mother tangue. Almost all the other deviations proceed from a hazy realization of lexical meanings, use of redundant items or preference for high-sounding words. They seem to be the outcome of the speaker's inattention or carelessness or, at worst, pomposity. Deviations produced thus are not likely to possess that life and vitality which can contribute towards the creation of a native variety of English.

In fact, many of the deviations studied in this paper could perhaps be simply termed 'errors' in the sense in which S. Pit. Corder uses the word.[14] Braj B. Kachru, too, makes the following distinction between a 'mistake' or an 'error' and a 'deviation': "A 'mistake' is any deviation which is rejected by a native speaker as out of the linguistic 'code' of that particular language and which may not be justified on formal or contextual grounds. A 'deviation' may invlove differences from the norm, but may be necessary in the cultural context in which a language functions."[15] The speakers at the seminar, in all the cases recorded except perhaps one, were not required to deviate from the 'code' of the English language by the communicational needs of specific cultural contexts as identified by Kachru in his paper. Their deviations may, therefore, be categorized as 'errors'.[16]

It may be argued that the persons who committed these 'errors' would have guarded against them and avoided them if they had known that their use of English was being observed. However, even if this is granted, that would only serve to underscore the significance of the present study. The seminar was an occasion of some academic importance. The participants included lecturers in English in colleges, besides a few ELT experts from institutions of high repute. If deviations of the types recorded in this paper could occur on such a formal occasion, it may be safely concluded that they occur more frequently in the use of the English language by the same speakers on less formal occasions. And the present study may

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14. cf. S. Pit Corder : "Whilst learners of a language are certainly liable to lapses and mistakes of the sort I have described, the great majority of their errors are of a different kind. They result in unacceptable utterances and appear as breaches of the code (what I have called errors in the case of a native speaker). They are not physical failures but the sign of an imperfect knowledge of the code". *Introducing Applied Linguistics* (Harmondsworth : Penguin Education, 1973), p. 259.

15. Braj B. Kachru, "Indian English : A study in Contextualization" in *In Memory of J. R. Firth,* op. cit., p. 284, note 13.

16. It is, perhaps, relevant to note here that none of the examples recorded in this paper finds a place in the Lexicon of Usage given by Nihalani and others in their *Indian and British English,* op. cit., wherein "a

thus be taken to indicate the directions and patterns of change to which the English language is subject in Gujarat, or by analogy, anywhere else in this country.[17]

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selection of about one thousand items of the English language which are used in a distinctive manner by large numbers of educated Indian speakers of English" is presented.

17. The writer is grateful to Professor R. A. Malagi, Head of the Department of English, School of Languages, Gujarat University, for his perceptive comments and suggestions when this paper was under preparation.

APPENDIX

List of works, besides the ALD, consulted for the purpose of identifying deviations recorded in this paper

(i) *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,* 2nd ed. (1933, rpt. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press for Calcutta : The standard Literature Company Pvt. Ltd., 1970) (abbr. SOED).

(ii) H. W. Fowler, *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage,* revised by Sir Ernest Gowers, 2nd ed. (1926 rpt. London : ELBS and OUP, 1968).

(iii) Eric Partridge, *Usage and Abusage,* rpt. (1947, London : Penguin Books, 1973).

(iv) Randolph Quirk and Sidney Greenbaum, *A University Grammar of English,* 2nd imp. (1973, Harlow, Essex : ELBS and Longman Group Ltd., 1981). (abbr. UGE).

(v) W. McMordie, *English Idioms and How to Use Them,* revised by R. C. Goffin, 3rd ed. (1909, rpt. London : OUP, 1955).

(vi) V. H. Collins, *A Book of English Idioms,* 3rd ed. (1958, rpt. ELBS and Longman Group Ltd., 1970).

(vii) Paroo Nihalani, R. K. Tangue and Priya Hosali, *Indian and British English : A Handbook of Usage and Pronunciation* (Delhi, OUP, 1979).

(viii) Michael Swan, *Practical English Usage,* 3rd imp. (London : OUP, 1981).

SHAKESPEARE'S CONCEPTION OF A COURTIER

D. C. Biswas*

'The courtier's, scholar's, soldier's, eye, tongue, sword'. This is how the agonized maiden Ophelia sums up the prince whose rudeness has left her in bewilderment. This also shows how noble was Shakespeare's notion of a courtier, for even a prince who may have a court of his own is, in the poet's eye, no more than a courtier so far as his accomplishments are concerned. We have also the evidence of Olivia rating Duke Orsino 'as free, learn'd and valiant'. And the Duke of Vienna in self-defence against the slanderous Lucio could present himself in no better light than as 'a scholar, a statesman and a soldier'. Portia's terse description of Bassanio as 'a scholar and a soldier' is repeated in the case of Benedick with the addition of 'shape' (comeliness) : 'shape, learning, argument and valour'. So courage and intellectual eminence (scholar and soldier) are the virtues generally stressed in an ideal gentleman. The prominence of courage and brains receives emphasis from the fact that despicable characters like Slender, Andrew Aguecheek, Thurio and others are nearly always both cowardly and silly.

Shakespeare's scholarly characters are not scholars in the common modern sense of the word. Although Hamlet is a student of the German University, Orsino mentioned as 'learned' and Bassanio as 'scholar' do not suggest to us studious and contemplative men; nor does Benedick either. So, by 'scholarly' Shakespeare possibly means well-informed and educated, whether formally or by experience of the world. Similarly one need not go to the war to be soldierly. Hamlet, for example, had not been to the wars, nor did he receive formal training in soldiership, but he is valiant and soldierly—worthy to be borne from the stage by four Captains. What Shakespeare possibly meant by the term 'soldierly' is courageous, strong, capable of effective physical action.

* 74/1, Ibrahimpur, Road,
Calcutta—700032.

No wonder that Shakespeare, mastermind of his age, was fashioning himself as a gentleman quite early in his career. True it is that his association with the nobility had been exaggerated in the nineteenth century. For example, Brandes attributed his melancholy to a number of causes, the chief among which was the fall of Shakespeare's heroes, the Earls of Essex and Southampton. This, we are told, stung the poet to such a frenzy that he fell from cheerfulness to gloom, turned to the writing of the dark comedies and the tragedies, and revenged himself on the queen by refusing to celebrate her death in verse ! Such adventures apart, it is nonetheless true that a few months after the publication of Greene's *Groat's Worth of Wit*, in which the frustrated, envious playwright had attacked Shakespeare, Chettle his publisher replied with a testimonial to Shakespeare's character, in which he praised him both as an actor and a writer, and spoke of the way diverse men of worship had resented Greene's attack. So it is evident that by 1592 Shakespeare had won the favour of a section of the nobility. Needless to say that the grant of arms that in 1596 conferred the status of gentleman on John Shakespeare was obtained through his son, who had by then succeeded handsomely in the London theatrical world so as to arouse Greene's envy.

These, together with a few more biographical details which have come down to us; the themes he chose for his early plays, especially *Two Gentlemen of Verona* and *Love's Labour's Lost*; and his sonneteering practices in the line of Sidney, Spenser, Daniel etc. all point to his ambition. For example, Shakespeare is often referred to as 'gentle' which means he was decent in his behaviour. After his death, his fellow–actors Heminge and Condell, who collected his works, spoke of him as 'so worthy a friend and fellow'. Ben Jonson in his elegy refers to him as his beloved, and elsewhere wrote 'I loved the man and do honour his memory (on this side idolatry) as much as any. He was indeed honest and of an open, free nature'. Years after Fuller gave a description of the wit–combat between Jonson and Shakespeare, in which he spoke of the quickness of his wit and invention. This has been by and large the main occupation of Italian courtiers to which Castiglione devotes a substantial section of his book *Il Cortegiano*. We are reminded of Valentine's wit–combat with his rival Thurio, which is 'a fine volley of words quickly shot off', and Hamlet's almost unrivalled capacity of returning the words of his adversary 'back again, pricking him

with his own weapon', hoisting him with his 'own petard'. Although we are not sure whether the 'Mr. W. H.' to whom Shakespeare addressed his early sonnets was the Earl of Southampton or the Earl of Pembroke, or any other, there is little doubt about the superior status of his friend whom he urges in the sonnets to marry and to whom he finally resigns his own mistress.

There is only one play *Two Gentlemen of Verona* which has an identical motif : Valentine's somewhat quixotic offer of his ladylove Silvia to his unrepentant friend Proteus who has earlier attempted to seduce her. Critics argue that the incident shows but the callowness of an immature playwright who never reverted to the unpsychological, stylized motif that friendship should always be stronger than sexual love. True, Shakespeare did not turn to it again; but Chapman did, fourteen years after, in *Monsieur d' Olive* (1606); and Shakespeare after all had followed a stylized convention which he borrowed from Elyot's *The Governour*, viz., that magnanimity like friendship is the cardinal virtue of a courtier. Elyot cites many instances of noble, self-sacrificing rulers and courtiers. Castiglione also refers to Alexander's magnanimity to his friend Apelles on whom he bestowed his ladylove once he had realized that the painter's passion for the lady had enabled him to paint her so faultlessly.

Love's Labour's Lost, another stylized play, is more concerned with manners than with real emotion : linguistic and amorous sophistications bulk large in the play. The king and his lords impose an ascetic pattern of behaviour on themselves in the interest of learning and then infringe it one by one – sighing for love, inditing sonnets and putting on the mask to dance with the ladies. One is reminded of the ladies' court in Castiglione where the courtiers were made to entertain. The moral of the play, if it has any, is focused on the French ladies' parting injunction to the lords to turn to life, driving the plough, visiting the sick etc. from which they have cut themselves off. So it is the superficies of love and learning that come in for a gentle ragging in the play.

One wonders if the theme had not been suggested to Shakespeare by the somewhat excessive importance given by Bacon and Elyot to the education of the prince and the governor ! Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning* wishes the prince to be 'a fountain of learning', whose ideal

examples are Julius Caesar and Alexander—one in eloquence rivalled Cicero, and the other had Homer by his bedside besides having Aristotle for his tutor ! Just as empiric physicians are a source of danger to the people's health, so are empiric statesmen dangerous to the state being merely men of experience. So Elyot requires the governor to have a thorough grounding in the classics apart from practising music, painting or sculpture, and a host of physical exercises too numerous to be mentioned. The insistence on virtue in Elyot's book might have suggested the ascetic ideal caricatured in *Love's Labour's Lost.*

Sonneteering also was a conventional poetic exercise of the elite. Sidney, Spenser, Daniel and others following the pattern set by Petrarch were in fact pipers of Petrarch's woes. Although the Italian sonnet was introduced in England as far back as the middle of the sixteenth century, the full tide of the sonnet-sequence began with Sidney's *Astrophel and Stella,* which was published in 1591. Sidney's Stella has been conclusively known to be Penelope Devereux[1], who was neither cold nor chaste as the poet described her to be in Sonnet VIII. Penelope might not have been unresponsive to Sir Philip for whom her deceased father had intended her. But as the marriage fell through she became the wife of Lord Rich, to whom she bore four children and had simultaneously her liaison with Charles Blount to whom she bore a son in 1589 and a daughter to Lord Rich the year after. Sidney was of course not alive to see all this; but Shakespeare could not have been unaware of it. Curiously enough, as Bradbrook[2] tells us, some of the sonnets which are a series of laments for Sidney under the name of Astrophel could be dedicated to his widow—though not indeed before she had become the wife of Stella's brother, the Earl of Essex.

In fact the idealization of the ladylove as a symbol of unblemished chastity and surpassing beauty was a fashion introduced by Sidney and Spenser. And although there are sparks of realism in their sonnets as in fact there are in Shakespeare, the convention itself did run its course in Shakespeare also. A poet is not on oath, as T. S. Elitot says; all poetry is dramatic and Shakespeare would cheerfully distort a biographical fact for the sake of writing a better poem. How much of the passion was genuine, how much mere convention will never be known. It is generally argued that Shakespeare's sonnet which begins 'My mistress' eyes are nothing like

the sun' was intended to ridicule the exaggerated praise of their mistresses by other Elizabethan sonneteers. Yet after declaiming the conventional poetic praise he wrote a sonnet to his mistress (Sonnet 132), which is a shameless imitation of Sidney's praise of the black eyes of Stella (*Astrophel and Stella,* VII). Shakespeare, it seems, was so thoroughly aware of the courtly manners as to be able to laugh at them and also to admire them.

II

The Renaissance ideal of culture was transmitted to England through Italian channels. Italy was remarkable not only as the most ancient seat of civilization but also for its finished treatises on courtesy, one of which *Il Cortegiano* by B. Castiglione[3] was translated into English by Thomas Hoby in 1561. Although Sir Thomas Elyot's *The Governour* (1531) was published earlier, it was but an anglicized version of gentility based on Italian sources. There is however a difference : Castiglione's courtier is an 'instructor of the prince' and no administrator or governor himself. For example, Plato and Aristotle have been cited as ideal courtiers by Castiglione, but by no stretch of imagination can these great philosophers be called administrators.

Dedicated to King Henry VIII, *The Governour*[4] (1531) treats with the education of future administrators of the realm who 'may be deemed worthy to be governors of the public weal under your Highness'. Published in 1531 i.e. the interragnum between the fall of Wolsey (1530) and the rise of Thomas Cromwell (1532) the book might not have been a mere coincidence. Contemporary history of England shows that the counsellors of the King became *de facto* rulers of the realm. The reverse was the case in Italy : the city states were not feudal in character, and were not guided by customs and conventions. The state was actually a work of art, as Burckhardt tells us : it was the handiwork of the individual acting as the Prince, the Medici or the Dictator. If the ruler required any help it was to beautify the city or to project its magnificence. Leonardo de Vinci was invited by Lodovico Sforza, the usurper of Milan to design buildings and canals and also the statue of his father on horseback.

Il Cortegiano describes the court at Urbino which was pleasantly situated on the hill. There assembled the famous men of Italy who spent

their nights in pleasant conversation. The assembly was presided over by the Duchess and Lady Emilia Pia because the young prince being an invalid had to retire early. So, it was for all practical purposes a ladies' court, which fulfilled the ideal requirements — women being the inspiration and mainstay of courtliness.

What are the virtues of a courtier ? They are indeed too many to be enumerated. The companions of Demosthenes in an embassy to Philip of Macedon praised the prince as handsome, eloquent and a good drinker. Demosthenes remarked that those were praises appropriate to a woman, a lawyer and a sponge. And Philip having heard that Alexander had excelled all in music at a particular feast rebuked him saying 'Aren't you ashamed to sing so well ?' In the case of the courtier however the position is just the reverse : he must possess an amorphous mass of virtues and the least among them might be more important than the best.

Calisthenes' high moral philosophy could not save him from Alexander's fury because he lacked sweetness of tongue, and could not 'mingle bare truth with courtliness'. On the other hand Aristotle would so adapt himself to the mood of the great emperor that he could persuade him to learn natural science and moral philosophy besides aiming at world conquest. Such 'divine wits' as Aristotle and Plato, says Octavian in *The Courtier*, might not have been unskilful in anything that belonged to courtliness. Not only music and other fine arts, even love-making understood in its Platonic sense of a certain craving for beauty which takes one out of himself may be said to have been practised by these great souls, says Benbo. How exalted was the Italian notion of courtiership !

In summing up the virtues of a courtier as Castiglione has them we have to mention high birth, comprehensive culture including interest in poetry, painting, sculpture etc., physical beauty, skill in wielding weapons, sense of honour, wit, elocution and above all the charm of personality along with the capacity for noble love. The most distinguishing mark is, however, grace, which has been defined as something arising out of the air of carelessness or nonchalance with which an accomplished courtier performs all his actions. In fact art to be real art must be effortless in order to rouse admiration in people : in Castiglione's words 'to eschew...affectation or

curiosity and to use in everything a certain recklessness to cover art withall'. Moreover 'love' for the Italian is an essential part of a courtier's life. It might lead to marriage or it might serve as religion, or worship of perfection outside of himself. Remarkable is Sir Walter Raleigh's comment that the courtier runs the risk of growing too preoccupied with his own improvement ever to accomplish anything.

It is the idea of personal perfection, as Kelso[5] also observes, far more than the idea of 'civil usefulness' that dominated the Italians. The English ideal implicit in the title 'The Governour' is on the other hand based on utilitarian consideration. The earnestness with which Elyot sets about his task of spreading the light of learning among gentlemen of England shows the English temper bent on practical ends. Roger Ascham speaks in the same vein when he remarks : 'only good men by their government and example make happy time in every degree and state'. To the same lofty ideal of virtue and serviceableness do Sidney and Spenser subscribe. *The Faerie Queene* is a reflection of Spenser's ideal conception of conduct, the means through which he was fashioning a gentleman in virtuous discipline.

Nothing better shows Shakespeare's distaste for the English ideal than his reactions to Prince Hal's turning into a victorious hero, an ideal king. The 'madcap' prince delights us when playing the truant from the court he romps about with his merry companions, and winning the battle at Shrewsbury with an easy grace leaves the credit of killing Hotspur to the false Knight to gloat over. But as soon as he becomes conscious of his grave responsibility which leads him to break the heart of his old crony he leaves his creator so cold that none of his victories in France or England could warm him up again.

Now to return to the English conception again : surprisingly, no one in England who sets forth the complete gentleman includes the art of loving among his accomplishments. Lyly's *Euphues* which is a manual on sophisticated behaviour is no courtesy book as such : mark its didacticism at the expense of women, their deceptiveness and treachery. This is a deviation from the medieval chivalric code according to which courtesy meant man's relation with women and specially from the Platonic ideal in which love is the expression of the yearning of the soul after beauty. So the notion

of beauty being a snare for the soul, which is so consistently repeated in *Euphues,* is an outright violation of the courtier's ideal. Only in Spenser is there an interaction of the Platonic conception of love as voiced in his early hymns to Love and Beauty and also his own experience of life. While the physical basis of love was being recognized it was simultaneously regarded as a step towards ideal love.

> Those who flee Venus too much, sin no less
>
> Than those who pursue her to excess.
>
> —Plutarch

It may be worthwhile to have a look at Sir Philip Sidney who is the noblest specimen of a courtier that we have among Englishmen living in his time. Yet, he is perhaps the nearest approach to the Italian ideal. Although Sidney had his eyes set on exploring America and winning laurels in war he could achieve nothing that way. It was as a scholar and a man of the finest sensibilities that he made his mark among his contemporaries.

As a lover of poetry he had his military experience behind him to assert that poetry is neither enervating nor too soft for a soldier to emulate as his ideal : 'I dare undertake *Orlando Furioso* or honest *King Arthur* will never displease a soldier'.[6] His love for Penelope inspired him to compose *Astrophel and Stella;* and his worship of Stella as a symbol of perfection was partly real and partly Platonic as the title, *Astrophel* (the star-lover) *and Stella* (the star) also suggests.

A dazzling example of the aristocratic ideal : poet, statesman, knight, he was 'a light and leading star to his country' as his friend Grevil[7] has depicted him. Leicester's nephew, Pembroke's brother-in-law he had advantages in life which few men of his time could claim. Ambitious of learning he would read Aristotle in the original Greek, 'though French would do for Plutarch' (C. S. Lewis). If personal perfection rather than social service be the hallmark of gentility he attained it. He held no administrative post being neither secretary nor provincial governor; and his chief interest being the policy of the government he travelled in foreign countries on relatively unimportant embassies; and so he had the best training in the world for serving his sovereign. Still very young (only 17) he astonished the foreign courts with his wisdom and learning. The Universities at home and abroad

honoured him, dedicated their books to him, and communicated every invention or improvement of knowledge with him.

'Magnanimity', says Bacon, 'no doubt consisteth in contempt of peril, in contempt of profit, and in meriting the times wherein one liveth'. A highminded man would seek dangerous enterprises, confer benefits liberally and also make light of his achievements. But the notion of courage had undergone a change in the Renaissance England. Courage found its most worthy outlet not so much in warlike exploits as in braving the dangers of the sea. So had Sidney secretly planned with Drake to embark on an American expedition. The arch-enemy Spain must be humbled; her source of strength—the riches she obtained from America—must be cut off. All preparations had been completed, and they were only to set sail. But the envious Drake stood in the way at the last moment; fearing that Sidney would easily outshine him, he divulged the secret plan to the court. Messenger after messenger sent from the court rode breathless to stop Sindney, and the queen had to adopt extreme measures to restrain the visionary hero from his perilous adventure; even as she had intervened once before to prevent the sensitive Knight from fighting a duel with the Earl of Oxford who had called him a 'puppy' on the tennis court.

So the 'glorious enterprise' came to nothing; and the soaring soul was pegged down by the queen in his new employment as Captain under the command of Leicester and sent away to the Low Countries. Sidney however took it easy, and never spoke a word about Drake's treachery to the soldiers. On the other hand, he assured them that his new employment was in effect directed against the same arch-enemy. As a Captain fighting under the command of the Earl he showed the same spirit of nonchalance. At the fateful battle of Zutphen he took off the cruises from his knees because the Marshal of the camp was lightly armed, and there at the unprotected knee he received his fatal wound which eventually led to his end. Wounded and gasping as he returned from the field he offered his bottle of water to the dying soldier. A few days before his death when his powers were fast declining he ordered that his unpublished writing should be consigned to the flames 'being but a shadow of vanity'.

III

Sidney wins our heart by a quality which is the reverse of what we commonly come across in Shakespeare's courtiers : even the best among them are not without their affectations. And there are affectations of all kinds : linguistic, amorous, moralistic etc. Possibly these had their roots in the conventions of high society which were stilted and artificial to an extraordinary degree. Shakespeare makes sportive mockery of the debasement of courtliness and projects his highly romantic ideal in the prince of Denmark who is a culmination of what an ideal courtier should be.

Possibly the worst vice in a courtier as Castiglione tells us, is ostentatiousness, be it of fine speech or manners or whatever else betokens sophistication or high culture. For example, there is all the difference in the world between Osric's efforts at fine speech and Hamlet's eloquence which comes so naturally. Apart from Shakespeare's romantic perfection viz,, the prince who is also the prince of courtesy, there are three characters in Shakespeare : Berowne, Mercutio and Benedick who combine politeness with high intellectual faculties, and about whom Coleridge[8] comments that they were ' natural enough with reference to the date when they were drawn'. These three intellectuals are realists all of them, critical of pretensions. If scoffing at traditional values be a mark of social snobbery they have it in the fullest measure. Berowne is an eloquent defender of the ' right Promethean fire '; but once at least he is caught in the toils of his ascetic colleagues and he joins their rank, for the fun of enjoying a supercilious laughter at their expense. He climbs a tree to take his position at some height from where he may watch their fooleries. But as he watches their transformation into sighing lovers delivering their pangs in sonnets, he recognizes his own sonnet written to Rosaline being misdelivered to the King, who reads it out to the hearty mirth of all.

Mercutio ridicules not the romantic passion as such, which is the theme of the play, but its shadow, the boyish fancy which occupies Romeo's unawakened heart so long as he acts the conventional lover of Rosaline. And once Romeo has felt the reality of the passion and given his heart to Juliet, Mercutio observes :

> Now art thou sociable; now art thou
> Romeo; now art thou what thou art
> by art as well as by nature.

The realist's function in the play is over; but the story has still its hold on him. The moment comes when he feels that a calm, dishonourable submission to Tybalt is more than flesh and blood can endure. So the man, who pretends no principle to himself, challenges Tybalt to a duel and goes to his death for a cause which is not his own : dying for the principle of a gentleman's honour, though he would not admit it to himself.

Benedick and also Beatrice show a further step in their distaste for the conventional amorous behaviour. These professed misogynists are no enemies of love as such. But wooing i.e. the time-worn formality of love is so great a horror to them that they would not admit the passion even to themselves for fear of being caught in its conventional toils. What actually brings them close to each other is the crisis in Hero's life, which makes Beatrice surrender to Benedick with "kill Claudio'. His response, which is almost simultaneous takes the form of a challenge to Claudio. But not being required at all because the villainy has been discovered in an adjacent quarter, the challenge remains a verbal formality till the last.

Facing each other at the altar they finally yield when Claudio suddenly discovers Benedick's hidden sonnet and Hero discovers its counterpart written by Beatrice. So unpretentiousness is itself a pretension, which is deflated with a laugh. Thus they are what they are, to quote Mercutio again, 'by art as well as by nature' : art itself is nature—you cannot dissociate the one from the other in Shakespeare's high intellectuals who are also fine gentlemen of the age.

Shakespeare's Hamlet, to my mind, is the finest gentleman in this sense, for the conventions of high life like sonneteering, noble diction, witticism etc. come so naturally to him that he is continually more than a match for others. Even his cynicism which arises from the shock that he sustained at his mother's overhasty and dishonourable marriage comes to his advantage showing him off as a young gentleman of the finest sensibilities who cannot adjust himself to the gross environment.

Look, for example, to linguistic sophistications which were carried to an excess at the court. How much of it was derived from the Italian court is not known. Castiglione mentions only a few instances of words

used in ambiguous meaning. He, however, advocates the use of old Tuscane words in writing on the ground that these learned words lend 'grace and authoritie unto wryting'. This was also the view of Spenser, though Sidney opposed it saying that the author of *The Shepheard's Calender* 'in affecting the ancients writ no language'. The factors largely responsible for the inkhorn sophistication were the abundant infusion of foreign words during the Renaissance and the free coinage of Latinisms. Shakespeare had not only the largest vocabulary at his command; he was also responsible for the earliest use of a large number of Latin words. Even so, he makes sportive mockery of the hollow pedantry of Holofernes and also of Oaric. The latter's description of the fine qualities of Laertes as a courtier—'the card or calender of gentry...the continent of part a gentleman would see'—is caricatured by the prince 'Sir, his definement suffers no perdition in you; though, I know, to divide him inventorilly would dizzy the arithmetic of memory'. Thus out-Heroding Herod, the prince 'hoists him with his own petard'. Yet look, how spontaneously is the prince moved to the highest eloquence by the firmamental splendour in which he notices a cosmic projection of his own paradox : 'the majestical roof fretted with golden fires appears no other thing to me than a foul, pestilent congregation of vapours' : so there is a perfect equipollence of language and meaning in the lines which flow naturally from his heart.

Hamlet is derisive not only to Osric whom he calls a 'waterfly' but also to the other courtiers like Rosencrantz, Guilderstern and specially Polonius, who is a bore to him ('these tedious old fools!') because of his prolixity. Yet nobody was more conscious than the prince himself about his own intoxication with words : 'words, words, words', while all the world about him was bent on action. We can of course understand his dislike of his two schoolmates who have been brought from abroad by the vicious king to spy on him. Look, how he frustrates their efforts at knowing his mind by engaging with him in a wit-combat :

Ham : A dream is but a shadow.

Ros : Truly, and I hold ambition of so airy and light a quality that is but a shadow's shadow.

Ham : Then our beggars bodies, and our monarchs and outstretched heroes the beggar's shadows. Shall we to the court ? II, 2.251

If ambition be a dream, since monarchs and heroes are ambitious, their anti-types (beggars) must be true bodies, of which monarchs and heroes are shadows. So Hamlet reduces the argument of his adversary to an absurdity. In another encounter he tells them point blank : 'you would play upon me; you would seem to know my stops; you would pluck out the heart of my mystery' (III. 2). Mark the image of the piper and his pipe which recurs in connection with his friend Horatio whose great virute he lacks, that of remaining unperturbed in trying situations : no pipe for 'fortune's finger'. The recurrent image points to a musician who fingers a pipe accustomed to its stops. Even when jeering at Polonius he plays with cloud shapes ('camel', 'weasel', 'whale') as no other Shakespeare's hero does, except Antony. His casual remarks reveal the richness of his mind as when sending Polonius on errand he calls the players 'the abstracts and brief chronicles of the time'; and a probing, declamatory mood of mind in 'use every man after his desert and who should scape whipping ?'

Punning is another linguistic sophistication commonly indulged by courtiers; and the extreme instance of this is of course Gaunt who plays with his name even when gasping for breath. Dr. Johnson accused Shakespeare of the 'malignant power' that quibbling had over him, which he calls his 'fatal Cleopatra'. Nobody knows better than Hamlet how to twist words into whatever ironies he would.

King : How fares our cousin ?

Ham : Excellent, I' faith; of the chameleon dish; I eat the air, promise-cramm'd : you cannot feed capons so.

King : I have nothing with us as answer, Hamlet : these words are not mine.

Ham : No, nor mine now. III. 2.87

Sententiousness is a common tendency that one notices in Shakespeare's gentlemen, great and small. Much of it is derived from consolations of philosophy or wisdom literature of the age, notably Plutarch's *Moralia* which was more popular in England in the sixteenth century than Plutarch's *Lives.* We have a long line of moralizers in Shakespeare : Senior Duke, Jaques, Duke of Vienna, Polonius, Brutus and Prospero etc. Even the prince of Denmark is no exception, for he reflects on the skulls of the politician,

lawyer, courtier—' now my lady worm's meat'. Significantly, ' worm's meat', ' a convocation of politic worms are even at him ' : might be an allusion to Martin Luther's *The Diet of Worms* (1521). What sounds like a laughable pretension in others is the natural culmination of the prince's world-weariness, his aversion for all that makes up life in this ' unweeded garden '—this ' vile promontory '. Jaques had been quite welcome to the senior Duke upto a certain point; but he is rightly snubbed when in his overzealousness he affects ' to cleanse the body of the infected world '. Nobody knows better than the prince the evils of the world : ' the oppressor's wrong ', ' proud man's contumely ', ' pangs of despised love ', ' law's delay' etc. : but rather than rise in arms against them he would ' shuffle off his mortal coil ' with a bare bodkin !

The old counsellor Polonius has caused no small confusion to critics who cannot reconcile his parting advice to Laertes so full of wise maxims with his own follies. Coleridge says that ' Polonius is excellent while he is discanting on matters of past experience ', but when he comes to advise a project ' he is a mere dotard '.

In an excellent article : ' Polonius : The Tyrant's Ears ' Lily B. Campbell[9] argues on the consistency of Polonius as a comic character. Being a spy of the murderous damned Dane, his ruling passion is curiosity and he acts as a busybody. It is his inordinate curiosity that makes him demand to be told the brother and sister confidences of his children, and insist on knowing the secret between Ophelia and the prince. He sends Reynaldo to spy on Laertes. He rushes about to announce the players to the prince who has already received the information and to deliver the summons from his mother which has been carried by Rosencrantz. He hides to overhear Ophelia and Hamlet, and also Hamlet and his mother from behind the arras. And killed casually his body is left below the stairs, treated as the ' worm's meat ' : this is the ignoble end of an informer.

He has a pretension to wisdom though he acts foolishly throughout. He thinks that Hamlet has been but toying with Ophelia's affection, though the sincerity of the prince's love is unquestionable. He merely deprives his daughter of the love of a prince. He misjudges the cause of the prince's melancholia, which even Gertrude knows to be his father's death and her

overhasty marriage. As to his wise maxims he might have culled them from the wisdom literature, as Claudius, for example, did from the consolations of philosophy when he advised Hamlet to bear his sorrow.

What makes Polonius exceedingly tedious is his prolixity. Shakespeare has played up this affectation in several scenes : when he rushes in to admonish Laertes to hurry and then delays him with his 'few precepts' which ought to carry him through life. The second occasion is the scene when he explains the nature of Hamlet's madness. Significantly he enunciates the rules of effective speech as 'brevity is the soul of wit', and violates it himself in an atrociously long-winded speech which provokes Gertrude's anxious protest : 'more matter, with less art'. His discourse on the dramatic genres——the interminable permutations and combinations of comedy, tragedy, history, pastoral, is indeed maddening! So, Polonius is a bundle of comic traits; the least among them his prolixity is enough to make a well-intentioned man like Antigonus in *The Winter's Tale* look like a buffoon.

And nobody was more aware than the prince how even a man's virtues however great will not avail against one defect : 'the vicious mole' as he says : 'but shall in the general censure take corruption / From that fault'. Is it not self-consciousness of our highest introspective hero ? In any case it sounds like a plea for toleration of so many of the good courtiers in Shakespeare who overshoot their mark : the good old Gonzalo's effusions on an ideal colony expose him to ridicule; Camillo, the perfect counsellor of the tyrant Leontes seems so unchivalrous because he leaves the queen alone to bear the brunt of the King's jealous fury. Kent, one of the best loved characters in Shakespare, overplays his part : a plain, blunt man who loves Lear more than himself, faces his fury by directly opposing him ('Be Kent unmannerly / When Lear is mad'), gets himself set in the stocks by provoking Cornwall, brings the quarrel with Goneril to a head, provides Regan and her husband with the pretext for being inhospitable to Lear; and all because of his plainness. So, even goodness without tactfulness may have the unintended effect of causing harm.

IV

In summing up, Hamlet seems to be an embodiment of Shakespeare's ideal of courtliness, which he derived from Castiglione. It is however being increasingly felt that the values which Castiglione holds dear are mere

abstractions, parts of a brilliant phantasy of a number of courtiers who are never presented as men in real-politik. If Hamlet's conduct sometimes grates upon us it is mainly because of the story, in which he has to play the principal part, being unsuited to his character. Shakespeare, it seems, has gone beyond his source to present an ideal romantic hero whose self-consciousness puts us in mind of Montaigne and whose sensitiveness reminds us of Keats. In fact Keats in one of his letters to Fanny Browne[10] refers to Hamlet's agony in the Nunnery Scene in which he finds his own misery reflected. Yes, the heart of the Hamlet-mystery lies in the agony that the sensitive soul suffered at the loss of his courtier's ideal, though it had an earlier spring than Ophelia's unreasoned repulsion.

It was A. C. Bradley who first pointed out that Hamlet's shock at the beginning arises from his mother's overhasty marriage, which impairs the courtier's ideal of Beauty and Goodness being one. My purpose here is to show that the prince's suffering was intensified by Ophelia's conduct, which, too, was a flagrant violation of the courtier's ideal; and it is at the ideological plane that we should look for the nature and extent of the romantic hero's suffering. Castiglione might be of help here.

'Beautie', says Bembo, is good, and consequently the true love of it is 'most good and holy and ever more bringeth forth good fruites in the soules of them that with the bridle of reason restraine the ill disposition'. This might explain Hamlet's first agonized cry at his mother's unseemly haste : 'O God ! a beast that wants discourse of reason / Would have mourn'd longer'. That Hamlet could never recover from the shock is proved by the fact that long after in the Closet Scene (III.4), where he charges his mother so mercilessly for her marriage, he has 'the mystical christian love' in mind, which she does not understand :

Queen : What have I done that thou darest wag thy tongue
In noise so rude against me ?

Ham : ——— O, such a deed
As from the body of contraction plucks
The very soul; and sweet religion makes
A rhapsody of words III. 4.38

Evidently Hamlet has been thinking of love as 'an influence of the heavenly bountifulnesse' and that 'beautie cometh of God, and is like a circle, the goodness whereof is the centre'. Even Hamlet's mounting fury at Gertrude's vile taste which leaving the 'fair mountain' battens 'on the moor'; her gross sensuality which at her age should have been ruled by 'judgment', may be traced to Bembo's remarks :

> The body where that beauty shineth, is not the fountain from which beauty springeth, but rather because beautie is bodiless...an heavenly shining beame, she loseth much of her honour when she is coupled with vile subject full of corruption.
>
> * * *
>
> ... that in young men deserveth more to be pittied than blamed; and contrariwise in old men, more to be blamed than pittied.

So the clue to Hamlet's melancholy lies in the defeat of his courtier's ideal in a person nearest to him. This might explain his world-weariness, his aversion from action, specially the one he has been charged with by his father's ghost. Even at the crucial moment of the ghost's shattering revelation of his father's murder he cannot forget his spite for the 'pernicious woman' :

> And thy command all alone shall live
>
> ....
>
> O most pernicious woman !

The wound has always been there, and now it is widened and deepened. On top of all these comes the repulsion of Ophelia to whom the aggrieved prince has turned for spiritual sympathy. Mark how lonely he is : intruded upon by the officious old man who as father of his ladylove might have been friendly, spied upon by his two schoolmates, and not understood even by his best friend–for what knows Horatio 'how ill all's about the heart'? After his harrowing experience with the ghost he goes straight to Ophelia 'pale as his shirt', 'his knees knocking each other' as if 'loosed from hell to speak of horror'. It is inconceivable that the prince has been making the first experiment of his 'antic disposition' and with such elaborate antics on his beloved ! Ophelia, on her part, has not

the least suspicion about his profound sorrow, which 'seem to shatter all his bulk'. Poor girl, she still repels him ! In silent agony the prince only looks at her face—and very intently. At the next interview in the Nunnery Scene Ophelia recoils further, returning the love-tokens she has received from him. This signifies the snapping of his last contact with life, his love. And Hamlet breaks forth in vituperations at Ophelia because he suspects her to be a decoy. This is the view of Dover Wilson who has been refuted by the late Professor T. N. Sen in his essay 'Hamlet's Treatment of Ophelia in the Nunnery scene'.[12]

Generally convincing though his arguments are, Professor Sen leaves some gaps here and there. For example, he does not say even a word about the interjectory sentence 'Are you fair ?' spoken immediately after 'Ha, ha, are you honest ?'. Similarly, he seems somewhat perplexed at Hamlet's perusal of Ophelia's face-'does he expect to find 'Frailty' writ large there ? he wonders ! Just the reverse, as we shall see.

In fact, there is more in the scenes than meets the eye; and we have to look up to Castiglione for the full import. What is the effect of Ophelia's repelling 'his letters' and denying 'his access' to her ? The first reaction of the prince must have been dazed incredulity : he cannot believe the words he hears. Stung to silence he falls to scanning her face expecting that it would belie her words. Look how scrutinizingly he examines the face :

> And, with his other hand thus o'er his brow
> He falls to such perusal of my face
> As he would draw it. Long stay'd he so.
>
> II.1.87.

Obviously he has been observing her from various angles : 'now goes he to the length of all his arms' and then coming near waves his head thrice 'up and down' and even when leaving the closet keeps his eyes fixed on her face. Beyond doubt, the prince has been looking for the signs of ideal Beauty, as Bembo has described them. And Beauty has another characteristic : it inflames the heart of the lover and is also inflamed with the lover's warmth of heart; and the 'mutual flame' is noticed in the

faces : 'And true plaine heartes do in the faces rest' (Donne). Look to the relevant section in Castiglione :

> Yet when it (Love) findeth out a face well proportioned, and framed with a certaine lively agreement of several colours, and set forth with lights and shadowes and with an orderly distance and limits of lines (outlines), thereinto it distilleth itself.........
>
> So that it (beauty) draweth unto it mens eyes with pleasure, imprinteth himself in the soule, and with an unwonted sweetnesse all to stirreth her and deliteth and setting her on fire maketh her to covet him.

She fails in the test; and it is much more than her failure to rise to the occasion : it amounts to a negation of the principle of Beauty. And the shock leaves the idealist–hero, who is also a master of words, speechless in anguish, which only comes out in sighs 'as it did seem to shatter all his bulk, / And end his being'.

In the Nunnery Scene Hamlet meets Ophelia again after his 'to-be or not-to-be' soliloquy. Since his earlier meeting he has soliloquized once before, met Polonius, Guilderstern and Rosencrantz and talked with them, heard the players reciting speeches and also given direction to them. Noticing Ophelia poring over a book of devotion he accosts her lovingly as 'Fair Ophelia ! Nymph, in thy orisons / Be all my sins remember'd'. Unluckily for him she replies formally : 'How your honour for this many days ?' Professor Sen has rightly stressed the tragic significance of the words : 'many days'. They had met only the day before. An unfortunate lapse which rings false to the prince who returns a cold 'I humbly thank you. Well, Well, Well'. The repetition indicates his weariness. Ophelia's reference to 'remembrances' which she has longed to re-deliver leaves the prince somewhat dazed, not immediately realizing the situation. It is after her 'perfumed' speech when she actually offers the tokens with 'there my lord', the sight of the tokens stings him to a frenzy as they put him in mind of the earlier heartrending scene when his anguish left him mute. 'Ha, ha, ! are you honest ?' 'Are you fair ?' The juxtaposition of the two words 'honest' and 'fair' has not been fully appreciated. 'Honest' means 'good', and 'fair' 'beautiful' which also connotes responsiveness to love : the

courtier's identification of Beauty and Goodness, What was implied in the silent scanning of the face now comes out in the sardonic, interjectory sentences. If Hamlet now comes to square Ophelia with the 'general sex' it is the shock that turns him to do so. The world becomes again the 'unweeded garden': 'we are all arrant knaves'. To the sensitive mind the vice becomes a common vice, and his own sorrow the woes of the world.

That Shakespeare has been all the time thinking in terms of Castiglione nothing proves better than that immediately after the prince's exit Ophelia falls to praising him most effusively and the first line in the compliment is an accurate rendering of the Italian 'corteziania' which implies, as L. E. Opdycke[13] tells us, the perfect gentleman, complete as courtier, soldier and scholar. In fact all her compliments be token perfect courtliness: he is the highest pattern of fashion and good taste. The sweet prince is peerless in 'form and feature' like a blossom. The flower-image in 'blown youth' suggests a spontaneous grace-'a certain sweetness in all his doings', which, as Frederick Frigoso tells us, is the essential quality of a courtier. The manner of speech, the range of his vocabulary which we have noticed earlier, and above all 'a certain recklessness' which is the hall-mark of gentility as Castiglione has it, mark him out as 'the observed of all observers'. Ophelia also recalls his honied words of love, and we have a sample of it in his letter: 'To the celestial and my soul's idol' followed by verses the quality of which he does not approve 'O dear Ophelia, I am ill at these numbers; I have not art to reckon my groans'. Look at his ardent admiration for his friend Horatio and his restraining of himself with 'something too much of this' and diverting the talk to the play to be performed that night-all accord with the ideal conduct of a courtier: his distaste for 'overacting or affectation'.

There are innumerable evidences in the play of the courtier-prince's finest artistic tastes. As composer of verses, reciter, actor, director, art-critic and with indications of his tastes in music and painting too, he has no peer in the whole range of world literature. But once only did he feel really exhilarated, and that was the exhileration of a creative genius after the production of his masterpiece-when the play intended to catch the King's conscience had succeeded more than he had expected.

Would not this, sir, and a forest of feathers—if the rest of my fortunes turn Turk with me—with two Provincial roses in my razed shoes, get me a fellowship in a cry of players, Sir? III. 2.265

Yes, Hamlet is the 'sweet prince' (V. 3. 270) through most of his life. But he is capable of violence of that dramatic sort as Castiglione advises. 'He therefore that we seek for, where the enemies are, shall show himself most fierce, bitter and ever more with the first'. In fact, Hamlet is noble, fearless, generous, loving, and like a true romantic hero, continually more than a match for his enemies both with weapon and wit. He has indeed so many of the noblest qualities in him that their combination in one person seems almost an impossible possibility.

Yet, when all is said, there are occasions in the play when the prince causes uneasiness in us by his indecorous and unseemly conduct which is out of tune with the fine traits of character Shakespeare has given him. His insult of Ophelia, his cynicism about women, his contemptuous treatment of Polonius' corpse, his tussling with Laertes in Ophelia's grave militate against our notion of a noble gentleman. The last one alone—his jostling with Laertes he has explained to Horatio as an expression of his disgust with the 'bravery' of Laertes' grief.

The important point to be considered in this connection is: the story in which he has to play the main role is thoroughly unsuited to his character. Hamlet like all other tragic heroes and even more than any of them, has to be made superior to his conduct because the atrocious story in which he has to play the role of avenger could not be altered. The first Act after the ghost's revelation ends despite the prince's resolve, with the outcry :

O cursed spite
That ever I was born to set it right!

and this has a wider implication than is generally perceived. His early soliloquies so full of self-reproaches may not be merely a reminder to the audience that he has not forgotten his task; he is continually whipping himself up for the deed, and like Macbeth 'pricking' the 'sides of his intent'—unavailingly.

And Hamlet, on the final impression, and that is ever so important in a work of art wins our heart and also exhilerates us. Excuse this platitude. Shakespeare has lent him such a grace, so superior an air that Horatio's last words about the prince echo our feeling : 'there cracks a noble heart'. Noble it is, in fact too noble for the gross environment in which destiny made him play his part. At the last moment he preserves his reputation for astuteness as well as reckless valour by hearkening to a premonition and with a smile defying it. So Hamlet may seem frisky, freakish, impudent without making us forget that he is a magnanimous soul and the rarest gentleman Shakespeare has ever produced.

Notes

1. The account of Penelope Devereux is based on the notes in *The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney,* ed. W. A. Ringer Jr. (Clarendon Press, 1962).
2. M. C. Bradbrook : *Shakespeare and Elizabethan Poetry.* Penguin, 1964, p. 129.
3. B. Castiglione : *The Book of the Courtier,* tr. Thomas Hoby, Everyman, 1959.
4. Thomas Elyot : *The Governour,* Everyman, 1962, p. 106.
5. Ruth Kelso : *The Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century,* Peter Smith, 1964, p. 84.
6. Philip Sidney : *Apologie for Poetry,* Everyman, p. 43.
7. Fulke Grevil : *The Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney.* London Gibbings & Co. Ltd. MDcccc VI, p. 5.
8. *Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism.* II. ed. T. M. Raysor Everyman, 1964, p. 64.
9. *Joseph Quincy Adams Memorial Studies :* 'Polonius : The Tyrant's Ears' by Lily B. Campbell. The Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, 1948, p. 297.
10. *Letters of John Keats.* ed. Robert Gittings, O.U.P. 1975, p. 386.
11. B. Castiglione, Op. cit. The excerpts quoted in this section are all taken from the Fourth Book.
12. Taraknath Sen : *A Literary Miscellany,* Rupa & Co., Calcutta, 1972, p. 155.
13. B. Castiglione. Op. cit. F. N. p. 15.

'TRAIN TO PAKISTAN' : A REVALUATION

SYED MASHKOOR ALI

Department of English

Government College, Gandhinagar

Critics never did so much favour to any other writer as they have done to Kushwant Singh. His widely read novel, *Train To Pakistan*, has often been regarded as a work of rare distinction. Vasant Shahane likes it for its well–thought–out structure, artistically conceived plot, absorbing and realistic narrative and imaginatively realized characters.[1] Not to deny the book's readability, this is too great an admiration for *Train To Pakistan* to deserve.

No doubt, much of the force of the book chiefly comes from the universal appeal of its theme. It is not merely a period piece about some troublesome era; it is a study in illumination. Hence, failing to perceive any 'pervasive moral outlook '[2] is, however, failing to do justice to the story. Though Jugga's heroic deed, with which the novel closes, does not apparently refer to any such pervasive moral outlook, his conversion compared to Iqbal's inaction, has certainly much to do with it. The primary impact of the book is, of course, the proper understanding of a situation and sharing human experience ' with malice towards none and sympathy for all '.

Such an understanding is at different levels. At the level of characters, it is most evidently displayed in Jugga's conversion and attitude. The situation Mano Majruns face has as much the same validity and relevance

even today, when the efforts are being made for world peace, as it had during 1947 or at the time of the composition of the novel. Communal harmony cannot, however, be achieved without individuals' initiative, co-operation and readiness to work for a common purpose by putting their personal differences and selfish motives aside.

The universality of its thematic appeal has been reinforced by its realistic presentation of the great human catastrophe of the Partition and the resultant tensions in the families and the smouldering political antagonism of the two communities; precisely enough, by its realistic evocation of a tiny village of Mano Majra. Kushwant Singh is indeed at his best in supplying realistic details. At the opening is one of his most vivid and carefully worked out natural descriptions :

"The summer of 1947 was not like other Indian summers. Even the weather had a different feel in India that year. It was hotter than usual, and drier and dustier. And the summer was longer. No one could remember when the monsoon had been so late. For weeks the sparse clouds cast only shadows. There was no rain. People began to say that God was punishing them for their sins."[3]

Then follows the superb description of Mano Majra, a small village on the banks of Sutlej river, very conscious of trains, and its "three brick buildings enclose a triangular common with a large peepul tree in the middle." (p. 2) The details of the scenes like growing political hatred, mob psychology, mass hysteria, Muslims on their Exodus, corpses of both men and animals floating on Sutlej river, villagers' conspiracy to cause a train accident and fill the train with Muslim dead bodies—are so beautifully handled as to create a painted image in the mind of the reader. Kushwant Singh's use of typically Indian imagery : the moth circling round the glass chimney and caught by the geckos, symbolic of Hukum Chand and Haseena respectively, and Gandhians compared to a crane, add much to the novel's realism.

But that does not suffice to evaluate Kushwant Singh's performance as a literary artist. There are many other elements, say, characterization, plot, action and style which are also equally important. Realism as a

literary technique, besides a down-to-earth evocation of the world of nature, also needs uncontrived situations and real characters in which Kushwant Singh does not come off so quite well. In his attempt to achieve credible situations and create three—dimensional characters, he met with greater difficulties that he hardly succeeded in overcoming.

The chief protagonist in the novel is the crowd; but from the amorphous and vague crowd, some individuals, who are made to embody the conceptual values of the book, emerge as independent. Except for the "notorious daredevil" Jugga, all other minor characters hardly have a personality of their own. The foreign educated Iqbal is an embodiment of false idealism and, hence, of inaction. He is simply an arm-chair thinker, a walking lie who finds an alibi in his circumcision to escape the situation. Hukum Chand, the Magistrate, who serves the Government for service's sake, is a true government servant in the strictest sense of the term. All other minor characters; Imam Baksh and his daughter Nooran, Malli and his friends, Haseena, the Muslim prostitute, Lambardar Banta Singh, the police Inspector, who move woodenly through the narrative,-are purely theatrical in nature, though Meet Singh stands out as a plausible individual. His character is brilliantly brought out and Kushwant Singh, besides portraying his surroundings, appearance, simplicity and mannerism, successfully captures his reaction to the situation itself. His helplessness to save the harmonious communal relations from being vitiated is conveyed in Christ like manner; "They know what they are doing... If they insist on doing evil, I ask God to fogive them." (p. 146) ("Father, forgive them for they know not what they do." Luke, 23 : 34).

The growing political awareness and the smculdering antagonism between two communities has been paralleled by Jugga's conversion and Meet Singh's refusal to lead the prayer for undesirable mission. The readers are invited to see the impact "the magic eyes" of Nooran has on Jugga. Jugga is made to embody most explicitly the conceptual values of the book. His first lesson of conversion actually comes from his meeting with Nooran. When we first see him in the beginning of the novel, he had already given up dacoity; and as the action of the novel progresses he has started speculating on the principle of Karma.

"Babuji, don't you believe that bad acts yield a bitter harvest ? It is the law of Karma. So the bhai is always saying. The Guru has said the same in the book". (p. 61) And by the end of the novel, with Nooran gone from Mano Majra, he appears to have undergone a profound change. The development of his character reaches its fullness when Meet Singh recites to him some verses from the Morning Prayer.

Though Jugga's character has been very beautifully portrayed, he does not satisfy readers. His heroism and exemplary courage–the slashing of the rope with his kirpan stretched horizontally above the train to cause accident–which he has usually been praised for, actually turns out to be his serious weakness. It makes him too heroic to be true, hence unbelievable. Such feats of bravery are very rare in life, and we do not believe him for the simple reason that he is far from being reasonably real.

Structurally also, *Train To Pakistan* is not without a flaw. Well begun is half done; and that is true of *Train To Pakistan*. The novel has a fairly engrossing beginning and an end; but it literally gropes in the dark in-between. Its plot lacks natural growth of action and appears to have been formed by incorporating various events around the tragic journey of a train bound for Pakistan. Scenes like the last one, the one novel closes with, appear to have deliberately been manipulated to bring about an emotionally effective climax and drive a moral home. Several other incidents : Jugga and Iqbal being taken to Chundunnuger Police station and Jugga's beating of Malli there and Hukum Chand's love making with Haseena, are out of place and could have safely been avoided to save the story from being interrupted by a good and skilled writer. Kushwant Singh's attempt to weave these episodes, does not, however, help him transmute the novel into a well–knit one.

The weakest aspect of *Train To Pakistan* is its language. The literal translation of Indian phrases and expressions into English : "She had not shed her milk teeth", "whatever you say is right to the sixteen anna of the rupee", "you want to sit on our heads", "I would have broken every bone in your body", "I will tear your tongue out of your mouth",

"they have been eating our salt for generations and see what they have done", "Have they ousted you from your lands or occupied your houses ?" "Have they seduced your womenfolk" and there are many such usages that can be cited almost endlessly,–though these are fitted well into the narrative—do not sound proper. The occasional use of many Indian words– "Zulum", "Badmash", "Badmashi", "Huzoor"– is quite effective while the repetion of "Cherisher of the poor" and "Government sends for you" renders his prose dull and ineffective. Surprizingly enough, when Kushwant Singh uses Hindi words as quoted above, he could have used "Gharib-parvar" and "Sarkar" for both the expressions respectively. Even the dialogues are mechanical :

> "'Here is a warrant for your arrest, Get up...' 'You have no right to arrest me like this' he shouted. 'You made up the warrant in front of me. This is not going to end here. The days of police rule are over. If you dare put your hands on me, the world will hear about it. I will see that the papers tell the people how you chaps do your duty'". (p. 46).

They fail to bring out the intended effect of anger; hence fail to invite the reader's participation in the character's experience.

The main strong point of the novel is its realistic narrative. On its negative side, it is marked by weak characterisation, incoherent structure and unexpressive language. Apart from this, there is nothing much else to write more about in *Train To Pakistan,* unless one likes typically Punjabi abuses, literally rendered into English : "son of fornication", "seducer of his mother", "incestuous lover of his sister", "ass of some place", "penis of a pig", "put hot chillies up bottom", "stick bamboo pole up his behind" and so on.

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LOVE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON

MANJULA VERMA

Department of English,

G. L. S. Girls' College, Ahmedabad.

Emily Dickinson's poetic realm is comprehensive. It includes poems on love, death, nature, eternity and god. It is the purpose of this paper to examine her love poems and to show how varied they are in mode and expression. Emily Dickinson had an immense capacity to love and suffer for love. Her love poems show how she could transmute her trivial mood into a meaningful experience. They emerge from an intense self-scrutiny and an urge to explore truth.

Her love poems are the utterances of an honest, sincere and devoted heart. There was in her an urgent need to be loved and also an incredible preparedness to do anything for love. It was on an ideological level-on an imaginative level that she lived what we may call an intellectual philosophizing of love. She cherished love and its lure as one who enjoys the fragrance of a rose without ever attempting to pluck it. She desired the satisfaction of love from a distance. It was love destined to blossom and mature in separation hence it attracted her with all its spell, glamour and romanticism untouched by a harsh reality. We find in Emily Dickinson a sort of unique acceptance of what life offers, an acceptance which culminates in a serene and calm renunciation.

Though greatly inspired by Wadsworth; Emily was not emotionally dependent upon him. Her need of Wadsworth was not only as an imagined lover but also as the " matser " to whom she entrusted her spiritual life. She knew too well that to love him was to lose him. Yet there was a kind of rare detachment in her attraction for him which presents a striking contrast between Emily Dickinson and Charlotte Bronte by whom she was greatly influenced. It does not mean that the course of life was all roses for her.

She did feel the pangs of separation and utter hopelessness; there were crucial moments which left her nervously exhausted. As she says in one of her poems :

After great pain aformal feeling comes,
The nerves sit ceremonious, like tombs. (1)

But at the same time she had a unique inner strength to sustain her spirit. Even when she suffered acutely she retained a sense of joy in living. In her own words 'Take all away from me but leave me ecstasy and I have all'. (2) Besides she had a great capacity to suffer :

You left me–Sire—two legacies–
A legacy of love
A Heavenly father would suffice
Had he the offer of–
You left me Boundaries of pain
Capacious as the sea
Between eternity and Time
Your consciousness–and me—
Sahara is too little price
To pay for thy Right hand–(3)

Where constancy in love is concerned, she is not the person to budge. Hers is rock-like firmness and an unflinching faith in the eternity of love.

Love–thou art veiled
A few–behold thee–
Smile–and alter–and prattle–and die–
Bliss–were an oddity–without thee–
Nicknamed by God
Eternity–(4)

Love is too lofty and too deep to be within the reach of an ordinary being. It is the brave man's cup of tea, for along with its enticement, glamour and bliss, it also involves agonies which cannot be expressed. One must have an eye to perceive it, and a heart to bear it. Very few can grasp its profundity, ordinary beings falter and change. They babble about it without knowing what it is. One is reminded of what Elizabeth Barret Browning says in the same connection–in, 'How do I love thee ? Let me count the ways'. (5)

Emily Dickinson was fascinated by the English Poetess Mrs. Browning. Elizabeth Barret Browning supports the contention that a poet's lyrical gift is self-sufficing. She writes in 'A Vision of Poets'—

"While my poems are full of faults......... they have my heart and life in them, they are not empty shells...... Poetry has been as serious a thing to me as life itself. And life has been a very serious thing; there has been no playing skittles for me in either. I never mistook pleasure for the final cause of poetry; nor leisure, for the hour of the poet. I have done my work so far, as work,– not as mere hand and head work apart from the personal being, but as the completest expression of that being to which I could attain."

One would be prompted to say that whatever Elizabeth Barret Browning has confessed, holds true of the poems of Emily Dickinson. Nevertheless it is to be noted that Emily surpasses Elizabeth Barret Browning in the subtlety of her thoughts and in her range of ideas. Emily had a strange and wonderful mind. Very few poets can surpass her economy of words.

For Emily to be in company of her lover is an exaltation. It is the most enchanting and exciting experience; it is not only to be lost in a Ethereal world where time, place and distance do not matter at all. It is a sphere of perpetual sunrise, of dawn with all its beauty, quiet, calm and serenity.

> ...... No seasons were to us–
> It was not night nor morn–
> But sunrise stopped upon the; lace
> And fastened it in Dawn. (7)

Emily's love poems manifest love in its multitudinous variety. She expresses two or more different attitudes towards the same idea. She argues, analyzes, criticizes and defines her feelings. At times we find her expressing the ecstasy of love in a union, at others a complete devotion that of a devotee who wants to forget her individuality and get absolutely merged into the other being and experience immensity and greatness.

> The Drop that wrestles in the sea–
> Forgets her own locality–
> As I towards the– (8)

The same idea is repeated in the poem, 'He touched me, so I live to know.' (506). Just as the sea absorbs many streams and puts them to rest she too experiences a unique serenity while she leaned upon his breast. In his company she assumes a superior air and a high status, 'Royal Crown'; not only that but she also feels 'transfigured' from 'Gypsyface' to 'tenderer Renown'. She shared with the other intellectual women of her time an interest in 'the position of women'. Moreover she belonged to a family where the idea of status would automatically be nurtured. Her father was 'imperial'. He was a man of intergrity and austerity. His legal profession also induced the idea of status in her mind. In many of her poems the achievement of status through experience is the major theme. It reflects her sophistication and artistic bent of mind which can be attributed to the family in which she was born. We often come across words suggesting status- 'queen', 'Royal', 'Wife', 'Woman', 'immortality', etc. But one wonders how a personality like Emily who was basically of an independent temperament and quietly defiant, sought such a status of a 'Wife', 'queen', etc. If we recall her own words :

> "I will bake his bread, make his puddings, knit his bed slippers, and I will play for him, and read to him and admire him and love him. But will not submit my mind to him. That's one thing it's unfair to ask of any one".

It may be that not seeing the possibility of acquiring the status she sought the fulfilment in her poetical realm. Or it may be that having experienced the cherished status at an imaginative level she understood the condition of earthly life, that realization of any sort, after all, involves renunciation, and the perfect status is immortality.

Any way love remains the life giving spirit-a source of self-fulfilment and transcendental joy. Love is eternity 'the fellow of Resurrection' (491) chanting "live", Love is immortality. Love is a 'later thing than Death', and 'more previous than life'. (924)

It is a boon to all alive. Emily Dickinson has glorified Love and her poems are the utterances of brave heart that is ready to suffer anything. She gave vent to her anguish in her poems. She accepted the legacy of love as well as the legacy of pain. But the amazing thing about her is that her

turbulent heart, her anguish, pain of seperation, elevate her. Suffering becomes an illuminating experience for her, making her mature and wiser than what once she was.

In 'I sing to use the waiting', (850) she exhibits a splendid idea. Waiting is always tedious. One grows impatient and irritated but when waiting is spent in singing all the anguish disappears. It is said that one's mood fluctuates because of the effect of music, but Emily finds relief from the agony of waiting for her lover through her singing. The poem is a celebration of a lover's arrival. Emily had the unique insight to enable her to raise an ordinary experience to a higher platform. In 'Proud of my broken heart' (1736). She expresses her feelings in the most dignified manner. She experiences the pain of a broken heart but there is not a tinge of self-pity. She never experienced such pain before she met him and she is proud of it, 'Proud of my broken heart since thou didst break it'. (1736). It also expresses her highest regards for her lover. The world without, is dark but there is some one luminous within.

While reading her poems we are often struck by her originality and depth. 'We learned the whole of love', (568) gives us an idea of self fulfillment and wholeness. After knowing a thing fully, nothing remains to be revealed and silence is the word for all. For the fullness can never be interpreted by means of language. It is an experience of a kind when all communication fails. Having achieved ultimate knowledge one assumes innocence which is diviner than that of childhood. It is a state of ultimate wisdom.

In many of her love poems Emily takes images from nature and seeks parallels. In 'Why do I love' You Sir?' (480) she expresses her inability to explain why she loved him. And she need not. 'The wind' not required to answer the grass why he moved her', and 'the lightning never asked an eye wherefore it shut'.

There is very little she does not touch upon while writing about love. She selects images from nature to express eroticism in love, for instance in, 'A narrow fellow in the grass' (986), in 'What shall I do when the summer troubles'—(56), in 'Ah.' Moon and Star', (240). Emily has taken beautiful images from nature. She can be with the moon and the

star but somebody is farther than them, where she cannot reach. The note of despair is striking. The same idea is repeated in 'It makes no difference abroad' (620). Separation is miserable, nothing matters to the 'Bee' but his separation from his 'Rose'. Once again she compares herself with an object in nature and is reminded of something which is denied to her. She is envious of little creatures like squirrels and bees. It is a mating season for all.

> How can I bear their jocund faces
> Thou from here so far ?

She has no wings to go to him. Her craving for union is intense. Without him it is all woe and despair even if 'Gabriel is to praise' (725) but separation is destined, it is God's indictment. In 'I make his Cresecent fill or lack' (909) we are told about the mutuality of love. Neither of the two knows who is the despot and who the tyrant. The same idea of mutual love between equals runs in the poem, 'I could suffice for him; I Knew', (643). When the elements of nature like the sea and the moon make mutual adjustment could she do anything other than that.

Here we are reminded of John Donne who also advocated the idea of love between equals in 'The Good Morrow',

> Whatever dyes, was not mixed equally,
> If our two loves be one, or thou and I
> Love so alike that none do slacken, none can die, (11)

Sometimes Emily expresses love in a most casual and a light-hearted manner. There was no time to hate nor to love but something must be done and the little toil of love is large enough for her, for hatred perishes with death but love is eternity. Hence it suits her. At another place she expresses her deepest faith and the noblest hope in love as eternity. It is 'Joy to have perished every step' to achieve paradise.

The same themes of separation and union, of life in death, of the oneness of all life in nature, of the indestructibility of the soul pre-occupied Emily Bronte with whom Emily Dickinson resembles a great deal. The poem, 'No coward soul is mine' (12), is the finest example of the spiritual quality of Emily Bronte's idea of love.

Emily Dickinson was a visionary. With her vision she could change her negatives in affirmatives. She found fulfillment in the celebration of suffering. Sometimes she reaches the most sublime heights when she says that she loved him in the manner 'Jesus love men'. (456). This is how she transcends earthly reality and suggests that to love a person truly is to achieve divinity.

True love expands its horizons, from the particular it reaches the universal, from one to all, from the human to the divine, when spiritual union, what the Hindus call " Adwaitya ", triumphs over the divisions of physical existence.

Each poem of Emily Dickinson has a new start, and is based on a fresh stirring of consciousness. In her we find a wonderful fusion of opposites. She was committed and yet detached. She yielded to imagination but had the capacity to analyse. Though intensely personal she had an awareness of the vast universe.

Poetry was her urgent need. Poetry emerging from self-denial may lead to gloom and morbidity. But it was not so in Emily's case. Emily turned to writing as a means of proving the reality of her inner vision. For her poetry was not an escape, nor was it a matter of implementing tradition of experimenting with form but listening to, and reproducing her inner voice. As she had said,

" I feel the need for immensity...... and when I touch it all is well but it happens so seldom. Between times I'm terribly alone. Yet in a way I'm rich, richer than I can tell because I do occasionally feel at one with something big. Then I'm lonely again... and in my writing, too. Trying to put thoughts and feelings into words is a lonely occupation. " (13)

Emily had " perfect Confidence " in God and great inner strength to derive joy from her own self. She enjoyed living. Her verse sprang from ecstatic appreciation, " I find ecstasy in living the mere sense of living is joy enough ". (14) For her suffering was a kind of creative agent, and a sense of belonging to someone was glory.

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THE YOGA OF ACTION IN 'FOUR QUARTETS'

D. S. Mishra

Department of English

S. P. University

Vallabh Vidyanagar

Commenting on the third section of 'The Dry Salvages' Professor Rajan makes a generalisation that Mr. Eliot is never happy in 'the maze of Oriental metaphysics'[1], but he does not substantiate it. He merely quotes a few lines to illustrate their ambiguity and to assert that the section begins badly due to the intricacy of these lines. He seems to look into this extract, as a separate unit, from the aesthetic point of view, obliterating its significance in the over-all context of the poem. Each Quartet, as we know it, is divided into five sections, of which the third one has a close affinity with the meaning of *the Gita*. And this section uses, not an ambiguous, but a paradoxical language, for paradox, as expressed in Indian scriptures, is considered to be the suitable language for the expression of profundities.

Contrary to Professor Rajan's assertion, Miss Ghose[2], in her doctoral thesis, overstates that the Dhyanyoga, the Karmayoga, the Jnanyoga and the Bhaktiyoga of *the Gita* may be respectively related to the Four Quartets. But she neither construes these yogas properly nor does she show how one can correlate them. Instead, she goes on stating the fact that Eliot was deeply influenced by the thoughts of *the Gita*. Her vague assumption is only partially true. Despite the fact that *Four Quartets* deals with the doctrine of the Karmayoga, it is certainly not a mere translation of the various yogas into a poetic language.

Though there are numerous reverberations of Hindu scriptures throughout the poem, the third section of each Quartet has an overt reference to the significant verses of *the Gita*. It has, in fact, a double movement. The former describes the precarious condition of man in the half-lit world, while the latter shows the way to accomplish self-perfection which is to

regain concentration and to live and to work in the inner light of the soul. Here, Eliot particularly refers to *the Gita* because he perhaps believes that modern man, who, like Arjua, is bewildered by conflicting events in the field of action, may achieve perfection, following the yoga of action as enunciated by *the Gita*. We shall now try to see how this idea is elaborated in the third section of each Quartet.

Section III of 'Burnt Norton'

The mechanical world has neither the daylight of knowledge nor the spiritual darkness to purify the soul. Enslaved to his senses and entangled in the phantasies of ignorant mind, aimless man has lost his concentration and, thereby, his peace and happiness. If he aspires to achieve the peace of mind he must practise the following spiritual discipline :

> "Descend lower, descend only
> Into the world of perpetual solitude,
> Desiccation of the world of sense,
> Evacuation of the world of fancy,
> Inoperancy of the world of spirit;
> This is the one way, and the other
> Is the same, not in movement
> But abstention from movement,[3]

According to Denis Donoghue, 'The descent......is guided by Heraclitus and St. John of the Cross, and its features the voiding of all claims to property, sense, fancy and even—the last surrender—spirit'.[4] However, it appears to me that the yoga of 'intelligent will', *buddhiyoga*, of *the Gita* is referred to here. Yoga means the state of equanimity in relation to success and failure, "*samatvam yoga uchyate*".[5] *Buddhi* stands for intelligence that has a power of recognition and discrimination. Metaphorically, *buddhi* is the charioteer of the body drawn by the horses of the senses which are controlled by the reins of the mind. It is often distracted by the insatiable senses and the restless mind. So it must be trained to attain insight and equal mindedness !

"For the uncontrolled, there is no intelligence; nor for the uncontrolled is there the power of concentration and for the one without concentration, there is no peace, and how could there be happiness for the peaceless ?"[6]

"When the mind runs after the roving senses, it carries away the understanding, even as a wind carries away a ship on the waters."[7]

"Therefore, O Mighty-armed (Arjuna), he whose senses are all withdrawn from their objects, has his intelligence firmly set.'[8]

To train intelligence and to achieve equanimity, one has to do two things. First, one must withdraw from the endless temptations and desires of the senses and abandon the whims, fancies and preferences of the mind. Secondly, controlling the senses and the mind, one must look within and discover the eternal soul that possesses peace, joy and silence. One must also bring forth one's secret soul to enlighten one's intelligence. He who lives in the light of his inmost self is released from the unrest of the world.

Katha Upanishad affirms :

"Realising through self-contemplation that primal God, difficult to be seen, deeply hidden, set in the cave (of the heart), dwelling in the deep, the wise man leaves behind both joy and sorrow."[9]

The phrase 'not in movement but abstention from movement' refers to the yoga of action, the Karmayoga :

"But he who controls the senses by the mind, O Arjuna, and who is without attachment, engages the organs of action in the path of work, is superior."[10]

"Therefore, without attachment, perform always the work that has to be done, for man attains to the highest by doing work without attachment."[11]

'Abstention from movement' is not an escape from work; it is the non-attachment or the renunciation of desire for the fruit of the work. It is not possible for us to abstain from work because Nature is always at work. While life remains, action is unavoidable. Thinking is an act, living is an act and these acts cause many effects. A liberated soul, therefore, must work with non-attachment for the good of the mankind.

Section III of 'East Coker':

Man's physical existence is brief and death is imminent. Mighty emperors, statesmen, priests, paupers, industrialists, contractors etc. all go to death. Since death is a stark reality we must accept it smilingly :

> "O dark dark dark. They all go into the dark...
>
> I said to my soul, be still, and let the dark come upon you
> Which shall be the darkness of God."[12]

The inevitability of death, however, cannot justify murder, suicide or war. We need not desire deliberately the death of others, simply because all men are bound to die. We must, on the contrary, wait, without love, hope, faith and thought, for death because it causes rebirth and opens the gate of eternity :

> "I said to my soul, be still, and wait without hope
> For hope would be hope for the wrong thing;
> wait without love
> For love would be love of the wrong thing;
> there is yet faith
> But the faith and the love and the hope are all
> in the waiting.
> Wait without thought, for you are not ready for
> thought,
> So the darkness shall be the light and the
> stillness, the dancing."[13]

The Gita asserts the same truth :

"For to the one that is born death is certain and certain is the birth for the one that has died. Therefore, for what is unavoidable, thou shouldst not grieve."[14]

The individual soul moves from one body to another. It takes birth, gathers to itself a mind, life and body formed out of the materials of Nature according to its past evolution and its need for the future. Since rebirth is said to be the immanent law of Nature, we should not have the fear of death as well as we should not grieve for the dead.

Section III of 'The Dry Salvages' :

Undaunted by death, man must resort to disinterested action in order to get perfection. He must perform all works allotted to him consecrating their fruits to the Divine :

> " Fare forward, you who think that you are voyaging;
> You are not those who saw the harbour
> Receding or those who will disembark. "[15]

Similarly, *the Gita* says :

" To action alone hast thou a right and never at all to its fruits, let not the fruits of action be thy motive; neither let there be in thee any attachment to inaction. "[16]

According to the law of Karma, every action, performed with some aim or other, must bear its corresponding result. It is for experiencing the fruits of one's actions that one has to take births and rebirths. In order to put an end to the cycle of births and deaths one should not only renounce all desire to harvest the fruits of one's actions, but should even crush the very disposition to such desire. He must work, without any selfish motives, for the upliftment of the suffering humanity.

Disinterested action is necessary for the preparation of meaningful action which is described as 'the thought' at the time of death.

> " On whatever sphere of being
> The mind of a man may be intent
> At the time of death"– that is the one action
> (And the time of death is every moment)
> Which shall fructify in the lives of others. "[17]

This passage corresponds to the following verses of *the Gita :*

" And whoever, at the time of death, gives up his body and departs, thinking of Me alone, he comes to my status (of being); of that there is no doubt."[18]

" Thinking of whatever state (of being) he at the end gives up his body, to that being does he attain, O Son of Kunti, being ever-absorbed in the thought thereof. "[19]

It is said that the soul goes to that on which its mind is set during the last moment of one's life. What we think, we become. Our past thought determines our present birth and our present one will determine the future. If we die meditating on the Brahman, we will attain the form of the Brahman. We, however, shall be able to think of the Brahman in the last moment only if we are devoted to Him throughout life. 'The thought' at the time of death is considered to be of great importance by *Prasna Upanishad* too;

"Whatever is one's thinking, therewith one enters into life. His life combined with fire along with the self leads to whatever world has been fashioned (in thought)."[20]

We, therefore, must perform our duty retaining the consciousness of Eternity. Just as a dancing girl fixes her attention on the waterpot she bears on her head even when she is dancing to various tunes, so also a truly pious man does not give up his attention to the blissful feet of the Supreme Lord even when he attends to his many concerns. All actions of our lives are to be surrendered to God :

"And do not think of the fruit of action.
Fare forward."[21]

Section III of 'Little Gidding'

The common man mostly works to gratify his desires, while the quietist withdraws into the silence of the Absolute to experience Bliss. But an ideal man is one who goes beyond these two extremes and works with indifference :

"There are three conditions which often look alike
Yet differ completely, flourish in the same hedgerow :
Attachment to self and things and to persons; detachment
From self and from things and from persons, and,
growing between them, indifference
Which resembles the others as death resembles life,"...

Since devotion, meditation, concentration and the like appear to be difficult for a common man, renunciation of desire for fruit, *Karmaphalatyaga*, is said to be the easiest way for him.

"If thou art not able to do even this, then taking refuge in my disciplined activity, renounce the fruit of all action, with the self subdued."[23]

If we, says Lord Krishna, cannot dedicate all our works to the Divine, we should act without desire of the fruit. We, in fact, should stop all personal striving, resign ourselves solely to God's saving power, submit to self-discipline and work abandoning all thought of the reward. Then the sources of unrest will be destroyed and calm and peace will be brought to us.

Four Quartets, likewise, explicitly expounds the yoga of disinterested action which consists of three interlinked tenets. First, the fruit of action must be offered to the Lord of the world and whatever is the outcome of that action, success or failure, must be accepted with a warm equanimity and a glad calm. Secondly, the work itself should be surrendered to the Lord of Sacrifice. Having known that it is Nature which determines action, one must perform one's daily acts, great or small, as a sacrifice to Him and for the welfare of people at large. Finally, one must realise that the Eternal alone, not the ego, is the doer of action. He must consecrate his will to the will of the Lord and become His veritable instrument. 'To allow your every act to be shaped through you by the divine Will in its immaculate sovereignty', says Sri Aurbindo, 'is the highest degree of the perfection that comes by doing works in yoga'.[24]

This correlation between *Four Quartets* and the yoga of action does not prove that Eliot is less of a Christian poet than he is commonly thought to be. It suggests the catholicity of his vision of Reality which, he perhaps thinks, can be arrived at by taking recourse to the spiritual ways preached by Christianity reinforced by those of *the Gita.* It also points to the fact that Eliot is significantly indebted to *the Gita* for the complex structure of *Four Quartets.*

Notes

1. Edited by B. Rajan, *T. S. Eliot–A Study of His Writings by Several Hands,* Dennis Dobson, London, 1971, p. 87.
2. Damayanti Ghose, *Indian Thought in T. S. Eliot,* Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta–6, 1978, p. 56.
3. T. S. Eliot, *Four Quartets,* Faber and Faber, London, p. 11.

4. " *Denis Donoghue,* T. S. **Eliot's Quartets** : *A New Reading,* included in **Four Quartets** *A Casebook* " edited by Bernard Bergonzi, Macmillan, 1969, p. 218.
5. Edited by S. Radhakrishnan, *The Bhagavadgita,* Blackie & Son, India Ltd. 1974, p. 120. 2–48.
6. ibid, p. 127, 2–66.
7. ibid, p. 127, 2–67.
8. ibid. p. 127, 2–68.
9. Edited by S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upanisads,* George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1953, *Katha Upanisad,* p. 613, 1.2.12.
10. *The Gita,* p. 134, 3–7.
11. ibid, p. 138, 3–19.
12. *Four Quartets* pp. 18–19.
13. ibid, p. 19.
14. *The Gita,* 2–27.
15. *F. Q.* p. 30.
16. *The Gita,* p. 119, 2–47.
17. *F. Q.*, p. 31.
18. *The Gita,* p. 228, 8–5.
19. ibid, p. 229, 8–6.
20. *P. U., Prsana Upanisad,* p. 660, 3–10.
21. *F. Q.* p. 31.
22. ibid, p. 40.
23. *The Gita,* p. 295, 12–11.
24. Sri Aurobindo, *Essays On The Gita,* Pondicherry, 1959, p. 800.

SEX SYMBOLISM AND SECULAR LOVE IN '*THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ*'

ARVIND SHARMA

Mariasusai Dhavamony has drawn attention to the fact that as far as he knows "there has not been so far any study of the semantics of *bhakti* in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*".[1] He has himself tried, it seems, to rectify the situation and has carried out a fairly detailed study of the use of the word Bhakti in the Bhagavadgītā.[2]

On the basis of his study, he states :

> At the outset we have to note that there is not a single case in the whole of the *Gītā* in which *bhaj*–is employed to mean secular love, sexual or asexual. What strikes a careful reader is that the *Gītā* does not, even within the context of religious love, bring in any sex symbolism at all, whereas it is rather common in other Hindu *bhakti* texts. All the forty–three cases in which the derivative of *bhaj*–are made use of indicate the personal relationship between God and men.[3]

Not only does he make this observation at the very outset, he also concludes on the same note :

> But in the *Bhagavad Gītā,* India's gospel of love, *bhaj*–is never used to mean secular love, sexual or asexual. What is striking is that within the perspective of religious love the *Gītā* never makes use of sex symbolism at all, whereas this is common place in other Hindu *bhakti* texts.[4]

1. Mariasusai Dhavamony, *Love of God according to Śaiva Siddhānta,* Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1971, p. 38.
2. Ibid., Chapter IV.
3. Ibid., p. 38.
4. Ibid., p. 44.

Thus as a result of his linguistic and semantic analysis Mariasusai Dhavamony concludes that :

(1) in the Gītā the root *bhaj* is never used to mean secular love, sexual or asexual; and

(2) in the context of religious love the Gītā never makes use of sex symbolism at all.

The purpose of this paper is to examine these twin claims.

II

One may begin by examining the second point first. It does not appear, at least to this writer, to be correct to say that in the context of religious love the Gita never makes use of the sex–symbolism at all.

The epiphany of the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavadgītā surely constitutes one of the high points of the Bhagavadgītā from the devotional point of view. As a matter of fact Rudolf Otto gives the whole scene described in Bhagavadgita XI. 35 " as an example of the place of the numinous, the *mysterium tremendum* in religion. '[1] As soon as Arjuna recognises the divinity of Kṛṣṇa he breaks forth into a hymn of praise. Then he realizes that he has been on " chummy terms " with the Lord of the Universe and may have unwittingly offended Him, so he says :

TASMĀT PRAṆAMYA PRAṆIDHĀYA KĀYAṀ
PRASĀDAYE TVĀM AHAM ĪŚAM ĪDYAM
PITE'VA PUTRASYA SAKHE'VA SAKHYUḤ
PRIYAḤ PRIYĀYĀ 'RHASI DEVA SOḌHUM.[2]

Therefore bowing down and prostrating my body before Thee, Adorable Lord, I seek Thy grace. Thou, O God, shouldst bear with me as a father to a son, as a friend to his friend, as a lover to his beloved.[3]

The last two lines of the verse merit close attention, and the last line even more so for clearly here some form of sex symbolism is involved.

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Bhagavadgita*, London : George Allen and Unwin, 1956, p. 282.
2. Ibid., p. 285; *Bhagavadgita* XI. 44.
3. Ibid.

The form used is *priyāyāḥ* which is clearly the Genitive of the *feminine* word *priyā*.[1] Thus Franklin Edgerton, whose translation of the *Gītā* has been considered "as literal as sometimes to be barely comprehensible"[2] renders the last line thus : "As a lover to his beloved, be pleased to show mercy, O God".[3] Clearly then, contrary to Mariasusai Dhavamony's claim, some element of sex symbolism *is*. involved in the perspective of religious love. It is present only to a limited degree no doubt, but it is present.[4]

It is also interesting to note that Dhavamony emphaslzes the point that "there is not a single case in the whole of the *Gītā* in which *bhaj-* is employed to mean secular love".[5] Does he thereby imply that patterns of secular love have no place in the *Gītā* ? One has to be very careful at this point for after "giving examples in which secular love is stressed" in general, Dhavamony points out that secular love "includes sex, family, friendship and social relationship".[6] It is interesting to note that in the verse from the *Gītā* cited above at least three of the four elements of secular

1. See William Dwight Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 133, para. 364.
2. R. L. Zaehner, *The Bhagavad-gītā*, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 1.
3. Franklin Edgerton, *The Bhagavad Gītā*, Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 59.
4. One possible reason why Dhavamony overlooked its existence could be an exclusive reliance on R. C. Zaehner's translation of the Bhagavad Gītā, to whom he has dedicated his book and whose "analysis and interpretation" thereof he seems to commend (*op. cit.*, p. 77). R. C. Zaehner translates the crucial clause in the last line of the *Bhagavadgītā* XI. 44 as "lover with the one he loves". Did the sexlessness of the "one he loves" as a translation of *priyāyāḥ* OBSCURE the sex-symbolism ?
5. Mariasusai Dhavamony, *op. cit.*, p. 38. "In the Epics the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa, bhakti* is often employed in the sense of both secular and religious love. But in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, India's gospel of love, *bhaj-* is never used to mean secular love, sexual or asexual" (Ibid., p. 44).
6. Mariasusai Dhavamony, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

love mentioned above by him are covered. For the last two lines translate thus : "As a father to a son, as a friend to his friend, As a lover to his beloved, be pleased to show mercy, O God".[1] The first instance covers "family", the second "friendship" and the third "sex". In fairness to Dhavamony, however, it must be pointed out that he does not say that examples of secular love are absent from the *Gītā*, only that the root *bhaj* is never employed in that sense. There is, however, some room for *suggestio falsi* here, albeit unintended, against which one must guard.

III

To conclude : it is not true to say, as Dhavamony claims, that sex symbolism is completely absent from the *Gītā* in the context of Bhakti and while it may be true that the root *bhaj–* is not employed to mean secular love in the *Gītā,* it does not mean that examples of secular love in the context of Bhakti are absent from the *Gītā.*[2]

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1. Franklin Edgerton, *op. cit.,* p. 59.
2. This analysis was confined to the nature of Bhakti in the Gītā per se. Some scholars, however, have claimed, perhaps in the tradition of the Śuddhādvaita school of Vallabha (see T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Outlines of Hinduism,* Bombay : Chetana Ltd., 1960, p.162) that the *Bhāgavata* Purāṇa is a "bhāṣya of the Bhagavad Gītā" just as the "Gītā is usually described as the bhāṣya of the Upaniṣads" (T. S. Rukmani, *A Critical Study of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (with special reference to bhakti), Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1970, pp. 141, 147. Also see p. 164). Thus T. S. Rukmani has even tried to connect the *Gītā* with the obvious sex symbolism of the Rāsalīlā (*op. cit.,* pp. 162–165). It will be noticed that the evidence on the sex–symbolism in the *Gītā* in this paper was presented internally from within the *Gītā* and not through an external apposition of it with some other text as is implied in the approach cited above.

POLITICS AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY : THE TWO HISTORY PLAYS OF ROBERT BOLT

SARVAR KHAMBATTA

Department of English,

St. Xavier's College, Ahmedabad-380009

Historical drama in the twentieth century has, in a large number of instances, tended to revolve around the theme of the individual against the establishment—the idealistic conscientious objector in a political, compromising society which lives on practical expediency. But this has also been a perennial theme in Western literary tradition—a theme as old as Sophocles's *Antigone* or Socrates himself. What is remarkable about its reappearance in twentieth-century historical drama is, on the one hand, its consonance with the general political temper of the age, and on the other, the fact that it has surfaced in dramatic representations of history after the deluge of romanticised-escapist-nostalgic history plays of the nineteenth century.

Sophocles's *Antigone* is one of the earliest dramatic presentations of the single individual's heroic but necessarily ineffective rebellion against the State. But Antigone, unlike some of her twentieth-century counterparts, rebels against the establishment in the name of a higher law. The law of the State claims that her brother, Polyneices, was a traitor, and his body must, therefore, be left outside the city walls since he has forfeited the right to a proper ritual burial. The divine law, speaking from within the individual, commands that Antigone shall be faithful to her duties as a sister and perform the last rites for the repose of her brother's soul.

The classic instance of such rebellion in actual life is, of course, to be found in the trial and death of Socrates. Both Antigone and Socrates died martyred by the law of the State. But, while Antigone was killed by the letter of the law, the death of Socrates was engineered by a malicious manipulation of the law; so that Socrates, by submitting to the law, to

the last, affirmed the need for and the validity of that law. And Socrates has been consciously used as a prototype of Sir Thomas More—both by historians and by Robert Bolt himself, in *A Man for all Seasons*.

In Act Two of this play, the Spanish Ambassador, Chapuys, refers unctuously to the fact that More's "angelic friend Erasmus" has called Sir Thomas "the English Socrates". More reacts dryly, "Socrates! I've no taste for hemlock, Your Excellency, if that's what you require."[1] The dramatic irony latent in More's sardonic perceptiveness is immediately apparent. He sees that Chapuys is trying to make him commit himself in so many words. But More's strength, as he constantly reiterates, lies in absolute silence. You can't, he reasons, send a man to the block for keeping his mouth shut. And this silence he only breaks after Rich's blatant perjury, when More is convinced that his judges *will* send him to the block *in spite of* his silence and *because* of it.

More's execution is the result of a perversion of the law, epitomised in the person of the cynical, timeserving Thomas Cromwell. And More, like Socrates, dies affirming the law; because it is this same law on which he has based his defence.

In the ultra politics–ideology–conscious twentieth century, the revival of interest in historical drama has usually manifested itself in a preoccupation with the confrontation between society or the establishment, and the individual's conscience. The stress, even when treating of religious figures like St. Thomas Becket or St. Joan of Arc or Martin Luther, tends to fall on the individual's integrity rather than the external principle he defends or seems to stand for. The principle—the Catholic Church, or the 95 theses, or the Voices, or scientific truth—becomes important only in so far as it is the core of its believer's integrity.

This confrontation has been dramatised alike by politically committed writers and by those, like Bolt, whose only commitment is to their art. At one extreme we have Brecht's Galileo, for instance, who comes to see his recantation as a betrayal of mankind : "...the steadfastness of one man could have shaken the world. If only I had resisted..." Now "the best one can hope for is for a race of inventive dwarfs who can be hired for anything."[2]

At the other extreme, we have Jean Anouilh reworking the stories of Antigone, St. Joan and Thomas Becket with an almost existentialist bias. The world, according to Anouilh, is, in essence, synonymous with compromise; the idealist is an uncompromising nihilist, whose only friend is death.

This confrontation between the individual and the 'establishment' is the basic situation of Bolt's first historical play, *A Man for all Seasons*. The central conflict arises from More's tenacious adherence to the innermost core of himself, his conscience, which will not let him accept Henry's Oath of Supremacy. But More, like Galileo and unlike Anouilh's idealists, is a very human man, a man with close family and social ties, who loves life, and will do everything that he *legally* can to avoid being massacred by the political machine.

But also from the beginning, there has been a repeated underlining of the fact that there ought to be two Mores. The King, argues Wolsey persuasively, needs an heir. England needs an heir to maintain its peace and stability. The Queen cannot provide one. Therefore, "certain measures" "perhaps regrettable," are necessary. "Now explain," the Cardinal demands of More, "how you as Councillor of England can obstruct those measures for the sake of *your own, private conscience.*" (p. 120, MFS, italics mine).

This is what the rest of the world tells him. That in his own interests and for the good of all concerned, More would do well to compartmentalise himself into More the politician and More the private man. The latter, Wolsey implies, can afford to indulge the whimsical quirks of a sensitive conscience, the former cannot. And in so far as More the politician gives way to his conscience, he is being self-indulgent in placing his private conscience above his public 'duty'. "You're a constant regret to me Thomas," Wolsey comments during More's midnight visit in Act One. "If you could just see facts flat on, *without that moral squint;* with just a little common sense, you could have been a statesman" (p. 118, MFS, italics mine). A little later in the same scene Wolsey says, "Oh, your conscience is your own affair; but you're a statesman!" (p. 120, MFS). In other words, if you want to be a strong and effective politician, you have no business to be a morally sensitive human being.

More is the only one who consistently sees the fallacy of compartmentalising a human being. " I believe, when statesmen forsake their own private conscience for the sake of their public duties...they lead their country by a short route to chaos, " he tells Wolsey. (p. 120, MFS). Even his daughter, Margaret, who is the closest to him intellectually, does not quite understand his intransigence in prison. And Alice, like Norfolk (who speaks like an average, ordinary human being) frankly tells her husband that he is doing that most un-Christian thing of all—committing suicide.

Every man, says Rich at the beginning of the play, " has his price " (p. 110, MFS). Even More admits it, up to a point. But he realises that if there isn't one tiny bit inside a man which he will not sell at any price, that man has no self—and the commodity sold is, by definition, worthless. More is the only one who realises that this self, this sense of identity, is one and indivisible; and that Wolsey's arguments are so much specious eyewash. Wolsey's is the reasoning of a politician whose star is on the decline. (And this Wolsey himself, we may remember, in Shakespeare's *Henry VIII*, utters, in the most deeply moving lines, a condemnation of the political process :

> Had I but served my God with half the zeal
> I served my king, he would not in mine age
> Have left me naked to mine enemies.
>
> (*III*, *ii*, 455–57)

More knows this from the beginning, as he also knows that if you want to be a strong and effective politician, you have no business to be a morally sensitive human being. This knowledge is revealed in the very opening of Act One. With Rich nagging at Sir Thomas, for a preferment, the latter replies, " Why not be a teacher ? You'd be a fine teacher. Perhaps, a great one. ".

> Rich : And if I was who would know it ?
>
> More : You, your pupils, your friends, God. Not a bad public, that... Oh, and a *quiet* life.

" You say that ! " retorts Rich with incredulous laughter. And More replies that his own high office has been " inflicted " upon him. (pp. 112–13, MFS).

That is why, when the bishops in Convocation, submit to Henry's hectoring, More resigns his chancellorship—because as Chancellor, he is the King's and his Government's representative and Speaker, not merely Thomas More, Esquire. When he sees that Thomas More, Esquire, and the King's Chancellor are tugging in opposite directions, he steps down from his public office and returns to being his private self shorn of all the pomp and circumstance of that office.

More, unlike Thomas Cromwell or Richard Rich (who both succeeded him to the Chancellorship of England), values his privacy, his identity, above the *éclat* of public office.

But More, among Bolt's historical personages, is fortunate in that he is a private man who has been raised to public office. "I was commanded into office;" More tells Richard Rich, "it was inflicted on me..." (p. 113, MFS). When the need arises, therefore, and he has to choose, he can return to being merely a man.

The tragedy of Bolt's queens in his other historical play, *Vivat ! Vivat Regina !* is that they are both born into office. They have been placed there by God, and they have not the option of stepping down. "I was born Queen," Mary comments on her own tragedy, "and have proved carnal. I ought to have been born common !"[3] Whereas More, in giving up the chancellorship, is humble enough to realise that he is not indispensable, that, in fact, someone else, equally efficient, will soon be found to take his place, the two queens know that they are indispensable at the helms of their respective kingdoms. Furthermore, they have both been inducted into the ways of the power struggle from birth. Both are conscious of the public-ness of their roles and the importance of those roles.

This leads us to another aspect of the contradiction between politics and individual identity— the privacy of the integral self as opposed to one's exposure to the public gaze, in playing a role. This is heavily emphasised through the symbolism of dress and costume in *A Man for all Seasons*, particularly through that veritable chameleon, the Common Man who has as many 'selves' as he has suits of clothing. The Common Man's first words are on the subject of costume and acting : "It is perverse !" he announces

to the audience. " To start a play made up of Kings and Cardinals in speaking costumes and intellectuals with embroidered mouths, with me"—and so on, lamenting the inadequacy of his own costume. (p. 109, MFS).

More, as Chancellor, is before the public eye, and is consciously " performing. " The office invests him with a role he has to play— and the parallels with acting and stage-peformance are too universal and perennial to need dwelling on at length. To symbolise his abdication of the office of Chancellor, his putting off of the role and his return to private life, More is very consciously made to remove his chain of office.

The treatment of the actor-playing-a-role symbol in *A Man for all Seasons,* and later, in *Vivat! Vivat Regina!* carries certain logical implications. The actor, by definition, by reason of his calling, and through no fault of his own, becomes a sort of involuntary hypocrite. It becomes difficult to tell the reality from the appearance, to separate the integral self of the man from the actor. These implications of the symbol highlight Bolt's presentation of the theme of politics versus self.

Wolsey's postulation of two Mores— the politician and the man— is carried over into the later play where the queens are presented as queens and women. At the end of the play, Mary goes to her death with a superb piece of self-dramatisation. As she comes to the scaffold dressed in a black robe, she sends a message to Elizabeth. " There is more living in a death that is embraced than in a life that is avoided across three score years and ten, " she says as she throws off her black robe and reveals herself in scarlet from head to foot (p. 91, VVR). (Scarlet was synonymous with the blood of martyrdom, on the one hand, and with the scarlet woman, the Whore of Babylon, the Church of Rome, on the other. And the historical Mary, contained within herself both interpretations. She saw herself as a martyr meeting death for the Catholic faith, at the hands of a Protestant. Elizabeth's faction painted her as the scarlet woman for the rest of the world to see.)

A few lines after Mary's words, Elizabeth speaks to Cecil, more as if she were trying to convince herself : " She was an adulterous, disorderly, lecherous strumpet ! " Cecil parries with a list of what Mary was not—

"worthy; thoughtful; self-denying; diligent; prepared." (p. 91, VVR). These two, rather exaggerated, lists sum up in a nutshell the difference between the two queens and the outcomes of their lives. This same difference is earlier underlined in Act Two when Elizabeth comments on Mary's escape from the hands of Rizzio's murderers : "She escapes... down little stairs and greasy passages, she escapes, through the kitchens. I do not know where the kitchens are...... And then in the dark, in the sweet smelling stables, she saddles her own horse; he knows her, he is quiet... *I* cannot saddle a horse. And then she rides, down rocky screes, through mountain rivers, two days and nights two hundred miles, she must have ridden without sleep... And *I* am sleepless; I am spent. And then, this Bothwell—raises men, half-naked men whose whole wealth is a sword, and drives her enemies from Edinburgh—and for what ? Why, *for herself*..." (pp. 54–55, VVR).

But, ironically, the lists also underline the import of Mary's own last words, quoted above. Elizabeth, the politician, has allowed her 'self' to shrivel up and wither away. She has become all "queen", all role, all facade. She has "reigned" with brilliant success, but she hasn't "lived", in Mary's words. And Elizabeth knows this herself. At Cecil's ringing rhetoric on Elizabeth's glory "down Centuries" the queen snarls, "And then?" That one brief phrase says it all (pp. 91–92).

"As a queen," says E. R. Wood, "she has triumphed : as a woman, she is a frightening figure even to herself." (p. 130, VVR). The role has usurped the position of the self and the human being in question has become a gilded shell.

Mary may have made a mess of her queenship, brought acute suffering to herself and anarchy to her kingdom, but she *has* "lived". As she proudly asserts on the scaffold, she brought her suffering upon herself; she, not Elizabeth, signed her own death warrant.

With her eyes wide open, having considered all the implications of the trap that Walsingham may have set for her, Mary goes ahead with her secret letter. To Nau's "Be patient ! and *preserve* yourself !" she replies with passionate self-justification : "God gives each one of us a different life to live. And if we live it well he gives us everlasting life in Heaven.

And if we live it ill, as surely I have lived right ill, yet still may Heaven be merciful. But if we live it not at all nay then I think Heaven has no mercy" (p. 70, VVR). She is paraphrasing the parable of the talents, implying, at the same time, that Elizabeth has lived "it not at all."

And this contrast is epitomised in the two queens' respective ends. Mary actively embraces death. Elizabeth, at the end of the play, just sits and waits. The historical Elizabeth, we know, died old and sick, clinging tenaciously to her pomp and state, unable to sleep, and, only with her last breath, able to name her successor.

The symbolic cluster, public office–actor–role–costume, also underlines the importance of the ideas of appearance and reality as thematic undercurrents in the plays. The opposition between the two concepts, in its most concentrated form, makes for Sir Thomas More's predicament. Other characters are also constantly preoccupied with it. And the opposition creates levels of awareness among the personae of the play.

Of all the personages in *A Man for all Seasons,* More alone, while appreciating the value of appearance, and even using it the way he uses the law, consistently allies himself with reality.

It is his conscience, that conscience on which he maintains absolute silence through the play, for which More pays with his life. And the sterling integrity of that conscience is pointed up by the respective "consciences" of King Henry, on the one hand, and of that slightly comic religious weather–vane, Roper, on the other. "The King's a man of conscience," says Cromwell who is as much an empty shell as More is an individual, "and he wants either Sir Thomas More to bless his marriage or Sir Thomas More destroyed. Either will do." (p. 178, MFS). The blatant matter–of–fact cynicism of this utterance shakes even the perjurer, Rich.

Roper's quite genuine "conscience" — "Joshua's trumpet" — is pointed up by More himself, with a warm, gentle humour. "Listen, Roper", he says to his daughter's suitor, "Two years ago you were a passionate Churchman; now you're a passionate—Lutheran. We must just pray, that when your head's finished turning your face is to the front again" (p. 125, MFS).

And Sir Thomas's hopes are gratified in a rather more extreme fashion than he had bargained for. Roper promptly opens the following act dressed in black, wearing a cross. "Must you wear those clothes, Will ?" asks his father-in-law. He must, Will asserts pompously, because the "time has come for decent men to declare their allegiance"—implying, of course, strong disapproval of what he construes as More's fence-sitting silence. His costume, Roper adds, declares his allegiance to the Church. In Roper's words, his own reality and appearance coalesce. But More retorts, "Well, you *look* like a Spaniard" (pp. 155–56, MFS). (The word "look" is italicised). And More, by implication, is reiterating his loyalty to his conscience, to the Holy Roman Church, but emphatically not to His Catholic Majesty of Spain. (This is a distinction which the other politicians in the play, particularly Chapuys, tend to overlook). In worldly matters More's loyalty is to his King and country.

Underlining the same problem of appearance and reality, More will not, even in the most penurious circumstances, accept a charitable gift from the clergy—because, he tells his wife, "it would *appear* as payment" for his writings. And his situation is such that he cannot afford to have appearances against him, however innocent the truth may be.

His circumspection, all along, is such that though Cromwell and his henchmen try their level best to turn appearances against More, they never succeed. Ultimately they have to resort to outright, barefaced perjury.

An earlier scene presents a secret meeting between Rich and Cromwell trying to manufacture evidence of bribery against More. But even they realise the truth. "Now our present Lord Chancellor," says Cromwell, "*there's* an innocent man". "The odd thing is," replies Rich, " he *is*." (p. 152, MFS). ('Is' is italicised). More's innocence is the incontrovertible fact, whatever *appearance* Cromwell and others may be able to give to his circumstances.

Similarly, when Henry visits his Chancellor at Chelsea, he makes an almost childlike appeal. "You *are* my friend are you not ?" he says to More (p. 138, MFS). ('Are', again, is italicised). The question implies that though More is the King's friend, his stand regarding the divorce makes him *appear* hostile to Henry in the eyes of the world, of people like the Spanish Ambassador Chapuys.

Apart from More, who is dedicated to the reality of his conscience, all the other personages live and react on the plane of appearances, as most ordinary people do. Henry's and Roper's "consciences" are predominantly appearance. Henry, Cromwell, Rich, even the honest Norfolk, send More to the block because, by his silence, he *appears* to be hostile to his king and country.

The theme of appearance and reality, is carried over into *Vivat! Vivat Regina!* as Cecil remonstrates with his Queen. Dudley may not have killed his wife, but " it would *appear* that he did it. That being so it must be *made apparent* that Your Grace did not. Your Grace must think how such a marriage would be taken in France and Spain.... " (p. 7, VVR). Elizabeth cannot marry the man she loves because she would *appear* to be countenancing murder. Mary, placed in a similar predicament with Bothwell, faced with a similar threat, lets appearances go hang, and marries the man she loves. In both cases the result is misery—misery in self-denial for Elizabeth, misery in self-indulgence, for Mary. And all because they both happen to be queens in whose world appearance has to be given far more importance than reality.

The symbolism of the actor playing a role helps intensify the essentially tragic predicament in *Vivat! Vivat Regina!* The queens are two human beings imprisoned in the roles that queenship foists on them. Neither is free to break loose. The one controls, and eventually stifles the private woman, and becomes a great but unhappy queen and stateswoman. The other, equally conscious of her role, has an impulsive tendency to give in to the private woman, is equally unhappy, fails deplorably as queen and ends her life at the headsman's block.

In his Preface to *Vivat! Vivat Regina!* Robert Bolt emphasises the see-saw movement in the relative fortunes of the two queens and cousins. (The two queens themselves were equally fascinated by one another. Each tended to regard the other as an extremely important factor in her own destiny as queen. In fact, Bolt's queens react to one another as both queens and women. They are as interested in each other's appearance as they are in each other's diplomacy.)

This movement is the determining factor in the play's structure. But the two queens have enough in common to make their dissimilar ends all the more poignant.

Both Elizabeth and Mary are extremely conscious of their royalty, of the fact that it sets them apart from the rest of mankind, that it involves prerogatives and duties. Each, also, can see the difference between the queen and the private woman within herself. But Mary, like Thomas More, insists that she is one and indivisible. At the beginning of Act One, Nau, having overcome Mary's reluctance to sign a treaty with Elizabeth, comments, "In this you show more Queen than she." To this Mary retorts with irony, "Aye anything that makes me less makes me more Queen, Claud, does it not ?" "There is much truth in that," says the wise politician. "There is no truth at all in that," explodes Mary, in exasperation. "And I am sick of hearing that. Diminish me, the Queen's diminished. Starve me and the Queen will fail. If I am sickly, she is pale. I am the Queen and more the Queen the *more* I am myself !" (p. 5, VVR). She maintains this attitude to the end.

Hard on the heels of this first scene between the womanly Mary and her wise statesman, Nau, follows a scene between the young, politic, but still womanly Elizabeth and *her* wise statesman, William Cecil.

The impression of two scenes suspended evenly in the balance, is heightened as Cecil's "Ho there—the Queen" at Elizabeth's entry, echoes, word for word, Nau's formal announcement of Mary's exit, a couple of lines earlier. And the conversation between Elizabeth and Cecil reiterates the problem of appearance and reality, of role and self, which Mary and Nau have just finished arguing about. The scene is also a vivid presentation of the cruel dilemma in which Elizabeth is trapped. The woman loves Robert Dudley and is firmly convinced that he is innocent of his wife's death. The queen, however, must dismiss him from her presence, pending inquiry into the death of his wife. As Cecil puts it, "For Your Grace to marry him and remain Queen of England is impossible..." Elizabeth : "We do not know yet that he did it !" Cecil : "It would appear that he did it. That being so it must be made apparent that Your Grace did not. Your Grace must think how such a marriage would be taken in France and Spain, as well as here at home". (p. 7, VVR).

But even these first two scenes, offer indications of each queen's essential bias in her statements on marriage. " I will marry as my heart *and conscience* say, " asserts Elizabeth, foreshadowing the stateswoman who is to send Leicester off as a suitor to her arch–rival's hand. Mary wants *tout court*, " to have a husband I might love, " revealing, in her words, as much of Bothwell's " puir wee lass ", as of queen.

Even in substance the two scenes balance one another. The theme at the centre of both is sexual love and its incompatibility with queenship. The first scene reveals that even faithful old Nau's affection for Mary had been smothered by his " better " political sense into letting her be married off to a boy with hereditary syphilis. " And you stood by, " Mary accuses Nau, " and said no word and let them marry me to syphilis ! " (p. 3, VVR). Her words to Nau are also an ironic comment on her disastrous, love–at–first–sight marriage to Darnley, against everyone's better judgement, later on.

And from what Nau says it becomes clear that even her mother's " love " has sacrificed the child, Mary, so that the " Queen of Scots ' might marry the prospective " King of France, " and " France and Scotland joined might get your English Kingdom too. " ' What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul ? '– This is the unuttered question that hangs in the air, as Mary, the woman, retaliates, " Would you, for fifty Englands, kiss my husband on the mouth ? " A few lines later she again reveals the warmth and passion in her nature. She has been forbidden to touch her husband. " There is a love that needs no touching, " says Nau. " With such a love as that I love him, " says Mary. " But what kind of ' love ' is that ? " (pp. 3–4, VVR). And in spite of this she affirms the identity between her ' self '–' me '–and her role–' the Queen '.

Elizabeth, with the same longing for love, and in the firm knowledge that her love for Dudley is reciprocated, lets herself be badgered by Cecil and by her own politic judgement into relinquishing her personal happiness. However, one must also keep in mind the fact that giving in to her love for Dudley might very well have proved disastrous for England and for Elizabeth the Queen—as Cecil insists on repeating. And this possibility is further underlined in the action, by the catastrophic repercussions of Mary's ' love ' marriages to Darnley and Bothwell.

Motherhood is the most essentially feminine attribute of a woman. And Bolt uses the concept to drive home his point. Mary, the giver-in to her womanliness, is physically a mother; but because of that very womanliness, she is deprived of her child. (In an agonising moment, in Act Two, she has to choose between Bothwell and her son. And not even to keep her baby will she give her lover up to be hanged. She gives up her child to the Scots lords.) Elizabeth, the 'Virgin Queen'—who, in one of the most painful moments of the play calls herself "a barren stock" (p. 55, VVR), becomes the child James VI's surrogate mother, at a distance.

Apart from this, both Elizabeth and Mary have had virtually motherless childhoods, thanks largely to the fact that their mothers were also queens. Elizabeth's mother, Anne Boleyn, was executed for treason within a few years of her child's birth. And Elizabeth grew up in an atmosphere of intrigue and suspicion. In the interests of self-preservation she soon learned to rely on her own wits and keep her own counsel.

Mary had a warm, cultured and cossetted childhood at the French court. But the first scene of *Vivat! Vivat Regina!* makes it very clear that she has been hankering for a mother's love—something that has not been very forthcoming. Mary of Guise's love for her daughter, says Nau, is of the kind that has led her to deprive herself of her child's presence in order to rule her child's Scottish kingdom—the "hardest kind" of love, says Nau. "And granite too is hard," responds Mary. "But I have yet to hear it is a good material to make a cradle of." "I tell you, Claud," she adds, and the dramatic irony is painful, "no care of State shall keep me from my child." (pp. 1-2, VVR).

These two plays—*A Man for all Seasons* and *Vivat! Vivat Regina!*—taken together, then, constitute a detailed critique of politics and the political process; of that cynical expediency epitomised in Henry of Navarre's famous "Paris is worth a Mass" just before ascending the throne as Henri IV of France. The plays, in Bolt's own words, treat of "Power, the pressures and penalties of Power, the gap between the fine appearance which Power makes and the shameful shifts by which it is sustained......the impermissible sacrifice of self which Power demands, and gets, and squanders;......" (p. *viii*, Introduction, VVR).

As "objective correlatives" for the "self" Bolt uses, in the earlier play, "conscience", man's moral nature; and in the later play, sexual love, motherhood, woman's instinctual nature—which may not say much for the author's feminism, but they do have the virtue of almost archetypal suitability. After all, Joan of Arc has never appeared to be as feminine a martyr as Mary Queen of Scots.

Notes

1. Robert Bolt, 'A Man for all Seasons' in *Three Plays* (1967; rpt. London : Heinemann, 1974), p. 157. Hereafter cited as MFS. Further references to the play are incorporated in the text.
2. Bertolt Brecht, *The Life of Galileo,* trans. Desmond I. Vesey (1964; rpt. Calcutta : Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 93.
3. Bolt, *Vivat! Vivat Regina!* (1971; rpt. London : Heinemann, 1974) pp. 50–51. Hereafter cited as VVR. Further references are incorporated in the text.

HESTER PRYNNE : A Compromise

AMINA AMIN
Department of English
School of Languages
Gujarat University
Ahmedabad–380 009.

The aim of this paper is to show that Hester Prynne of Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter* is a compromise between his ideal of womanhood and his vision of a new woman who is not exactly a feminist in the way we understand the word today, but who nevertheless, is struggling hard to free herself from the restrictions and conventions that society has imposed on womankind. Hawthorne himself had recognised his tendency to idealize women and girls :

> I know these girls to be realities of flesh and blood,
> yet... they mingle like kindred creatures with the
> ideal beings of my mind[1].

Even when one agrees with the contention that the book as a whole is characterized by a 'moral' or 'religious' ambivalence, the fact remains that it was the tendency on Hawthorne's part to idealize woman that is responsible for his bungling the portrait of Hester.

From the moment Hester makes her first appearance, when she steps out of the prison door, she strikes the reader as a different woman. She repels the town beadle as he tries to draw her forward, an action marked with 'natural dignity' and 'force of character'. She steps into the open air as if by 'her own free will'. As she stands clasping her baby to her bosom, there is a 'burning blush' on her face, and yet a 'haughty smile and a glance that would not be abashed' by the presence of the multitude of neighbours and townspeople. Even her attire seems to express the attitude of her spirit, the 'desperate recklessness of her mood'. Haughty as her demeanour is, she undergoes an agony as if 'her heart had been flung into the street for the witnesses to spurn and trample upon'. But so great is her self-control that she walks to the scaffold with 'almost a serene deportment'. Her temperament is not of the order 'that escapes from too intense suffering by a swoon'. In short, on the morning of her ignominy she had fortified herself to endure the spiteful stings of the community.

A woman of lesser fibre would have left the place of her sin and shame. Hester does not flee. She settles with her infant on the outskirts of the town, earning her living through her skill in needlework. Although, because of her work, she has established herself very well in the community, she chooses to remain aloof and lonely, 'without a friend on earth', cutting all but the most essential contacts with the people. In all her intercourse with society there is nothing that makes her feel as if she belongs to it and as Hawthorne says :

> Every gesture, every word, and even the silence of those with whom she came into contact, implied, and often expressed, that she was banished, and as much alone as if she inhabited another sphere, or communicated with the common nature by other organs and senses than the rest of human kind.[2]

Even if one grants the fact that Hawthorne is holding the puritan community partly responsible for Hester's predicament it is obvious that he is also suggesting that her isolation or banishment confers on her the benefit of economic and emotional independence which makes her so different from the other women of her community.

Hester shows the same fearlessness and boldness when she asserts her right, as a mother, to bring up Pearl. The Elders of the community want Pearl to be taken out of her charge, to be clad soberly and disciplined strictly and instructed in the truths of heaven and earth. They do not want to trust 'an immortal soul', such as there is in Pearl to the guidance of 'one who hath stumbled and fallen amid the pitfalls of this world'. Without flinching she asserts :

> I can teach my little Pearl what I have learned from this ![3]

No weeping, no wailing, no pleading humbly on Hester's part. She demands emphatically what is her due.

> God gave her (Pearl) into my keeping...I will not give her up ![4]

Isolated and friendless as she is, she will not be cowed down by the authority of the Elders.

Hester is a different woman in yet another way; that is in her freedom of speculation. Unlike the other women of her community, who lived on the level of feeling, Hester often indulged in thinking and brooding. This freedom, Hawthorne says, was common enough on the other side of the

Atlantic, not in New England. What was Hester speculating about ? A dark question often arose in her mind with reference to the whole race of womanhood. Being a social outcast, and possesing a 'mind of native courage and activity', Hester had wandered, without rule or guidance in a moral wilderness that was as vast, as intricate and as shadowy as a forest.

> For years past she had looked from this estranged point of view at human institutions, and whatever priests or legislators had established; criticizing all with hardly more reverence than the Indian would feel for the clerical band, the judicial robe, the pillory, the gallows, the fireside, or the church...The scarlet letter was her passport into regions where other women dared not tread.[5]

But a woman's road to happiness, Hawthorne, says, is not through the head but through the heart. At least, that is what he is suggesting when he says :

> A woman never overcomes these problems by any exercise of thought. They are not to be solved, or only in one way. If her heart chance to come uppermost, they vanish.[6]

Hester wandered in 'the dark labyrinth of mind' because her heart had lost 'its regular and healthy throb'. In other words, Hester could hope to be happy only if she remained true to her heart. As a woman, she can hope to live happily only on the plane of her feelings, her sentiments, which in turn will remind her that it is as a wife, a mother, a sister of mercy–the roles that society has cut out for her kind since times immemorial–that she will find happiness and fulfilment.

Hence, even while emphasizing the unconventional traits of Hester's personality Hawthorne emphasizes her conventional virtues–those that we associate with a mother, a nurse, a sister of mercy. One of the most arresting descriptions of Hester appears in the second chapter of the book where, as she stands with her child clasped to her bosom undergoing her ordeal in the market–place, Hawthorne says :

> Had there been a Papist among the crowd of Puritans, he might have seen in this beautiful woman, so picturesque in her attire and mien, and with the infant at her bosom, an object to remind him of the image of Divine Maternity...Here, there was the taint of deepest sin in the most sacred quality of human life...[7]

'Motherhood' is the most sacred quality of human life. And Hester, standing with Pearl at her bosom, reminds Hawthorne of that sacred image of 'sinless motherhood'. Indeed all through the book Hester is shown devotedly performing a mother's duty towards Pearl. Hawthorne goes to the extent of saying that those unquiet elements that had distracted Hester before Pearl's birth had since begun to be soothed away by the softening influences of maternity. It is not merely to Pearl that Hester is a mother. She is a mother and a sister of mercy to the weak and the destitute. Even as she stays away from the community which has ostracized her, she continues to bestow her time and means in charity, on wretches less miserable than herself. Referring to the influence of her charitable actions on her personality Hawthorne says :

> In such emergencies, Hester's nature showed itself warm and rich, a wellspring of human tenderness, unfailing to every real demand and inexhaustible by the largest. Her breast, with its badge of shame, was but the softer pillow for the head that needed one. She was self-ordained a Sister of Mercy;...[8]

But before she finally assumes her role of a sister of mercy, Hawthorne gives Hester one more chance to assert her individuality. It is when she sees Dimmesdale at the midnight vigil that Hester decides that she will have to discard her passive role if she has to save him. Hester realizes that because of his own guilt which he was hiding in his bosom, as well as the diabolical influence of Chillingworth, Dimmesdale's nerve was absolutely destroyed. Hester's soul shudders at the way he appeals to her for support, when she ultimately breaks her oath to Chillingworth and reveals to Dimmesdale who his enemy has been. To what extent Dimmesdale's spirit has sunk into weakness, is evident from his cry to Hester :

> Think for me, Hester ! Thou art strong, Resolve for me ![9]

and again,

> Be thou strong for me ! Advise me what to do.[10]

It is here that Hester puts forth the plan which Dimmesdale accepts in the excitement of the moment. And Hester's plan is characteristic of her boldness and the courage of her conviction that their sin had a consecration of its own.

> Thou art crushed under this Seven years' weight....But thou shalt leave it all behind thee !...Leave this wreck and ruin here where it happened. Meddle no more with it ! Begin all anew !... The future is yet full of trial and success. There is happiness to be enjoyed. There is good to be done !...Do anything, save to lie down and die ! Why shouldst thou tarry so much as one other day in the torments that have gnawed into thy life !—that have made thee feeble to will and to do !— that will leave thee powerless even to repent ! Up and away ![11]

This is Hester's best moment in the book. It is as if the floodgates of her spirit have been thrown open. Although she too has continued to suffer the consequences of her sin, she has not allowed her will to weaken. She can still make bold decisions. Even after Dimmesdale's death she does not budge from her decision. She leaves the place of her sin and guilt with Pearl.

But this trait in Hester's personality–the courage to challenge social sanctions–conflicted with Hawthorne's conception of womanhood. He could not envisage a woman daring enough to venture out in an alien world all by herself. So Hester returns to the place of her sin and sorrow. What baffles the reader is why Hawthorne should have allowed her to have tried courageously to challenge social norms, as she does after she has been banished by her community, why after having allowed her to take the initiative of planning a flight from Boston and starting life anew with Dimmesdale, why after Dimmesdale's death he should have allowed her to leave Boston with Pearl, live abroad for a few years and then ultimately have her return to her past and repent for her sin till the end of her life. Of course, Hawthorne does say that Hester 'returned and resumed, of her own free will......the symbol' of her guilt. But it is a 'will' guided purely by her sentiments, her feelings,– not that speculative part of her personality that prompted her to ask questions about the plight of women, but one that succumbs to the age–old belief that a woman finds happiness only when she obeys the dictates of her heart. Hence Hester finds happiness playing the role of a sister of mercy. Hawthorne puts it tellingly :

> ...as Hester Prynne had no selfish ends, nor lived in any measure for her own profit and enjoyment, people brought all their sorrows and perplexities and besought her counsel, as one who had herself gone through a

> mighty trouble. Women, more specially in the continually recurring trials of wounded, wasted, wronged, misplaced, or erring and sinful passion–or with the dreary burden of a heart unyielded, because unvalued and unsought–came to Hester's cottage, demanding why they were so wretched and what the remedy ! Hester comforted and counselled them, as best she might.[12]

We know that Hester has been very charitable and large hearted in the past. But this total devotion to comforting and counselling on her part is unacceptable only because the reason that Hawthorne gives is unconvincing.

> But there was a more real life for Hester Prynne here in New England than in that unknown region where Pearl had found a home. Here had been her sin; here, her sorrow; and here was yet to be her penitence.[13]

Hawthorne seems to be seeking an easy way out of a difficult situation when he states that the world is still not ripe enough for an order which would establish the whole relation between man and woman on a surer ground of mental happiness. Hester was not destined to be the prophetess through whom the 'divine truth' could be proclaimed because she is stained with sin. The apostle of the coming revelation according to Hawthorne must be a woman of course, but 'lofty', 'pure and beautiful' and 'wise'. It is not clear what kind of a new order Hawthone is hoping for, when the woman who is going to be its herald is going to remain a bundle of traditional virtues like 'purity', 'beauty', 'charity', 'meekness' etc.

Hester had 'great elements', to use Chillingworth's words. Hawthorne has sacrificed those elements at the altar of an ideal he cherished.

Note

1. Quoted in Edward Wagenknecht, *Nathaniel Hawthorne: Man and Writer* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 132.
2. *The Scarlet Letter* (New York : Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965) Ch. 5, p. 74. All references to the text hereafter will be to this edition.
3. ibid., Ch.8, p. 97. 4. ibid., Ch.8, p. 99. 5. ibid., Ch.18, p. 177.
6. ibid., Ch.13, p. 147. 7. ibid., Ch.2, p. 49. 8. ibid., Ch.13, p. 143.
9. ibid., Ch.17, p. 174. 10. ibid., Ch.17, p. 174. 11. ibid., Ch.17, pp. 175–176.
12. ibid., Ch.24, p. 233. 13. ibid., Ch.24, p. 233.

प्रीतमदास और उनकी हिन्दी वाणी

डा. रामकुमार गुप्त
रीडर, हिन्दी विभाग,
गुजरात युनिवर्सिटी, अमदाबाद.

गुजराती सन्त साहित्य में अखा के पश्चात् जितनी लोकप्रियता प्रीतमदास को मिली उतनी संभवतः किसी अन्य को प्राप्त न हो सकी। वे वस्तुतः गुजरात के लोकधर्मी सन्त थे। वे जितने त्यागी और लोकानुरागी थे, उतने ही तपोव्रती और समदृष्टा भी थे। वे लोकमानस की अतल गहराइयों में जाने वाले "मरजीवा सन्त कवि" थे। उनके समकालीन ज्ञानी सन्त जन गोविन्द के शब्दों में वे सूरदास के अवतार थे। "सूरसागर" का संचित रूप एक तरह से "प्रीतम" की वाणी में साकार हो उठा था।[1] वे निर्गुण-सगुण की साधना का समन्वय लेकर अवतरित हुए थे, जिन्होने अपने मार्ग में राम और श्याम का भेद भी मिटा दिया था। वे गुजरात की रामानंदीय परम्परा के वैरागी साधुओं में से एक थे, जो सच्चे अर्थों में "सिद्ध बाबा" थे, साधुयोगी थे, साधवा थे। "बावा" शब्द की निगूढ़ता को उन्होने पचाया था।[2] वे भक्तिमार्ग को प्रशस्त करने वाले सूरमा साधक थे, जिन्होने अग्नि-ज्वालाओं में तपा-तपा कर अपनी साधना की कसौटी की थी।[3] प्रीतम एक ओर जहाँ पहुँचे हुए साधक थे, वहाँ वे दूसरी ओर आख्यानकार और कीर्तनकार भी थे। इसीलिए वे अखा और प्रेमानंद के बीच की सृष्टि थे। वस्तुतः प्रेमानंद की सरसता और अखा की अद्वैतभावना का सम्मिलन यदि कहीं ढूँढ़ना हो तो वह केवल प्रीतम की वाणी में ही संभव है।

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1. "सूरसागर पूरब जनमे,
आहाँ प्रीतम थई आव्या,
सूर सूरातण सोभाव्युं,
मारा मनमां भाव्या।"
—संदेसर हस्तप्रति 5, पन्ना 408.

2. "भाई अमे बावा रे बावा,
हाथे माळा गोविन्द गुण गावा।"
—श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी, पृ. 483.

3. "हरिनो मारग छे सूरानो, नहि कायरनुं काम जोने;
× × ×
प्रेमपंथ पावकनी ज्वाळा......देखनहारा दाझे जो ने।"
—वही, पृ. 496.

अपने समकालीन सन्तों में प्रीतम का नाम समादरणीय रहा है। शेरखी के रविसाहब का पत्र इस दृष्टि से उल्लेखनीय है।[1] रविसाहब के मन प्रीतम एक निर्मल और कोमल हृदय वाले सन्त थे, जिनसे गोष्ठी करने के लिए उनका मन सदैव अभिलाषा करता रहता था। उनके कथनानुसार स्वामी प्रीतम का समग्र जीवन भक्तिमय प्रतीत होता है। वे सच्चे अर्थों में ब्रह्मज्ञानी थे। नडियाद के गोविन्दराम ने इसीलिए उन्हें नवधाभक्ति से परिपूर्ण कहा है। प्रीतम के ही समकालीन दास सीभाई (श्रीभाई) ने उन्हें सन्त शिरोमणि बताते हुए अलौकिक आनन्द-रस का भोक्ता कहा है।[2] इस प्रकार हम देखते हैं कि एक पहुँचे हुए साधक के रूप में प्रीतम अपने समय में ही प्रख्यायित हो चुके थे। अपने समय के सगुण-निर्गुण सभी साधकों में विशिष्ट स्थान धारण करने वाले स्वामी प्रीतम सचमुच जीवनमुक्त योगी थे, जिनके भीतर से अनीन-उपासनाभाव निरन्तर फूटा करता था। साधना एवं व्यवहार दोनों क्षेत्रों में अपने "प्रीतम" (प्रीतिमय) नाम को उन्होने सार्थक किया था।

जन्म, जन्मस्थान एवं मृत्यु समय :

प्रीतमदास का नाम उनकी वाणी में कई रूपों में आया है। उनकी साखियों और पदों में प्रीतम, प्रीतम स्वामी, प्रीतमदास और जनप्रीतम की छाप मिलती है। खासकर "प्रीतम के प्रभु प्रेम सनेही" का अधिकांश प्रयोग उनके पदों में मिलता है। इनके जन्म, जन्मस्थान एवं जीवन के विषय में प्रामाणिक सामग्री के अभाव में विद्वानों के बीच अनेक मतभेद मिलते हैं। स्व. इच्छाराम ने इनकी आयु 72 वर्ष की बतायी है[3]; तो श्री के. एम. झवेरी ने 72 वर्ष की अवस्था में इनकी पत्नी का देहावसान सूचित किया है।[4] स्व. छोटालाल पटेल ने "श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी" की भूमिका में प्रीतमदास के जीवन पर सामान्य प्रकाश डालते हुए यह कहा है कि—"प्रीतमदास ने संवत् 1817 वि. में संदेसर में सर्वप्रथम आकर भजन किया और इसके बाद वे सदेसर में ही बस गये। यह बात आज भी पुरानी हस्तपोथियों में से उपलब्ध होती है।[1] इसीके अन्तर्गत उन्होंने यह भी कहा है कि प्रीतम-दास के 34 शिष्य थे, जिनमें नारणदास प्रमुख शिष्य थे। नारणदास के समय में प्रीतम के कुल 52 मंदिर थे जिनकी संख्या आगे चलकर 104 तक बतायी गयी है। इन मंदिरों में केवल त्यागी साधू ही रह सकते थे।[2] इन तथ्यों से यह सिद्ध होता है कि "संदेसर" प्रीतम की जन्मभूमि न होकर साधनाभूमि अथवा कर्मभूमि थी। कुछ विद्वानों ने "बावला"

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1. देखिए—श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी पृ. 51.
2. "प्रेमभक्तिनुं करो पोषण, परमारथमां पूरा,
   ज्ञान विज्ञानमां वाम्यव, सघळी वाते सूरा।"

   —दास सीभाई
3. बृहद् काव्य दोहन, भाग–3.
4. गु. सा. भा. स्तंभो, श्री कृष्णलाल झवेरी।

   1. श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी, पृ. 38।
   2. वही, पृ. 38–89।

को प्रीतम की जन्मभूमि बताया है, लेकिन अभी कुछ समय पूर्व उपलब्ध प्रमाणों के आधार पर यह बात भी सही प्रतीत नहीं होती। संदेसर-मंदिर से सम्बन्धित जयपुर के भाट श्री द्वारकादास केशोदासकी एक वही में से (पन्ना नं. 53 से) जो तथ्य प्राप्त हुए हैं, वे इस प्रकार हैं :—

1. प्रीतमदास की जन्म तिथि संवत् 1774 वि. केवल इसी पोथे में मिलती है।
2. संदेसर में प्रीतम के आगमन की तिथि संवत् 1817 वि. का उल्लेख।
3. "सरसगीता" का रचना संवत् 1831 जो कृति के अन्तर्गत भी यही मिलता है।
4. प्रीतमदास की मृत्यु तिथि-संवत् 1854, वैसाख वदी 12, मध्याह्नकाल में। इसी बात का संकेत "भगवतगीता" के अन्त में प्रीतम के शिष्य नारणदास ने किया है कि—"सने अढार चोपना, वैसाख वद 12 ने दिवसे मध्यान ने काले बावोजी सधाम पधारा छे, ते जाणजो।"
5. पिता का नाम प्रतापसिंह और माता का नाम जेकुंवरबा मिलता है। इस तथ्य की पुष्टि हमें संदेसर से मिलने वाली हस्तप्रतियों में प्राप्त संकेतों से भी होती है। श्री इच्छाराम ने इनके पिता का नाम रघुनाथदास बताया है, किन्तु यह आधार-रहित है।
6. जयपुर की वही में ही हमें एक महत्त्वपूर्ण तथ्य और भी मिलता है कि प्रीतमदास की जन्मभूमि चुड़ा थी जहाँ के मंदिर के महन्त भाईदासजी से उन्होंने 'भेख' लिया था। यह उनकी प्रथम रामानंदी दीक्षा थी।
7. इसी आधार पर यह भी प्रतीत होता है कि प्रीतमदास बारोट (भाट) जाति के थे।[1]

उपर्युक्त तथ्यों से यह स्पष्ट होता है कि प्रीतमदास मूलतः चुड़ा (काठियावाड़) के बारोट थे, जिनका जन्म संवत् 1774 वि. और निधन सं. 1854 वि. में हुआ था। इस प्रकार उन्होने कुल 80 वर्ष की आयु प्राप्त की थी, जो ऐसे त्यागी संतपुरुष के लिए कोई मुश्किल बात नहीं थी।

सूरदास की भाँति प्रीतमदास के अंधत्व के विषय में भी काफी मत–वैभिन्य मिलता है। इनके अनुयायिओं की यह दृढ़ मान्यता है कि ये जन्मांध एवं बाल ब्रह्मचारी थे। वे बचपन से ही त्यागी–वैरागी थे। श्री के. एम. झवेरी ने इनकी उत्तरावस्था में इनका अंध होना बतलाया है।[2] प्रीतम की कुछेक रचनाओं में निरूपित वर्णनों से ऐसा लगता

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1. "प्रीतमदासजी की जन्मपतरी लखी छे। गाँव चुड़ा, देश काठियावाड में बारोट प्रतापसिंह के घर जेकुंवरबाई के प्रीतमदास को जन्म हुआ छे। पछी वैराग धारण कर्या...गाँव संदेसर, देश गुजरात में बिराज्या।"

—देखिए फोटो प्रिन्ट प्लेट नं. 3

प्रीतम : एक अध्ययन (प्रकरण–3 के प्रारम्भ में)

2. देखिए—गु. सा. भा. स्तंभो—श्री कृष्णलाल झवेरी।

है कि प्रीतम जन्मांध नहीं थे। निश्चय ही सूरदास के अंधत्व की भाँति प्रीतम के सम्बन्ध में भी ये सभी तर्क ज्यों के त्यों लागू होते हैं। प्रीतम अंध अवश्य थे, लेकिन वे कब अंध हुए यह ठोस प्रमाण के अभाव में निश्चित रूप से कुछ कहा नहीं जा सकता। प्रीतम को अपना अंधत्व अवश्य ही दुःखदायी लगा होगा। तभी तो वे कहते हैं—"नथी देखतो दुर्मति, आँख फूटी।" प्रीतम के अंधत्व के विषय में एक प्रमाण और भी दिया जा सकता है कि उनके ग्रन्थों में जो लिपिकों की बेशुमार अशुद्धियाँ मिलती हैं, वे स्वयं उन अशुद्धियों को देखने में असमर्थ रहे होंगे। तभी तो "सदेह" के बदले "सधे", "अविनाश" के बदले "अविन्यास", "स्पर्श" के बदले "प्रसप्रस", "अवश्यमेव" के बदले "अश्वमेव" जैसी उच्चारण सम्बन्धी भूलें रह गयी हैं। ऐसा भी प्रसिद्ध है कि वे अंध होने के बावजूद अपने शिष्य नारणदास के साथ काशी तक हो आये थे।

श्री के. एम. झवेरी और स्व. इच्छाराम दोनों ही प्रीतम को विवाहित मानते हैं, लेकिन इस कथन की सत्यता अन्तः साक्ष्य एवं बहिर्साक्ष्य दोनों आधारों पर सिद्ध नहीं होती। प्रीतम स्वयं रामानंदी जमात के त्यागी साधू थे, जिन्होने जगह-जगह अपने आपको "बावा" कहा है। यही नहीं, प्रीतम स्वामी के सभी मन्दिरों में आज भी यह परम्परा ज्यों का त्यों सुरक्षित है कि इनका महन्त तथा साधू वही हो सकता है, जो त्यागी हो। प्रीतमदास की गुरु प्रणालिका भी त्यागी साधुओं की है। ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि बहुत छोटी उम्र में उन्होंने गृह-त्याग किया था। घर-संसार से वे इस कदर विनिर्मुक्त थे कि उन्होने अपने माता-पिता का नाम तक लेने की परवाह नहीं की है। उन्होने तो चौरासी लाख योनियों में जन्म लेने वाले सभी जीवों को अपना माता-पिता कहा है—

"स्थावर जंगम जो तनधारी, सो तो जानो सब जात हमारी;
चारखाण चौराशी जेह, हमरी मात-पिता सब एह।"

—प्री. वा., पृ. 206

ऐसे विरक्त साधू को गृहस्थ जीवन का भोक्ता कैसे कहा जा सकता है? उन्होने तो विषयरोग का समूल काट कर अपने आपको नरवा (नरश्रेष्ठ) बना दिया था। इस रूप में हम देखते हैं कि प्रीतम आजीवन अपरिणित ही रहे। वे गृहस्थ साधू न होकर वैरागी साधू थे।

गुरु के सम्बन्ध में :

प्रीतमदास के गुरु कौन थे? उनका नाम क्या था? इस सम्बन्ध में गुजराती साहित्य के विद्वानों में अनेक मतभेद मिलते हैं। स्व. इच्छाराम और श्री झवेरी ने "गोविन्द-राम" को इनका गुरु बताया है। यह नाम प्रीतम-वाणी में अनेक बार आता भी है, लेकिन यह सचमुच प्रीतम के गुरु के नाम के रूप में नहीं आता, अपितु ईश्वर के पर्याय के

रूप में मिलता है। उदाहरण के लिए—

"वंदु गुरु गोविन्द अखंड एक रूप,
अखंड एकरूप, अखंड एकरूप
आद्य पुरुष प्रभु अकल स्वरूप।"[1]

अर्थात् "गुरु गोविन्द" शब्द का प्रयोग प्रीतमदास ने अपने गुरु के लिए नहीं, बल्कि आद्य और अखंड स्वरूप परमात्मा तत्त्व के लिए किया है। नडियाद के गोविन्द-राम इनके गुरु इस लिए नहीं हो सकते, क्योंकि उन्होने स्वयं प्रीतम का नाम बहुत ही आदर सत्कारपूर्वक लिया है। उन्होने तो प्रीतम को सूर का अवतार माना है। अत: यह निश्चित है कि नडियाद वाले "जन गोविन्द" प्रीतमदास के गुरु नहीं हो सकते। प्रीतम ने ऐसे अनेक शब्दों के प्रयोग किए हैं, जो एक ओर परमात्म तत्त्व के पर्याय-से लगते हैं तो दूसरी आर ऐसे नाम उनके गुरु होने की शंका पैदा करते हैं। यथा—

"गुरु विसंभर विश्वाधार,
गुरु विना कोये ना पामे पार।
गुरु परमात्मा आत्माराम,
प्रीतम प्रेमे करे प्रणाम।[1]

इसमें "गुरु विश्वंभर" और "गुरु आत्माराम" ऐसे संकेत परम गुरु परमात्मा के सम्बन्ध में ही हो सकते हैं। यह बात अलग है कि प्रीतमदास की गुरु प्रणालिका में कुछ नाम इस तरह के भी मिल जाते हैं। कवि ने "भक्त नामावली" में जहाँ सैंकड़ों भक्तों का नामोल्लेख किया है, वहाँ प्रारम्भ में उसने आदरपूर्वक भक्त भाईजी अर्थात् "भाईदास" का स्मरण अपने गुरु के रूप में किया है—

"जै गुरुदेव दयानिधि स्वाभी,
सकल लोक को अन्तरजामी;
भक्त भाईजी सद्‌गुरु देवा,
तन-मन लायक करुँ निज सेवा।"[2]

इस आधार पर यह सिद्ध होता है कि भक्त भाईदासजी ही प्रीतमदास के दीक्षागुरु थे, जिनकी सेवाचाकरी उन्होंने तन-मन से की थी। जयपुर के भाट के वहीखाते में भी

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1. संदेसर वाली हस्तप्रति—5, पन्ना—78.

1. देखिए—संदेसरवाली हस्तप्रति, क्रम-5, पन्ना-77.

2. श्री प्रीतमदासजीनी वाणी, पृ. 69.

प्रीतमदास की जो "गुरुप्रणालिका" मिलती है, वह इस प्रकार है —

कोबाजी अथवा कूबाजी
|
दामोदरदासजी
|
वसनदासजी
|
गोकुलदासजी
|
काशीतरामजी अथवा करसनदास
|
आत्मारामजी
|
भायदासजी अथवा भाईदासजी
|
प्रीतमदासजी — धनजी — मनोहरदासजी (बापुजी)

इसी पोथी के अन्तर्गत ऐसा उल्लेख भी मिलता है कि—"संदेसर प्रीतम स्वामीजी के गुरुभाई बापुर्जी महाराजा प्रीतमदासजी के शिष्य 34 थया।" अतः अब यह निर्विवाद रूप से कहा जा सकता है कि "बापु" वस्तुतः प्रीतम के गुरु न होकर गुरुभाई थे, जिन्हें उन्होने गुरुवत् सम्मान दिया था। यों भी जहाँ प्रीतम ने ईश्वर को जगह-जगह "गुरु" के नाम से पुकारा है, वहाँ ऐसा ही अहोभाव प्रीतम के सत्संग में आने वाले अनेक सन्तों के लिए भी दिखायी देता है। इन सन्तों में रवि साहब, दास सीभाई, हीमा भगत, जन गोविन्द आदि के नाम विशेष रूप से लिये जा सकते हैं। जन गोविन्द के द्वारा तो प्रीतम ने "शांकरभाष्य" और "भागवत एकादश स्कंध" का श्रवण किया था, ऐसे उल्लेख भी मिलते हैं।[1] "ज्ञानगीता" में तो प्रीतम ने यह स्पष्ट कहा है कि यह ग्रन्थ गुरु समान गोविन्दराम की प्रेरणा से ही लिखा है।[2] प्रीतमदास यह मानते थे कि गुरु के भीतर ही नारायण का वास रहता है—

"गुरु नारायण नर के रूपा, शब्दबोधमय तत्त्व अनूपा,
सीतल कोमल वचन रसाला, कहे प्रीतम गुरु परम दयाला।"[3]

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1. देखिए-प्रीतम : एक अध्ययन, पृ. 115.
2. "हरि गुरु संत प्रसादे पाम्यो, प्रीतम परम आनंद,
कृत कृत्य धन्य धन्य थयो ते, कृपा गुरु गोविन्द।"
—प्रीतमदासनी वाणी, पृ. 93.
3. प्रीतमदासनी वाणी, पृ. 47, गुरुमहिमा-2.

"गुरुमहिमा" के सम्बन्ध में प्रीतम ने अनेक साखियों और पदों की रचना की है। इनमें संदेसर वाली हस्तप्रति-2 में संकलित पद[1] बड़ा ही महत्त्वपूर्ण है। इस पद में प्रीतमदास ने कहा है कि जिस तरह कल्पवृक्ष और सुरधेनु में सभी देवता वास करते हैं, उसी तरह गुरु की देह में सभी देवों की व्याप्ति है–

"विष्णु वसे निज चरन, सेष सोइ सप्त पताला,
कटि जंघा मध्य लोक विरंचि गज वदन विसाला।
सागर पोहूये करधंना, गोदावरी गलका तीरथ,
नाभी मध्य नारायन रमा, जहाँ सब सुकीरथ।
संभु सहित कैलास, वास रुदयास्थल कीनो,
कंठ विसध स्थान, जगत चौदस को चीनो।
वांम दक्षिण दोऊ भुजा, सदा शिव विष्णु विराजे,
घड़े वहुविध घाट, रुदे चतुरानन राजे!"

यही नहीं, प्रीतम ने इसी पद में गुरु के सौंदर्य का इस तरह वर्णन किया है, मानों वे गुरु का नखशिख वर्णन ही कर रहे हों। इस सम्बन्ध में कुछ पंक्तियाँ द्रष्टव्य हैं।—

"नखद्युति अरक समान मोहतम निकट न आवे,
धरहु निरन्तर ध्यान अधिक मन मोद बढ़ावे।
उदर देख तीन, मानुं तेहि तरंग विलासा,
रुदे परम सुख ऐन, कीन एक राम निवासा।
तुलसी कमल उर माल, सुमने छवि सरस बनाई,
देव धुनि रवि सुता सारदा संग सोहाई।
बाहु प्रलम्ब विसाला सरोरु रूपबल सोहे,
सुंदर रूप रसाल रसिकजन को मन मोहे।"

प्रस्तुत "गुरु महिमा" का पद निश्चय ही भाव, भाषा एवं वस्तु की दृष्टि से बड़ा मनोहारी एवं कलात्मक है। प्रीतम ने–अखा की भाँति यों तो समस्त संसार को अपना गुरु माना है, फिर भी उनकी दृष्टि में गुरु के तीन रूप हैं—(1) परमात्म रूप (2) दीक्षा गुरु (3) संत रूप। परमात्मारूप एवं दीक्षागुरु के अभिव्यक्तिकरण में विशेषीकरण है, जब कि संतरूप में सामान्यीकरण है। सामान्यीकरण से हमारा तात्पर्य अहोभाव से है। प्रीतम ने इन तीनों रूपों की अलग-अलग रचनाएँ की हैं, जिनमें भाईदास स्पष्टतः उनके दीक्षागुरु दिखाई देते हैं। अन्तःसाक्ष्य एवं बहिर्साक्ष्य दोनों से इस बात की पुष्टि भी होती है।

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1. देखिए—संदेसर हस्तप्रति—2, पन्ना—70.

ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि प्रीतम ने बहुत छोटी उम्र में ही भाईदासजी से गुरुदीक्षा प्राप्त कर ली थी और उन्होंने गृहत्याग किया था। चुड़ा (राणपुर) में आज भी रघुनाथजी का एक छोटा-सा मन्दिर जीर्ण-शीर्ण अवस्था में है, जिस से इनका सम्बन्ध जोड़ा जाता है। चुड़ा (राणपुर) मन्दिर की परम्परा रामानन्दी साधुओं की परम्परा है, जो जिंटड़ा (जिंथड़ा) से आनेवाले करसनदास से प्रारम्भ होती है। करसनदास के शिष्य आत्माराम और आत्माराम के शिष्य भाईदास हुए, जिन्होंने प्रीतम को किशोरवय में गुरुदीक्षा प्रदान की थी।[1] भाईदास के कुल चार शिष्य थे. जिनमें बापु बड़े थे और प्रीतमदास छोटे थे। यह भी सम्भव है कि बापू ने प्रीतम को रामानन्द - सम्प्रदाय के शास्त्रों और सिद्धान्तों को समझाया हो और इस रूप में प्रीतम ने बापू के नाम से अभिहित किया हो। रविसाहब ने इसीलिए प्रीतम के गुरु के रूप में बापू का उल्लेख किया है – "साचा सतगुरु वरिया बापू, साची कीधी सेवा"।[2]

प्रीतम के मन गुरु के प्रति इतना आदरभाव था कि वे कहा करते थे कि—"जाके मस्तक गुरु नहीं, सो नर नुगरा जाण।[3] गुरुहीन प्राणी को उन्होंने ढेार का अवतार कहा है, उनकी दृढ़ मान्यता थी कि जो व्यक्ति गुरु तथा गोविन्द की पूजा नहीं करता उसके हाथों में तो बेड़ियाँ डाल देनी चाहिए। हरि के बग़ैर उच्चारण करने वाले की जीभ खेंच लेनी चाहिए।[4] जगत में अन्य सभी नाते-रिश्ते स्वार्थ के कारण जुड़े हुए हैं। गुरु ही एक मात्र अन्तर्यामी और उपकारी है, जिसकी प्रीति सदा-सर्वदा एक-सी बनी रहती है –

"मात तात, सुत, भांमनी, भ्राता,
ए सब स्वारथ के संग राता।
स्वारथ छुट गया जब मनका,
टुटा नाता नेह सबन का।
ताते गुरु के चरण नमामी,
आद्य अंत मध्य अंतरजामी।
गुरुसम कोउ नहिं उपकारी,
अधमजीव लिये बहु उबारी।"[1]

ऐसा जीव जो गुरुभक्ति नहीं करता, वह धिक्कार का पात्र है, वह कूकर—शूकर, काग और षपे (सस्सा, खरगोश) का जन्म लेनेवाला है। यह नहीं, जो अपने गुरु की निंदा

1. देखिए – प्रीतम : एक अध्ययन, अश्विन पंटेल, पृ. 120.
2. प्रीतमदासनी वाणी, पृ. 51.
3. वही, पृ. 142.
4. वाल्ला मन्दिर, ह. प्र. 2.

1. देखिए–खंभातवाली हस्तप्रति, पन्ना–176,
विनेदीनता पद।

सुनता है ऐसा जीव अधम, मूढ़ और गंवार है ।[2] प्रीतम इस बात को दृढ़तापूर्वक मानते हैं कि—

"प्रीतम साई परमपद पावे,
जा सतगुरु के सरने आवे ।
गुरु महिमा सुने अरु गावे,
सो बहुरि गर्भवास न आवे ।"[3]

"सतगुरु" और "सन्त" ये दोनों ही बड़े महत्त्वपूर्ण शब्द हैं प्रीतम की वाणी में। जिस तरह सतगुरु को इन्होंने तारणहार कहा है, उसी तरह संत को "मरजीवा" कहा है—

"खेले वसंत संत मरजीवा,
आनंद फूल्यो फाग;
वदन सरोज सोहे सब्द मधुकर,
गुंजत ज्ञान–वैराग ।"[4]

सन्त समागम एवं गृहत्याग :

गुरु महिमा-गान के साथ-साथ प्रीतम ने सन्त-समागम पर भी खूब लिखा है। ये दोनों विषय प्रीतम की वाणी में एक-दूसरे के पर्याय-से बनकर आये हैं। लगता है, बारह वर्ष की अवस्था से ही प्रीतम ने इस प्रकार का समागम करना शुरू कर दिया था। "बार बरस बचपनमां खोया" की अभिव्यक्ति इस बात की सूचक है।[1] इसी सत्संग के प्रभाव से उन्होंने गृहत्याग किया हो, यह बहुत संभव है। ऐसा भी प्रतीत होता है कि प्रारम्भकाल में प्रीतम रामानन्दी साधुओं के सम्पर्क में रहे, लेकिन ज्यों-ज्यों समय बीतता गया त्यों-त्यों वे इस प्रकार के दायरे से भी मुक्त होते चले गये। निर्गुण ब्रह्म के साथ सगुण श्याम की भक्ति उनकी इसी क्रमिकता का बोध कराती है। "ज्ञान प्रकाश" में तो कवि ने भगवान से याचना की है कि "हे प्रभु! अगर कुछ देना ही है तो मुझे आठों याम सन्त-समागम दो"[2] इसके साथ ही कवि ने अपनी साखियों में सन्त और असन्त की लम्बी व्याख्या भी प्रस्तुत की है। सन्तों के लक्षण गिनाने में प्रीतम अघाते नहीं हैं, फिर भी उनका कहना है कि—

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2. वही, पन्ना–240.
3. वही, पन्ना–240.
4. देखिए—वाछा मंदिर हस्तप्रति–1, पन्ना–178.

1. इस प्रकार की अभिव्यक्ति हमें कबीर में भी मिलती है। देखिए—
"बारह बरस बालपन बीते,
बीस बरस कछु तप न कर्यो।" —संन्त कबीर, आ. 15, पृ. 105.
2. ज्ञान प्रकाश, प्री. वा. पृ. 84.

"संत लक्षण कहि सके,
शेष न पामे पार।
कहे प्रीतम कैसे करूँ,
वाणिरहित विचार।"[3]

निश्चय ही, प्रीतम ने मन, वाणी और कर्म से सन्त-सेवा का व्रत धारण किया था। यही वजह है कि गुरु की भाँति प्रीतम के जीवन-निर्माण में अनेक सन्तों का महत्त्वपूर्ण योगदान था। वे सत्संग के सामने जप, तप, योग और आचार को भी व्यर्थ समझते थे।[4] सत्संग-सुलभता के हेतु ही प्रीतम निरन्तर भ्रमणशील रहे। चुड़ा (राणपुर) को छोड़कर वे संदेसर में विराजे, किन्तु वहाँ भी कभी लम्बे समय तक के लिए टिक कर नहीं रहे। वे जहाँ भी गये, अपनी शालीनता और विनम्रता बिखेरते गये और इसी लिए अपने समय के प्रायः सभी सन्तों में वे सबसे अधिक समादृत हुए।

प्रीतम के समकालीन :

चरोतरभूमि के अन्य समकालीन प्रतिष्ठित सन्तों में वीरसद के बस्तों, सोजित्रा के देवीदास, खंभात के शिवदास और विष्णुदास डाकोर के भक्त द्वारकादास, पीज (नडियाद) के नरभेराम, खेड़ा के रत्नो भगत और कपड़वंज के रणछोड भगत आदि के नाम विशेष रूप से उल्लेखनीय हैं। इन सभी में प्रीतमदास कुछ अलग ही दिखायी देते हैं। लोकजीवन के एक सजग प्रहरी और गायक बनकर प्रीतम ने अपनी साधना का पथ प्रशस्त किया था। इसीलिए उनकी वाणी में हमें एक गहन सामाजिक उत्तरदायित्व का भाव मिलता है। प्रीतम की भक्ति कहीं भी एकान्तिक नहीं हो पायी है, बल्कि वह सामाजिकता से आतप्रोत है। अपने समय के भयंकर दुर्भिक्ष के बीच भी इस रचनाकार ने अपनी अध्यात्मपूर्ण वाणी का अमृत पिलाकार तत्कालीन जनजीवन को जाग्रत रखा है। भयंकर अकाल की स्थिति में सामान्य प्रजा का दुःख जब प्रीतम से देखा न गया तो वे भगवान को भी खरी-खोटी सुनाने में पीछे नहीं हटे। अपने दोनों हाथ उपर उठा कर उन्होने भगवान से कहा कि—"हे प्रभु! हमारी सहनशक्ति की अब और कितनी परीक्षा लोगे? लोग अन्न और जल से वंचित होते चले जा रहे हैं। साधु-सन्त भी आखिर "प्रसाद" कहाँ से तैयार करें? प्रजा तो आखिर प्रजा है, उसे जीवित रहने के लिए पेट तो भरना ही पड़ेगा। लेकिन अगर तुझमें इतनी शक्ति नहीं थी तो तूने सृष्टि की रचना ही क्यों की? हे भगवान, अब बहुत हो चुका! देखो न, लोगों का धैर्य टूटता जा रहा है। अब तो

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3. साखी ग्रंथ, संत माहात्म्य अंग—प्री. वा. पृ. 141.
4. "सत्संग किया भया भवपारा,
नहीं जप, तप, जोग आचारा।" —प्रा. वा. पृ. 205.

दयालु बनो ।"[1] प्रीतम ने सचमुच संसार के बीच बैठ कर अपनी साधना की धूनी रमायी थी और इसलीए राजनीतिक अशान्ति में उन्होने पुरुषार्थ और सत्कर्म का संदेश दिया था । इतना होने पर भी हम उन्हें समाज सुधारक नहीं कह सकते, बल्कि वे अपने समय के पहुँचे हुए सन्त पुरुष थे ।

परिव्राजक के रूप में :

यद्यपि संदेसर स्थित जानरायजी का मंन्दिर ही प्रीतम का मुख्य साधनाधाम था, फिर भी वे मूलत: साधू[2] होने के नाते परिव्राजक थे । भ्रमण भी अकेले नहीं, भाण साहब की तरह प्रीतम भी अपनी शिष्य मंडली को साथ लेकर चलते थे । हर मुकाम पर उनके उत्सव और कीर्तन से समूचा वातावरण गूँज उठता था । इसीलिए प्रीतम को "उत्सविया कीर्तनकार" भी कहा गया है । वे हर पूर्णमासी के दिन डाकोर – रणछोड़रायजी के मन्दिर के दर्शनार्थ अवश्य जाते थे । उन्हीं के द्वारा थाल और राजभोज के गीत गाए जाते थे । प्रीतम ने ऐसे अनेक श्रृंगार, आरती और थाल सम्बन्धी पद लिखे हैं जिन्हें आज भी भक्तजन डाकोरजी के मन्दिर में बड़े चाव से गाते हैं ।[1] पूनम के ऐसे दिवाने कवि का "पूनमिया" भी कहा गया है । प्रीतम की भ्रमणशीलता का पथ कानम से कच्छ तक और खंभात से पावागढ़ तक विस्तृत था । कूबाजी की द्वारगद्दी का फैलाव गुजरात में हमें चुड़ा–राणपुर, मांडल और चोटीला तक दृष्टिगत होता है, उसका बहुत बड़ा श्रेय अकेले प्रीतमदास को दिया जा सकता है । उनके कीर्तनिया स्वरूप की यशगाथा से प्रभावित होकर स्वयं कच्छ के राव ने उन्हें कई बार अपनी संस्कृत पाठशाला में कथा–कीर्तन के लिए आमन्त्रित भी किया था । कच्छ के रावने प्रसन्न होकर उन्हें तुरई और मृदंग की भेंट दी थी जो आज भी संदेसर के मंदिर में मौजूद है । प्रीतम ने एक जगह कहा है कि भटकते–भटकते इसी तरह एक दिन सतगुरु से भेंट हो गयी, जिनके द्वारा मेरे भीतर आत्मतत्त्व का स्नेह पैदा हुआ । गोविन्दराम ने भी प्रीतम की इस भ्रमणशीलता की सराहना की है ।

प्रीतम ने अपनी भ्रमण–यात्रा का अनुभव कहीं–कहीं व्यक्त भी किया है । नर्मदा–माहात्म्य, द्वारका–दर्शन, नर्मदातीर के व्यंकटेश्वर के दर्शन, गंगा माहात्म्य और व्रज की चौरासी कोस की यात्रा आदि इसीके प्रमाण हैं । प्रीतम ने दयाराम की भूमि चाँदोद का अत्यन्त मनोहारी वर्णन किया है । उनके यात्रा–वर्णन से ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि उन्होने ऋषिकेश और संभवतः केदारनाथ तक की भी यात्राएँ की थीं ।

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1. संवत् 1847 के दुर्भिक्ष सम्बन्धी पद : प्रीतम-वाणी, पृष्ठ 382–83.
2. "साधू तो चलता भला, जैसा बहता नीर ।" — कबीर.

1. प्रीतम के थाल सम्बन्धी सर्वाधिक पद "खंभात वाली हस्तप्रति" एवं "संदेसर हस्तप्रति-4" में मिलते हैं । इस प्रकार के पदों में कलेऊ, बालभोग, राजभोग समय के सभी व्यंजनों का समावेश कवि ने किया है ।

प्रीतमदास वस्तुतः लोकधर्मी साधू थे। गुजरात के नैष्ठिक रामानंदी साधुओं की जमात में से वे एक थे। इन साधुओं की मोटे तौर पर दो श्रेणियाँ थीं—(1) पर्यटक नागा बाबाओं की जमात (2) स्थानकवासी भद्रवेषधारी बाबाओं की जमात। इन दोनों जमातों से प्रीतम पूर्णतः परिचित थे। वे एक तरह से इन दोनों के समन्वित रूप थे। उन्होने अपनी एक साखी में हरिस्तुति, दान-पुण्य और पैरों की परिक्रमा (परकम्मा) पर विशेष बल दिया है—

> **"हाथे हरि-सेवा करो, दान पुन्य उपकार,**
> **पाये परकम्मा करो, प्रीतम ए शुभसार।"**

"साधू तो चलता भला" की उक्ति प्रीतम जैसे साधू के साथ बिलकुल ठीक बैठती है। वे "अनिकेत" होकर भी "सानिकेत" थे। घर-संसारी और साधुओं के बीच सत्संग-आशय से ही उन्होने 52 मन्दिरों की स्थापना की थी। प्रीतम ने नंगे पैरों घूम-घूम कर गुजरात में हरिभक्ति का प्रचार किया था। उनकी हरिभक्ति का रूप भी बड़ा विशाल और निर्लेप था। वे कृष्णोपासकों को कृष्णभक्ति का बोध देते थे और रामोपासकों को रामभक्ति का। प्रीतम ने अपने इष्टदेव "जानराय" का रूप भी रामश्याममय बना दिया था। वस्तुतः भक्ति के क्षेत्र में यह एक बहुत बड़ी क्रान्ति थी। प्रीतम की भक्ति में सगुण और निर्गुण का भेद करना भी व्यर्थ है। वे मूलतः ज्ञानाश्रयी सन्त थे, किन्तु उनका ज्ञानवाद राम और श्याम के निर्गुण-सगुण समन्वित रूप का रसामृत है। प्रीतम ने अपनी यात्राओं में निरन्तर भक्ति के इसी स्वरूप का गुणगान किया है। उनका ज्ञान प्रेम से इस कदर सराबोर है कि वे जगह-जगह इस बात को "प्रेम सनेही" के रूप में व्यक्त भी करते हैं।

सम्प्रदाय और परम्परा :

प्रीतम वस्तुतः गुजरात की रामानंदीय-परम्परा के सन्त थे। इस परम्परा का सम्बन्ध कूबाजी के साथ जोड़ा जाता है जो जींटड़ा की परम्परा के नाम से प्रसिद्ध है। जींटड़ा की गद्दी-परम्परा रामानंद-संप्रदाय की 36 द्वारा गद्दियों में से एक है। जींटड़ा जिला पाली-(मारवाड़) का एक ऐसा छोटा-सा स्थान है, जहाँ रोहट से होकर जाया जाता है। इस तीर्थधाम में भगवान जानरायजी का मंदिर है। कहा जाता है कि इस मंदिर की मूर्तिपूजा पहेले कूबाजी किया करते थे। भगवान का नाम जानराय कैसे पड़ा ? इस सम्बन्ध में एक दन्तकथा भी है कि भगवान स्वयं यहाँ हठपूर्वक, जानबूझ कर बिराजे थे, इसलिए उनका नाम "जानराय" पड़ा। प्रीतम के संदेसर-मंदिर में जो मूर्ति मिलती है, वह भी इसी प्रकार की है। इसी आधार पर प्रीतम ने अन्य मंदिरों की स्थापना की थी। राम-श्याम की समन्वित छविवाली मूर्ति की पूजा-अर्चना का भाव इसी परम्परा की देन है। इस परम्परा के अन्य मन्दिर हमें सौराष्ट्र के सायला, वांकानेर, चुड़ा (राणपुर), पाटड़ी, वीरमगाम, दूधरेज और मांडल आदि स्थानों में मिलते हैं। यह परम्परा केवल गुजरात तक ही सीमित नहीं है, बल्कि मध्यप्रदेश (रायपुर), अयोध्या (लक्ष्मण किला), जयपुर, मुजफ्फरपुर, राजस्थान (नारलाई और कोटा बूँदी) तक फैली हुई है।

संदेसर का जानराय का मन्दिर इस दृष्टि से बडा महत्त्वपूर्ण है। यह पहले कुंजबिहारीलाल के मन्दिर के नाम से सुप्रसिद्ध था, लेकिन प्रीतम ने संवत् 1817 में चुड़ा (राणपुरा) को छोड़कर संदेसर में जब साधना की धूनी रमायी तो यही मंदिर "जानराय–मन्दिर" अथवा "प्रीतम–मन्दिर" के नाम से प्रख्यायित हुआ। इसकी प्रतिष्ठा संवत् 1831 के बाद हुई होगी, ऐसा अनुमान है।

इसी परम्परा के अन्तर्गत प्रीतम के अन्य मन्दिरों में रामजी मन्दिर (सिहोन), गोपालजी मन्दिर (वाल्हा), श्री बापजी मन्दिर (खंभात), मुरलीधर प्रीतम मन्दिर (खंभात), प्रीतम मन्दिर (करमसद) आदि विशेष रूप से उल्लेखनीय हैं। जैसा कि प्रसिद्ध है कि स्वामी प्रीतमदास ने 52 मन्दिरों की स्थापना की, वे इस प्रकार हैं–1. संदेसर, 2. जीटडी, 3. चुड़ा, 4. जुगड़, 5. चकलासी, 6. खंभात, 7. भडकच्छ, 8. सुणाव, 9. वटाव, 10. खंभात, 11. सावली, 12. बारेजा, 13. मोगरी, 14. मरेडा, 15. मंगलपुरा, 16. अरड़ी, 17. काशीपुरा, 18. पिलयातु, 19. करमसद, 20. वाल्हा, 21. आशीपुरा, 22. जावला, 23. वांकानेर, 24. डाकोर, 25. डाकोर, 26. गोपागेट, 27. वासणा, 28. भाटियेल, 29. डाकोर, 30. बेहुचा, 31. डाकर तुलसी, 32. कामल, 33. लिम्बासी, 34. दाम नगट, 35. भावनगर, 36. कणियुं, 37. बीला, 38. जुनिया, 39. धमेल, 40. मुवाल, 41. देलवाड़ा, 42. भावनगर, 43. पालीताणा, 44. हालड़ी, 45. जूनागढ़, 46. रतनपुर, 47. भड़कच्छ, 48. भुराकुई, 49. बोरिया, 50. भालज, 51. आखडोल, 52. देथरी।

इस सूची में ध्यान खींचने वाली बात यह है कि इसमें सिहोल मन्दिर का उल्लेख नहीं है, अतः सम्भव है कि यह मन्दिर प्रीतम के बाद अस्तित्व में आया हो। प्रीतम के बाद इन मन्दिरों की संख्या सौ से ऊपर बैठ चुकी थी। ये सभी मन्दिर रामानंद सम्प्रदाय का सेवा–विधियों से आज भी ज्यों के त्यों जुड़े हुए हैं। स्वामी रामानंद का समय संवत् 1356 वि. माना गया है। उन्हींकी शिष्य परम्परा में कूबाजी (केवलदास) का समय सं. 1611 मिलता है, जो जीटड़ा की गद्दी पर विराजमान हुए। कूबाजी की शिष्य परम्परा में करसनदास हुए, जिन्होने चुड़ा (राणपुर) में अपनी गद्दी स्थापित की। करसनदास के प्रधान शिष्य आत्माराम थे। और प्रीतमदास के गुरु भाईदासजी इन्हीं आत्माराम के शिष्य थे, जिनकी चर्चा इससे पूर्व की जा चुकी है।

प्रीतमदास की शिष्य परम्परा बड़ी बृहद है। ऐसा प्रसिद्ध है कि उनके 34 शिष्य थे, जिनमें नारणदास का नाम विशेष उल्लेखनीय है। नारणदास ने प्रीतम की मृत्यु पर एक बहुत बड़ा भंडार किया था। कुछेक मंदिरों में आज भी उनके शिष्यों द्वारा प्रीतम का पुण्यतिथि प्रतिवर्ष वैसाख वदी 12 के दिन मनायी जाती है। यह बात अलग है के प्रीतम के द्वारा स्थापित अनेक मन्दिर नष्टप्राय हो चुके हैं। कुछ मन्दिरों में अब शिष्य–प्रशिष्यों के आपसी संघर्ष चलते रहते हैं, अतः प्रीतम की परमार्थ–परम्परा के स्वरूप (अन्नक्षेत्र, गोशाला, चबूतरा, कुत्तों को रोटी बाँटना आदि) उनमें से विलीन होते चले जा रहे हैं, फिर भी

कुछ मदिर प्रीतम की स्मृति के अक्षुण्ण स्तम्भ हैं । संदेसर, सिहोल, खंभात और वाल्ला के मंदिरों का परम्परा इस दृष्टि से बड़ी ही समृद्ध परम्परा रही है ।

संदेसर का परम्परा इस प्रकार है—

प्रीतमदासजी के नारणदासजी के केशवदासजी के गंगारामदासजी के रणछोड़दासजी के मथुरदासजी (बंसीदासजी) के त्रिकमदासजी के अमरदासजी ।

प्रीतमदास (संवत् 1954 में देवलोक सिधारे)
|
नारणदास (संवत् 1902 वि.)
|
केवलदास (संवत् 1932 ,,)
|
गंगाराम (संवत् 1948 ,,)
|
रणछोड़दास (संवत् 1977 ,,)
|
मथुरदास (?)
|
त्रिकमदास (?)
|
अमरदासजी (जीवित)

वाल्ला मन्दिर की परम्परा इस प्रकार है –

प्रीतमदास
|
नारणदास
|
रणछोड़दास
|
करसनदास
|
गारधनदास
|
तुलसीदास
|
नारणदास
|
शामलदास (जीवित)

सिहोल से प्राप्त हस्तप्रति-4 के अन्तिम पृष्ठ पर खंभात मन्दिर की परम्परा इस प्रकार दी गई है।[1]—

खंभातस्थिति मुरलीधर महाराज के "प्रीतम-मन्दिर" की परम्परा इस प्रकार उपलब्ध होती है—

1. "संवतश्री गांम खंभात बंदर मधे साधु मथुरादास प्रसाद लेता पण नथी। महात्मा पुरस छे। आगे बावा प्रीतमदासना सीस नारणदासना हरीदासना बालकदासना मथुरादासना ... बालकदासना हीरांदास जेरामदास...हरीदासना प्रभुदास संवत् 1902 नी सालमां चउद वरसनी उमरमां खंभात गांम आवा ते जाणजो।"
—हिसोल हस्त प्र.–4.

2. सिहोल ह.प्र. – 2 में साधु प्रभुदास का परिचय मिलता है — "साधू प्रभुदास हीरादास के शिष्य सं. 1930 चैत्र सुदी 5 के दिन पधारे, जिनकी जन्मभूमि सोजित्रा के पास मलाजत गाँव है।"

खंभात के तीसरे "प्रीतम मन्दिर की परम्परा इस प्रकार मिलती है—

प्रीतमदास
|
नारणदास
|
हरिदास
|
बालकदास
|
तनमनदास
|
मथुरदास अथवा मथुरादास
|
हरजीवनदास

सिहोल के प्रीतम–मन्दिर की परम्परा इस प्रकार मिलती है—

प्रीतमदास
|
नारणदास
|
हरिदास
|
बालकदास
|
हीरादास
|
जेरामदास
|
हरिदास
|
प्रभुदास (खंभात मंदिर से आये हुए)
|
महाराज गोविन्दराम

उपर्युक्त परम्पराओं के अलावा भी प्रीतम के अन्य मंदिरों की कतिपय शिष्य-परम्पराएं मिलती हैं, किन्तु उनका विशेष महत्त्व यहाँ इसलिए नहीं है कि उनमें कोई सृजनशील प्रतिभासम्पन्न सन्त प्रायः नहीं हुआ। प्रीतम का अधिकांश सृजनात्मक साहित्य भी उपर्युक्त मंदिरों से ही उपलब्ध हुआ है। यहाँ भी बहुत–सी पोथियाँ विनष्ट हो चुकी हैं, जो शेष हैं उन्हीं से सन्तोष कर लेना पड़ता है। इसमें भी प्रकाशित अंश बहुत कम है। तिस पर, प्रीतम की हिन्दी रचनाओं की तो प्रायः उपेक्षा–सी ही रही है। ये रचनाएँ निश्चित क्रम में एक जगह कहीं भी उपलब्ध नहीं होती।

प्रीतमदास की हिन्दी वाणी

प्रीतमदास की वाणी का विस्तार गुजराती-हिन्दी दोनों भाषाओं में मिलता है। इनकी गुजराती रचनाओं का संकलन एवं संशोधन गुजराती साहित्य के मनीषियों ने निश्चय ही बड़े मनोयोग से किया है, किन्तु इनका समग्र हिन्दी वाणी का सम्पादन एवं अनुशीलन प्रायः अछूता-सा रहा। यों "सस्तु साहित्य वर्धक कार्यालय, अमदावाद" से प्रकाशित "श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी" में प्रीतमदास के 12 हिन्दी पदों का संकलन मिलता है। इसके अलावा सप्तश्लोकी गीता, गुरु महिमा-2[1] भक्त-नामावली[2] प्रीतमदासनी साखिओ[3] (बीच-बीच में आनेवाली कुछ हिन्दी साखियाँ), विनय दीनता की चौपाइयाँ[4], ब्रह्मलीला[5] आदि का संकलन भी प्रस्तुत वाणी-संग्रह में हुआ है। सर्वप्रथम इनके विषय में चर्चा करना समीचीन होगा।

चिन्तामणि—

डा. अम्बाशंकर नागर द्वारा सम्पादित "गुजरात के सन्तों की हिन्दी वाणी" में प्रीतमदास रचित साखी ग्रन्थ "चिन्तामणि" के दर्शन होते हैं।[6] "चिन्तामणि" वस्तुतः प्रीतमदास का एक महत्त्वपूर्ण ग्रन्थ है, जिसमें विषय की दृष्टि से कुल 13 अंगों की योजना की गयी है, जो इस प्रकार है—

(1) मन को अंग (2) स्मरण को अंग (3) नाममाहात्म्य को अंग (4) संत माहात्म्य को अंग (5) गुरु-महिमा को अंग (6) ज्ञान को अंग (7) प्रेम को अंग (8) अनन्य को अंग (9) विरह को अंग (10) ब्रह्मस्वरूप को अंग (11) काम को अंग (12) नारी-निन्दा को अंग (13) जीवन-मुक्त को अंग।

इन अंगों के माध्यम से प्रीतमदास ने अपने ज्ञान-वैराग्य-भक्ति एवं सामाजिक विचारों को स्पष्ट करने का प्रयास किया है। "नारी-निन्दा का अंग" विशेष महत्त्वपूर्ण कहा जा सकता है, जिसमें वे स्पष्टतः यह कहते हैं कि मैं इस में नारीजाति की नहीं, बल्कि नारी के अवगुणों की निन्दा कर रहा हूँ। नारी के भी अनेक रूप और प्रकार ठीक वैसे ही हैं, जैसे सिक्के के अनेक रूप और प्रकार होते हैं:–

> **"मोहोर, रुपैया, तांबियो, कोड़ी नाणा मांही।**
> **कहे प्रीतम यह दाम है, सब ही बराबर नहीं॥**
> **सती, सूरी, पतिव्रता, कृत्या कहिए नार।**
> **कहे प्रीतम सोई समज के, वाको संग निवार॥**

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1. देखिए-श्री प्री. वा., पृ. 45.
2. वही, पृ. 69.
3. वही, पृ. 135–195.
4. वही, पृ. 205.
5. वही, पृ. 132.
6. गुजरात के सन्तों की हिन्दी वाणी, पृ 200 से 210.

प्रीतम ने एक ओर नारी को "नारायणी" कहा है, तो दूसरी ओर उसे "नरक की खान" भी कहा है नारी के प्रति ऐसी तटस्थ दृष्टि हमें बहुत कम सन्तों में दिखाई देती है। उन्होंने तो स्त्री-पुरुष दोनों को ईश्वर का ही रूप बताया है। नारी-पुरुष की समानता का ऐसा उद्घोष हमें अन्यत्र प्रतीत नहीं होगा। प्रीतम ने अन्य साखियों में भक्ति, प्रेम, अनन्यता, संत समागम और गुरुमहिमा का जो वर्णन किया है, वह संत-प्रणालिकागत होते हुए भी निरा शुष्क एवं चरा-चर्वित नहीं है। वस्तुतः "चिन्तामणि ग्रन्थ में क्रमशः गर्भावस्था से लेकर मृत्युपर्यन्त की मनुष्य की ईश्वरप्रतिगामी विभिन्न प्रवृत्तियों के प्रति चिन्ता व्यक्त की गयी है।[1] इसके माध्यम से हमें साधना की क्रमागत स्थितियों के दर्शन भी होते हैं। इसीलिए प्रीतम ने प्रारम्भ में मनः साधना पर बल दिया है। वे यह मानते हैं कि पवन को बांधना और मन को जीतना कोई आसान काम नहीं है। अतः सच्चा सूरमा वह नहीं, जो बाहर विजय पाता है बल्कि वह है जो भीतर के मन-पर अपना काबू पा लेता है।[2] इसके लिए निरन्तर प्रभु स्मरण की आवश्यकता होती है। ईश्वरआराधन में लीन हो जाने पर मन मेरु की तरह अडिग बन जाता है।[3] मन को जीत लेने पर साधक "रामनाम" रूपी एक ऐसा अजपाजाप जपता है, जिससे समस्त विश्व के ताप और दुःख दूर हो जाते हैं—

"रामनाम जोगी जपे, तपे नहीं भव ताप।
कहे प्रीतम मन जीत के जपे अजपा जाप॥"[4]

रामनाम को इसीलिए प्रीतम ने चिन्तामणि, कल्पवृक्ष और कामधेनु तक कहा है। वस्तुतः हरिनाम रूपी इस सुधारस को जो पी लेता है, वह जन्म-मरण के चक्कर से मुक्त हो जाता है और अमर अभयपद का भोक्ता होता है। लेकिन, इस नाम रूपी अमूल्य रत्न को दिलरूपी दरिया के भीतर वही पाता है, जो सच्चा "मरजीवा" होता है। किसी अन्य को यह रत्न हाथ नहीं लगता।[5]

साधना के क्षेत्र में जितना महत्त्व. रामनाम का है, उतना महत्त्व संत-समागम और गुरुभक्ति का भी है। संत वस्तुतः बैकुंठ का वासी होता है, जो धरती को पावन करने के लिए अवतार धारण करता है। और गुरु तो स्वयं ब्रह्मस्वरूप है, जो संसाररूपी समुद्र में डूबते हुए जीवों को बाँह पकड़ कर उबार लेता है। ज्ञान का सही अर्थ प्रीतमदास ने "आत्मज्ञान" से लिया है, जो पारसमणि के समान है। इसके साथ ही, प्रेम की भी आवश्यकता होती है। कबीर की भाँति प्रीतमदास ने ज्ञान और प्रेम के समन्वय की बात

1. डॉ अम्बाशंकर नागर-प्रा.हि बा. पृ 198.
2. देखिए मन को अंग–6.
3. देखिए—स्मरण को अंग–4.
4. नाम—माहात्म्य को अंग–1.
5. "नाम रत्न अमूल है, दिल दरिया के मांहि।
कहे प्रीतम मरजीवा लहे, दूजा पात्रे नांहि" ॥ 9 ॥

कही है । उन्होंने कहा है—

"प्रेम बिना प्रपंच है, सेवा-स्मरण ध्यान ।
कहे प्रीतम शुद्ध प्रेम बिना, फीको लागे ज्ञान ॥"[1]

भक्ति का आदर्श अनन्यताभाव है, जिसे प्रीतम ने अन्यत्र "अनीन" भी कहा है । पतिव्रता एकनिष्ठभाव से जिस तरह अपने पति को चाहती है, उसी तरह भक्त का भी अपने भगवान के प्रति अनन्यभाव होता है । इसके आगे ही प्रीतम ने विरह को जोड़ा है, जहाँ भक्त की पूरी कसौटी हो जाती है । उस कसौटी में भक्त को अपने भीतर के कामादि विकारों को जलाकर खाक कर देना होता है । जीवनमुक्त होकर ऐसा साधक अपने समस्त अहकार को भस्मीभूत कर देता है । अहंकार का विलय होते ही वह "सदा समाधि" में लीन हो जाता है । वह धरती का वासी होकर भी उसकी "सुरता" (सुरति) तो आकाश में ही लगी रहती है—

पंखी पृथ्वी पर चले, सुरता रहे अकाश ।
कहे प्रीतम चारा लगी, करे भूमि पर वास ॥

इस प्रकार हम देखते हैं कि प्रीतमदास ने "चिन्तामणि" में एक प्रकार से भक्तियोग के क्रमिक विकास का संकेत भी किया है । साधक को साधना-यात्रा में कदम-कदम पर सावधान करना ही इस कृति का आशय है ।

प्रीतम ने इसके अलावा कतिपय चिन्तामणियाँ चौपाई छन्द में लिखी हैं । वाल्ला एवं खंभात मंदिरों से प्राप्त हस्तप्रतियो में इनका संकलन मिलता है ।[2] ये एक प्रकार की अनुभवजन्य चेतावनियाँ हैं, जिनमें प्रीतम ने माया-मोहादि के बन्धनों से मुक्त होकर ईश्वराभिमुख होने की प्रेरणा दी है कि—

"जै जै कृष्ण कहो रे भाई, या तन तेरो बहोर न आई ।
समझ बूझ साधन करनी का, जाते उतरे दोस जियका ॥"

और, इसके साथ ही यमराज के दरबार में जीव की क्या स्थिति होती है, इसका बड़ा ही मनोहारी चित्रण प्रीतम ने "चिन्तामगि" में किया है ।[3]

साखी ग्रंथ :

चौबीस अंगों में विभक्त "साखी ग्रंथ" का संकलन "श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी" (पृ. 135 से 139) में किया गया है । कवि ने इस ग्रंथ की रचना संवत् 1845, शुक्लपक्ष

1. देखिए—चिन्तामणि, प्रेम को अंग-8.
2. वाल्ला मंदिर ह. प्र. 2, पन्ना 8 तथा पन्ना 61 पर । इसी प्रकार खंभात वाली हस्तप्रति के प्रारम्भ में ही "चिन्तामणि" का संकलन मिलता है । इनमें पाठभेद भी मिलता है ।
3. वाल्ला मंदिर वाली ह. प्रति-2, पन्ना-8.

पंचमी, रुद्रवीसी, अश्विन माह में की थी, ऐसा उल्लेख मिलता है । प्रस्तुत ग्रंथ की रचना संदेसर में ही पूर्ण हुई थी, जिसमें कुल मिलाकर 638 साखियाँ हैं ।[1]

प्रस्तुत ग्रंथ में अधिकांश साखियाँ गुजराती भाषा में लिखी गयी हैं, जबकि बीच-बीच में कुछ साखियाँ हिन्दी की उपलब्ध होती हैं । उसके अन्तर्गत मन, स्मरण, नाम माहात्म्य, प्रेम, अनन्य और विरह आदि के अंगों का आयोजन ठीक उसी तरह हुआ है, जैसा हमें अनेक "चिन्तामणि" ग्रन्थ में दिखायी देता है । यही नहीं, इनमें अधिकांश साखियाँ एक समान हैं । इस प्रकार के पुनरावर्तन के कारण ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि प्रस्तुत बृहद् साखी ग्रन्थ से हिन्दी की साखियों को अलग छाँट कर उसे "चिन्तामणि" नाम दे दिया गया होगा । यह कहना मुश्किल है कि इस कार्य को प्रीतमदासने स्वयं किया था अथवा उनके पश्चात् उनके किसी शिष्य ने किया । इतना तो निश्चित है कि प्रीतम ने इन सभी साखियों की रचना किसी एक समय में नहीं की थी । हाँ, इनका संकलन–कार्य प्रीतम की उत्तरावस्था में अवश्य हुआ था ।

"साखी ग्रंथ" में प्रीतम ने अपने ब्रह्मज्ञान का समस्त सार प्रस्तुत कर दिया है । इन्होंने प्रस्तुत ग्रंथ में योग, माया, ब्रह्म, जीव, वैराग्य, भक्ति और विरह का खुलकर वर्णन किया है । ब्रह्म और जगत का सम्बन्ध प्रीतम ने इस प्रकार प्रस्तुत किया है—

"ज्युं सिंधु में होत है, लहरी अनंत अपार ।
कहे प्रीतम युं ब्रह्म में, उपजे सब संसार ॥"[2]

प्रीतम के शब्दों में ब्रह्म अनादि, अटल, अजन्मा और अद्वैत है । वह एक ऐसा अग्निपुंज है, जिससे अनेक दीपक जलते रहते हैं । ऐसे दीपक ही जीव स्वरूप होते हैं । वस्तुतः उस एक ब्रह्म में समूचा विश्व समाया हुआ है ।[3] प्रीतम ने कहा है कि जिस प्रकार आकाश का कभी नाश नहीं होता, आत्मा भी उसी प्रकार अखंड और अद्वैत है । आक के रस में जैसे अभ्र होता है, तरुवर में जैसे पत्ते लगते हैं, ब्रह्म में भी उसी प्रकार देह का आवागमन होता रहता है । भक्तिभाव के सम्बन्ध में प्रीतम ने कहा है कि भक्तों की भावना के वश भगवान गोकुल में अवतार धारण करते हैं और व्रज में गाय चराते हैं ।

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1. संवत् अढार वीसी, रुद्रनी, पिस्तालो आश्विन मास;
 कहे प्रीतम शुक्ल पक्ष पंचमी, साखी ग्रंथ प्रकाश ।
 संदेसरमां सुखनिधि, जानराय जुगदीश;
 कहे प्रीतम साखी पूरण, छसें आडत्रीय ॥
 साखी गाये सांभले, राखे हृदिये विचार;
 कहे प्रीतम प्रपंच टले, पामे पद निरधार ॥ —प्रीतमदासनी वाणी, पृ. 192-93
2. साखी ग्रंथ-ब्रह्मस्वरूप वर्णन, साखी-6.
3. वही, साखी—11 से 19.

यही नहीं, वे इस भावना के वशीभूत होकर गोरस की चोरी तक करते हैं।[1] प्रीतम का कहना है कि निर्गुण ब्रह्म भक्तिभावना के कारणे ही सगुण का रूप धारण करता है और अपनी विविध लीलाओं का विस्तार करता है। जो भक्त शुद्ध भाव से भगवान का स्तवन करता है, भगवान उसके लिए हस्तामलक बन जाते हैं।[2] जीवन मुक्ति का सरलतम मार्ग भी भक्तिभाव ही है।[3]

"माया को अंग" में प्रीतम ने अपने माया-सम्बन्धी विचारों को स्पष्ट किया है। कबीर और अखा की भाँति प्रीतम ने भी माया को त्रिगुणात्मिका माना है, जिसके माध्यम से वह सकल संसार की रचना करती है। प्रीतम ने इस माया को पंसारी काबोरा कहा है कि जिसमें सभी प्रकार की चीजें भरी रहती हैं। बबूल के बीज को सहस्र वर्ष तक सहेजने पर भी उसे जब बोया जाता है तब उसमेंसे काँटे ही निकलते हैं। ठीक यही प्रकृति माया की भी है। माया का आवरण जीव पर निरन्तर छाया रहता है। यह आवरण आठ प्रकार का होता है—पृथ्वी, पानी, तेज, वायु, गगन, गुण, अहंकार और मन।[4] इस माया को प्रीतम ने अविद्या, अव्याकृत, अक्षर, अज्ञान, प्रकृति, अजा, क्षेत्र, धाम, प्रधान आदि अनेक नामों से अभिहित किया है।[5] उन्होंने यह भी कहा है कि जीव के भीतर जैसे ही ब्रह्म का प्रकाश प्रकट होता है, वैसे ही माया का तिमिर हटने लगता है।

ज्ञान-अंग में प्रीतम ने भक्ति और ज्ञान का समन्वय किया है। वे वस्तुतः इन दोनों के बीच कोई भेदक-रेखा खींचना नहीं चाहते। इस क्षेत्र में उनकी दृष्टि तुलसी के समान है। ज्ञान के विषय में उनका मत है कि—

> **"ज्ञान-ज्ञान सब को कहे, आतम ज्ञान सो जान।**
> **कहे प्रीतम पारसमणि, और सबै पासाण॥"**
>
> **—ज्ञान अंग, सा. 23**

प्रीतम ने भक्ति और माया को दो सुंदरियाँ बताते हुए कहा है कि ये दोनों निरन्तर प्रभु के पास रहती हैं, लेकिन भक्ति अटल स्वरूपा है, जबकि माया "सुपन-बिलास" है। प्रीतम ने अन्यत्र भी कहा है कि भक्ति का आदर्श "सती और 'सूरा'" का आदर्श है।

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1. साखी ग्रंथ - भावनुं अंग, साखी-5.
2. वही, साखी—25.
3. वही, साखी—26.
4. "माया आवरण अष्ट है, पृथ्वी अदक तेज,
   कहे प्रीतम वायु गगन, गुण, अहंकार, मन एज।"
   —माया-अंग, सा. 25
5. वही, साखी-20.

ब्रह्मलीला :

अखा की 'ब्रह्मलीला" की भाँति प्रीतम ने भी "ब्रह्मलीला" नामक एक लघु ग्रन्थ की रचना की है, जिसकी कुल मिला कर 63 पंक्तियाँ हैं। पुष्टिमार्गीय भक्तों ने जिस प्रकार कृष्ण की लीलाओं का मनोहारी वर्णन किया है, ठीक उसी प्रकार गुजरात के ज्ञानमार्गी सन्तों ने प्रकृति एवं पुरुष की रासलीलाओं का वर्णन किया है। तन रूपी मन्दिर में भक्तिरूपी राधा और यशोदा के साथ ब्रह्म ने जो खेल खेला है, उसी की अनूठी अभिव्यक्ति प्रीतम ने प्रस्तुत ग्रन्थ में की है। कहीं-कहीं हमें अखा और प्रीतम की अभिव्यक्ति की समानता भी इस प्रकार मिलती है।

"ऐसो रमन चल्यो नित्य रासी,
प्रकृति पुरुष को विविध विलासा।"

— अखा, ब्रह्मलीला–4.

"श्री ब्रिंदावन कमल आकारा,
कृष्ण राधिका अखंड विहारा,
ताको तेज विविध विस्तारा,
सब तन मन्दिर खेलनहारा।"

— प्रीतम, ब्रह्मलीला–23, 24.

अखा ने जो बात प्रकृति और पुरुष के माध्यम से कही है, वही बात प्रीतम ने राधा और कृष्ण के माध्यम से कही है। सूरदास कृत "सूर सारावली" मे ब्रह्म के नित्य विहार का वर्णन इसी प्रकार का है—

"अविगत, आदि, अनंत, अनुपथ, अलख पुरुष अविनासी।
पूरण ब्रह्म प्रगट पुरुषोत्तम, नित नित लोक विलासी॥"

ज्ञातव्य है कि अखा ने "ब्रह्मलीला" ग्रंथ की रचना जहाँ हरिगीतिका छन्द में की है, वहाँ प्रीतम ने चौपाई छन्द अपनाया है। इस प्रकार दोनों रचनाओं का अपना-अपना महत्त्व है, यद्यपि अखाकृत "ब्रह्मलीला" अधिक स्तरीय है।

प्रीतम ने प्रस्तुत ग्रंथ की रचना संदेसर में ही भगवान "जानराय" की साक्षी में संवत् 1847 वि. चैत्र मास, शुक्ल पक्ष नवमी सोमवार के दिन की थी। कवि ने स्वयं इस सम्बन्ध में कहा है—

"संवत अढार सुडतालो कहीए, चैतर मास शुक्ल पक्ष लहिए।
नवमी सोमवार सुखकारी, वास संदेसर कुंजबिहारी।
ताके शरण चरण चित्तधारी, प्रीतम प्रेमकथा विस्तारी।"

"जानराय" भगवान की स्तुति करते हुए प्रीतम उन्हें आद्यस्वरूप अविनाशी कहते हैं, जो सकल सृष्टि को प्रकाशित करने वाले हैं। वस्तुतः वह परम तत्त्व ही सृष्टि का विस्तार

करने वाला है। चन्द्र, मेघ, इन्द्र, ब्रह्मा, विष्णु, महेश आदि सभी के भीतर उसीका रूप फैला हुआ है। योग-याम का कर्ता वही है, ध्यान धारणा का धर्ता वही है। वह एक ऐसा चैतन्य सिन्धु है; जिस में जगत की स्थिति बुदबुदे की भाँति है। वह ज्योतिस्वरूप जगत का स्वामी है। ऐसा निजानंद निर्गुण स्वरूप धारण करते हैं। इसीके परिणाम स्वरूप वे अनेक अवतार धारण करते हैं और अपने ब्रह्मस्वरूप का परिचय देते हैं। इस स्वरूप को पहचानते ही जीव का देहभाव अपने आप दूर हो जाता है।

इस प्रकार प्रीतम ने "ब्रह्मलीला" में ब्रह्म के सगुण निर्गुण स्वरूपों का बड़ा ही मनोहारी एवं हृदयस्पर्शी चित्रण किया है।

सप्तश्लोकी गीता :

प्रीतम ने गुजराती में श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता के अठारह अध्यायों की विस्तृत रचना की है। यही नहीं, उन्होंने सरसगीता, ज्ञानगीता और "एकादशस्कंध" की स्वतंत्र रूपेण रचना की है। इसी क्रम में उन्होने हिन्दी में सात श्लोकों वाली "सप्तश्लोका गीता" की भी रचना की है।[1] इस लघु रचना के अंतर्गत प्रीतम ने ओंकार एकाक्षर ब्रह्म के मर्म को भगवान श्रीकृष्ण की वाणी में समझाने का प्रयत्न किया है। इस मर्म को पाने वाला जन्म-मरण के बन्धन से छूट जाता है।

भगवान श्रीकृष्ण अर्जुन से कहते हैं कि सभी पद-पाणि, सभी सिर लोचन-मुखवाणी, श्रुति और मन आदि सभी वस्तुओं में मैं ही व्याप्त हूँ। इन सभी में मेरे स्वरूप को पहचानना ही परमतत्त्व का सार है।

हे अर्जुन ! यही मेरा साक्षात् स्वरूप है। जो पूर्ण पुरुषोत्तम है, वही सकल जीव का कर्ता है। वह इतना सूक्ष्म है, जहाँ मन और वाणी की भी पहुँच नहीं है। सूर्य का अनन्त तेज उसी परब्रह्म का तेज है। वह एक ऐसा वृक्ष है जिसका मूल उपर की ओर है और डालियाँ नीचे की तरफ हैं, जिसकी वेल और पत्ते विशाल हैं। ऐसे वृक्ष को जो जान लेता है, वही सम्यक ज्ञानी कहलाता है।

ऐसा ज्ञानी भी अन्ततः मेरा ही रूप है, मैं ही प्राणिमात्र के हृदयों में निवास करता हूँ। ज्ञान-अज्ञान, स्मरण ध्यान और वेदों का गान सब कुछ मुझसे हैं।

वेदांत का कर्ता और ज्ञाता मैं ही हूँ। मुझे छोड़ कोई दूसरा पुरुष है ही नहीं। इस प्रकार मेरे सच्चे स्वरूप को जो जान लेता है, वह जन्म-मरण के फेरों से छूट जाता है। हे अर्जुन ! तू अपने मन को मुझ में पिरो दे। मेरे भजन के बगैर सब बेकार है। अन्ततः मेरा भक्त ही मुझे पाता है। वस्तुतः प्रीतम ने अठारह अध्यायों का निचोड़ इन सात श्लोकों में भर दिया है। "सप्तश्लोकी गीता" एक तरह से तत्त्वचिन्तन की गागर ही

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1. देखिए—श्री प्री. वा., पृ. 475 तथा खंभातवाली हस्तप्रति, पन्ना 175.

है। प्रस्तुत रचना के यत्र-तत्र पाठान्तर भेद भी मिलते हैं। यद्यपि रचनाकाल के सम्बन्ध में कोई उल्लेख नहीं मिलता तथापि इसे हम प्रीतम की उत्तरकालीन रचना मान सकते हैं। वस्तुतः वेदान्त निरूपण के हेतु जहाँ अखा ने "अखे गीता" गोवाल ने "गोपाल गीता" और भाण साहब ने "भाणगीता" की रचना की है, वहाँ प्रीतम ने इस परम्परा में अनेक रचनाएँ प्रस्तुत की हैं। वस्तुतः श्रीमद् भागवत गीता ने प्रीतम को काफी दूर तक प्रभावित किया है।

भक्त नामावली :

तिरेपन पंक्तियों की यह एक लघु रचना है, जिसमें प्रीतम ने सैकड़ों भक्तों का नामोल्लेख बड़े आदर सहित किया है। प्रस्तुत लघु रचना का महत्त्व इसलिए है कि इसके प्रारम्भ में ही कवि ने अपने गुरु भाईजीदास को "सद्गुरुदेव" कहते हुए तन-मन से उनकी सेवा का व्रत धारण किया है। कलियुग के भक्तों में उन्होंने नामदेव, कबीर, रोहीदास (रैदास), पीपा, धीरा, रांका-बाँका, सेना, केवलपुरी, कूबाजी, मीरांबाई, सजना, देवा, द्वारकादास, रसिक, मोरार साहब, कृष्णदास, अनंतानंद, नरसी महेता, श्रीधर, प्रेमानंद, वल्लभाचार्य, विट्ठलस्वामी और सूरदास आदि का उल्लेख किया है। सूरदास को लेकर प्रीतम ने तीन नामों का उल्लेख किया है—सूरसागर, सुरकिशोर और सूरश्याम।[1] बहुत संभव है ये तीनों नाम अलग-अलग भक्तों के हों यद्यपि ये तीनों नाम प्रसिद्ध "सूरदास" के लिए भी प्रचलित हैं। स्वयं आचार्य वल्लभ ने सूरदास को "सूरसागर" की छाप दे रखी थी। "सूरसागर" के अनेक पदों में "सूरश्याम" की छाप भी मिलती है। ऐसे पद "सूरसागर" के प्रामाणिक पद हैं अथवा प्रक्षिप्त अंश हैं, यह कहना बड़ा कठिन है। प्रीतमदास द्वारा एक ही स्थान पर तीनों नामों का उल्लेख करना बहुत ही सांकेतिक प्रतीत होता है। बहुत संभव है ये नाम अलग-अलग भक्तों के भी हों। रचना के अन्त में इनका कथन "भक्त नामावली" के आशय को स्पष्ट करने वाला है –

> **"प्रीतम प्रेम पाठ के अर्थे, भक्तनामावलि गाई ग्रन्थ;**
> **वसुधा कागल सागर साई, लखे शारदा गनपतराई।**
> **करे विचार सत कल्प परजंता, संत सुजस पाये नहिं अंता,**
> **प्रीतम मंदमति वरणे कैसे, सागर छीये उलेचे जैसे॥"**[2]

गुरु महिमा :

प्रीतम ने "गुरु महिमा" को लेकर हिन्दी-गुजराती में अनेक पदों की रचना की है। "श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी" के पृष्ठ 45–46 पर 'गुरुमहिमा-2' का संकलन मिलता है, जिसमें कहा गया है कि गुरु के चरणों में जिसकी प्रीति नहीं लगती, वह महा अभागा

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1 "कृष्णदास अनंतानंद सुरसागर, सुरकिशोर अरु नरसिंह नागर;
सुरश्याम प्रेमानंददासा, श्रीधर माधो प्रेम विलासा।"
—श्री प्री. वा., पृ. 70

2. प्री. वाणी, पृ 71.

पुरुष है। गुरुभक्ति के बिना ऐसे व्यक्ति का जन्म धारण करना ही बेकार है। यही नहीं, वह सूअर, कुत्ता, काआ, और बिल्ली से भी निकृष्ट कोटि का होता है। गुरू को जो व्यक्ति ब्रह्मस्वरूप में देखता है, वह स्वयं भी अन्ततोगत्वा ब्रह्मभाव को प्राप्त कर लेता है। गुरु महिमा का गान एवं श्रवण करने वाले को गर्भवास से सदैव के लिए मुक्ति मिल जाती है। प्रस्तुत रचना में गुरु के प्रति अपना भक्तिभाव निवेदित किया है। इसमें कलागत वैशिष्ट्य का अभाव है।

"गुरुमहिमा" पर लिखे गए अनेक पदों में संदेसर वाली हस्तप्रति का एक अप्रकाशित पद बड़ा ही महत्वपूर्ण है, जो भाव एवं भाषा दोनों दृष्टियों से उत्कृष्ट कोटि का प्रतीत होता है।[1] इसके माध्यम से प्रीतम ने यह दिखाने का प्रयास किया है– कि जिस तरह कल्पतरु और कामधेनु में सभी देवता वास करते हैं, उसी तरह गुरु की देह मे सभी देवों की व्याप्ति समायी हुई है। "ऐसे गुरू के चरण-कमल रूपी मकरन्द को ग्रहण करने वाला मेरा मनरूपी मधुप है।[2] विष्णु जिनके चरणों में वास करते हैं, कटि-जंघा के बीच विरंचि विराजते हैं, नाभि मे नारायण रमते हैं, हृदयस्थल में कैलासवासी शंभु विराजते हैं। ऐसे सभी देवों के धाम गुरु के चरण कमलों की मैं वंदना करता हूँ।" प्रीतम ने मानों इस माध्यम से गुरु का पूरा "नखशिख वर्णन" ही कर दिया है। प्रस्तुत रचना के मध्य का एक अंश द्रष्टव्य है—

"अधर अरुण रंग चोल दसनमणि उज्ज्वल मोती;
सुंदर श्रवण कपोल नासिका निरमल जोती ॥
तिलक मनोहर भाल अंग अदसन की सोभा;
सीस मुकट मणिलाल देख सुरमन मुनि लोभा ॥
वदे सेस महेस निगम नारद सुनकादी,
जपे नाम जोगेश कहे जस अगम अनादी ॥"

प्रीतम वस्तुतः रूपवर्णन के कलाकार हैं। उन्होंने जहाँ गुरु की शोभा का मनोहारी वर्णन किया है, वहाँ अन्यत्र अपने पदों में भगवान श्रीकृष्ण की रूप माधुरी का भी वर्णन किया है। प्रीतम के ऐसे वर्णन बिराट-सौंदर्य की झाँकी कराने वाले हैं।

विनयदीनता की चौपाइयाँ :

प्रीतम ने विनयदीनता की कुल 68 चौपाइयाँ लिखी हैं,[3] जिसके अन्तर्गत सर्वप्रथम उन्होने सद्‌गुरुचरणों की वन्दना की है। प्रीतम का कहना है कि—"मैं गुरु के चरणों का

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1. देखिए –सदेसरवाली हस्तप्रति–2, पन्ना 70.
2. "श्री गुरू परम दयाला जासु गुन अगम अपारा;
   चरण कमल मकरन्द लेत मन-मधुप हमारा।"
3. देखिए—श्री प्री. वा., पृ. 205

वन्दना इसलिए करता हूँ कि संसार में माता-पिता, पुत्र, पत्नी, भाई आदि सभी नाते-रिश्ते स्वार्थपूर्ण हैं। केवल गुरु ही "अधमउधारण" और "तारण-तरण" है। वह त्रिभुवनपति है और मैं गाफिल तथा गुनहगार हूँ, मूर्ख और अज्ञानी हूँ, पुच्छ-विषाणहीन पशु हूँ। मनुष्य जन्म धारण करके मैंने विषय-वासना को छोड़ और क्या किया ?[1] कवि अपनी हीनता और असमर्थता का बयान करते हुए अन्त में भगवान श्रीकृष्ण से प्रार्थना करता है—

"तुमसों काहा दुराइये स्वामी, सकल जीवन उर अंतरजामी;
राखो शरण प्रणत हितकारी, क्रिपासिंधु श्रीकृष्ण मोरारी।

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हमरे और चाहना नाहीं, राखो निज भक्तन की छाहीं;
अविरत भक्ति दया करि दीजे, अपनो जान अभय कर लीजे।"

प्रस्तुत ग्रन्थ की रचना संवत् 1848 वि., वर्षाऋतु आषाढ़ मास के प्रथम दिवस अर्थात् रथयात्रा के महोत्सव पर संदेसर में हुई थी।

प्रीतम के हिन्दी पद :

दयाराम की "गरबी" और अखा के "छप्पा" की भांति प्रीतम के "पदे" बड़े सुप्रसिद्ध हुए। इनकी प्रसिद्धि का एकमात्र कारण उनका पदलालित्य है। प्रीतम के पदों मे जहाँ एक ओर अखा-5 सी अध्यात्मचिन्तना है, वहाँ दूसरी ओर उनमें दयाराम-सी शृंगार-पूर्ण भक्ति की अविरल रसधार भी है। इस प्रकार, शान्त तथा शृंगार रस की धारा से समन्वित प्रीतम के पदों में हमें ज्ञान एवं भक्ति का समान बल मिलता है। एक ओर उनमें "सूरसागर"-सा लीला-वर्णन है तो दूसरी ओर मीराँ-सी छटपटाहट भी है। इनमें प्रीतम की प्रीतिमय भाषा का माधुर्य भी जगह-जगह झलकता है।

स्व. इच्छाराम ने प्रीतमदास के पदों की संख्या 1500 के आसपास बतायी है।[2] डा. अश्विनभाई पटेल ने इनके पदों का विषयलक्षी वर्गीकरण करते हुए उनकी कुल संख्या 1681 बतायी है।[3] इनमें से 1145 पद अभी अप्रकाशित हैं, जो संदेसर, सिहोल, वाल्ला, खम्भात, करमसद, बड़ौदा, सलुण आदि गाँवों के प्रीतम-मंदिरों की विभिन्न हस्तप्रतियों में सुरक्षित हैं। डा. पटेल ने बम्बई, नडियाद एवं अहमदाबाद के संग्रहालयों से उपलब्ध प्रीतम के अन्य अप्रकाशित 21 पदोंका उल्लेख किया है। इससे पूर्व गुजराती के विविध संकलनों में प्रीतम के प्रकाशित पदों की संख्या 515 बैठती है।[4] इनमें से हिन्दी के प्रकाशित पदों की संख्या केवल 12 है, जिनका संकलन "सस्तुं साहित्य वर्धक कार्यालय" द्वारा प्रकाशित "श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी" में हुआ है। प्रीतम के अप्रकाशित हिन्दी पदों

1. वही, पृ 206.
2. देखिए — बृ. का दोहन, भाग — 3.
3. प्रीतम : एक अध्ययन, डॉ. अश्विनभाई पटेल, पृ. 407—408.
4. देखिए - प्रीतम : एक अध्ययन, डॉ. अश्विनभाई पटेल, परिशिष्ट 2, पृ. 393.

की संख्या 200 से ऊपर बैठती है, जिनकी प्राप्ति में डा अश्विनभाई पटेल की सहायता का उल्लेख करना यहाँ समीचीन प्रतीत होगा। अपने शोध प्रबन्ध में उन्होंने इस तथ्य का उल्लेख भी किया है कि — "इनके अधिकांश पद गुजराती में हैं। 153 पद हिन्दी व्रजभाषा में हैं, 3 पद मारवाड़ी भाषा में और लगभग 44 पद हिन्दी — गुजराती मिश्र भाषा में भी हैं[1] इनमें गुरुमहिमा, नाम महिमा, रवेगी, लघु चिन्तामणि, वार एवं तिथि से सम्बन्धित पद भी आ जाते हैं। विषय की दृष्टि से इन पदों को हम मोटे तौर पर दो भागों में विभक्त कर सकते हैं—

1. ज्ञान, भक्ति तथा वैराग्य से सम्बन्धित पद।
2. शृंगार एवं लीला–वर्णन के पद–जिनमें वसन्त, होली, दानलीला, रास, हिंडोला, झाँकी (रूपवर्णन), प्रभाती और थाल आदि के पदों का समावेश भी हो जाता है। इन पदों में मुख्यतः सगुणभक्ति के दर्शन होते हैं।

ज्ञातव्य है कि प्रीतम ने ज्ञान–वैराग्य की विशद चर्चा साखियों में की है, जिसका अनुशीलन इससे पूर्व किया जा चुका है। उनके कुछेक पद इसी कोटि के हैं, जिसमें नाम-महिमा, ज्ञान–भक्ति और वैराग्य आदि का निरूपण किया गया है। प्रीतम ने नाम-महिमा में राम का विशेष उल्लेख किया है जबकि लीला–वर्णन में श्याम का उल्लेख मिलता है। यद्यपि प्रीतम ने राम-श्याम का भेद रहने ही नहीं दिया है। इस आधार पर वे पूरे ज्ञानवादी सिद्ध होते हैं, किन्तु प्रीतम के समग्र पदों का अनुशीलन करने पर ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि वे सगुण साधकों से भी किसी माने में कम नहीं उतरते। संभवतः उनका यह रूप इतना अधिक प्रख्यायित रहा है कि उनके ही समकालीन श्री गोविन्ददास ने उन्हें "सूरदास का अवतार" कहा है।[2] बहुत संभव है प्रीतम की वाणी पर उनकी व्रजयात्रा एवं "सूरसागर" का प्रत्यक्ष प्रभाव पड़ा हो। सूरदास की भाँति वे भी अंधे थे—इस नाते सूर की–सी रागात्मकता और एकतानता प्रीतम को भी प्राप्त हुई हो। प्रीतम पुष्टिमार्ग में दीक्षित नहीं थे, बल्कि वे रामानंदी परम्परा के सन्त थे फिर भी सगुण कृष्णभक्ति का रंग सूर की भाँति उनके पदों में सर्वत्र दिखायी देता है। सूरदास की भाँति प्रीतम ने भी माया के बल को खंडित करने के लिए परमेश्वर के अनुग्रह की कामना की है। प्रीतम के ही समकालीन दास सीभाई के एक पद से ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि प्रीतम की साधना वस्तुतः सगुण और निर्गुण की मिलीजुली साधना पद्धति थी, जिसमें सगुण के प्रति उनके मनमें प्रबल स्नेह था और निर्गुण उनका लक्ष्य था।[3]

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1. प्रीतम : एक अध्ययन—डा. अश्विनभाई पटेल, 182
2. "सरसागर पूरब जन्मे, आंहां प्रीतम थई आव्या;
   सूर सुरातन सोभाव्युं, मारा मनमां भाव्या।"
   —संदेसर इ. प्र., पन्ना-408.
3. "सरगुण ऊपर सबक स्ने ने, निरगुणनुं नीसान;
   जक्त कोय जाणे नहीं, तमे धरो एकान्ते ध्यान।"

प्रीतम के पद विविध राग-रागनियों में लिखे गये हैं। वे मूलतः कीर्तनकार एवं उत्सवी मन के गीतकार थे। मीराँ की भाँति उनके पद भी राग, ताल और लय से बद्ध हैं। इनमें शब्द और स्वर का अपूर्व समन्वय है।[1] सूरदास ने जिस तरह श्रीनाथजी के चरणों में बैठकर "हवेली संगीत" को प्रतिष्ठित किया था, ठीक उसी प्रकार प्रीतम ने डाकोर के ठाकुर श्री रणछोड़राय के चरणों में बैठ कर कल्याण, केदारो, मारु, वसन्त, फाग के ढेरों सुमधुर गीत रचे हैं। इनमें भी भगवान श्रीकृष्ण के रूपवर्णन, वसन्त. झूला और वर्षा आदि के पदों को देखते हुए हमें ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि प्रीतम का विशेष अनुराग रूप, उत्सव और मौसम के प्रति है। इस आधार पर हम इस कवि को प्रेम, रूप, रंग राग, आशा और प्रकाश का कवि कह सकते हैं। प्रीतम वस्तुतः अपने युग के "वसन्त वैतालिक" थे। सर्व प्रथम कवि द्वारा रचित "रूप माधुरी" का एक पद द्रष्टव्य है, जो राग "कल्याण" में मिलता है—

> "मतवारे रे तेरे नैंन मद के प्याले;
> रंगरस न्याले चंचलतामय नैंना। मतवारे ......[2],
>
> सुंदर बदन कमल-दल लोचन,
> दुख-मोचन सुख-दनां;
>
> प्रीतम के प्रभु प्रेम-चतुर अति,
> निरखत भये चितचेनां। मतवारे ......[3].

प्रीतम के प्रायः सभी पद संगीत की विविध राग-रागिनियों में बद्ध हैं। उनके प्रिय रागों में केदारा, घोल ओट सारंग राग हैं। सारंग राग की देसियाँ प्रीतम ने गुजराती में मन भर कर लिखी हैं। खास कर "दानलीला" के पदों में हमें प्रीतम की ये देसियाँ मिलती हैं।

संदेसर के मन्दिर में मौजूद तुरई, करताल मंजीरे और मृदंग आदि वाद्योंग को देखने से ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि प्रीतम की रुचि संगीत के क्षेत्र में काफी गहरी थी. उनका "उत्सविया कीर्तनकार" नामकरण भी इस बात का सूचक है, कि वे अपने समय के उत्कृष्ट कोटि के भजनिक-समुदाय में से एक थे। प्रीतम द्वारा प्रस्थापित ऐसी परम्परा गुजरात से आज विलुप्त-सी होती जा रही है।

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1. देखिए—राग "जैजवंती" के छूटे पद—
   "मेरे तो छबीलो कहान, प्राण को आधार है।" तथा
   "मेरे तो जीवनधन नंदाजी को लाला है।"
   —लिखित हस्त प्र. 8.
2. बालका मन्दिर, ह. प्र. 4, पत्ता-107 के पद 55 से उद्धृत।
3. खंभातवाली ह. प्र., पत्ता - 14.

रूप-वर्णन के पद :

संध्या समय के संग लाटनेवाले "वनमाली" का रूप प्रीतम ने मन भर कर लिया है। श्रीकृष्ण वृषभानु दुलारी के साथ जाते हुए ऐसे प्रतीत होते हैं, मानो उदयगिरि पर इंदु का प्रकाश हो रहा हो।[1]. ऐसे रूपराशि से पूर्ण रंगभरे पिया आनंदकंद अखंड अविनाशी हैं, जिनके सलोने ननों की कृपादृष्टि जिस पर बरसती है, वह निर्भय हो जाता है। बछिया के संग रसभीने लाल वेणु बजाते हैं और जमुनाजी के किनारे अपनी ग्वाल मंडली सहित "भात" खाते हैं। इस दृश्य को देखकर स्वयं ब्रह्मा भी अपनी सुधबुध खो देते हैं।[2] शिहोल की ह. प्र. 7 में एक ऐसा "मंगलगीत" नामक पद मिलता है, जिसमें कवि ने भगवान श्रीकृष्ण का नखशिख वर्णन ही कर दिया है —

"आज आनंद अपार द्वार हरि आये हु

× × ×

वंदुं चरण सरोज मनोजल भावन,
सोभित खटदल चहेन मुनिन मनभावन।
चंद्रछटा नखविसुध सुधा सुख के भरे,
अखिल भोवन भवतीभर देखि तेइ छिन टले।

× × ×

रुणझुन नेपुरनाद निगमधुन होत ही,
मनहु सप्तस्वर गायो भवजाप पोत ही।
पीतांबर छवि अधिक रंग उपजावहीं,
तपत कनक रवि उदित दामिनी लजावहीं,
कटि किंकनी मनिजटित धवल नटनागर,
नाभि अगम गंभीर परम सुख सागर।"

कवि के ही शब्दों में "सांवरे जब कदम्ब वृक्ष की छाँह में खड़े होकर जमुना के नीर को निहारते हैं, तो लगता है मानों रुप का अंबार एक जगह आकर ठहर गया हो।"[3]

नंदभवन में कृष्णरूपी कल्पतरु फूल रहा है, जो भामिनी (यशोदा माता) को बड़ा रुचिकर प्रतीत हो रहा है, जिनके बालचरित्र को देख-देख कर स्वयं इन्द्र अपना मान खो बैठे हैं। ऐसे कल्पतरु में सदाकाल नवपल्लव और फूल पुष्पित होते रहते हैं। जिसकी "प्रेम-सुवास" में भक्तजन अमररस के झूले में झूल रहे हैं।[4] ऐसे सांवरे सुजान प्राणों से

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1. बाल्ला मंदिर ह.प्र. 6, पन्न—22.
2. वही, पन्ना—22.
3. "खड़े कदम की छैयां सांवरो, खड़े कदम की छैयां,
   निरखत नीर गहरे जुमना को, आये रूप एक ठैयां।"—शिहोल ह.प्रति से।
4. "नंदभावन अति भाये भामिनी, कृष्णकल्पतरु फूले:
   बालचरित्र विचित्र देख के, इन्द्र अमर अज भूले॥ ३॥
   —खमातवाली ह. प्र., पन्ना-28

भी अधिक प्रिय हैं, जिन्हें अर्धनिमिष के लिए अलग करने को जी नहीं चाहता। इनके प्रेमरूपी रंग में अंग-अंग भीज गया है, नैन और बैन (वाणी) और ज्यादा मतवाले हो गये हैं।[1] प्रीतम गोपीभाव से श्याम के चरण-कमलों की वंदना करते हुए कहते हैं—'हे श्याम ! मैं तेरे ऐसे पद-सरोज पर वारी गयी हूँ, जो मंगलकारी हैं, दूषणों को हरनेवाले हैं। इन्हीं चरणों से तो पावन गंगा प्रकट हुई है। मैं ऐसे चरणरज की वंदना करती हूं।[2] मैं उस राधावर रासविहारी की सुंदरता पर बलिहारी जाती हूँ, जिन पर करोड़ों कामदेव निछावर किये जा सकते हैं।[3]

कवि ने भगवान श्रीकृष्ण की रूपशोभा के साथ-साथ व्रजभूमि, वृन्दावन, जमुनाजी और गोवर्धन आदि का बड़ा ही हृदयस्पर्शी चित्रण किया है। प्रीतम इस बात पर बल देना चाहते हैं कि भगवान के जिस रूप का ध्यान ब्रह्मा और शिव आदि धरते हैं, वही गोकुलवासियों के स्नेह के वश गोकुल में गाय चरा रहे हैं। उन्होंने समूचे गोकुल को गोलोक बना दिया है।[4]
भगवान श्रीकृष्ण के रूप वर्णन में भी प्रीतम की दृष्टि "चरणारविन्द" पर ही टिकी है। इसे हम प्रीतम की विनयभक्ति का आधिक्य ही कह सकते हैं। प्रीतम की प्रेमलक्षणा भक्ति में भी अन्ततः विनयभाव ही प्रधान है। संभवतः इसीलिए वे राधा का वैसा खुल कर वर्णन नहीं कर पाते, जैसा सूरदास ने "सूरसागर" में किया है। प्रीतम की भक्ति में "राधाभाव की अपेक्षा "गोपीभाव" विशेष है। जो हमें श्रीमद्भागवत् के प्रभाव की ओर संकेत करता है। यहीं नहीं, प्रीतम की दृष्टि में कृष्ण का रुप मूलतः अकल और अविनाशी ब्रह्म का रूप है, जिसके स्मरण मात्र से सभी प्रकार की भ्रान्तियाँ निर्मूल हो जाती हैं; द्वेष-निन्दा का परदा हटने लगता है तथा ज्ञान एवं बुद्धि का प्रकाश फैलने लगता है। प्रीतम तो भगवान से केवल प्रेमाभक्ति की याचना करते हैं।[5] उनकी दृष्टि में यशोदा मुक्तिरूपा है जब कि राधा भक्तिरूपा है। नन्द आनन्दरूप हैं।[6]

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1. "सांभरे सुजान काहान, प्रानहु ते प्यारो,
एक झलक अर्ध निमिष, होउ न न्यारो।" —वही, पन्ना-31
2. वही, पन्ना-32.
3. वही, पन्ना-32.
4. खंभातवाली हस्त प्र., पन्ना-15.
5 श्रीकृष्ण के चरणार विन्द, प्रेमप्रीत लागी;
अकल रूप देख-देख, सकल भ्रान्ति भागी।
रूपरास श्रीनिवास, अवर आस त्यागी;
ज्याको गुणगान करत, महामुनि बैरागी।
निन्दा सबहु उड़ि गयी, ज्ञान-बुद्धि जागी;
प्रीतम प्रभु के पास, प्रेमभक्ति मांगी ॥
— खंभातवाली ह. प्र., पन्ना-31.
6. वाला ह प्र., पन्ना-182.

प्रीतम ने भगवान श्रीकृष्ण के मनोहारी रूप वर्णन के साथ-साथ "मुरली वर्णन" भी किया है। इस मुरली का प्रभाव देखिए कि इसने जड़ को चेतन और चेतन को जड़ बना दिया है—

"मोरली मदन मन माती,
उनमत बाजत मनहु न बाजत, परम मुदित रंगराती ॥ 1 ॥
जड़ चैतन, चैतन जड़ कीने, सुंदर श्याम सोहाती;
प्रीतम के स्वामी को अधररस, प्रेमे पीवत दिनराती ॥ 2 ॥[1]

प्रीतम ने गुजराती में "मुरली वर्णन" के अनेक पद रचे हैं, यद्यपि वे सूरदास अथवा दयाराम की बराबरी के नहीं हैं। प्रीतम की दृष्टि में मुरली गोपियों के बिरह को जगाती है तथा वह आध्यात्मिक संकेत देनेवाली है।

ऋतुवर्णन के साथ-साथ कृष्ण का रूप वर्णन भी प्रीतम की एक अन्य विशेषता है। कुछ उदाहरण देखिए—

वर्षाऋतु के अवसर पर—

"भीजत नंद किसोरा बन में, भीजत नंद किसोरा।
झीनी-झीनी बूँद परते वसुधा पर, बोलत चातुक मोरा॥

और भी—

"झूम रहे बादर अमर, देखो आली झूम रहे बदर अमर;
भानुं गजराजसेन सुरपति को, उड़े भोवन भमर।[2]

शरदऋतु के अवसर पर—

"सरद सरोरुह नेनां साम के, सरद सरोरुह नेनां।
मद के से प्याले भानु मतवारे, सकल सुधा एनां।[3]

इन सभी के मध्य कवि ने अखंड-साधना की है। वह अन्त में कहता भी है—

"अखंड गोकुल अखंड गोपी, अखंड आनंद आनंद पूजहि।
अखंड गिरिवर अखंड जमुना, अखंड फूलन कुंजहि॥
अखंड तरुवर अखंड पक्षी, अखंड करत कलोलहि॥
अखंड लालन लीला, अखंड वेण बजावहिं,
अखंड अमृत कथा कीर्तन, अखंड प्रीतम गुन गावहिं।[4]

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1. खंभातवाली ह. प्र., पन्ना–3?.
2. खंभातवाली ह. प्र., पन्ना–251.
3. वही, पन्ना–251.
4. वही, पन्ना–254.

प्रीतम ने वस्तुतः ऐसे ही नंदनंदन गिरिराजधरण का रूप अपने हृदय में धारण किया है, जिसका स्मरण वे निरंतर करते हैं। इस प्रकार, हरिदास की अखंड खुमारी को जो एक बार पी लेता है, उसकी तारी अगम के घर लग जाती है।[1]

हिंडोला-पद :

वर्षाऋतु के आगमन के साथ ही हिंडोलागान वस्तुतः व्रजलोकजीवन की परम्परा है। इस दृष्टि से राधाकृष्ण के प्रणयनिरूपण में कृष्णभक्त कवियों ने अनेकविध हिंडोलापदों की रचना की है। गुजरात की कृष्णभक्ति-परम्परा में भी इस प्रकार की पदरचना का विशेष महत्त्व दिखायी देता है। पुष्टिमार्गीय एवं स्वामिनारायण सम्प्रदाय के कवियों ने वर्षावर्णन के साथ-साथ हिंडोलापदों की रचना अवश्य की है। यही नहीं, प्रीतमदास जैसे रामानंदीय कवियों ने भी कृष्णभक्ति के परिवेश में अधिकाधिक हिंडोलापद रचे हैं। हीरेजड़ित हेमखंभों में नवल लाड़ली का कृष्ण के साथ झूला झूलना ऐसा प्रतीत होता है मानों व्रजकामिनी कनकलता हो और कृष्ण नवतरु तमाल हों। व्रजवधुओं के आनन्द-उत्साह का यह समय होता है। झूला-झूलते हुए ये आपस में हँसती-हँसाती हैं और एक-दूसरे का नाम लेती-लिवाती हैं। इनकी सुन्दरता पर कोटिक काम न्यौछावर किये जा सकते हैं।[2] उस समय का सारा वातावरण फूलों से महक उठता है और भौंरों का गुंजार होने लगता है। चतुर सहचरियाँ मधुर स्वर का गान करती हैं। तरुणियाँ भाँतिभाँति के भूषण अपने अंगों पर सजाती हैं। आषाढ़ वदी द्वितीया के लगते ही वृक्षों पर हिंड़ोले पड़ जाते हैं और श्रावण वदी त्रितीया को इनकी पूर्णाहुति होती है।[3]

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1. "हरिरस अखंड अखंड खुमारी,
   जे पीवे सो फेर न उतरे, लगे अगम घर तारी।

   × × ×

   प्रीतम अमे अखंड पद पावे, जो मन जुक्ति विचारी।"
   —खंभातवाली ह. प्र., पन्ना-19.

2. आनी हो हँसत-हँसावत, व्रजवधू, लेत-लेवावत नाम;
   सुन्दरता छवि ऊपरे, वास कोटिक काम ॥
   आनी हो कननवेल व्रिजकामिनी, नवतरु कृष्ण तमाल;
   प्रीतम के प्रभु की छवि, निरखत होते निहाल ॥
   —संदेसर ह. प्र., पन्ना 75.

3. "आनी हो मास असाड़वद द्वितीया, बैठे हुलसि हिंदोरे;
   श्रावणवद सुभ त्रितिया, उतरे जुगल किसोरे।"
   —वही, पन्ना-75.

प्रीतम ने इस समय का अत्यन्त मार्मिक चित्रण किया है—

हिंदोरे झूले ललनां हो,
हो मोरी आयो है श्रावण मास ॥ 1 ॥
श्री वृंदावन फूल रह्यो है, सोभा अधिक अपार;
घेर-घेर फूली द्रववेली, मधुकर करत गुंजार ॥ 2 ॥
कंचन खंभ खचित मनि-मानिक, वारूं कोटि अनंग;
चौकी तीस बत्तीस जूमखां, डांडी शुभ सरल सोरंग ॥ 3 ॥
गादी तकिया कुसगंधधवा, लसत पाट में दोर,
झूले परम चतुर अति नागर, नागरी नंद किसोर ॥ 4 ॥

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उरझे हार सिंगार परस्पर, ललिता लेत समार;
जे जे धुन सुर करत गगन में, बरखत कुसुम अपार ॥[1]

प्रीतमदास ने श्रृंगाररस निरूपण में भक्तिरस को ही प्रधानता दी है। इसीलिए उसमें मर्यादाभाव है। इस सम्बन्ध में प्रीतम का कथन भी है कि—

"जोग भोग हम चाहत नांहीं,
रिद्धिसिद्ध माया मांन;
जायूँ प्रेमभक्ति सतसंगत,
ब्रन्दावनलीला रसगान।"

प्रीतम ने हिंडोलों की विविध झांकियाँ प्रस्तुत की हैं। आज भी डाकोर के मन्दिर में भाँतिभाँति के हिंडोला-श्रृंगार किये जाते हैं। बहुत संभव है, प्रीतम के मन पर इन सबका अत्यधिक प्रभाव पड़ा हो। इस आधार पर कवि ने राधाकृष्ण की भावपूर्ण छवियों का वर्णन किया है। आकाश में घटा घिरी है और धरती पर नंदनंदन झूला झूल रहे हैं; उस समय का एक दृश्य देखिए—

गगन घटा घंन छायो, देखो आली;
गगन घटा घंन छायो,
झूलत हिंदोरे जबहि नंदनंदन,
तापर छत्र बनायो ॥ 1 ॥
दमकत दांमिनी ज्युं नट नाचत,
इन्द्र मृदंग बजायो;
नरतत बुंद अती रंग उपजे,
प्रीतम प्रेमे जस गायो ॥ 2 ॥[2]

1. देखिए—सिहोल ह. प्रति.
2. वाल्हा, ह. प्र.–3, पन्ना–23.

झूले की गति के साथ-साथ दामिनी का दमकना, बादलों का गड़गड़ाना और धरती पर बूँदों का नृत्य करना कैसा सुहावना प्रतीत होता है ! ऐसे में किशोर-किशोरी की जोड़ी बड़ी अद्भुत लगती है । नीले-पीले पट आपस में उलझने लगते हैं ।[1] इसीमें पान-मिठाई का दौर चलता है । ललिता नामक सखी लविंग-सुपारी से भरी बीरी उन्हें दे रही है। सारा हिंडोला फूलों से सजा है, जिसमें फूलों की चौकी है और फूलों के झुमके सजे हैं ।[2] राधा की साड़ी भी फूलों से सजी है । अंगिया और चूड़ीं तक में फूल भरे हैं । कृष्ण की पाघ फूलों से भरी है, पिछौरी में फूल सजे हैं । वृक्ष फूलों से लदे हैं । भ्रमर, पोपट और मोर भी फूले नहीं समाते । मस्त पवन भी आनंदित होकर झकोरे ले रहा है । इस झांकी को देख कर अपने प्राणजीवनधन भगवान श्रीकृष्ण के प्रति प्रीतम के हृदय में प्रेम उमड़ रहा है ।[3] श्यामा-श्याम की उस आनंदकारी छवि को देखकर प्रीतम कौनसी उपमा प्रदान करे यह सूझता नहीं । फिर भी, कवि ने जो उपमा दी है उसे देखिए—

> "पिया प्यारी आनंदकारी, उपमा बरनी न जावे,
> कनकबेल तमाल लपटी, ज्युं दामिनी घन माये ।
> नील-पीत सरोज्य सुन्दर, अरक-इन्दु लजाये,
> लाल लली दोउ रसिक झूले, प्रीतम प्रेमगुण गाये ।[4]

हिंडोले पर हरि बैठे हैं, व्रषभानुनंदिनी वामांग होकर बैठी हैं और आसपास सभी व्रजनारियाँ हैं । हिंडोले के स्वर्णखंभ रत्नों से जड़ित हैं । चारों डंडियाँ हीरे-मोती से जड़ी हैं । गद्दी तकिये का सहारा लेकर कमलनयन गिरधारी बैठे हैं जो सुंदरता के सागर हैं । "सूरसागर" में सूरदास ने भी भगवान कृष्ण को "सुंदरता का सागर" कहा है । वस्तुतः सौंदर्य की ऐसी विराट कल्पना अन्यत्र दुर्लभ है ।

रासलीला के पद :

प्रीतम के रासलीला सम्बन्धी पद हिंडोला पदों के साथ ही जुड़े हैं । गुजराती भाषा में रचित उनके इस प्रकार के विपुल पद मिलते हैं,[5] हिन्दी में ऐसे पदों की संख्या अल्प ही है । रासधारी कृष्ण का वर्णन कवि ने इस प्रकार किया है—

> "अहो रासधारी,
> मोर मुकुट मकराकृत कुंडल,
> कमल नयन मुख इंदु तुमारी ।[6]

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1. वही, पन्ना-23
2. वही, पन्ना-24.
3. वाल्ला, ह. प्र.-3, पन्ना-24.
4. वही, पन्ना-25.
5. "धन्य व्रन्दावन रसनुं धाम, रंगरेल थई,
   तुलसी सागर सामासाम, रंगरेल थई ॥ "
   — सदेसर ह प्र., 5, पन्ना-71.
6. वाल्ला मंदिर, ह.प्र.-6, पन्ना-7.

इनके रास मंडल की झांकी का एक रूप देखिए—

"रास मंडल कीनो,
एक-एक गोपी एक गोविन्द,
रूप रसिकवर लींनो, रासमंडल कीनो... ॥ 1 ॥
जादू जैसो भाव उर अन्तर,
ताकु दरस तेहि दीनो;
प्रीतम कहे प्रभु प्रेम सनेही,
प्रेमप्रीत रंग भीनो, रासमंडल कीनो ... ॥ 2 ॥"[1]

ऐसे राधाबर रासबिहारी की सुंदरता पर प्रीतम बलिबलि जाते हैं और इसी रूप को हृदय में धारण करते हैं।[2]

बसन्त एवं फाग के पद :

आषाढ़ और सावन की तरह फागुन का महीना प्रीतम को बेहद पसन्द है। राग "धमार" में उन्होंने इस महीने के परिवेश को ले कर "होली" एवं "बसन्त" के अनेक पदों की रचना की है। ब्रज की नवल नागरियों के साथ नन्दलाल कहीं अबीर-गुलाल उड़ाते दिखाई देते हैं तो कहीं गोपियाँ काले श्याम को केसर में सहला कर गोरा बना देती हैं।[3] कृष्ण गोपियों के साथ होली खेल रहे हैं और वे परस्पर रंगभरी पिच-कारियाँ छोड़ रहे हैं। बसुधा केसर की कीच से भर गई है। मजे की बात तो यह है कि प्रीतम ने होली के इस प्रसंग को भी "ज्ञान" के रंग में रंग दिया है। प्रेम और ज्ञान का संयोग ही प्रीतम के भक्तिरस की विशेषता है, जिसे वे इस रूप में घोषित करते हैं—

षेलो सांम के संग, रंगभेरय होरियां,
ज्ञान-गुलाल उड़ाइये, प्रेम की गागर ढोरियाँ।
मन को मृघ मद स्नेह को मुधा,
करणी केसर घोरियाँ,

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1. वही, पन्ना-7.
2. खंभातवाली ह.प्र., पन्ना–32.

3. षेले बसन्त बिहार, व्रज नवल नागरि,
ठोर ठोर जुबती के जुंमख, गावे सरस धमार।

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कारे सो गोरे किथे, कारे अद्भुत सोभा सार,
प्रीतम के प्रभु प्रेम सनेही, छबि पर जाउँ बलिहार।

—बाला, ह.प्र., 4, पन्ना – 162.

परपंच परदो डारदें,
मिट जाय चित्त की चोरियाँ ।
अन्तर छाँड़ि निरन्तर रमतां, भव के बन्धन छोरियाँ,
प्रीतम के प्रभु रूप निहारत, पीवत पीयूष कटोरियाँ । [2]

ब्रिन्दावन की "होरी" के साथ-साथ प्रीतम घट के भीतर की "होरी" के खेल को नहीं भूलते । उसमें वे दया-धर्म रूपी केसर को घोलकर शुद्ध प्रेम का रंग निचोना चाहते हैं, जिनसे दिल की दग्ध नाडियाँ प्रेम की पिचकारी बन जायें जहाँ शब्दरूपी श्याम सुरतिरूपी श्यामा के साथ ब्रह्मरंध्र धाम में दिनरात अखंड खेल खेलते रहें । [2] और, जहाँ अनहद की धुन निरन्तर बजती रहे । उस जलहल जलहल ज्योति में ब्रह्मधाम का तेजोमय रास निरन्तर होता है, जिसमें द्वैत की स्थिति का नाश हो जाता है । [3] ऐसी जगह पहुँच कर प्रीतम निश्चय ही "चिद्ब्रह्म" और "नादब्रह्म" दोनों का परचा एक साथ पा लेते हैं । प्रीतम का निजी व्यक्तित्व भी इसमें खिल उठता है, जहाँ वे सूर और दयाराम आदि से भिन्न प्रतीत होते हैं । वैसे, गोकुल में राधा के संग श्याम की होली खेलने के अनेक मनोहारी प्रसंग प्रीतम ने वर्णित किये हैं, लेकिन वसन्तरूपी संत का मरजीवा बन कर आनन्द के सागर में डुबकी लगानेवाला फाग-वर्णन प्रातम की वाणी में अद्भुत है । वदनरूपी सरोज पर शब्दरूपी मधुकर ज्ञान-वैराग्य का गुंजन कर रहा है और प्रेमरूपी पिचकारी के छूटते ही अंग-अंग भीगा जा रहा है । त्रिवेणी-तट पर रंगभरा है, जिसमें हृदय डुबकियाँ लगाकर "रसिया" बन गया है । [4] इसी प्रकार माया और ब्रह्म की होली के रूपक प्रीतम ने जगह-जगह निरूपित किये हैं । ऐसे पदों में कवि वैशेषिक शास्त्र के अनुसार जीव-सृष्टि की मीमांसा करता हुआ दृष्टिगत होता है । सुरति-निरति की पिचकारी भर कर सोहं के साथ होली खेल लेने पर जो रंग एक बार चढ़ जाता है वह फिर कभी उतरता नहीं । ऐसा खेल खेलनेवाले को चिदानंद ब्रह्म का मिलन तो होता ही है, उसे सहज ही "परमपद" रूपी "फगुवा" भी मिलता है । [5]

प्रीतम के शब्दों में बसन्तऋतु रंगों से भर गई है और ब्रन्दावन में आनन्द का सागर उमड़ पड़ा हैं, राधा और कृष्ण रूपी गौर श्याम रंग के कमल उसमें खिल उठे हैं। केसर से भरी मटकियाँ ले-लेकर गोपिकाएँ अपने-अपने घरों से निकल पड़ी हैं और उन सभी ने गोपाल का जमुना के घाट पर घेर लिया है । तभी एकसाथ चंग-उपंग, झांझ-डफ,

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1. वाह्ला ह.प्र. 4, पन्ना-161.
2. वाह्ला हस्त प्र.-4, पन्ना-160.
3. वही, पन्ना-160.
4. वही, पन्ना-178.
5. वाह्ला, ह. प्र.-4, पन्ना-182.

मुरली, मृदंग, तंतरी–तरंग, ढोल–ढोलक, दुन्दुभि और खंजरी आदि वाद्य बजने लगते हैं। राधा अपनी सखियों को इशारा करती हुई आगे बढ़ रही हैं। उन्होने नंदनंदन को चारों ओर से पकड़ कर कहा — "फगुवा दोगे तब छूटोगे मोहन माखनचोर"।[1] किसीने मुरारी की मुरली छीन ली तो किसीने पीताम्बर खींच लिया। किसीने "लाल" की आँख ही आँज दी तो किसीने आवेश में आकर उनका मुख चुम्बन कर लिया। और, अन्त में कृष्ण कन्हाई की तब जाकर छुट्टी हुई जब वे सभी के लिए मधु–मंगल फगुवा ले आये।[2] प्रीतम के ऐसे वर्णनों में चित्रोपमता एवं सहज नाटकीयता भर गई है।

भ्रमरगीत :

हिंडोला, फूलडोल, रास और बसन्त-फाग आदि विषयक पदों में प्रीतम ने जहाँ एक ओर संयोग शृंगार का वर्णन किया है वहाँ दूसरी ओर "भ्रमरगीत" के पदों एवं "सरस गीता" में उन्होंने गोपिकाओं के विरहजन्य भावों को भी उद्घाटित किया है। सूर की भाँति प्रीतम ने भी विरह के साथ उपालंभभाव को जोड़ कर प्रेमाभक्ति की निगूढ़ता एवं तन्मयता का चित्रण किया है, लेकिन सूर के मुकाबले में प्रीतम के इस प्रकार के पदों की संख्या अंगुलियों पर गिनने लायक ही है।

उद्धव के उपदेश और कुब्जा के संदेश पर प्रीतम की गोपियाँ कहती हैं कि—"हे ऊधो! तुम्हारी बात सत्य है, लेकिन व्रजबालाओं की बुद्धि भी कच्ची मिट्टी की नहीं है। तुमने जैसा कहा, वैसा ही हम क्यों करें? हीरे को छोड़ कर कंकर का स्पर्श हम क्यों करें? हे ऊधो! यह जोग तो हमारे लिए विष की भाँति है।"[3] सूरदास की गोपिकाएँ जिस तरह ऊधो से कहती हैं कि — "ऊधो मन नाहीं दसबीस, एक हुतो जो गयो श्याम संग, को आराधे ईसा।" ठीक उसी प्रकार प्रीतम की गोपियाँ भी तर्कपूर्ण उत्तर देती हैं कि अगर हमारे अनेक मन होते तो हम भी अनेक भेष धारण कर लेतीं। एक ही तो मन था जो "हरी" में लीन हो गया। जल की मछली को क्या जल से बाहर निकला जा सकता है?[3] अब तो गोपाल लाल से लगन लग चुकी है। न तन की सुधबुध रही है और न खानपान की खबर है। मन की ममता भी छूट चुकी है। सोते-जागते बस

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1. वाह्ला ह.प्र.–4, पन्ना—182.
2. वही, पन्ना–183.
3. "मन हो जा अमारे अनेक रे,
   भला नूजवा धरावत भेष रे।
   हतूं एक ते हरीमां थयुं लीन रे,
   नव नीसरे जेहवुं जलमीन रे।"

— संदेसर ह.प्र.–5, पन्ना–61.

उन्हीं का ध्यान आता है। हमारी हालत उस चातक पक्षी-सी है जो, निरन्तर "घनश्याम" की ओर टकटकी लगा कर देखता हो।[1]

गोपियाँ उद्धव से कहती हैं कि — "हे मधुकर ! माधव से जाकर यह कहना कि हम तुम्हारे दर्शन के बगैर पागल हुई जा रही हैं और तुमने वहाँ जाकर कुब्जा को अपनी कमला बना लिया है ? जगत में कितनी हँसी होगी, इसका भी विचार नहीं आया ! इसके बावजूद ऊधो को तुमने हमारे पास योग का पाठ पढ़ाने भेजा है ?[2] सूर की भाँति प्रीतम ने भी "योग" और "वियोग" (विजोग) का सुन्दर श्लेषात्मक निरूपण किया है।

जन्म बधाई सम्बन्धी पद :

प्रीतमदास ने कृष्णजन्म बधाई के अनेक पद लिखे हैं। हिन्दी में कृष्णजन्म बधाई से सम्बन्धित उनके आठ पद मिलते हैं। इनमें प्रीतम ने भगवान कृष्ण के जन्मोत्सव, व्रजमंडल के आनन्दोत्सव, नंदगृह की शोभा एवं व्रजवनिताओं के रूप का अत्यन्त मनोहारी चित्रण किया है।

कृष्णजन्म की बधाई के साथ-साथ कवि ने वामन जन्म बधाई, रामजन्म बधाई, नृसिंहावतार स्तुति, राधाजन्म बधाई आदि के पद भी लिखे हैं। वस्तुतः जयदेव से लेकर सूरदास तक की वर्णनशैली का प्रभाव, प्रीतम के इन पदों पर पड़ा है। इस दृष्टि से राधावर्णन का एक पद द्रष्टव्य है, जिसमें कवि कहता है कि "राधा का तन अत्यन्त कोमल और मन हंसिनी के समान है। भ्रकुटियाँ भ्रमर के समान, स्वर कोकिला के समान, कंठ कपोत के समान, आँखें खंजन पक्षी के समान, नाभि मधुपुष्प के समान, चम्पा कुसुम-सी देह, तिलपुष्प समान नासिका, बिल्वफल के समान सुंदर कुच और पके हुए फल के समान राधा के गाल हैं।"[3] शची, रति, शारदा और करोड़ों मेनकाएँ ऐसी सांवरी के एक एक रोम पर न्योछावर की जा सकती हैं।[4] बरसाने में राधा का जन्मोत्सव मनाया जा रहा है, बधाइयाँ गायी जा रही हैं। आँगन में कुंकुम-केसर छिड़का जा रहा है, चौक मोतियों से सजाया जा रहा है और चारों तरफ परस्पर आनंद एवं प्रेम छाया हुआ है।[5]

वस्तुतः राधा-वर्णन की ये उपमाएँ परम्परागत ही विशेष हैं, फिर भी इनके भीतर झिलमिलाती निरूपण की निजता ही प्रीतम की मौलिक विशेषता है। विविध जन्म बधाइयों के जरिये उन्होने विविध अवतारों का निरूपण किया है, जिसे हम प्रीतम का शैलीगत वैशिष्ट्य ही कह सकते हैं।

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1. "लगी लगन गोपाल लाल सों, भूल गई सब सुध्य तन की;
   खबर नहीं कछु खानपान की, छूट गई ममता मन की।
   सूतां-बेठां धांन निरन्तर, ज्यूं चातक चितवन घन की।"
   — सदेसर ह.प्र.—5, पन्ना-40.
2. वही, पन्ना-39.
3. देखिए—बाल्ला ह. प्र. 4, पन्ना-239.
4. वही, पन्ना-239.
5. वही, पन्ना-238.

थाल एवं आरती पद :

प्रीतम की भक्तिभावना के मोटे तौर पर दो स्वरूप हैं (1) भावात्मक (2) क्रियात्मक। क्रियात्मक सेवाविधि का स्वरूप प्रीतम के पदों में ठीक वैसा ही है, जैसा हमें पुष्टिमार्गीय सेवा पद्धति में दिखाई देता है। डाकोर के "पूनमिया भक्त" होने के कारण उनमें इस प्रकार का सेवाभाव जाग्रत हुआ हो तो इसमें आश्चर्य की बात नहीं। भगवान की विविध समय की आरती के साथ-साथ भोग, नैवेद्य, कलेऊ, राजभोग एवं व्यालू आदि के रसमय थालपद प्रीतम ने रचे हैं, जिनमें उन्होने भाँतिभाँति के व्यंजनों का उल्लेख किया है। थाल की सामग्री का वर्णन करते-करते प्रीतम की दृष्टि भगवान श्रीकृष्ण के मनोहारी रूप-वर्णन में रमने लगती है। एक उदाहरण देखिए-

"जीमत जुगल किसोर जुगत सुं,
सुंदर थाल समारि;
पेय पकवान मिठाई-मेवा,
भाँति भाँति तरकारि।
× × ×
सुन्दर वदन कमल दल लोचन, कुंडल की छवि न्यारी,
प्रीतमनां सामीनी सोभा, बार-बार बलिहारी।"[1]

सेवा में विविध वस्त्राभरणों से इष्ट विग्रह को विभूषित करना शृंगार सेवा के अन्तर्गत आता है। राधाकृष्ण की जोड़ी को रत्नसिंहासन पर बैठाकर भोजनोपरान्त वे "पानबीरी" देना नहीं भूलते। कलेऊ-वर्णन, बालभोगवर्णन, शृंगार एवं राजभोग तथा शयनभोग (सखड़ीभोग) सभी में सेवाभाव की तल्लीनता एवं माधुर्य का भाव भरा है। प्रीतम को अपने स्वामी की व्यस्तता एवं रुचि का पूरा खयाल है। वे कहते हैं-

"बालभोग कीजे मेरे प्यारे, गऊअन के संगचलना रे,
व्रन्दावन की कुंज गली में, कीरतसुता कुं मिलना रे॥
बालभोग, सणगार, राजभोग, सयनभोग नहिं टलना रे,
सुंदरवन देखाये सांवरे, दासन के दुख दलना रे॥"[2]

जानराय के समक्ष "भोग सामग्री" का वर्णन करते हुए प्रीतम ने "दधि, मेवा, पकवान-मिठाई, मोहनभोग, मिसरी, नवनीत, साल-दाल" आदि व्यंजनों का उल्लेख किया है।[3] प्रीतम के प्रभाती पदों में भी अक्सर "माखन-रोटी" का जिक्र आता है-

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1. खंभातवाली ह. प्र., पन्ना-1.
2. खंभातवाली ह. प्र., पन्ना-26.
3. संदेसरवाली ह. प्र.-4, पन्ना-82.

"प्रात भयो प्राणपति, प्रेमप्रीत जागो;
दंतधावन करो कान, माखन रोटी माँगो ।"[1]

आरती पदों में भगवान श्री जानराय, श्री रणछोड़राय, श्री रघुवरराय एवं आनंदसिन्धु श्री गुरुगोविन्द विषयक आरतीपद विशेष महत्त्वपूर्ण हैं। यशोदारानी स्वयं बाल गोपाल की आरती उतार रही हैं, जिसका वर्णन कवि ने बड़े कलात्मक ढंग से किया है—

"अपने लाल को वदन निहारत,
हिरदे रे हिरदे अधिक अधिक हरखानी,
आरती करत जसोदारानी ॥ 1 ॥"

मोर मुकुट मकराकृत कुंडल, कमलनैना सुखदानी,
भाल तिलक नासा गजमोती, उपमा न जाये बखानी ॥ 2 ॥

उर मणिमाल हार तुलसी के, सोभा देख लोभानी,
भुज कंकण कटिरत्न किंकिनि, पदनेपुर रे
पदनेपुर की ठमकानी ॥ 3 ॥

मेघ बरन तन पीत वसन जो, दामिनि घन लपटानी,
अंग अंग छैल छबीले, रूप रास रसखानी ॥ 4 ॥

सुक नारद सारद सिव ब्रह्मा, ध्यान धरत मुनि ज्ञानी,
प्रीतम प्रेम प्रभु के जस गावत, करत सुफल मन वानी ॥ 5 ॥[2]

प्रीतम ने पुष्टिमार्गीय आरती-समय का अनुसरण करते हुए "मंगला आरती", "श्रृंगार आरती" एवं "सायं आरती" के महत्त्व को विशेषरूपेण प्रतिपादित किया है। कवि ने इन सभी में सेवाभाव के विस्तार को निरूपित किया है। इसके तत्त्वमसि तुरियापद स्वरूप आनंदसिन्धु निर्गुण स्वरूप की आरती[3] कवि ने निर्गुण सन्तों की भाँति भी की है। अतः यहाँ भी प्रीतम ने सगुण–निर्गुण के प्रति अपने सेवाभाव के समान रूप को कायम रखा है।

अन्य पद :

प्रीतम ने कुछ ऐसे फुटकल पद रचे हैं, जिनमें रामभक्ति, तुलसी-विवाह आदि की चर्चा मिलती है। ऐसे पद प्रायः संदेसरवाळी हस्तप्रति-3 एवं 5 में मिलते हैं। ये पद प्रायः जंगला (ख्याल) और कल्याण रागों में बद्ध हैं। शैली का स्वरूप बिलकुल कृष्णभक्ति पर रचे गये पदों-सा है। राधा-कृष्ण की भाँति प्रीतम राम-सीता की अनुरागमई छवि का अंकन करते हैं। एक उदाहरण देखिए—

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1. वाल्ला मंदिर ह. प्र.–4, पन्ना–40.
2. खंभातवाळी ह. प्र., पन्ना-22.
3. खंभातवाली ह. प्र., पन्ना–2[1].

"निरखत नयन प्रेमझड़्य लागी,
दसरथ-नंदन जनक-नंदिनी अरस-परस अनुरागी।
श्रीमुख चन्द्र चकोर जानकी, पीवत रूपरस पागी॥
जनम जनम के रघुवरसंगी, प्रीत पुरातन जागी।
प्रीतम के प्रभु प्रेम सनेही, भावे भजे सो बड़भागी॥"[1]

"साँवरे की सूरत मन में इस तरह बस गई है कि एक पल के लिए उसका ध्यान हटता नहीं। क्या करूँ, कहाँ जाऊँ? मेरे प्राण "परबस" हो चुके हैं। अब तो राम के गले में माला डाल चुकी हूँ।"[2] हे मन! रामजी के रंग में पूरी तरह रंग जा। उनके बग़ैर जीव-मुक्ति असंभव है। राम के नाम पर तो पत्थर तक तैर गये थे, फिर तू रामनामरूपी अमीरस का पान क्यों नहीं करता?[3]

प्रीतम ने विवाह-वर्णन के अनेक पद गुजराती में लिखे हैं। सीता-विवाह, रुक्मिणी-विवाह और तुलसी-विवाह पर लिखे गये पदों में गुजरात की विवाह-परम्परा का सजीव चित्र उभर आया है। हिन्दी में उनका "तुलसी-विवाह" से सम्बन्धित एक अधूरा पद मिलता है जिस में कवि ने तुलसी-महिमा का गान किया है।[4]

तिथि एवं वार सम्बन्धी पद :

महीना, तिथि, वार और ककहरा (कक्का) पर यों प्रीतम ने गुजराती में मन भर कर रचना की है, हिन्दी में अभी तक उनके तिथि-वार विषयक केवल दो पद उपलब्ध होते हैं। तिथि में पड़वा से पूर्णिमा तक[5] और वार में सोम से शनि तक[6] प्रीतम ने मन को भक्तिरस में निमग्न रहने की ओर प्रेरित किया है। ऐसे पद परम्परागत ही विशेष हैं, जिनमें "प्रभु-स्मरणभाव" को ही बार-बार दोहराया गया है। भक्त की जीवन-सारिणी का यह एक विशिष्ट रूप है, जिसे प्रीतम ने तिथि और वार जैसे पदों में बाँधने का प्रयास किया है।

रवेणी पद :

"रवेणी" और "रमैनी"—दोनों समानार्थी शब्द हैं, जिनका अर्थ "बीजक" में स्तुति वर्णन, उपदेशप्रद पद्य और लोकोपकार के रूप में मिलता है।[7]

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1. संदेसर ह. प्र.-5, पन्ना-41.
2. वही, पन्ना-41.
3. संदेसर ह.प्र.,-5, पन्ना-41.
4. देखिए — संदेसर ह.प्र.-3, खंडित प्रति।
5. खंभातवाली ह.प्र., पन्ना—129.
6. वही, पन्ना-130.
7. देखिए - कबीर बीजक, पृ.-2, 17 और 128.

कबीर और अखा की रमैनियों की भाँति प्रीतम ने भी "रवेणी पद" लिखे हैं। लेकिन, प्रीतम रचित रवेणी पदों की शैली कुछ भिन्न प्रकार की है। प्रीतम प्रारंभ में 6 से 16 पंक्तियों का विस्तार करते हैं, जो पंक्तियाँ चौपाई छन्द में मिलती हैं और पदान्त में वे दो साखी भी अवश्य जोड़ते हैं। चौपाइयाँ प्रायः ज्ञान, वैराग्य, प्रेम, भक्ति, मनःसंयम, सद्गुरु एवं सन्त विषयक हैं जबकि साखियों में प्रीतम ने गुरुमहिमा का मधुर गान किया है। चौपाई और दोहा छन्दों की इस प्रकार की जोड़ी सन्तकाव्य के क्षेत्र में प्रीतम की अपूर्व देन कही जा सकती है। गुजरात के अन्य सन्त कवियों में अखा, दयानंद और लालदास आदि ने भी सुन्दर रवेणी पद लिखे हैं।

हिन्दी में रचित प्रीतम के लगभग 12 पद उपलब्ध होते हैं। "श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी" में राग देशाख एवं राग सदर के तीन पद मिलते हैं[1], जबकि वाल्ला और शिहोल से प्राप्त हस्त प्रतियों में इस कोटि के अन्य नौ "रवेणी पद" उपलब्ध हुए हैं। इन पदों में प्रीतम कबीरवाणी से अत्यधिक प्रभावित होते हुए-से दिखाई देते हैं। "जा घट विरह न संचरे सो घट जाण मसान" की भाँति प्रीतम ने भी प्रेम-प्रकाश के महत्त्व को इस प्रकार प्रतिपादित किया है—

> "जे घटमां नहि प्रेम प्रकासा,
> ते हृदये नहि राम निवासा ॥
> सो घट खाली जान निदानां,
> प्रेम बिना नर मृतक समाना ॥
> जैसे पिया बिना नारि सोहागा,
> प्रेम बिना ऐसे वैरागा ॥
> × × ×
> भव दूषन कूं मान-बड़ाई,
> प्रेम बिना मिथ्या चतुराई ॥"[2]

प्रीतम कहते हैं कि प्रेम के बगैर ज्ञान-वैराग्य और नर का नरत्व सब बेकार है। यह सच है कि प्रेम में अन्ततोगत्वा दुख ही दुख है, लेकिन "भव दूषण को मान बड़ाई" अर्थात् संसार के दुखों को तो मान और बड़ाई देनी चाहिए। उनसे भागना तो कायरता है। नरसी महेता की तरह प्रीतम "भलुं थयुं भांगी जंजाल" को पसन्द नहीं करते। वे तो संसार के क्लेशों के मध्य प्रेम की गंगा बहाना चाहते हैं। प्रेम की खुमारी, जब एक

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1. देखिए—श्री प्रीतमदासनी वाणी, पृ. 366 से 368.
2. शिहोल प्र. 1, पन्ना-93.

बार चढ़ जाती है तो फिर उतरती नहीं। उसे रिद्धि-सिद्धि और मुक्ति की कामना तक नहीं रहती।[1]

प्रीतम के रवेणीपद अभिव्यक्ति की दृष्टि से सचोट हैं, जिनमें एक ओर भाषा की सजावट है तो दूसरी ओर उनमें आनुप्रासिकता एवं रूपक आदि अलंकारों का चमत्कार भी है। इस दृष्टि से एक उदाहरण प्रस्तुत है—

"रे मन मूरख मूढ़ गमारा, कहा वरनूं तोय बारंबारा।
चंचल चपल चोरगति तेरी, कपट कुटिलता करत घनेरी।
स्वान, सूकर, खर, काग मझारा, अधम जरठ गमन बटपारा।

* * *

प्रीतम मन गयंद गति, फिरत अविद्या साथ।
पीलवान गुरु वस करे, ज्ञानअंकुस लाये हाथा।"[2]

गुरुगम और अनुभवीजन का संग करने पर आत्मतत्त्व निश्चय ही परमधाम की प्राप्ति करता है और वहाँ पहुँचते ही "अखंड उजास" (प्रकाश) और "ब्रह्म-प्रकाश" होने लगता है, अमृत की बारिश होने लगती है। गगन में बादल गरजने लगते हैं और चारों तरफ बिजली चमकने लगती है।[3] एक अन्य रवेणीपद की साखी में ब्रह्मानंद के विषय में कबीर के "गूंगा केरी सर्करा" की भाँति प्रीतम कहते हैं—

"प्रीतम आनंद ब्रह्म को, मुखे कह्यो नव जाय।
जैसें पतिसुख सुंदरी, समण समण मुसकाय॥"

अखा ने भी ज्ञानी को जहाँ-"अनुभवार्थी" कहा है[4], वहाँ प्रीतम ने उसे "अनुभवीजन" से संज्ञापित किया है। तात्पर्य यह कि साधना के क्षेत्र में अनुभवहीन ज्ञान दो कौड़ी का है, जो न तो अखा को पसन्द है और न प्रीतम को। प्रीतम के ऐसे "रवेणी पद" वस्तुतः

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1. शिहोल ह. प्र.-3.
2. देखिए—अखाकृत छप्पा : दशविध ज्ञानी को अंग।
3. प्रीतम प्याला प्रेम का, पीवत होय सुत्र चेहन;
   चढ़ी खुमारी न ऊतरे, घूमत रहे दिन-रैन।
   प्रेम-अमल न ऊतरे, जिन पिया एक बार;
   रिध्य सिध्य नव निध्य मुक्तिफल, निहिं दिलमां दरकार।
   — शिहोल प्र. 1, पन्ना-92.
4. वाला मन्दिर ह.प्र. 6, पन्ना-31.

उनकी साखियों के भाष्य-से प्रतीत होते हैं। "साखी" के माध्यम से प्रीतम ने जिस बात को अत्यन्त संक्षेप में कहा है, "रवेणी" में उसका उन्होने भाव विस्तार किया है।

सारांशत: हम यह कह सकते हे कि प्रीतम का वेदान्ती एवं ज्ञानी स्वरूप हमें जहाँ उनकी साखियों में मिलता है, वहाँ वे अपने पदों में भक्ति के भावात्मक एवं रागात्मक स्वरूप को बड़ी कुशलता से निरूपित कर पाये हैं। उन्होंने केवल अपने सम्प्रदाय से बद्ध होकर रचनाएँ नहीं की अपितु अपने आराध्य की अनीनता (अनन्यता) में भक्ति का जो भी मार्ग उन्हें रुचिकर प्रतीत हुआ है, उस पर प्रीतम ने निःसंकोच एवं निर्भीकता से कदम रखा है। वे अखा की तरह न तो ज्ञानवाद से बोझिल प्रतीत होते हैं और न दयाराम की भाँति कोई साम्प्रदायिकता ही उन्हें बाँध पायी है। वस्तुतः वे भावात्मक कोटि के सच्चे "मरजीवा सन्त थे।[1]

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1. गुजरात युनिवर्सिटी द्वारा स्वीकृत शोध परियोजना-'प्रीतमदास की हिन्दी वाणी' के आधार पर प्रस्तुत लेख।

आचारांग के प्रथम श्रुतस्कंध में स्वीकृत कुछ पाठों की समीक्षा[1]

डॉ. के. आर. चन्द्र
अध्यक्ष, प्राकृत-पालि विभाग

यह सर्व-विदित है कि आचारांग का प्रथम श्रुत-स्कंध प्राकृत साहित्य का सबसे प्राचीन ग्रन्थ है। इसकी भाषा भ. महावीर की मूल वाणी है, यदि सबको यह स्वीकार्य नहीं हो तो भी इतना तो सबको मान्य है कि इसकी भाषा भ. महावीर की मूल वाणी के साथ बहुत साम्य रखती है। अतः इस ग्रन्थ में प्राकृत भाषा का प्राचीनतम रूप मिलना चाहिए। परंतु उपलब्ध संस्करणों में अनेक स्थलों पर भाषा की प्राचीनता विलुप्त सी जान पड़ती है। इसका कारण यह है कि प्राकृत भाषा में होने वाले निरन्तर परिवर्तनोंने इस ग्रन्थ के विद्वानों, उपदेशकों, आचार्यों एवं लेहियों को ऐसा प्रभावित किया कि उन्होंने ग्रन्थ की मूल भाषा में पाठकों की सुविधा के लिए समय समय पर अप्रचलित रूपों के स्थान पर प्रचलित रूप रख दिये। ग्रन्थ की विविध प्रतियों में मिलने वाले विभिन्न पाठ इस प्राचीनता-अर्वाचीनता के साक्षी हैं। यह सब होते हुए भी प्राकृत भाषा के विकास का शास्त्रीय एवं वैज्ञानिक अध्ययन करने वालों को इतना तो स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि कौनसा रूप प्राचीन है और कौनसा अर्वाचीन है। विभिन्न शताब्दियों के प्राकृत भाषा में मिलने वाले शिलालेख इस भाषा के तत्कालीन स्वरूप को जानने के लिए हमारे पास अकाट्य प्रमाण हैं। ध्वनि-परिवर्तन की दृष्टि से प्राकृत भाषा का विकास सामान्यतः इस प्रकार माना गया है कि सबसे पहले इसमें संयुक्त व्यंजनों का समीकरण हुआ, तत्पश्चात् मध्यवर्ती अघोष व्यंजनों का घोष एवं घोष व्यंजनों का अघोष में परिवर्तन हुआ और अंतमें मध्यवर्ती व्यंजनों का लोप हुआ। विभक्तियों एवं प्रत्ययों में भी क्रमशः परिवर्तन आये जो प्राकृत भाषा के ऐतिहासिक विकास का कोई भी अध्येता उन्हें अच्छी तरह से जानता है। इसी भाषाकीय विकास या परिवर्तन को ध्यान में रखकर आचारांग के संस्करणोंका[2] यह समीक्षा की जा रही है और उसके फल-स्वरूप ऐसा प्रतीत होता है की अभी भी आचारांग के एक ऐसे संशोधित संस्करण की आवश्यकता है जिसमें उपलब्ध प्रतों के आधार पर अनेक पाठ बदले जा सकते हैं जो भाषा की प्राचीनता को सुरक्षित रखने में सहायक हो रहे हैं।

प्रस्तुत समीक्षा ग्रन्थ की भाषा की प्राचीनता को कायम रखने में कितनी उपयोगी बन सकती है इस पर विद्वान लोगों को विचार करना है! यहाँ पर प्रस्तुत किये गये सुझाव स्वीकार करने योग्य हैं या नहीं उन पर विद्वानोंकी आलोचना हो इसी उद्देश्य से यह अध्ययन प्रस्तुत किया गया है। आशा है विद्वान लोग अपने अपने प्रतिभाव प्रकट करेंगे जिससे प्राचीन ग्रन्थोंकी मूल भाषा पुनःसंस्थापित[3] की जा सकें।

५. पू. जम्बू-विजयजी द्वारा स्वीकृत पाठों की समीक्षा :

१. प्राचीन रूप स्वीकृत किया गया है चाहे वह प्राचीनतम प्रत में नहीं मिलता हो ।

ध्वनि-परिवर्तन :

(१) अविजाणए (सूत्र, १०, पृ. ४, पं. १; पाठान्तर-अवियाणए)

(२) परिवंदण (सूत्र ७, पृ. ३, पं. ९, सूत्र ९१, पृ. १३, पं. ८, सूत्र ५८, पृ. १५, पं. २; पाठान्तर-परियंदण)

(३) गुणासाते (सूत्र ४१, पृ. ११, पं. १ पाठान्तर-गुणासाए)

(४) पडिसंवेदयति (सूत्र ६, पृ. ३, पं. ७. पाठान्तर-पडिसंवेदेति, पडिसंवेएइ)

(५) पवेदितं (सूत्र २६, पृ. ७, पं. १६; पाठान्तर-पवेतियं)

(६) अधेदिसातो (सूत्र १, पृ. १, पं. १४; पाठान्तर-अहेदिसातो)

(७) खेत्तण्णे (सूत्र ३२, पृ. ८, पं. १५; पाठान्तर-खेतण्णे, खेअन्ने, खेयन्ने)

(८) पिच्छाए (सूत्र ५२, पृ. १३, पं. १७ पाठान्तर-पिंछाए)

(९) पुच्छाए (सूत्र ५२, पृ. १३, पं १७ पाठान्तर-पुंछाए)

कभी कभी कागज की एक मात्र अर्वाचीन प्रत से प्राचीन रूप लिया गया है।

(१०) अपरिणिव्वाणं (सूत्र ४९, पृ. १२, पं. १७; मात्र ला. प्रत का पाठ; पाठान्तर-अपरिणेव्वाणं)

पद-रचना :

११. विजहित्ता (सूत्र २०, पृ ६, पं. ११; पाठान्तर-विजहित्तु)

२. कभी कभी अर्वाचीन रूप स्वीकृत किया गया है जबकि प्राचीन प्रतों एवं चूर्णि में प्राचीन-रूप मिलता है ।

(१) कप्पइ णे कप्पइ (सूत्र २७, पृ. ८, पं. १, यह पाठ ताडपत्रीय जे. प्रत और अन्य कागज की अर्वाचीन प्रतों में मिलता है ।

(२) 'कप्पति णे कप्पइ' (यह पाठ प्राचीन प्रतों एवं चूर्णि में मिलता है। लेकिन इसे छोड़ दिया गया है।)

(३) सहसम्मुइयाए (सूत्र २, पृ. २, पं. ४) पाठ स्वीकृत, जब कि चूर्णिका पाठ 'सहसम्मुतियाए' और सं., शां. का पाठ 'सहसम्मुदियाए' छोड़ दिया गया है।

३. कभी कभी अर्वाचीन रूप स्वीकृत किया गया है चाहे वह चूर्णि एवं अर्वाचीन कागज की प्रतों का पाठ हो ।

मंदस्स अवियाणओ (सूत्र ४९, पृ. १२ पं. १५, प्रत हे. १, २, ३ एवं चूर्णि) जबकि अधिकतर प्राचीन प्रतों शां, खे, ख, एव (जे.)में 'मंदस्साविजाणतो' पाठ मिलता

है। यदि ऐसा पाठ मिलता हो तो उसे 'मंदस्स अविजाणतो' करने में क्या दोष है। लेहिए की भूल से भी संधि कर दी गयी हो। (शुब्रिंग महोदय के संस्करण में चूर्णि एवं प्राचीनप्रत का 'मंदस्स अविजाणओ' पाठ (पृ. ५, पं. ४) स्वीकृत किया गया है।

४. कभी कभी चूर्णिमें मध्यवर्ती मूल व्यंजन के मिलने पर भी उसका लोप स्वीकृत किया है।
(१) उववाइए (सूत्र १, पृ. २, पं २) चूर्णि-पाठ उववातिए)
(२) सहसम्मुइयाए (सूत्र २, पृ. २, पं. २) चूर्णि-पाठ सहसम्मुतियाए)

प्राचीन रूप ही ग्रहण करना या चूर्णि एवं प्राचीन प्रतों में उपलब्ध रूप ही ग्रहण करना या चर्णिके ही प्राचीन रूप को ग्रहण करना ऐसा कोई नियमित विधान इस संस्करण में अपनाया गया हो ऐसा प्रतीत नहीं होता है। अर्वाचीन प्रतों से अर्वाचीन रूप भी ग्रहण किये गये हैं। ऐसी अवस्थामें किसी भी प्रत में यदि प्राचीन रूप मिलता हो तो भगवान महावीर के समय एवं प्राकृत के तत्कालीन रूप को ध्यान में रखते हुए प्राचीन रूप क्यों नहीं अपनाया जाना चाहिए क्योंकि अर्वाचीन प्रतों के सामने आदर्श प्रत तो उनसे भी प्राचीन ही रही होगी। ऐसी भी संभावना नहीं की जा सकती कि अर्वाचीन प्रतों में जानबुझकर अर्वाचीन रूप को प्राचीन बना दिया गया हो। यदि ऐसा होता तो सभी रूपों को प्राचीन क्यों नहीं कर दिया जाता। कभी कभी तो प्राचीन प्रतों में भी अर्वाचीन एवं प्राचीन रूप दोनों ही एक साथ मिलते हैं।

यहाँ पर इस दृष्टि से पू. श्री जंबूविजयजीके संस्करण के कुछ अन्य पाठों की समीक्षा की जाय उसके पहले शुब्रिंग महोदय द्वारा स्वीकृत किये गये कुछ पाठोंकी समीक्षा करना भी उपयोगी सिद्ध होगा।

शुब्रिंग महोदय के संस्करण के कुछ पाठोंका विश्लेषण
(आचारांग : प्रथम श्रुत-स्कंध)

१. प्राचीन रूप स्वीकृत किये गये हैं भले ही वे अर्वाचीन प्रतोंमें मिलते हो।

स्वीकृत :— णिव्वाणं, परियावेण

अस्वीकृत :— (णेव्वाणं) (परियावेणं)

२. प्राचीन रूप स्वीकृत नहीं किये गये है, भले ही वे अर्वाचीन प्रतों में मिलते हो।

अस्वीकृत :— (पडिसंवेदयइ), (समुट्ठाय), (खेत्तण्णे)

स्वीकृत :— पडिसंवेएइ, समुट्ठाए, खेयण्णे

जबकि पू. श्री जंबूविजयजीने अपने संस्करण में इन स्थलें पर प्राचीन रूप स्वीकृत किये हैं :—

पडिसंवेदयति खेत्तण्णे (संदी. प्रतमें शुद्ध पाठ मिलते हैं। परिशिष्टमें ऐसा कहने से उसका 'समुट्ठाय' पाठ उनके (जंबू.) लिए स्वीकार्य हो जाता है।)

३. प्राचीन रूप अस्वीकृत किये गये हैं भले ही वे प्राचीन प्रत में मिलते हो।

अस्वीकृत :- (जीवा अणेगे)

स्वीकृत :- जीवा अणेगा

(पू. श्री जंबूविजयजीके अनुसार संदी. में मिलने वाला शुद्धपाठ 'अणेगे' लिया जाना चाहिए)

[इससे स्पष्ट है कि अर्वाचीन प्रतों में भी प्राचीन रूप मिलते हैं।]

४. अर्वाचीन प्रत और चूर्णिमें प्राचीन रूप मिलते हुए भी उसे छोड़ दिया गया है।

अस्वीकृत :- (अखेत्तन्ने)

स्वीकृत :- अखेयन्ने

५. प्राचीन प्रत एवं चूर्णि में उपलब्ध रूप असामान्य होते हुएभी उसे ही लिया गया है।

स्वीकृत :- घायमीणे, समणुजाणमीणे

अस्वीकृत :- (घायमाणे), (समणुजाणमाणे)

६. चूर्णि एवं प्राचीन प्रत का पाठ कभी कभी छोड़ दिया गया है ।

अस्वीकृत :- (अस्सायं)

स्वीकृत :- असायं

७. चूर्णि एवं अर्वाचीन प्रतका पाठ भी कभी कभी छोड़ दिया गया है ।

अस्वीकृत :- (अवियाणए), (पिञ्छाए)

स्वीकृत :- अविजाणए, पिच्छाए

८. मात्र चूर्णि में प्राचीन रूप उपलब्ध हो तो छोड़ दिया गया है ।

अस्वीकृत :- (अकरणीयं), (अनितियं), (सोतपण्णाणेहि)

स्वीकृत :- अकरणिज्जं, अनिच्चयं, सोतपण्णाणेहिं,

अस्वीकृत :- (परिहायमाणेहि)

स्वीकृत :- परिहायमाणेहिं

(पू. श्री जंबूविजयजीने 'अणितियं' पाठ स्वीकृत किया है।)

९ चूर्णि की प्रतों में गलत रूप भी मिलते हैं।

पवुच्चई (पवुच्चइ) (शुब्रिंग)

मंता (मत्ता) (जंबू, शुब्रिंग)

हिंसिस्सु (हिंसिसु) (जंबू, शुब्रिंग)

१०. चूर्णिकी प्रतों में अर्वाचीन रूप भी मिलते हैं।
परिन्नाए (परिन्नाय)
अवियाणए (अविजाणए), पिन्छाए (पिच्छाए)
लोयं (लोगं); [जंबू. संस्करण].
[इससे यह स्पष्ट है कि चूर्णि में सदैव प्राचीन और शुद्ध रूप ही मिलते हो ऐसा नियम नहीं है।]

११. विविध सम्पादकों के लिए उपलब्ध सामग्री एवं विविध प्रतों के अनुसार एक ही पाठ प्राचीन या अर्वाचीन हो सकता है।

'पिंछाए' पाठ पू. श्री जंबूविजयजी के लिए आचा. की प्राचीनतम ताडपत्र एवं चूर्णि का पाठ है जब कि शुब्रिंग महोदय के लिए यही पाठ आचा. की अर्वाचीन प्रत एवं चूर्णि का पाठ है।

१२. चूर्णि की विभिन्न प्रतों में विभिन्न पाठ मिलते हैं।
पन्नाणेहिं (शु.), पण्णाणेहि (जंबू.)

१३. अलग अलग सम्पादकों द्वारा अलग अलग पाठ स्वीकृत किये गये हैं—
शुब्रिंग—'वियहित्तु' पृ. ३, पं. १०, पडिसंवेएइ, पृ. १, पं. १८
जंबू—'विजहित्ता' पृ. ६, पं. २०, पडिसंवेदयति, पृ. ३, पं. ७
शुब्रिंग—समुट्ठाए, खेयण्णे, अणेगा, अनिच्चयं
जंबू—समुट्ठाय, खेत्तण्णे, अणेगे, अणितियं

पू. श्री जंबूविजयजी को 'अणेगे' पाठ स्वीकार्य है जो संदी. प्रत में उन्हें मिला है (देखिए ग्रन्थ का परिशिष्ट)।

१४. एक ही सम्पादक ने (ध्वनि-परिवर्तन के नियमों के अनुसार) कभी प्राचीन तो कभी अर्वाचीन रूप स्वीकार किया है—
शुब्रिंग—अविजाणए, पृ. २, पं. ३; (पाठान्तर 'अवियाणए')
वियहित्तु पृ. ३, पं. १०; (पाठान्तर 'विजहित्ता')

अब हम पुनः पू. जम्बूविजयजी के संस्करण के पाठों की समीक्षा करेंगे।

पू. श्री जम्बूविजयजी द्वारा स्वीकृत पाठों की समीक्षा

ऐसे प्रसंग जब प्राचीन प्रतों में मध्यवर्ती मूल व्यंजन सुरक्षित होते हुए भी उसका परिवर्तित रूप स्वीकृत किया गया है।

१. मूल अघोष के बदले में घोष व्यंजन स्वीकृत किया गया।

(क) एगेसि[3] (सूत्र १, १४, २५, पाठान्तर-एकेसि)

(ख) लोगावादी (सूत्र ३, पाठान्तर-लोकावादी, पुरानी प्रत शां. में 'लोयावादी' भी मिलता है।)

(ग) लागसि (सूत्र ८, ९, पाठान्तर-लोकंसि)

(घ) लोगं (सूत्र २२, पाठान्तर-लोकं)

(ङ) एगे (सूत्र १२, पाठान्तर-एके).

२. मूल घोष व्यंजन के बदले में अघोष[4] व्यंजन का त्याग एवं लोप का स्वीकार—

(क) आयाणीयं (सूत्र १४, ३६, ४४, ५२, पाठान्तर-आताणीयं)

(ख) पवयमाणा (सूत्र १२, पाठान्तर-पवतमाणा)

३. मूल अघोष व्यंजन का घोष अस्वीकृत परंतु लोप स्वीकृत—

(क) उववाइए (सूत्र १, २, पाठान्तर-उववादिए)

(ख) सहसम्मुइयाए (सूत्र २, पाठान्तर-सहसम्मुदियाए).
[दिगम्बरों के प्राचीन शास्त्र की भाषा शौरसेनी है और उसमें 'त' का 'द' पाया जाता है। 'त' का लोप तो बहुत बाद में हुआ है। अतः श्वेताम्बरों के अर्धमागधी आगम की भाषा क्या दिगम्बरों के आगमों से भी पश्चात्कालीन मानी जानी चाहिए ?]

४. मूल व्यंजन के बदले में लोप स्वीकृत—

क. सव्वाओ दिसाओ सव्वाओ अणुदिसाओ[5] (सूत्र २, पाठान्तर-सव्वातो वा दिसातो सव्वातो अणुदिसातो)

ख. अवियाणओ (सूत्र ४९, पाठान्तर-अविजाणतो)

ग. कप्पइ णे कप्पइ णे पातुं (सूत्र २७, पाठान्तर-कप्पति णे कप्पइ णे पातुं)

घ. सहसम्मुइयाए (सूत्र २, पाठान्तर-सहसम्मुतियाए)

ङ. अहं (सूत्र ४१, पाठान्तर-अधं)

५. शब्द का प्राचीन के बदले अर्वाचीन रूप स्वीकृत

क. अट्ठिमिंजाए[6] (सूत्र ५२, पाठान्तर-अट्ठिमिज्जाए)

६. पद का प्राचीन के बदले अर्वाचीन रूप स्वीकृत

क. पण्णाणेणं[७] (सूत्र ६२, पाठान्तर-पण्णाणेण)

ख. समुट्ठाए[८] (सूत्र १४, २५, ३६, ४०, ४४, ५२, ५९; सूत्र ७०, ९५, और १९३ में भी कुछ स्थलों पर 'समुट्ठाय' पाठान्तर मिलता है। संदी. प्रत को शुद्धतम माना गया है उसमें भी 'समुट्ठाय' पाठ मिलता है।

ग. अणुपुव्वीए (सूत्र २३०, पृ. ८४, पं. १३ पाठान्तर-अणुपुव्वीय) प्राकृत के व्याकरणकारों ने इस 'य' विभक्तिका उल्लेख नहीं किया है परंतु प्राचीन प्राकृत साहित्य में 'य' विभक्ति के कितने ही उदाहरण मिलते हैं और पालि भाषा में तो यह प्रचलित विभक्ति है।

७. लेहिए की गलती से कभी कभी भ्रम होने से पाठ बदल गया है और प्राचीन विभक्ति के बदले अर्वाचीन विभक्ति अपनायी गयी हो ऐसा स्पष्ट प्रतीत होता है।

अण्णयरम्मि (सूत्र ९६, पृ. २८, पं. ११; पाठान्तर-अण्णयरंसि, यह पाठान्तर शुब्रिंग महोदय द्वारा उपयोग में लायी गयी प्राचीनतम ताडपत्रीय प्रत और चूर्णि में भी उपलब्ध है। प्रतों में 'स्सि' के बदले 'म्मि' की भ्रान्ति होती है यदि अक्षर स्पष्ट नहीं हो। उदाहरण के तौर पर 'संपमारए' (जंबू. सूत्र १५, पृ. ५, पं. १७, एवं शुब्रिंग पृ. २, पं. ३०) के बदले में शुब्रिंग महोदय के संस्करण में प्राचीनतम ताडपत्र की प्रत में 'संपसारए' पाठ मिलता है और हिंसिंसु (अर्थात् 'हिंसिम्सु') के बदले में चूर्णि में 'हिंसिस्सु' (जंबू. सूत्र ५२, पृ. १४, पं. १) पाठ मिलता है।

पाद-टिप्पण

१. आचारांगके अनेक संस्करण प्रकाशित हुए हैं और उन सबमें जर्मनी से प्रकाशित शुब्रिंग महोदय का, आगमोदय समिति द्वारा प्रकाशित पू. सागरानंदसूरिजी का, जैन विश्वभारती द्वारा प्रकाशित पू. मुनि श्री नथमलजी का एवं श्री महावीर जैन विद्यालय द्वारा प्रकाशित पू. मुनि श्री जम्बूविजयजी का ये चार संस्करण महत्त्वपूर्ण माने जाते हैं। इनमें से प्रथम और अन्तिम संस्करण में विभिन्न प्रतियों से पाठान्तर दिये गये हैं जब कि अन्य दो में पाठान्तर नहीं दिये गये हैं। ('अंगसुत्ताणि' संस्करण के लिए अन्त में दिया गया परिशिष्ट देखिए।') अन्तिम संस्करण आधुनिकतम संस्करण है।

यहाँ पर पाठान्तर युक्त संस्करणों की ही और उनमें से भी मुख्यतः पू. जम्बूविजयजी के संस्करण के पाठों की समीक्षा की जा रही है।

२. आगमों की मूल भाषा कितनी बदल गयी है इसको जानने के लिए देखिए– पू. मुनि पुण्यविजयजी द्वारा सम्पादित 'कल्पसूत्र' की प्रस्तावना पृ. ३ से ७, : साराभाई मणिलाल नवाब, अहमदाबाद, १९५२.

३. ऐसा जरूरी नहीं है कि मध्यवर्ती 'क' के लिए 'ग' वाला पाठ ही स्वीकृत किया जाना चाहिए। 'क' की यथावत् स्थिति, उसका घोष या लोप (या 'य' श्रुति) ये तीनों पाठ इस ग्रंथ में लिए गये हैं। उदाहरण के तौर पर जैसे :—

(अ) एकयरं (सूत्र ९६), णिकूणाए (सूत्र ९७), पकरेंति (सूत्र ६२)

(ब) एगेसिं (सूत्र १), अणेग (सूत्र ६), आहारग (सूत्र ४५), लोगंसि (सूत्र ५)

(क) लोए (सूत्र १०), पत्तेयं (सूत्र ४९), उदय (सूत्र २३),

[सूत्र ५२ में एक ही शब्द के दो रूप एक साथ मिलते हैं—वधेंति, एवं वहेंति। सूत्र ३३ में 'सता' और 'सदा' दोनों रूप एक साथ मिलते हैं।]

४. 'त' श्रुति का प्रश्न :—मध्यवर्ती 'त' एवं 'थ' का क्रमशः 'द' एवं 'ध' में बदलना शौरसेनी एवं मागधी भाषा का लक्षण माना गया है। यह प्रवृत्ति महाराष्ट्री प्राकृत में होने वाली लोप की प्रवृत्ति से प्राचीन मानी गयी है। पैशाची प्राकृत में 'द' का 'त' में परिवर्तन होता है और यह प्रवृत्ति भी लोप की प्रवृत्ति से प्राचीन मानी गयी है। 'द' के 'त' में होने वाले परिवर्तन एवं मध्यवर्ती 'त'को सुरक्षित रखनेवाली प्रवृत्ति को 'त' श्रुति नहीं कहा जा सकता। इन दो व्यंजनोंके अतिरिक्त अन्य मध्यवर्ती अल्पप्राण व्यंजन के स्थान पर यदि 'त' आता हो तो उसे ही 'त' श्रुति कहा जायगा, जैसे :— धम्मतं (धर्मकम्, सूत्र ४५), उववादिते (उपपातिके, सूत्र २) बाहिता (बाह्यका, सूत्र ५६), इत्यादि 'त' श्रुति के उदाहरण हैं। सता (सदा, सूत्र ३३), पवतमाण (प्रवदमान, सूत्र १२का पाठान्तर) इत्यादि 'त' श्रुति के उदाहरण नहीं माने जाएँगे परंतु घोष व्यंजन का अघोष में परिवर्तन माना जायगा।

[इधर इतना और स्पष्ट कर देना उचित होगा कि पू. जम्बूविजयजीने 'तहा' और 'जहा' के बदले ताडपत्रीय प्रतों और चूर्णि में मिलनेवाले 'तधा' और 'जधा' पाठों को छोड़ दिया है और उनके पाठान्तर भी क्वचित् ही दिये हैं (देखिए प्रस्तावना पृ. ४४)। ऐसा करके उन्होंने प्राचीन रूप छोड़ दिये हैं और उनके बदले में अर्वाचीन रूपों को स्वीकार किया है। जैसा कि प्रारंभ में कहा जा चुका है कि आचार्यों एवं उपदेशकों ने प्राचीन रूप छोड़ कर प्रचलित अर्वाचीन रूप समय समय पर अपनाये हैं उसी का यह एक आधुनिकतम उदाहरण है।]

५. सूत्र नं. १ में —ओ एवं —तो (पंचमी एकवचन की विभक्ति) दोनों रूप एक साथ स्वीकृत किये गये हैं।

सूत्र नं. २ में 'पुरत्थिमातो दिसातो' में 'दिसातो' का स्वीकृत पाठ किसी भी ताडपत्रीय प्रत का पाठ नहीं है। इसी तरह आगे इसी सूत्र में 'इमाओ दिसाओ' के बदले में कागज की जं. प्रत का पाठ 'इमातो दिसाओ' क्यों छोड़ दिया गया है।

६. स्वीकृत पाठ 'मिंजाए' के बदले 'मिज्जाए' रूप प्राचीन है जब कि इसी सूत्र नं. ५२ में 'पिंछाए, पुंछाए' के बदले में 'पिच्छाए, पुच्छाए' रूप स्वीकृत किये गये हैं। तब फिर 'मिज्जाए' रूप क्यों छोड़ दिया गया है।

७. तृतीया एकवचन की—एण विभक्ति—एणं विभक्ति से प्राचीन है और यह—एण विभक्ति प्राचीनतम प्रतमें मिलती है।

८. यह जरूरी नहीं कि सभी जगह एक ही रूप प्रयुक्त हुआ हो। खं, हे ३ एवं ला. प्रतों में 'समुट्ठाय' मिलता है और सूत्र नं. ७० में तो संदी. प्रत में 'समुट्ठाय' ही मिलता है। संदी. प्रत शुद्धतम मानी गयी है। देखिए पृ. ४१६)।

परिशिष्ट

पू. युवाचार्यजी (मुनि नथमलजी) द्वारा सम्पादित 'आचारांग' (अंगसुत्ताणि) के कुछ पाठों की समीक्षा:[१]

अ. उपयोग में ली गयी प्राचीनतम 'घ' संज्ञक प्रत में प्राचीन रूप मिलते हुए भी अर्वाचीन रूप स्वीकृत:—

स्वीकृत रूप : चुओ (१.१.२), पड़िसंवेदेइ (१.१.८), विजहित्तु (१.३.३६)।
अस्वीकृत रूप : चुते, पडिसंवेदयइ, विजहित्ता।

ब. अन्य अर्वाचीन प्रतों में प्राचीन रूप मिलते हुए भी अर्वाचीन रूप स्वीकृत:—
स्वीकृत रूप : वहंति (१.६.१४०), पहू (१.७.१४५)
अस्वीकृत रूप : वधंति (क), पभू (क)

स. पूज्य जम्बूविजयजीने इन स्थलों पर 'चुते, पडिसंवेदयति, विजहित्त, वधंति और पभू, पाठ स्वीकृत किये हैं जबकि शुब्रिंग महोदय ने 'चुओ, पडिसंवेएइ, वियहित्तु, वहंति और पहू पाठ स्वीकार किये हैं।

सभी उपलब्ध प्रतों में यदि अर्वाचीन रूप ही मिले तो सम्पादक को वही रूप ग्रहण करना पड़ता है जैसे कि 'अंगसुत्ताणि' के पाठ अहे (१.१.१), पवेइयं (१.३.५७) खेयण्णे

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१. पू. युवाचार्यजी का बहुत बहुत आभार जिन्होंने मेरे इस लेख की हस्तप्रत देखकर मुझे 'अंगसुत्ताणि' का अवलोकन करने को प्रेरित किया (पत्र संख्या ४५७, दिनांक १४-९-८४, जैन विश्व भारती, लाडनूँ (राज.)

(१.४.६७) और पायपुंछणं (२.५.११२)। परंतु पू. जंबूविजयजी के संस्करण में उपलब्ध प्रतों के आधार से इन स्थलों पर 'अधे, पवेदितं, खेत्तण्णे और पादपुंछणं' पाठ स्वीकार किये गये हैं जो वास्तव में प्राचीन रूप हैं। 'अंगसुत्ताणि' में जो 'पायपुंछणं' का पाठ लिया गया है उसके बारे में कुछ चर्चा करना आवश्यक हो गया है। ग्रंथ के सम्पादकीय में पृ. १७ पर 'मूलाराधना' से उद्धृत अवतरण में 'पादपुंछणं' पाठ मिलता है। इससे स्वयं सिद्ध होता है कि अन्य ग्रंथों में उद्धृत अवतरणों में भी प्राचीन रूप मिलने की संभावना बनी हुई है और ऐसी अवस्था में उन प्राचीन रूपों को क्यों नहीं स्वीकार किया जाना चाहिए। पू. जंबूविजयजीने जो 'पादपुंछणं' (पृ. २६.६) पाठ स्वीकार किया है वह उनके द्वारा उपयोग में लायी गयीं सभी प्रतों एवं टीका ग्रंथों में समान रूप से मिलता है। इससे स्पष्ट है कि आचारांग के प्रथम श्रुत-स्कंध की भाषा के रूपों को अर्वाचीन बना दिया गया है और इसीलिए उसकी मूल भाषा का उद्धार होना चाहिए।

प्रश्न यह है कि किस संस्करण को अन्तिम माना जाय। अलग अलग संस्करणों में से विभिन्न पाठों के अनेक उदाहरण प्रस्तुत किये जा सकते हैं। एक ही उदाहरण से स्पष्ट हो जायगा कि कितने ही स्थलों पर अर्वाचीन रूपों के बदले प्राचीन रूपों को स्वीकार करने की आवश्यकता है। 'अंगसुत्ताणि' में पृ. २६ पर 'अण्णयरंसि' (२.६.१५०) पाठ मिलता है। इसका कोई पाठान्तर नहीं है और जिन प्रतों का उपयोग किया गया है वे १६ वीं शती से प्राचीन नहीं हैं। शुब्रिंग महोदयने प्राचीनतम ताडपत्रीय प्रत (सं. १३४८) एवं चूर्णि और दो अन्य प्रतों में प्राप्त 'अन्नयरंसि' के बदले 'अन्नयरंमि' पाठ स्वीकार किया है। पू. जंबूविजयजीने 'अण्णयरंमि' (पृ. २८.११) पाठ स्वीकार किया है जब कि अर्वाचीन प्रतों (हे १, २, ३, ला.) में 'अण्णयरंसि' पाठ उपलब्ध है। कहने का सार यह है कि शुब्रिंग महोदय ने प्राचीनतम प्रत का पाठ जो चूर्णि में उपलब्ध है उसे छोड़ दिया है, पू. जंबूविजयजीने अर्वाचीन प्रतों का पाठ छोड़ दिया है जबकि अंगसुत्ताणि' में अर्वाचीन प्रतों का पाठ ग्रहण किया गया है जो वस्तुतः प्राचीन रूप है। सप्तमी एक वचन की विभक्ति 'म्मि' का प्रयोग 'अंसि' विभक्ति से बहुत पश्चात् कालीन है जो शिलालेखीय प्राकृत भाषा एवं साहित्यिक पालि-प्राकृत भाषाओं के ऐतिहासिक अध्ययन से स्पष्ट है। अतः 'अण्णयरंसि' पाठ ही यहाँ पर स्वीकार्य माना जाना चाहिए क्योंकि इसी ग्रंथमें अनेक स्थलों पर 'अंसि' विभक्तिवाले रूप ही मिलते हैं।

प्राचीन ग्रंथों का पुनः सम्पादन उनके रचना-काल और उस कालकी भाषाके स्वरूप को ध्यानमें रखकर किया जाना चाहिए यही मेरा मन्तव्य है। इस दृष्टि से आचारांग के प्रथम श्रुत-स्कंध के उपरोक्त चारों संस्करणों में से किसी भी संस्करणको अंतिम नहीं माना जा सकता है। जैन आगम साहित्य एवं प्राकृत भाषा के विद्वान इस पर विचार करें एवं भाषाकीय दृष्टि से आगमों के संशोधित संस्करण की आवश्यकता के विषय में अपने अपने मत प्रकट करें ऐसी विनंति।

R. A. MALAGI

DANTE ALIGHIERI : LA DIVINA COMMEDIA
INFERNO : CANTO II

Lo giorno se n'andava, e l'aere bruno
toglieva li animai che sono in terra
da la fatiche loro; e io sol uno 3

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1. **lo giorno** *m.* the day. **se** *rfl.* **n'andava = ne + andava. n'** *prn conj.* **andava < andare** [A 8] to go, to depart, *3rd sing. impf,* was departing. It is the evening of Good Friday, April 8, 1300. See *Inf.* XXI, 112. The Thursday night was passed in the *selva* (cf. I. 21); Friday was spent, till the evening, in his struggle to climb the mountain. **aere** *m.* air. **bruno** *adj.* dark. The "dark air" is of the evening. Carlyle refers to the phrase, praising Dante's graphic and vivid painting (PT, DEL, ii 503).

2. **toglieva < togliere** [C] *tr.* to take, *3rd sing. impf.* was taking. **li animai = li animali** (G & S) **< animale** *m.* animal, creature, *pl.* 'i.e., all animate creatures, including man, a common use of the term both in Latin and in Dante. See also *Inf.* V, 88...' (S). **in** on. **terra** *f.* earth.

3. **da** *prep.* from. **fatiche < fatica** *f.* labour, *pl.* **loro** *poss. adj.* their. **sol = solo** *adj.* alone. **uno** one. **Io sol uno** I alone. 'Dante can be said to be alone, since Virgil is a shade. See *Inf.* I, 67 : "Non omo, omo gia fui"' (S).

Cary compares the lines to Chaucer's
'The day gan failen; and the derke night,
That reveth bestes from hir besinesse,
Berafte me my booke & C'

(*Parlement of Foules,* 85)

1-3. Day was departing, and the dark air was taking the creatures on earth from their labors; and I alone

m'apparecchiava a sostener la guerra
 si del cammino e sì de la pietate,
 che ritrarrà la mente che non erra. 6

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4. **m' apparecchiava = mi + apparecchiava. mi** *rfl.* **apparecchiava < apparecchiare** [A4C] to prepare, make ready, *3rd sing. impf.*, was making ready. **a** to. **sostener** [e] (B 32) to sustain. **guerra** *f.* the strife, 'the painful struggle' (T). 'For *guerra* in the sense of "travail" cfr. *Rime,* L, 52; C, 62' (Sp).

5. **Si…si = sia…sia** both…and. **del = di + il** of the. **cammino** *m.* journey (cf. *Inf.* I. 1) **pietate = pietà** (G & S) *f.* pity; '*la pietate :* The "pity" that the living man knows he will feel for the tormented souls of the damned' (S).

6. construe : *che la mente che non ritrarrá.* **che** *rel. prn.* which. **ritrarrà < ritrarre** (B 33) to retrace *3rd sing. fut.* will retrace; "'will recount', cp. *Inf.* IV. 145" (T). **la mente** *f* mind, memory. '"Mente" is here used in the sense of *memoria,* a frequent meaning of *mente* in Dante (and of *mens* in Latin). See *Rime*, L, 1; LXVII, 59' (S). 'Memory will now faithfully retrace the real event of the journey exactly as it took place. This most extra-ordinary journey through the realms of the afterlife is represented never as dreamed or experienecd in vision, but as a real happening…Here, then, and in the following invocation, the poet's voice is heard for the first time as it speaks of his task as poet' (S). **che** which. **erra < errare** [A 1] to err, to wander, to stray from the right way. "**che non erra** : not 'unerring', 'infallible', but 'which does not stray', as being fixed intently on its purpose" (T). cf. *Purg.* VII, 59.

4-6. was making ready to sustain the strife, both of the journey and of the pity, which unerring [unstraying] memory shall retrace.

O Muse, o alto ingegno, or m'aiutate;
O mente che scrivesti ciò ch'io vidi,
qui si parrà la tua nobilitate. 9

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7. **Muse < musa** *f.* muse, *pl.* 'The invocation is in the epic style...Similar invocations are made at the beginning of the other two *cantiche*...That the invocation of the *Inferno* is made here in Canto II declares that this second canto is actually the first canto of the *Inferno* proper (which, then like the other two *cantiche*, consists of thirty-three cantos)...' (S). For the view that both cantos I and II constitute the General Prologue to the *Commedia* see Ernest H. Wilkins. 'The Prologue of the Divine Comedy', **Annual Reports of the Dante Society,** Cambridge, Mass., 1926, pp. 1–7 and C. S. Singleton, **Dante's** *Commedia* **: Elements of Structure,** 1954, p. 9. Also E. R. Curtius, **European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages,** pp. 238–9 : 'The *Commedia* is not an epic in the antique sense, yet it took over the epic invocation of the Muses ...' **alto** *adj.* high. **ingegno** *m.* genius; " 'spirit of genius' of which the Muses are the representatives" (T). '*alto ingegno* : poet's own genius, his *virtu'* whereas the Muses are invoked to give inspiration. Such a distinction is traditional. See De Vulg. Eloqu. II. IV, 9–10...' (S). See also here a similar balancing of the two constituents of the *invocatio* in Milton's opening passage : the heavenly Muse (l. 6.) is matched by the 'upright heart and pure' (l.18) (PL. I, 1–26). **or=ora.** *adv.* now. **m'aiutate=mi+aiutate.** mi=me, *acc.* **aiutate < aiutare** [A 1] *tr.* to help. *2nd pl. pres*, cf. Lat. *iuvare,* to help.

8. **mente** memory (see vs. 6 above): **che** that. **scrivesti < scrivere** (C 12) *tr. abs.* to write *2nd. sing. past def.* wrote down, '*mente che scrivesti* : Latent is the metaphor of a Book of Memory, a figure that controls the whole form of the *Vita nuova* after it is presented there in the opening words (See C. S. Singleton, 1949, [**An Essay on the** *Vita Nuova*], pp. 25–54) ..' (S). **scrivesti** 'sc. on the tablets of memory; cp. *Inf.* XV. 88' (T). cf. Shakespeare's 'the tablet of my memory....' (**Hamlet,** I. V. 97–104). **ció** *prn. indecl.* that. **ch' io=che io. vidi < vedere** (B 35) *tr.* to see, *1st sing. past def.*, saw.

9. **qui** *adv.* here. **si** *rfl.* '**si parrà** : apparirà' (Sp), *3rd fut.* will appear. **nobilitate=nobiltà** (G & S), nobility, worthines; 'See Conv. IV, XVI, 4...' "This word 'nobleness' means the perfection in each thing of its proper nature" (S). Cary in his note on *mente* refers to Chaucer's lines :

O thought! that wroot al that I mette,
And in the tresorie hit shette
of my brayn! now shal men see
If any virtu in thee be.
Hous of Fame, Book II, l.15.

Io cominciai : “ Poeta che mi guidi,
guarda la mia virtù s'ell' è possente,
prima ch'a l'alto passo tu mi fidi. 12

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10. **cominciai < cominciare** [A 3] *tr., intr.,* to begin, 1*st sing. past def.* began. **Poeta** *m.* poet. **mi** *acc.* **guidi < guidare** [A 1] to guide, 2*nd sing. pres.* you (who) guide (me). ‘The prologue and the invocation completed, the canto's *pars executiva*—as Dante terms it in his *Letter to Can Grande* (*Epist.* XIII. 43)—begins with this verse’ (S).

11 **guarda < guardare** (A 1) to pay attention to, to consider, 2*nd sing. imper.* **virtù** *f. indecl.* virtue. **s'ell' = se + ella.** **se** *conj.* if. **ella** *prn. f.* she, here *virtù.* **possente** *adj.* powerful, sufficiently strong. Sp. notes that the construction *sell'è*...with anticipation, or prolepsis of the subject, which is repeated in the pleonastic pronoun ‘ella’ is analogous to that of *Rime*, XC, 50, ‘guarda la vita mia quant ell'è dura’ (‘Consider how hard is my life [and take pity on it]’).

12. **prima ch'** *adv.* before. **a** to. **l'alto = lo alto** the deep; “ **alto** adds a superlative force to the substantive, like that of ‘supreme’ in English; and so in the present connexion may mean ‘dread’, ‘momentous’, or ‘hazardous’” (T). **passo** *m.* way. ‘*l'alto passo :* the “deep way” that lies ahead, “guerra del cammino” of vss. 4–5. Note in “passo” the suggestion of a “passing” or” crossing over” (into the world of the dead), and a certain figurative correspondence with “lo passo che non lasciò giá mai persona viva” (*Inf.* I, 26–27)’ (S). Sp. glosses further and says, ‘to this dreadful leap from the mortal life to the immortal, and from time to eternity’, and notes how the hesitations and objections on the part of Dante, and Virgil's answers contribute to the universal significance of Dante's mission, comparable to those of Aeneas and Paul. **fidi = affidi** (G & S) **< affidare** (A 1) *rfl.* with *a,* trust to.

10–12. I began, “Poet, you who guide me, consider if my strength is sufficient, before you trust me to the deep way.

Tu dici che di Silvïo il parente,
corruttibile ancora, ad immortale
secolo andò e fu sensibilmente. 15

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13. **dici < dire** [B 10] to tell, *2nd sing. pres.* **parente** *m.* parent, father. **Silvïo** Silvius. *Il parente di Silvïo,* the father of Silvius, by Lavinia, is Aeneas (cf. *Aen* VI, 763–66). 'A small instance of Dante's habitual relevancy to the matter in hand in his language is his naming of Aeneas 'the son of Anchises' in the first canto [I, 74] when the reference is back to Troy, and here 'the father of Silvius', when it is forward to the royal line and Rome' (JDS, p. 44). 'The passing touch of "Tu dici che" recognizes that Aeneas' journey to the world of the dead as related in the **Aeneid** was poetic fiction... In contrast, no such "reservation" is made when Paul's journey is mentioned' (*Inf.* II, 28, "Andovvi")' (S). It may also be noted that Virgil himself is willing to believe the journey to be a poetic fiction when he makes Aeneas leave the underworld by the ivory gate (VI, 893 ff.). See R. D. Williams's observations on the passage in his edition of the **Aeneid**. Sp. has made similar observations about Dante's view of Aeneas's journey to the underworld.

14. **corruttibile** *adj.* corruptible, mortal. **ancora** *adv.* still. '**Corruttibile ancora**: while still clothed in human flesh', cp. 1 Cor XV, 53, 'for this corruptible,' & c.' (T). **ad** to. **immortale** *adj.* eternal.

15. **secolo** *m.* world (Lat. saeculum). 'For *secolo* "world", cfr. *Vita nuova*, III, 1; XXIII, 6; XXX, 1' (Sp). "*Immortale secolo* 'the eternal world', i.e., the world of disembodied spirit" (G & S). '"Immortale secolo" refers to "the other world", and is general enough to include both Hades and Paradise... "immortal world" here in Canto II clearly suggests Heaven as well as Hell : Paul went to the former, Aeneas to the latter...' (S). **andò < andare** (A 7) to go, *3rd sing. past. def.* went. **fu < essere** (B 13) to be, *3rd sing. past def.* was. '*sensibilmente* [*adv.*] 'In his bodily senses' (S). "**fu sensibilmente** : 'was there in the body,' not in a vision" (T).

13–15. You tell how the father of Silvius went, while still mortal, to the immortal world and was there in his bodily senses.

Però, se l'avversario d' ogne male
cortese i fu, pensando l'alto effetto
ch'uscir dovea di lui, e'l chi e'l quale
non pare indegno ad omo d'intelletto; 19

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16. **Però** *conj.* but. se *conj.* if. **avversario** *m.* adversary. **d'ogne = di + ogne. ogne < ogni** every, *pl.*, all. **male** *m.* evil. " The adversary of all evil " is God. Sp. refers to **Psalms** V, 5–7: see especially, 7 ' odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem ' (you hate all evil men).

17. **cortese** *adj.* gracious. ' *i=gli* [him]; cp. *Inf.* XXII, 73; Par. XXIX, 17' (T); ' an archaic form of the dative of the personal pronoun (from *ei*) Cfr. *Inf.*, X, 113; *Rime*, LXVIII, 35, etc. ' (Sp.). **pensando < pensare** to consider, *gerund;* ' if we consider ' (G & S). ' The subject understood may be either " God " or " one " in a kind of ablative absolute. " If one considers the high effect... " seems the more probable interpretation ' (S). **l'alto** the high. **effetto** *m.* effect. ' *l' alto effetto :* As stated in vss. 20–24 ' (S) i.e., the establishment of the Roman Empire.

18. **ch'uscir = che uscire. uscire** (D 16) *intr.* to spring from. **dovea = doveva** (G & S) **< dovere** (B. 12) *aux. vb. foll. by inf.* to have to be obliged to. **di** from. **lui** him. *ch' uscir dovea di lui* : ' that should spring from him ' (JDS). " e'l chi e'l quale (*quis et qualis*), ' who and what he was ' : Father Aeneas, founder of Rome. cf. *Mon.* II, iii, 7–10. Aeneas had nobility both of birth and of character..." (G & S). *quis et qualis* is a scholastic phrase. ' **quale,** lit. ' of what sort ', i.e. how great ' (T).

19. **pare < parere** (B 19) to seem (cf. vs. 9), *3rd sing. pres.* **indegno** *adj.* unworthy, unfitting. **omo = uomo** *m.* man. **intelletto** *m.* intellect, understanding.

16–19. But that the Adversary of all evil should show him such favour seems not unfitting to an understanding mind, considering the high effect that was to spring from him, and who and what he was; T paraphrases the verses thus : Wherefore, if the adversary of all evil (God) was gracious to him, in consideration of the mighty result which was to proceed from him (viz. the Roman Empire), and the person (the Emperor), and his greatness, this cannot but approve itself to a reflecting mind. '

ch'e' fu de l'alma Roma e di suo impero
ne l'empireo ciel per padre eletto : 21

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20. **ch'e'=che+ei. che** *conj.* for. '*e*'=*ei*(*egli*)' (S). **ei** *m. prn. 3rd sing.* (*poet.*) he. **de=di,** *now chiefly archaic,* of. "*alma,* 'revered'. *Almus* in the Middle Ages often meant *sanctus*" (G & S). **di suo** of her (Rome). **impero** *m.* empire.

21. **ne** in. **empireo** *adj.* relating to the Empyrean, the highest heaven. **ciel** [o] *m.* heaven. '*l' empireo ciel* : The Empyrean heaven, the tenth and outermost sphere, God's abode and "kingdom", as it is called in *Inf.* I, 127. See Conv. II, iii, 8, 10...' (S). **per** as. **padre** *m.* father. **eletto** goes with **fu** in vs. 20. **eletto** *past part.* chosen. '*eletto* : For Dante, the Roman Empire is directly ordained by God as part of His providential plan for man's redemption and was established in order to prepare the way for the Advent of the Saviour and the foundation of His Church on earth—a conception that emerges time and again in the course of the poem. See C.S. Singleton (1958), [**Dante Studies 2 : Journey to Beatrice**], pp 86–100...' (S).

20–21. for in the Empyrean heaven he was chosen as father of glorious Rome and of her empire,

la quale e 'l quale, a voler dir lo vero,
fu stabilita per lo loco santo
u' siede il successor del maggior Piero. 24

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22. **la quale** (*Roma*) *f.* **il quale** (*impero*) *m. rel. prn.* '"Roma e suo impero" (vs. 20) are the antecedents. A compound subject governing a singular verb is common in Dante' (S). **a voler[e]** (B 36) to wish. **dir[e]** (B 10) to say. **vero** *m.* **truth.** '**a voler dir lo vero**: this form of asseveration seems to be a profession of faith on Dante's part in the relationship of the Empire and the Church which is here implied; perhaps also it contains an apology to Virgil for giving a Christian interpretation (and therefore a different one from his) of the foundation of the Roman Empire' (T). S refers to Conv. IV, iv, 13 '...this city [of Rome] was imperial, and had special progress from God'.

23. **stabilita** < **stabilire** [D2] to establish, *past part.*; **fu stabilita** was established. Sp notes that the grammatical concordance is only with the first of the two subjects, of which frequent examples exist in early Italian, cfr. *Inf.* I, 41–43; XVI, 66–68. **per** as. **loco** *m.* place. **santo** *adj.* holy.

24. '*U'*=*ubi* (*ove*)' (S) where. **siede**=**sede** *f.* seat. **successor** *m.* successor. '**maggior Piero,** St Peter, greatest of Peters or Popes. **Maggior** frequently, meant *grande* [great]' (G & S). 'Probably no comparison is intended here; the adjective may simply mean "great". Possibly however, some comparison might be implied in the sense that Peter is thus singled out as the first and greatest of the popes. See *Par.* XXXII, 136, where Adam is styled the "maggior padre di famiglia"' (S).

22–24. and both, to say the truth, were established as the holy place where the successor of great Peter has his seat.

Per quest' andata onde li dai tu vanto,
intese cose che furon cagione
di sua vittoria e del papale ammanto 27
Andovvi poi lo Vas d'elezïone,
per recarne conforto a quella fede
ch' è principio a la via di salvazione. 30

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25. **Per** in. **questa** *demon.* this. **andata** journey. **onde** *rel. adv.* with which, for which. *'li = gli'* (S) him. **dai** < **dare** to give, *2nd sing. pres.* **vanto** *m.* credit, glory: ' By this journey for which thou honourest him ' (JDS). '...for which thou dost celebrate him ' (T). ' Again the particular turn of phrase implies that Aeneas' journey was poetic fiction. See n. to vs. 13 ' (S).

26. **intese** < **intendere** (C 1) to hear, to learn, *3rd sing. past def.* **cose** < **cosa** *f.* thing, *pl.* **furon** [O] < **essere** to be (B 13) *3rd pl. past def.* were. **cagione** *f.* cause.

27. **sua** his. **vittoria** *f.* victory. **papale** *adj.* papal. **ammanto** *m.* (*poet.*) mantle. 25–27 ' ...the meaning is : He heard the prophecies concerning the Roman Empire, which gave him confidence to conquer Italy, and so to cause the foundation of Rome, the future seat of the papacy ' (T). cf. the ' alto effetto ' referred to in vs. 17.

28. construe : *poi lo Vas d'elezïone andovvi.* '*andovvi = vi andó* i.e. "ad immortale secolo", which is Heaven in this case. '(S) **Andovvi = andò + vi. ando<andare** to go, 3*rd* sing. *past def.* **vi** *adv.* there. " *Lo Vas d'elezione,* ' the Chosen Vessel ', St Paul; Acts 9:15' (G & S). **Vas** [**o**] *m.* vessel. **elezione** *f.* election, choice.

29. **per** *prep.* in order to. **recarne = recar** [**e**] + **ne. recare** [A 2] *tr* to bring. **ne** thence, from thence. **conforto** *m.* confirmation. **a** of. **quella** *demon adj. f.* that. **fede** *f.* faith. ' Paul, " caught up into paradise, " saw by direct vision (II Cor. 12 : 2–4), not *per speculum* [as in a mirror], as faith must see in this life. His was a seeing that transcended faith, and the report of it is a " conforto " to faith ' (S). See Joseph Anthony Mazzeo, ' Dante and the Pauline Modes of Vision ', **Structure and Thought in the Paradiso,** New York, 1968, pp. 84–110.

30. **ch'è = che + è. principio** *m.* beginning. **a** of. **salvazione** *f.* salvation. S refers to Heb. 11 : 6, ' Without faith it is impossible to please God '.

25–30. In this journey, which you affirm he made, he learned things that were the cause of his victory and of the papal mantle. Later, the Chosen Vessel went there, that he might bring thence confirmation of that faith which is the beginning of the way of salvation.

Ma io, perche' venirvi ? O chi 'l concede ?
Io non Enëa, io non Paulo sono ;
me degno a ciò nê io né altri 'l crede 33

Per che, se del venire io m' abbandono
temo che la venuta non sia folle.
Se' savio; intendi me' ch'i' non ragiono." 36

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31. **Ma** but. **perche'** why. **venirvi** = **venir** + **vi** " 'Why should I come thither'; the infin. is used, because it is a rhetorical question, which does not expect an answer, and it is hurriedly uttered ' (T). ' The *vi* continues to refer to the " immortale secolo " (vss. 14–15), including both Heaven and Hell, but the shift from the " going " of Aeneas and Paul (" andata ", vs. 25) to the " coming " of Dante (" venuta ", vs. 35) brings in Virgil and his point of view. This shift is sustained throughout the rest of the canto ' (S). **chi** who. **'l** it (*venir*). **concede** < **concedere** (C 19) to allow, grant *3rd sing. pres.*

32. **Enëa** Aeneas. **Paulo** = **Poalo** (G & S) St. Paul. S comments on "io... io... io..." (vss. 31–33). : ' In Italian, the subject pronoun is always emphatic, it becomes the more so by its repetition. S also notes that Aeneas, at the start of his journey mentions two names, Theseus & Alcides (*Aen.* VI, 122–23) PT (i 7) finds an echo of Dante's sentiments in Chaucer's **The House of Fame :**

' O god,' thoughte I, ' that madest kinde,...
What thing may this signify ?
I neither am Enok, ne Elye,
Ne Romulus, ne Ganymede
That was y–bore up, as men rede,
To hevene with dan Jupiter,
And maad the goddes boteler ' (ii, 79–84)

One may also suspect an echo of Dante's lines, though in a totally different key, in Eliot's Prufrock when he says : ' No ! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be ; I Am an attendant lord... ' (ll. 111 ff.). Auden in a deliberately light vein writes, ' I am no Lawrence... I am not even Ernest Hemingway... I ' m not Peter Fleming....'(' Letter to Lord Byron ')

33. **me** me. **degno** *adj.* worthy. **a cio'** of this. **ne'...ne'** neither... nor. **altri < altro** other, *pl.* other people. **'l** *pleonastic pronoun.* this. **crede < credere** (B 1 C) to believe, 3*rd sing. pres.* " **il crede** : 'believes this', viz., that I am worthy" (T).

34. **per chè** wherefore, so that **abbandono < abbandonare** (A 1 C) to abandon, to yield, 1*st sing. pres.* '*Se del venire io m' abbandono* : "If I allow myself to come"' (S). Sp says that **abbandonarsi** is a Gallicism. 'For the use of *abbandonarsi* cp. Purg. xvii. 136; Par. xvii 108; xxxi. 75' (T).

35. **temo < temere** (B 1) to fear, 1*st sing. pres.* **la venuta** *f.* the coming **sia < essere** to be *pres. subjunc.* be. **folla** *adj.* foolish. '"Folly", with the touch of a suggestion that for him to undertake the journey would be an act of *hubris*' (S).

36. **Se = sei,** you are. **savio** *adj.* wise. **intendi < intendere** (C 1) to understand, 2*nd sing.* **ch'i' = che io** '*me' = meglio*' (S) *adv. comp.* of bene (good). **che** than. **ragiono < ragionare** (A 1 C) *intr.* reason, explain 1*st sing. pres.*

31–36. But I, why do I come there ? And who allows it ? I am not Aeneas, I am not Paul; of this neither I nor others think me worthy. Wherefore, if I yield and come, I fear that the coming may be folly. You are wise; you understand better than I explain it."

E qual è quei che disvuol ciò che volle
e per novi pensier cangia proposta,
sì che dal cominciar tutto si tolle, 39
tal mi fec'i'o 'n quella oscura costa,
perchè, pensando, consumai la 'mpresa
che fu nel cominciar cotanto tosta.

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37. **qual[e]**, as. **quei = quegli** (cf. I, 22) *indef. prn. m.* that man; see S's note on **Questi** *Inf. I.* 46 : '**Questi :** masculine singular demonstrative pronoun corresponding to **quei** (vs 22). ' P T, DEL cites John Sanford : ' Quei is sometimes of the singular number as *qual é quei che disvuol cio che volle,* who is who nilleth what he would ' (i, 108). **che** who. **disvuol < disvolere** (B 36) to un-will, *3rd sing. pres.* **ciò** that. **che** which. **volle < volere** to will, *3rd sing. past def.* willed.

38. **per** with. **novi = nuovi**(G S) < **nuova** *adj.* new, *pl.* **piensier [i] < pensiero** *m.* thought, *pl.* **cangia < cangiare** (A 3) *tr.* (*poet.*) to change, *3rd sing. pres.* ' *cangia = cambia* ' (S). ' *proposto = proposito* (cf." proposto ", vs. 138)' (S) *m.* purpose, intention, resolve.

39. construe : *si che si tolle tutto dal cominciare.* **si che** so that. **comincar [e]** (A 3) to begin, used as a noun, ' What he has begun '. **tutto** *adv.* quite. **si** *rfl.* '**tolle = toglie** (from Latin *tollere*). The meaning here is " si distoglie " ' (S). **toglie < togliere** (B 2) to prevent, to hinder, *3rd sing. pres.* **si distoglie < distogliersi** [da] to give up the idea of.

40. **tal**[e] such, goes with *qual* of vs. 37. ' 37–40. *E quel......tal mi fec' io* : Again a pseudo-simile (see n. to *Inf.* I, 55–60) ' (S). **mi** *rfl.* **feci < fare** (B 14) *rfl.* (*acc.* of *prn* ' si ') to become, *1st sing past def.*, ' did I become '. **'n = in. quella** that. **oscura** *adj.* dark. **costa** *f.* slope. ' *oscura costa* : Like " piaggia " (see n. to *Inf.* I, vs. 29). " costa " can mean either " shore " or " slope ", or, as here, it may have both meanings. It is dark because night has fallen, but it is dark also in a moral sense, as the " piaggia " is " diserta " in both a physical and a moral sense ' (S). Sp has noted how this verse takes us back to the sad note of the opening verse of the canto.

41. **perche** for. **pensando** < **pensare** (A 1) *gerund.* thinking. **consumai < consumare** (A 1) to consume, *sing. past def.* consumed; 'I put an end to' (G & S). RL observes : 'Having consummated in thought the undertaking—having, that is, conjured all of the obstacles and difficulties such a venture would present —Dante again sinks into despair' and adds in a footnote, 'Dante's verb [consumare] conflates the idea of fulfilment (< *consummare*) with that of consumption (*L. consumere*)' (p. 129). E. Allison Peers has noted a similar ambiguity in St John of the Cross's **The Living Flame of Love,** II.5: "Oh gran gloria de almas que merecé is llegar a este sumo fuego !; en el cual, pues hay infinita fuerza para os *consumir* y anihilar[os], està cierto que, [aunque] no consumiendoos, inmensamente os *consuma* en gloria [Oh, the great glory of you souls that are worthy to attain to this supreme fire, which, while it has infinite power to *consume* and annihilate you, *consumes* you not, but grants you a boundless consummation in glory, (Italics mine) and adds the footnote : 'The play upon the words *consumir* ('consume') and *consumar* ('consummate', 'perfect') cannot be exactly rendered in English' (St John of the Cross, **The Living Flame of Love,** Image Books, 1962, p. 60). One suspects a similar ambiguity in Yeats's, 'O sages ...consume my heart away...' ('Sailing to Byzantium'). **impresa** *f.* enterprise, undertaking. T paraphrases the verse : 'so that through reflexion I cancelled the enterprise'.

42. **che** which. **cominciar** as in vs. 39, is used as a noun, 'beginning'. **cotanto** *adv.* so much. **tosta** *adv.* quickly, suddenly. JDS paraphrases the verse : 'that was so hasty in its beginning'. This 'suddenness' of the undertaking suggests *Inf.* I. 'mi ritrovai per una selva oscura' (vs. 2) and 'Io non so ben ridir com'i 'v'intrai' (vs. 10) which also show how 'imperceptible' the plunge into the dark wood was. Dante's spiritual state, as reflected in the 'simile' is comparable to the soul in the dark night, which has given up the things of the flesh in order to seek the things of God... 'And thus they are like to one who abandons what he has done in order to do it over again, or to one who leaves a city only to re-enter it, or to one who is hunting and lets his prey go in order to hunt it once more. This is useless here, for the soul will gain nothing further by conducting itself in this way...,' St John of the Cross, **Dark Night of the Soul** (Tr. E. Allison Peers), Image Books,, p. 70.

37–42. And like one who unwills what he has willed and with new thoughts changes his resolve., so that he quite gives up the thing he had begun, such did I become on that dark slope, for by thinking on it I rendered null the undertaking that had been so suddenly embarked upon.

"S'i' ho ben la parola tua intesa,"
rispuose del magnanimo quell'ombra
"l'anima tua é da viltade offesa; 45
la qual molte fiate l'omo ingombra
sí che d'onrata impresa lo rivolve,
come falso veder bestia quand'ombra. 48

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43. construe : *s'i' ho intesa ben la tua parola.* **s'i'=se io.** se if. **ho**<**avere** (B 3), to have, 1*st sing. pres.* **ben[e]** *adv.* well. **parola** *f.* word, what you say. **tua** your. **intesa** < **intendere** (c 1) to understand, *past. part.,* agrees with parola *f.*

44. construe : *rispuose quell' ombra del magnanimo.* **rispuose** < **rispondere** (C 11) answer, 3*rd sing. past def.* **il magnanimo** the magnanimous one. **ombra** *f.* shade. Sp notes that the magnanimity of Virgil is contrasted with the *viltate* (cowardice), vs. 45, of Dante, i.e. to the pusillanimity of Dante and refers to *Conv.* I. xi, 18–20.

45. **construe :** *l'anima tua è offesa da viltade.* **anima** *f.* soul, spirit. **da** by. **viltade=viltà** [G & S] *f.* cowardice. **offesa** <**offendere** (C 3) *tr.* to damage, beset, *past part.* and agrees with *anima.* "offesa : 'impeded', as by a stumbling-block; 'the impediment that cheeks thy spirit is cowardice'" (T). Sp notes that *viltâ* is the slackening (of the spirit) which derives from a very scant awareness of the self and one's own powers. S cites Conv. IV, XXVI, 7, 9 and shows how, in Dante, at this point, there is a struggle between magnanimity and pusillanimity. Sp glosses **offesa** as *diminuita* (diminished), *indebolita* (enfeebled), and says, it frequently has the sense of *offendere* (to hurt) in the Dantean language (cfr. *Inf.,* V, 102 and 109; VII, 71; *Purg.,* XXXI, 12, etc.).

46. **la qual[e]** *f. rel. prn.* which. **molte** < **molta** *f. adj.* much, many, *pl.* **fiate** < **fiata** *obsol.* time, occasion, *pl.* '*fiate=volte,* of frequent occurrence in Dante' (S). **omo=uomo** *m.* man. **ingombra** < **ingombrare** (A 1 C) to encumber, 3*rd sing. pres.*

47. construe : *si che rivolve lo d'onrata impresa* **si che** so that. **d'onrata=da onrata** **onrata=onorata** (S). **da** from. **onrata** *part. adj.* honourable. Sp. notes

that it is a syncopated form which is found again in *Inf.*, IV. 76 and that it is a Provencalism. **impresa** *f.* endeavour (cf. vs. 41). **lo** *pers prn. m. sing. acc.* him. **rivolve=rivolge** (G & S) < **rivolgere** (C 5) to turn, *3rd sing. pres.*

48. **come** as. **falso** *adj.* false **veder** [e] used as a noun, sight, seeing. **"falso veder** : 'mistake of sight' " (T). **besta** *f.* beast. "*quand' ombra=quando s'adombra*" (S). **quando** *adv.* when. **ombra=adombra** (G &S) < **adombrare** (A1 C) to shade, *rfl.* (of horses) to shy, *3rd sing. pres.* G & S paraphrases the verse : 'As imperfect sight does an animal when it shies'. J. S. Carroll has rightly noted that Virgil, the embodiment of Reason, overcomes Dante's diffidence by charging him with cowardice which stings him to activity. He cites Aristotle's Ethics, IV, 7, 'A high-minded (or great-souled) person seems to be one who regards himself as worthy of high things, and who is worthy of them' and adds, "it is the sign of true greatness of soul not only to be equal to great enterprises, but to *know* one's self equal to them Dante's fears and doubts made him underestimate his own powers and Virgil who is Reason, seeks to rouse his 'magnanimity,' a due and reasonable sense of the greatness of his soul. Nothing is more characteristic of Dante : to undervalue one's self is no virtue, it is mere cowardice, which turns men back from 'honoured enterprise' " (**Exiles of Eternity**, London, 1924, pp. 38–39).

43–48. "If I have well understood what you say," the shade of that magnanimous one replied, "Your spirit is beset by cowardice, which oftentimes enumbers a man, turning him from honourable endeavour, as false seeing turns a beast that shies.

Da questa tema a ciò che tu ti solve,
dirotti perch' io venni e quel ch'io 'ntesi
nel primo punto che di te mi dolve. 51

Io era tra color che son sospesi,
e donna mi chiamò beata e bella,
tal che di comandare io la richiesi. 54

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49. Construe : *a ciò che ti solve tu da questa tema.* **da** from. **questa** *demon adj. f.* this. **tema** *f.* (*poet.*) fear. **a ciò che** in order that. **tu** you. **ti** *rfl.* **solve** < **solvere** (C 14) *tr.* to deliver, to free. ' *solve=solva,* present subjunctive of *solversi*' (S).

50. ' *dirotti=ti dirò* ' (G & S). **diro** < **dire** (B 10) tell, 1st *sing. fut.* **perch'** why. **venni** < **venire** (D 17) to come, 1*st sing. past def.* **quel=quello** that. **ch' io 'ntesi=che io intesi. che** *rel. prn. indecl.* what. **intesi** < **intendere** (C 1) to hear, 1*st sing. past def.*

51. **primo** *adj.* first. **punto** *m.* point (of time). **di** *adv.* towards. **te** *pers. prn.* you. ' **dolve**=dolse, archaic past absolute of **dolere** [*rfl.* to be sorry] in an impersonal construction, " it grieved me for you " ' (S).

52. **tra** *prep.* among. **color** [o] *pers. prn. pl.* they, those. **che** who. **son= sono. sospesi** < **sospendere** [C 1] to hang up, to suspend, *part. adj.* **(sospeso)** *pl;* " 'dangling', i.e., between Heaven and Hell, in Limbus" (G & S). ' Literally, " suspended ". The meaning will become clear when the reader learns more (see *Inf.* IV, 28–42) about the condition of those in Limbo, of Virgil and the other virtuous pagans whose punishment it is to live in desire but without hope. The adjective " sospesi " (both here and again in *Inf.* IV, 45) indicates not only this spiritual condition, but also the actual physical position of Limbo, outside of Hell proper, it nevertheless is counted as the first circle ' (S).

53. **donna** *f.* lady, Beatrice. cf. EM's note : " Dean Plumptre considers it to be proved beyond doubt by Dante's use of *donna*, which ' in the recognised

use of Italian poetry, as in the speech of common life, was applied to a married woman only '...'' (Second Series, p. 97). **chiamò** < **chiamare** (A 1) to call, *3rd sing. past def.* **beata** *adj. f.* blessed. **bella** *adj. f.* fair, lovely.

54. Construe : *tal che io richiesi la di comandare.* **tal[e]** *adv.* so. **di** to. **comandare** (A 1) *tr.* to command. **la** *pers. prn. f. 3rd sing. acc.* her. **richiesi** < **richiedere** (C 19) to ask again, to request, to pray to *3rd sing. past def.*

49–54. To free you from this fear I will tell you why I came and what it was I heard when I first felt pity for you. I was among those who are suspended, and a lady called me, so blessed and so fair that I prayed her to command me.

Lucevan li occhi suoi più che la stella;
e cominciommi a dir soave e piana,
con angelica voce, in sua favella : 57

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55. **Lucevan[o] < lucere** (C *def.*) *intr.* shine, 3rd *pl. impf.* **occhi < occhio** *m.* eye, *pl.* **più che** more than. '*la stella :* Singular for the plural, as elsewhere in Dante' (S); "for 'the stars' generally. Cp. *Vita Nuova,* § 23, ll 176, 177, 'Poi mi parve vedere appoco appoco Turbar lo sole ed apparir *la stella*' [Then it seemed the sun gradually grew dark and *the stars* started appearing]; *Conv.* iv 19, ll. 30–31, 'Siccome è 'l cielo, dovunque è *la stella*' [as is the sky, so are *the stars* (everywhere)] (T). Italics mine.

56. **cominciommi = cominciò + mi. cominicò ⊲ cominciare** (A 1) to begin, 3*rd sing. past. def.* **a dir** [e] to say. **soave** *adj.* sweet, soft. **piana** *adj.* gentle, soft. Sp cites Gelli, " *Soave,* i.e., sweet and gracious,...and *piana,* i.e. modest and as a serious person. " 'Both adjectives function here as adverbs modifying " dir " ' (S). " take **in sua favella** with this—' in sweet and low tones ', lit. ' sweet and low in her manner of speaking ' " (T). Sp. also notes that these and similar adjectives are in common poetic use and the single epithets end up as synonyms; ' (cf. *Rime*, LXVII, 10–11, " piani, soavi e dolci "; LXIX, 10 : " benigna e piana"; *Vita nuova,* XIX 1, 3 : " giovane e piana" etc).'

57. **con** with. **angelica** *adj.* angelic. **voce** *f.* voice. **favella** *f.* speech. '**in sua favella** : " In her speech " or mode of speaking' (S). Sp notes (at vs. 54) that ' the atmosphere in which the first presentation of Beatrice is placed is typically stilnovistic, in its particulars, and above all in Virgil's " homage " to her. The language, vocabulary, and images are also stilnovistic, from that pair of adjectives used adverbially *soave e piana* (which is not only quite frequent in the poets of the time, but directly representative of a certain poetic gusto) to the *angelica voce,* to the eyes shining *piú che la stella,* till that phrase with which the discourse of Beatrice is concluded and which brightens up to us the whole intonation, in the range of that love mysticism which had inspired the *Vita nuova,* " amor mi mosse, che mi fa parlare " [Love moved me, which made me speak]. This second canto gets poetic

results, on the whole more intensely, as compared to the first but with less of novelty. There was at least the presentation of a new dramatic technique; here we are brought back to the ambit of traditional lyric, refined but fragile as much.'

55–57. Her eyes were more resplendent than the stars, and she began to to say to me, sweetly and softly, in an angelic voice,

'O anima cortese mantoana,
di cui la fama ancor nel mondo dura
e durerà quanto 'l mondo lontana, 60
l'amico mio, e non de la ventura,
ne la diserta piaggia è impedito
sì nel cammin, che vólt' è per paura; 63

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58. **anima** *f.* soul, spirit. **cortese** *adj.* kind, courteous. **mantoana** = **mantovano** *adj. n. m.* Mantuan. 'Virgil was born near Mantua' (G & S).

59. **di cui** whose. **fama** *f.* fame. **ancor** *adv.* still. **mondo** *m.* world. **dura** < **durare** (A 1) *intr.* to last, 3*rd sing. pres.*

60. **durerà** < **durare,** 3*rd sing. fut.* **quanto** as long as. **lontana** *adj.* (now obsolete) lasting, long-lived, enduring, adverbial and goes with *fama*; '...and shall endure as long as the world lasts,' (J D S) .See, Shakespeare's sonnets for the theme of immortality conferred by poetry, especially, "Shall I compare thee...' (18) and 'Not marble...' (55). 'Beatrice's words to Virgil have a rhetorical amplitude and formal development that follow recognized models, with an exordium in the manner of a *captatio benevolentiae* ("gaining the good will [of another]") We may note here the first of the many appeals in the *Inferno* to enduring fame in the world of the living—a survival after death that is desired by many of the damned of Hell as if it were their only "immortality" '(S). Sp observes that 'it is not necessarily a **rhetorical** device, so utterly instinctive gentleness of the lady and almost of a queen, that she bends to request a favour for her vassal'.

61. **amico** *m.* friend. **ventura** *f.* fortune. '"Ventura" is synonymous with "Fortuna" and, accordingly, bears in this context some suggestion of a personification, as if two ladies, Beatrice and Lady Fortune, were contending for this man's affections. Behind the term "amico", in this context, lies the current phrase "nemica Fortuna" [enemy Fortune] as well as "nemico della Fortuna" [enemy of Fortune]...' (S). Macaulay quotes this verse to illustrate his observation : 'Almighty wisdom had assigned to her the care of the sinful and unhappy wanderer who had loved her with such perfect love' (PT **DEL** ii, 397). Sp paraphrases the verse 'he who loved me for

myself, disinterestedly, without hankering after any sort of recompense, and placing all his beatitude in the praise of the beloved lady (cf. *Vita nuova,* XVIII, 3–6), and cites, among others, Buti who emphasises the allegorical sense; ' many love the doctrine of divine things, not for themselves, but to acquire, by them, fame and worldly reputation and wealth and dignity '.

62. **ne** *prep.* (*poet.*) in. **diserta piaggia** desert slope of *Inf.* I, 29. **impedito** < **impedire** to impede, *past. part.* è **impedito** is impeded.

63. ' *volt ' é = é* **volto** ' (S) < **voltare** to turn back, *3rd sing. past def.* (cf. *inf.* I 36, 60). **paura** *f.* fear ' In fact, throughout the preceding account of this same scene, fear (See *Inf.* I, vss. 6, 15, 19, 44, 53, 90) was stressed as the chief obstacle to the ascent of the mountain. Now fear is explicitly said to be what caused the wayfarer finally to turn back. Virgil's question to Beatrice (*Inf,* II, 82–84) will continue to underline fear ' (S).

58–63. " O courteous Mantuan spirit, whose fame still lasts in the world, and shall last as long as the world, my friend and not the friend of Fortune—finds his way so impeded on the desert slope that he has turned back in fright;

e temo che non sia già sí smarrito,
ch' io mi sia tardi al soccorso levata,
per quel ch'i' ho di lui nel cielo udito. 66

Or movi, e con la tua parola ornata
e con ciò c'ha mestieri al suo campare,
l'aiuta sí ch' i' ne sia consolata. 69

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64. **temo** < **temere** to fear, 1*st sing. pres.* (cf. vs. 35). **sia** ◁ **essere** *pres. subjunc.* 'may be'. **già** *adv.* already. **sì** so. **smarrito** ◁ **smarrire** *rfl.* to lose one's way, *past. part.* 'The word echoes "smarrita" (*Inf.* I, 3) and suggests that the wayfarer may be in danger of again losing the "diritta via", as indeed he is in his "ruining down to the depth". (*Inf.* I, 61)' (S). 'It is useless to try to justify rationally this trepidation of Beatrice, for, as blessed she sees in God the present as well as the future. Here Beatrice is not only a blessed creature (and much less a pure symbol); she is a saint and a lady at once, as in *Vita nuova* and in the poetry of praise' (Sp).

65. **sia** as in vs. 64. **tardi** *adv.* late, too late. **soccorso** < **soccorrere** (C 5) *tr.* to help; *n. m.* help. **levata** < **levare** (A 1) to rise *past, part.*

66. **per quel che** from what. **lui** him. **cielo** *m.* heaven. **udito** ◁ **udire** (D 15) to hear, *past part.* **ho udito** have heard (from Lucia as she will tell in vss. 103 ff.).

67. **Or** now. **movi**=**muovi** (G & S) < **muovere** (C 15) *tr* **to move,** 2*nd sing. pres.* go. **parola** *f.* speech (vs. 43). **ornata** *part. adj.* < **ornare** (A1 C), elegant, fair, "**parola ornata** : skill in speech'; cp. *parole ornate* in *Inf.* XVIII, 91" (T). '**ornata** : as of a poet, who knows how to avail himself of all the instruments of art' (Sp).

68. **ciò che** whatever. **mestieri**=**mestiere** (S) need, necessity. '**ha mestieri** : is opportune, necessary' (Sp). **compare**=**comparare** (A15, A 1) (?) to acquire, to buy (*obsolete*). cf. *Purg.* I. 62. **al suo compare** (cf. Lat **comparo** provide); '**al suo compare** to rescue him' (Sp).

69. **l'aiuta**=**aiuta lo** (G & S). **aiuta** < **aiutare** (A 1) to help, 2*nd sing. imperat.* **ne** it. **consolata** < **consolare** (A 1 C) *tr.* to comfort *past part.* **ne sia consolata** I may be comforted by it.

64–69. I fear he may already have gone so astray that I am late in arising to help him. Go now, and with your fair speech and with whatever is needful for his deliverance, assist him so that it may console me.

I' son Beatrice che ti faccio andare;
vegno del loco ove tornar disio;
amor mi mosse, che mi fa parlare. 72

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70. **I'son**=Io **sono. Beatrice** Beatrice. ' Virgil had referred to Beatrice in vss. 122–23 of the preceding canto as a soul worthier than he to take over as guide and lead the wayfarer to Paradise, but he did not explicitly name her...' (S) Sp. notes that she is both the lady Dante had loved in his youth and, in the poem, the symbol of the wisdom of the revealed things, i.e., theology, by means of which man begins to acquire eternal felicity. **che** who. **faccio < fare** (B 14) to make, 1*st sing. pres.* **ti faccio andare** lit. make you go, i.e., send you.

71. **vegno = vengo < venire** (D17) to come, 1*st sing. pres.* **loco** *m.* place. **del loco** from Heaven. **ove** *conj.* (*poet.*) where. **tornar** [e] (A 1 C) to return. **disio** = **desiderio** (G & S) < **desiderare** (A I S) to desire 1*st sing. pres.*

72. **amor** [e] *m.* love. **mosse < muovere** (C 15) *tr.* to move, 3*rd sing. past def.* moved. **che** which. **fa < fare** 3*rd sing.* **parlare** (A 1) to speak. ' *amor mi mosse :* As is evident from Beatrice's whole account of the prologue action in Heaven, the love she speaks of is a love *de sursum descendens* (" descending from on high "), the blessed Virgin Mary's love and, in the last analysis, God's love. Beatrice in the *Commedia* is no Pre-Raphaelite " Blessed Damozel " ' (S). Though Singleton rightly ditinguishes the two veins of poetry, Dantean and Pre-Raphaelite, there should be little doubt that Rossetti's form was directly inspired by Dante's vision of Beatrice, though it is soaked in the idiom and imagination of the pre-Raphaelite mode. Sp. notes that this verse is redolent, in all it complexity or ambiguity, of meaning which the style [(stil nuovo)] bore and while it is the love of Beatrice for the loyal one, it is also the Love understood in its absolute value, **i.e.**. of God from whom derives every impulse of charity.

70–72. I am Beatrice who send you. I come from a place to which I long to return. Love moved me and makes me speak.

Quando sarò dinanzi al segnor mio,

di te mi loderò sovente a lui.'

Tacette allora, e poi comincia' io : 75

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73. **Quando** *adv.* when. **saró < essere** 1*st sing. fut.* will be. **dinanzi a** *adv.* before. **segnore=signore** (G & S) *m.* Lord.

74. **le** you. **mi** *rfl. prn.* **lodero<lodare** (A 1) *tr.* to praise, 1*st sing. fut.* **"Di te mi lodero :** I will express myself pleased with thee, this is the proper meaning of *lodarsi di;* cp. *Inf.* 22–24, 'ciascun se ne loda.'" (T). **sovente** *adv.* often, frequently. **a lui** to Him. 'The old commentators interpret the verse allegorically in the sense that theology makes use of human reason or philosophy, and therefore had the motive of praising it; thus for example, to Benvenuto this signifies that theology often uses the service of natural reason' (Sp).

75. **tacette=tacque** (G & S) **< tacere** (B 20) *intr.* to be silent, 3*rd sing. past def.* 'cp. *Inf.* XXVII, 98' (T). **allora** *adv.* then. **poi** then. **comincia'=cominciai.**

73–75. When I am before my Lord I will often praise you to Him.'
"Then she was silent; and I began,

O donna di virtú, sola per cui
    l'umana spezie eccede ogne contentc
    di quel ciel c'ha minor li cerchi sui, 78

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76. **donna di virtù** the lady of virtue. Sp quotes Chimenz who has noted that this is the highest praise that Virgil, a pagan, could bestow upon any human being. 'In the *Vita Nuova,* X, 2, Dante calls Beatrice " regina de la virtú. " cf. Boethius, *Cons.*, I, Pr. iii, " O omnium magistra virtutum " (O Mistress of all virtues).' (G & S). **sola** *adj. f.* alone. **per** through. **cui** *pers. prn. dat.* whom.

77. **umana** *adj.* human. **spezie=specie** (G & S) *f. indecl.* species. **l'umana specie** the mankind. **eccede<eccedere** (B 1) *tr.* to exceed, to rise beyond. **ogne<ogni** *pl.* all. **contento=contenuto** (G & S) **<contenere** (B 32) *tr.* to contain, *past. part.* "...the expression, 'everything contained by that heaven' —**ogni contento Da quel ciel**—is equivalent to 'everything sublunary' " (T).

78. **di quel** by that. **ciel[o]** heaven. **minor** *adj.* least. **cerchi<cerchio** *m.* circle, *pl.* **sui=suoi** (G & S); **c' ha=che ha.** lit. 'by that heaven which has the smallest of circles'. 'The first of the concentric spheres which form Dante's heaven is that of the moon...and as this is the nearest to the earth, which is the centre of the system, it is the smallest–**ha minor li cerchi sui**' (T). 76–78. 'These words of recognition to Beatrice are most important as a first focus on her allegorical meaning' (S).

76–78. 'O Lady of virtue, through whom alone mankind rises beyond all that is contained by the heaven that circles least,

tanto m'aggrada il tuo comandamento,
che l'ubidir, se giá fosse, m'é tardi;
piú non t'è uo' ch' aprirmi il tuo talento. 81

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79. **tanto** so. **m'aggrada = mi + aggrada. aggrada < aggradare** (A 1) *intr. impers. defect.* to be pleasing, *3rd sing. pres.* **'m'aggrada** it pleases me' (Sp). **comandamento = comando** *m.* command. 'And also, this speech, as indeed the very turn of phrase, is of the language of the lyrics of love' (Sp).

80. **ubidir[e] = ubbidire** (D 2) to obey, **l'ubidir** is used as a noun, the obedience. **se** if. **giá** already. **fosse < essere** (B 13) to be, 3rd *sing. impf. subjunc.* **m'é = mi é. tardi** *adv.* late. JDS paraphrases vss. 79–80 : 'so grateful to me is thy command that my obedience, were it given already, is late'. "First he says, with polite extravagance of speech, 'obedience to your behests comes to me all too late, even were it already paid', in other words, 'I would readily, and more than readily, obey on the spot'" (T). This expression of spontaneous courtesy is in conformity not only with the tradition of the poetry of chivalry, but also with the very profound principle of heavenly charity of which Virgin Mary is the perfect embodiment; as St Bernard says in *Par.* XXXIII, 16–18 : 'Thy loving-kindness not only succors him who asks, but oftentimes freely foreruns the asking'.

81. **piu'** adv. more. '*é uo' = é uopo*' (S). **uopo** *m.* need, necessity. **ch'** that. **aprirmi = aprire + mi. aprire** (D 8) *tr.* to open, declare. **talento** *m.* will, 'desire' (T). 'There is no need for more than to declare thy will to me' (JDS).

79–81. Your command so pleases me, that had I obeyed already it would be late. You have only to declare your will to me.

Ma dimmi la cagìon che non ti guardì
de lo scender qua giuso in questo centro 83

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82. **Ma** *conj.* but. **dimmì = dì + mi. dì < dire** to tell, *2nd sing. imperat.* '*la cagion che = la cagione per la quale*' (S). **cagion** [e] *f.* reason. "**che** : 'for which (reason)', 'why'" (T). **guardì < guardare** (A 1) *intr.* to attend to, to be wary of, *2nd sing. pres.* '**non ti guardi** : non ti riguardi [you are not beware], non temi [you do not fear]' (Sp).

83. **de** of. **lo** *pers. prn. m. sing. acc.* it. **scender**[e] (C 1) *intr* to descend. **qua** *adv.* in this place. **giuso = giú** (G & S) *adv.* down. **centro** *m.* centre; 'according to Dante the earth was the centre of the universe, and hell extended from just within the surface of the earth to its centre' (T). 'In this context the phrase bears a strong pejorative connotation, which stems from the well-established view that the earth's position at the center of the universe is the most ignoble—because it is farthest from God and His angels. The cavity of Hell is of course, even farther from the, "ampio loco" (vs. 84) of the Empyrean heaven' (S). S also cites from Giordano da Rivalto : 'The earth...is the centre of this world...But the true center is precisely that point within the earth which is in its midst...We believe that Hell is located there, at the true center'. When Milton writes that the 'trump of doom' thunders through the deep, 'The aged earth aghast / With terror of that blast, / Shall from the surface to the centre shake;' (**Nativity,** 160–2), he includes Hell also in the 'centre'. Milton also has a similar contrast between Heaven and Hell when he describes the 'portion' of the fallen angels 'As far removed from God and light of heaven / As from the centre thrice to the utmost pole. / O how unlike the place from whence they fell !' (**PL, I,** 73–5). Significantly, Milton follows the Virgilian proportion of distances between the Heaven, the Earth and the Tartarus which is twice as far below earth, as heaven is above it (**Aen. VI, 577**). Virgil is here wondering what brought Beatrice from the 'spacious region' of Empyrean, of Eternal Light, to the centre of the Earth, Hell, the place of eternal darkness.

82–83. But tell me the reason why you are not wary of descending to this center

de l'ampio loco ove tornar tu ardi'.

Da che tu vuo' saver cotanto a dentro,
dirotti brievemente,' mi rispuose,
'perch' i' non temo di venir qua entro. 87

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84. **de** from. **ampio** *adj.* ample, spacious. **loco** *m.* place. '*l' ampio loco* : The Empyrean heaven, the outermost sphere, which contains the whole universe. It is a spiritual heaven where the saints abide with God' (S). 'Cp. *Purg.* XXVI 63, 'più ampio si spazia' [spreads the widest]' (T). **ove.** *conj.* (*poet.*) where. **tornar** [e] (A 1 C) *intr.* to return. **ardi < ardere** (C 3) *intr.* to burn, to long, *2nd sing. pres.* '**ove tornar tu ardi** : cfr. v. 71' (Sp). 'Latent in the verb [*ardi*] is the metaphor of fire or a flame which, in Dante's physics as in Aristotle's, seeks ever to rise to its "proper" place, i e., the sphere of fire, the highest of the elemental spheres, as to its resting place. So Beatrice "burns" to return to her "proper" place' (S). cf. St Augustine, **Confessions** : '*Ignis* sursum tendit, deorsum lapis... Dono tuo *accendimur* et sursum ferimur; *inardescimus* et imus, *ascendimus*...' (Fire tends upward, a stone, downward... We are inflamed, by Thy gift we are kindled; and are carried upwards; we glow inwardly, and go forwards....) (XIII. 10. 11–21. Italics mine).

85. **da** since. **che** that. **vuo' saver = vuoi savere. vuoi < volere** (B 36) to wish), *2nd sing. pres.* **saver = sapere** (S) (B 26) to know. **cotanto** *adv.* so much. **dentro** *adv.* inwardly; **a dentro** deeply. "**Saper cotanto addentro :** 'to know so much of the heart of the matter', 'investigate the matter so closely'" (T).

86. **dirotti = ti diró** (S); cf. vs. 50. **brievemente = brevemento** (G & S) *adv.* briefly. **mi** to me. **rispuose** cf. vs. 44.

87. **perch'i' = perche io. perche** why. **non temo** I am not afraid. cf. vss. 35, 64. **di venir** [e] to come. **qua** in this place cf. vs. 83. **entro** *prep.* within.

84–87. from that spacious region to which you long to return. "'Since you wish to know so deeply', she answered me, 'I will tell you briefly why I am not afraid to come within this place.

Temer si dee di sole quelle cose
c'hanno potenza di fare altrui male;
de l'altre no, ché non son paurose. 90

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88. Construe **:** *si dee temer di quelle cose sole.* **si** *indef. prn.* one, people, we. **dee = deve** (S) < **dovere** (B 12) should, must, 3*rd sing. pres.*

89. **c'hanno = che hanno. hanno** < **avere,** 3rd *pl. pres.* **potenza** *f.* power. **di fare** to do. '*altrui* : A dative here [' to others '], although it should be noted that *altrui,* invariable in form, also can be accusative or possessive, according to the context ' (S). **male** *m.* evil, harm. 88–89. "We must fear only those things that have power to do one [others] harm " " **altrui :** ' persons ', ' men ' : cp. *Inf.* I. 18; *Purg.* IV. 54 " (T).

90. **de** connects with **Temer** vs. 88. **altre** < **altro** *adj.* other *pl. n.* other things. **no** not. **ché** for. **paurose** < *adj. f.* **paurosa** fearful, *pl.,* agrees with *cose* vs. 88.

88–90. Those things alone should be feared that have power to do one harm – not other things, for they are not fearful.

I' son fatta da Dio, sua mercé, tale,
che la vostra miseria non mi tange,
né fiamma d'esto 'ncendio non m'assale. 93

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91. **I' son = Io sono. fatta < fare** (B 14) to make, *part.* **sono fatta** am made. **da** by. **Dio** *m.* God. **sua** his. **mercé** *f.* mercy. " **sua mercé** 'thanks to Him', an elliptical expression " (T).

92. **che** that. **vostra** yours. S notes the shift from singular [tu] to plural [vostra] that takes place here and remarks that Beatrice refers to the misery of all the damned of Hell. **miseria** *f.* misery, suffering. **tange < tangere** (C *def.*) *tr.* (*poet.*). to touch, *3rd sing. pres* S refers to Sapien 3:1. " But the souls of the just are in the hand of God, and the torment of death shall not touch them ".

93. **ne** *conj.* neither. **fiamma** *f.* flame. **d'esto = di esto. esto = questo** this; cf. **esta selva** *Inf.* I. 5. **'ncendio = incendio** *m.* fire. **m'assale = mi assale. assale < assalire** (D 4. D2) to assail, *3rd sing. pres.* 'Fire stands for all the torments of Hell, even though it actually proves to be the instrument of punishment in only two of the several circles (the seventh and the eighth). Among the many Biblical references to the fire of Hell, see especially Ecclus. 28:25-27'(S). C. H. Grandgent places this passage (*Inf.* II, 76–93) alongside *Purg.* I, 76–93 where Cato expresses a similar detachment from affection for his wife Martia who dwells in Limbo, and says ' Beatrice exemplifies one utterance of Gregory, to wit : " In the minds of the just the sight of the punishment of the wicked does not impair blessedness, because where compassion for misery no longer exists, it cannot dominish the happiness of the blest, " ' and refers to Cato's exemplification of another of Gregory's observations " ...the souls of the just, although they have pity in the kindness of theirs nature, being then close to their Maker's justice, are already bound by such righteousness that they are moved by no compassion for the wicked. " ('Quid Ploras ? ' **Annual Reports of the Dante Socitey**, 1926, pp. 14–17) 'The lack of compassion toward the damned in Limbo and Hell is the characteristic attitude shown by the saints in Paradise. Thomas Aquinas summarses it (*Summa Theol.* II, suppl. q. 94, a.2, resp.) :... Therefore the blessed in glory will have no pity on the damned ' (S). DS cites C. S. Lewis (*The Great Divorce*) : " The action of pity will live forever; the passion of pity will not ".

91–93. I am made such by God, of His grace, that your suffering does not touch me, and no flame of this burning assails me.

Donna è gentil nel ciel che si compiange
di questo 'mpedimento ov' io ti mando,
sí che duro giudicio là sú frange. 96

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94. é there is. **gentil** [e] *adj. noble*. gracious. '**Donna** è **gentil** : the Blessed Virgin is meant, who symbolises prevenient grace. Her name, like that of Christ and other saved names, is not allowed to be pronounced in Hell... cp. *Inf.* IV. 53' (T). **si** *rfl.* **compiange** < **compiangere** (C 5) to pity, *3rd sing. pres.; rfl.* takes **di** (vs. 95). '*Compiangersi* is registered in the old translations in the vernacular from French' (Sp).

95. **'mpedimento = impedimento** *m.* impediment; ' the hindrance to Dante's orward course' (T). **ov' = ove** *conj.* (*poet*) where; ' to deal with which ' (T). **mando** < **mandare** (A 1) *tr* to send, 1*st sing. pres.*

96. **sí che** so that. **duro** *adj.* stern. **giudicio = giudizio** (G & S) *m.* judgment. **tà** *adv.* there. **sù** *adv.* above. **frange** < **frangere** (C 5) *tr.* to break, 3rd *sing. pres.* ' she breaks the stern judgment there on high ' (JDS); " ' so that she mitigates the strictness of God's judgment,' i.e., she causes mercy to prevail againsi justice in Dante's case " (T). ' As is made clear later (but may well be taken for granted), the blessed Virgin Mary is " our advocate " in Heaven. Her intercession, in fact, makes this journey to God possible—" stern judgment is broken thereabove ". The sinner otherwise would have remained in the darkness of sin and finally have been swept down to the " second death " of Hell. Dante's own great devotion to Virgin Mary is evident throughout the poem '. (S). S also refers to *Par.* XX, 94-99 for the phenomenon of the modification of the Divine Will by Love and *Par.* XXXIII, 16-18, for his devotion to Mary. EGG refers to Richard of St Victor in connection with Dante's, as well as St Bernard's devotion to Mary, and cites his commentary on *Song of Solomon* : ' ... Her compassion comes to meet us more swiftly than it is invoked, and anticipates the needs of the wretched '. (**DM** p. 182)

94-96. In Heaven there is a gracious lady who has such pity of this impediment to which I send you that stern judgment is broken thereabove.

Questa chiese Lucia in suo dimando
e disse : —Or ha bisogno il tuo fedele
di te, e io a te lo raccomando—. 99

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97. **Questa** *f. indef. prn.* this woman. **chiese < chiedere** (B 6) to ask, to ask for, *3rd sing. past def.* **Lucia** 'This doubtless is St. Lucy of Syracuse, the third century virgin martyr regarded as patron saint of those who suffer from eye ailments. Early commentators consider her as the symbol of illuminating grace' (S). **dimando = domanda** *f.* request.

98. **disse < dire** to say, *3rd. sing. past def.* **or[a]** *adv.* now **bisogno** *m.* need. **fedele** *m.* loyal subject. '**Il tuo fedele** : this expression implies that Dante was a devotee of St Lucy. This was probably due to her being a patron saint of those who suffered from diseases of the eyes (Jameson, *Sacred and Legendary Art*, ii, p. 617), for Dante tells us that he was affected by weakness of sight, first through weeping for the loss of Beatrice (*Vita Nuova* § 32, ll. 1–4), and afterwards from the effects of overmuch reading (*Conv.* iii. 9, ll 149–153)' (T). S has pertinently noted that Dante is primarily concerned with inner light. 'At any rate this spirit of enlightenment [Lucy] is the medium between grace and revelation; Lucy brings the message of the Virgin to Beatrice' (JDS, p. 45).

99. **raccomando < raccomandare** (A 1) *tr.* to recommend, *1st, sing. pres. pers. prn. m. sing. acc.* him.

97–99 She called Lucy, in her request, and said, "Your faithful one has need of you now, and I commend him to you."

Lucia, nimica di ciascun crudele
si mosse, e venne al loco dov'i' era,
che mi sedea con l'antica Rachele. 102

Disse :–Beatrice, loda di Dio vera,

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100. **nimica = nemica** *f.* enemy, **ciascun[o]** *adj.* every. **crudele** *adj.* cruel; 'an adjective used substantively, and the meaning is "all who are cruel"' (S). '*nimica di ciascun crudele* : The phrase is similar to "l' avversario d'ogne male" in vs. 16' (S); "gentleness was one of St Lucy's characteristics. Probably as the term **crudelitas** in Aquinas is used of 'over-severity in punishment,' it is implied here that she would naturally second the efforts of the Virgin to cause mercy to triumph over justice" (T).

101. **si** *rfl.* **mosse < muovere** (C 15) *tr.* to move, *3rd sing. past. def.* 'Mary does not leave her seat, as Lucy does; a higher and a lower rank thereby are implied' (S). **venne < venire** (D 17) to come *3rd sing. past. def.* **dov'i' era = dove io era. dove** *conj.* where.

102. "**che** : 'I who was sitting'; or perhaps, 'where', the notion of place being supplied by the antecedent *loco*" (T). **mi** *rfl.* **sedea = sedei < sedere** (B 28) to be seated *1st sing. past. def.* **antica** *adj.* ancient. **Rachele** Rachel. 'Beatrice has her seat in Heaven beside Rachel, as the poem states both here and again at the end (see *Par.* XXXII, 8–9). / Rachel, according to the account in Genesis, was the younger sister of Leah. Jacob first married Leah, and then finally won Rachel'(S). 'In medieval symbolism, [she] represents commonly the contemplative life (as her sister Leah, active) : vide *Purg.*, XXVII, 100–108' (Sp).

103. **loda = lode** (G & S) *f.* praise. '*Loda* is the normal form in Dante. be it in prose or verse (cf. eg. *Vita nuova* XXI.1)' (Sp). **vera** *adj. f.* true; '**loda di Dio vera** [true praise of God] : literally, because Beatrice's perfection of beauty and virtue returns to the glory of God who created her (the concept expressed in *Vita nuova,* XXVI, 1–2, 6 [and others said : she is a marvel : for blessed be the Lord who knows so marvellous to work]; allegorically, because "the holy theology [is]... truly the praise of God, and not falsely whether in the exercise of the activity, or in the repose of contemplation" (Buti)' (Sp).

100–103. Lucy, foe of every cruelty, arose and coming to where I saw with ancient Rachel, said, 'Beatrice, true praise of God,

ché non soccorri quei che t'amó tanto,
ch'uscì per te de la volgare schiera? 105
Non odi tu la pieta del suo pianto,
non vedi tu la morte che 'l combatte

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104. **che'=perche'** (S) why. **soccorri < soccorrere** (C 5) *tr.* to help, *2nd sing. pres.* **quei** that man, him. **che** who. **t'amó=ti amó. amó < amare** (A 1) *tr.* to love, *3rd sing. past. def.* **tanto** *adj.*, so much, such.
105. **ch'uscei=che uscì. che** that. **uscì < uscire** (D 16) *intr.* to leave, *3rd sing. past def.* for you. **de=di** (*archaic*) from. **volgare** *adj.* vulgar. **schiera** *f.* band, throng. 'A familiar tenet of the doctrine of courtly love is expressed here : by his love for his lady the poet is lifted above the vulgar. The past tense points back to the experience described in the *Vita nuova*, where Beatrice appears not as a disembodied allegory but as a real lady, as here' (S). See **V. N.** XVIII (The conclusion of the work) : 'After writing this sonnet it was given unto me to behold a very wonderful vision (This we may believe to have been the Vision of Hell, Purgatory and Paradise, which furnished the triple argument of the 'Divina Commedia'. The Latin words ending the *Vita Nuova* are almost identical with those at the close of the letter in which Dante, on concluding the *Paradise*, and accomplishing the hope here expressed, dedicates his great work to Can Grande della Scala) : wherein I saw things which determined me that I would say nothing further of this most blessed one, until such time as I could discourse more worthily concerning her. And to this end I labour all I can; as she well knoweth. Wherefore if it be His pleasure through whom is the life of all things, that my life continue with me a few years, it is my hope that I shall yet write concerning her what hath not before been written of any woman. After the which may it seem good unto Him who is the Master of Grace, that my spirit should go hence to behold the glory of its lady : to wit, of that blessed Beatrice who now gazeth continually on His countenance *qui est per omnia saecula benedictus* ('who is blessed throughout all ages'). *Laus Deo* [Praise to God].' (D. G. Rossetti's translation). 'The expression could refer to "the beautiful style which has done honour to Dante, singing of Beatrice, and to the spiritual superiority over the vulgar, together with the poet by virtue of his love" (Chimenz)' (Sp).
106. **odi < udire** (D 15) to hear, *2nd sing. pres.* **pieta** *f.* pity, pitifulness. **pianto** *m.* lament.
107. **vedi < vedere** to see *2nd sing. pres.* **morte** *f.* death. '*la morte* : spiritual death, primarily, but also physical death (see *Purg.* I, 58-60). What is seen here from Heaven connects with the first simile of the poem (*Inf.* I, 22-27)' (S). **che'l=che+lo. lo** him. **combatte < combattere** (C 1) *tr.* to assail *3rd sing. pres.*

104-107 Why do you not soccor him who bore you such love that for you he left the vulgar throng ? Do you not hear his pitiful lament ? Do you not see the death that assails him.

su la fiumana ove 'l mar non ha vanto ? 108

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108. **Su** on. **fiumana** *f.* flood. **ove'l = ove + il. ove** where. **mare** *m.* sea. **vanto** *m.* vaunt. 'This river or "flood" is essentially the same water as the "pelago" of *Inf.* I, 22–27. It is not a river that flows into the sea; hence the sea rightly can be said to have no vaunt over it' (S). S. also asks us to look up his article in the *Romanic Review*, XXXIX (1948) in this connection for the imagery and meaning of this verse. 'The *fiumana* is perhaps the Acheron, the river of death which flows beneath Dante's feet. Most commentators understand it as a mere metaphor, signifying the same thing as the *selva*. For a different explanation see Singleton (1970) [as above].' [G & S]. By far the most brilliant and convincing explanation of the verse is by John Freccero : 'When we consider that the entrance into grace of the newly baptised soul is completely analogous to the restoral to grace of the fallen sinner in late Christanity, we come to see that it is precisely as a "Jordan" that we are to read the barrier in Dante's poem : the *fiumana* is a death which is a prelude to authentic life, but before the barrier is surmounted, a descent in humility, into Hell itself, will be required... It is precisely because the River Jordan is a figure for the baptism of Christ that it is a river unlike all other rivers, superior to the sea, which figures only the baptism of John the Baptist. It stands to the sea as Christ stands to the Baptist, *the greatest of all prophets* (Luke 7 : 8) It is, in the figure of baptism, a river over which not even the *Red Sea* can boast... Now, in the prologue scene, he is blocked on the shores of a *fiumana* which he cannot cross until, like Christ, he descends into the depth of the earth. The implication seems to be that the preparation for grace lies within the competence of man, in the pure natural order. However, only Beatrice can bring the pilgrim the grace that is needed to accomplish a death and resurrection. This is to state in theological terms what we have known all along : were it not for Beatrice, neither the journey, nor the poem could have come into existence' ('The River of Death : *Inferno* II, 108,' **The World of Dante,** Ed. Chandler and Molinaro, University of Toronto Press, 1966, pp. 25–42). One of the classic expressions of the spiritual death to self which precedes the birth of a new life is St. John of the Cross's famous poem, 'Coplas del alma que pena por ver a Dios'. The third stanza runs thus : 'Estando ausente de Ti, / Què vida puedo tener / sino muerte padecer / la mayor que nunca ví ? / Làstima tengo de mí, / pues de suerte persevero, / que muero porque no muero ('Being absent from you, what life can I lead without suffering the greatest death I ever saw ? I pity myself because I persevere in such fashion that I am dying of not dying') (**Vida Y obras de San Juan de la Cruz,** Madrid, 1978, p. 383. The translation is by J. M. Cohen, **The Penguin Book of Spanish Verse**).

108.. on that flood over which the sea has no vaunt ?"

Al mondo non fur mai persone ratte
a far lor pro o a fuggir lor danno,
com'io, dopo cotai parole fatte, 111

venni qua giù del mio beato scanno
fidandomi del tuo parlare onesto,
ch' onora te e quei ch' udito l'hanno." 114

109. **fur=furono** (G & S) were. **mai** *adv.* ever. **persone < persona** *f.* person *pl.* **ratte < ratto** *adj.* (*poet.*) swift, *pl.* **ratte=rapide** (S).

110. **a far[e]** to take. **lor [o]** *poss. indecl.* their. **pro** *m.* advantage. **O** or. **a fuggir [e]** (D 1) to flee (from). **danno** *m.* harm.

111. **com' io=come io** as I was. **dopo** *adv.* after, when. '**cotai=cotali**' (S) *indef. prn. pl.* these. **parole < parola** *f.* word, *pl* **fatte < fare** to make, *part. pl.* '**fatte** uttered by Lucy to me' (Sp.) 'The verb *fare* often replaces the more specific verb *dire* ' (S), as in English ' do ' does.

112. **venni < venire** to come, *1st sing. part. def.* **qua** here. **gia** *adv.* down. **del=di+il. di** from. **beato** *adv.* blessed. **scanno** *m.* seat.

113. **fidandomi=fidando + mi. fidando < fidare** (A 1) to trust, *pres. part.* trusting. **del=di + il. di** in. " **parlare onesto** : ' skill in speech ', like the **parola ornata** of l. 67 " (T). ' **onesto** : is emphasised and clarified by *che onora*, which follows a true and proper etymological figure according to the usage of the time. Moreover the connection between *onestà* ...and *onore* is very much alive in the linguistic consciousness of the writers and also of philoshophers (cf. St. Thomas. *Comm. Ethics,* I, 5 ...). Considering the various present shades the word has in the Dantean use, but always in the circumscribed limit, *onesto* is meant here in the sense of " noble, decorous " (the " parola ornata "); pointing out besides that *parlare onesto* constitutes a unique verbal connexion (cf. *Inf.*, X, 23), where *onesto* is in the adverbial function ' (Sp).

114. **onora < onorare** (A 1 C) to honour, *3rd sing. pres.* **quei.** *indef. prn. m.* that person, *pl.* **che** who. **udito < udire** to hear, *past part.* **l'hanno=lo hanno. lo** *per. prn. m. sing. acc.* it (*parlare* vs. 113). ' **udito** understood, heard. making a treasure of it'(Sp). " **e quei** etc. : the meaning apparently is : 'and those who have heard and imitated it ' : Cp. *Inf.* i. 86, 87" (T).

109–114. " ' On earth no one was ever so swift to seize advantage or to flee from harm as I was when these words were uttered to come down here from my blessed seat – trusting in your noble speech, which honors you and all who have heard it '.

Poscia che m'ebbe ragionato questo,
li occhi lucenti lagrimando volse,
per che mi fece del venir più presto. 117

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115. **Poscia** *adv.* (*poet.*) then. **Poscia che** when. **m'** to me **ebbe < avere,** had. '**ragionato** [*past part.*] said' (Sp). **questo** this.

116. **lucenti < lucente** *adj.* shining, *pl.* **lagrimanto = lacrimando < lacrimare** (A 13) to weep, *pres. part.* lit. 'the eyes shining with weeping (tears)' '**lacrimando :** lacrimanti; gerund with the value of the present participle, according to a frequent use in old Italian and also in Dante (*Vita nuova,* III. 11–12; *Inf.*, XXX. 14; *Purg.*, IX, 38; X, 56; *Par.*, XVIII, 45, etc.)' (Sp). **volse < volgere** (C 5) *tr.* to turn, *3rd sing. past def.* 'Beatrice turns her tearful eyes to Virgil (not toward Heaven as some commentators understand). **Volgere** is often used to signify a turning of the attention rather than a bodily movement. Beatrice was looking at Virgil before, as she spoke to him; it is only now that her eyes fill with tears, as she continues to face toward him and urges him to proceed to the rescue of the wayfarer on the dark slope. It is this that makes Virgil more eager to do her command' (S). Sp holds the same view and cites Boccaccio who observes that the tearfulness of the eyes is an act of a lover, especially of a lady whose eyes shed unrestained tears to demonstrate their most ardent desire. cf. also *Purg.* XXVII, 136–7 and XXX, 139–41.

117. **per che** which. **fece < fare** *3rd sing. past. def.* **più presto** sooner, more eager.

115–117. " When she had said this to me, she turned her eyes, which shone with tears, making me the more eager to come;

E venni a te così com' ella volse :
d'inanzi a quella fiera ti levai
che del bel monte il corto andar ti tolse. 120

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118. **venni**<**venire** *1st sing. past. def.* **cosi com'** even as **ella** *prn. f.* she. '*volse* : past absolute of *volere* [to wish]' (S). '**volse** : volle. Form still common and still living in the Tuscan dialects : here makes an identical rhyme' (Sp). cf. *Inf.*, XXIX, 102.

119. **d'inanzi=di inanzi. di** from **inanzi a** before, in the presence of. **fiera** the beast, the wolf of *Inf.*, I, 49–54. 'The she-wolf, the most troublesome of the three beasts and the one that was causing the wayfarer finally to ruin back into the darkness of sin' (S). **levai** < **levare** (A. 1) to take away from, to rescue. *1st sing. past. def.*

120. Construe : *che ti tolse il corto andar del bel monte.* **bel monte** the fair mountain, cf. *il dilettoso monte* of I, 77. **corto** *adj.* short. **andar** [**e**] *m.* why. '*il corto andar* : The phrase clearly implies that there is a longer way up the mountain. What the longer path is the poem will make clear in due course' (S); 'the shortest way, direct' (Sp). This is the *altro viaggio* of I, 91 and Virgil describes the route in I, 112–23. **tolse** < **togliere** (C) to prevent, *3rd sing. past def.* (cf. vss. 2; 39). '**tolse** : impeded' (Sp).

118–120. and so, even as she wished, I came to you and rescued you from the beast that was preventing your going the short way up the fair mountain.

Dunque : che è ? perché, perché restai,
perché tanta viltà nel core allette
perché ardire e franchezza non hai, 123
poscia che tai tre donne benedette
curan di te ne la corte del cielo,

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121. **Dunque** *adv.* then. well then. **che** what ? ' Dunque che è ? this is the answer to Dante's objections as to his fitness for the journey ' (T); cf. vss. 10–42 above.

perché why. '*restai=ristai.* " Why do you stay ? " or " Why do you hold back " from entering upon this journey ? *Restare* frequently means " to stay " or " to leave off " ' (S).

122. **tanta** such. **vilta** *f.* cowardice cf. vs. 45. **core=cuore** *m.* heart '*allette=alletti*' (S) < **allettare** (A 1) to labour *2nd sing. pres.* ' **allette** : for *alletti,* ' give entrance to ' ; *allettare* is from Lat. *adlectare,* ' to entice ', ' to invite ', frequentative of *allicere*; cp. the use of *allettarsi* for ' to find entrance ' in *Inf.* IX 93 ' (T). cf. also Lat. **allecto** to allure, to entice, and Virgil's Allecto (*Aen.* VII, 323 ff.) who symbolises *furor* and works upon Amata and Turnus to consume their very personality. See R. D. Williams's comments *ad loc.*

123. **ardire** *m.* courage, boldness. **franchezza** *f.* freedom; ' is the condition of the spirit emancipated from every doubt and fear ' (Sp). Lit. " Why don't you have courage and freedom ? '.

124. **poscia** *adv.* then, when (vs. 115). ' *tai=tali.* cf. " cotai " vs. 111 ' (S) < **tale** *adj. m. pl.* such. **tre** three. **donne** < **donna** *f.* lady, *pl.* **benedette** < **benedetta** *adj.* blessed, *pl.*

125. **curan[o]** < **curare** (A 1) to take care of, to take for. **ne** in. **corte** *f.* court.

121–125. What, then, is this ? Why, why do you hold back ? Why do you harbour such cowardice in your heart ? Why are you not bold and free, when in Heaven's court three such blessed ladies are mindful of you,

e'l mio parlar tanto ben ti promette ?" 126

Quali fioretti dal notturno gelo
chinati e chiusi, poi che 'l sol li 'mbianca,

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126. **parlar[e]** speech, words; 'All that Virgil had said (*Inf.*, I, 112–20)' (S). **tanto** *adj.* so much. **ben[e]** good; 'cf. *Inf.*, I, 8' (S). **promette** < **promettere** (C 20) *tr.* to promise *3rd sing. pres.* JDS has some pertinent remarks to make on the whole episode : "When Dante shrank from the journey, Virgil's rebuke was not sufficient to change him. It needed a deeper appeal and assurance than that of reason itself to make him obedient to reason, and Virgil had to show Dante a warrant higher than his own, that he had been sent by her who was for Dante the embodied revelation of the truth of God...Reason or conscience—the two are one in Virgil—is but the messenger and the vicegerent of revelation and only in so far as it is that, and more than a mere private prompting, has it authority. Beatrice, the personal embodiment of heavenly truth, is in a sense the representative of the ideal Church, as Virgil of the ideal world-Empire, so that her prompting of Virgil here for Dante's deliverance suggests that co-operation of Church and Empire to which Dante looked for all human well-being. It is at the bidding, so to speak, of the true Church and Empire that he sets out on his pilgrimage...The symbolism of the 'three blessed ladies' is in itself arid and formal, but the late Professor Rossi rightly noted 'the serenity and sweet intimacy of all this scene in Paradise'" (pp. 44–5). Grandgent writes : "The three ladies form a counterpart to the three beasts. The Virgin, here as generally in Christian thought, symbolises divine Mercy. Lucia [is] ... the emblem of Grace—probably as her name suggests Illuminating Grace... Beatrice... stands for Revelation, for which Dante's distorted mind must be prepared by Reason. God in his mercy sends forth his illuminating grace to prepare the way for complete revelation, which will ensue as soon as the reawakened voice of reason shall have made the sinner ready to receive it" (G & S, p. 20). Sp sees that the episode culminates into the highest and most solemn dramatic represenation of the secrect autobiographical sources of Dante's invention and the consciousness of a high poetic and moral mission. (pp. 17–8)

127. **Quali** < **quale** as *pl.* **fioretti** < **fioretto** *m. dim.* little flower *pl.* **da** from. **notturno** *adj.* nocturnal, of the night. **gelo** *m.* frost.

128. **chinati** < **chinato** *part. adj.*, bowed down, bent *pl.* **chiusi** < **chiuso** *part. adj.* shut, closed, *pl.* **poi che** *conj.* when. **sol[e]** *m.* sun. **li** them. **'mbianca** = **imbianca** < **imbiancare** (A 2) *tr.* to whiten, to brighten *3rd sing. pres.* "**gli imbianca** : 'lightens upon them'; cp. Par. vii. 81" (T).

126–128. and my words pledge you so great a good ? " As little flowers, bent down and closed by chill of night,

si drizzan tutti aperti in loro stelo, 129

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129. **si** *rfl.* **drizzan[o] < drizzare** (A 1) *tr.* to straighten, *3rd pl. pres.* **tutti < tutto** *adj.* all *pl.* **aperti < aperto** *part. adj.* open *pl.* **in** on. **loro** their. **stelo** *m.* stem (*sing.* used for plural, 'stems'). 'The image of flowers (thousand times taken up and varied, from Boccaccio to Poliziano, from Tasso to Manzoni) is employed fully in the range of the precious lyric, of provencal derivation; and had a precedent in *Rime*, C, 46–48 (cf. also. *Purg.*, XXVIII, 56; *Rime,* CI, 12)' (Sp). One may also note how Dante thanks St Benedict: '... cosi m'ha dilatata mia fidanza, / come 'l sol fa la rosa quando aperta (have expanded my confidence as the sun does the rose when it opens to its fullest bloom)' (*Par.* XXII. 55–56). RL comments on the simile : 'The renewal of spirit constitutes Dante's last emotional change before entering the gates of Hell and the imagistic content of the simile points symbolically to the ultimate source of moral regeneration throughout the poem : the "fioretti" are warmed by the sun, a sun which looks back to the sun that bathed with its rays the sides of the mountain that Dante had unsuccessfully attempted to climb, and a sun which looks forward to the sun that is God, the "punto luminoso" of the Empyrean (p. 130.), Boccaccio (*Il Filostrato*, II. 80) repeats the first two lines word by word and has a slight variation on the third, while the image is the same which he uses for Troilus who recovers from his weary spirits : 'Quali i fioretti dal notturno gelo / Chinati e chiusi poi che,l' sol gl'imbianca,/ Tutti s'apron diritti in loro stelo; / Cotal si fe' di sua virtude stanca /Troilo allora...', and as noted by Cary, Chaucer imitated him closely : 'But right as flowres, thorugh the cold of nyght / Iclosed, stoupen on hire stalke lowe, / Redressen hem ayein the sonne bright, / And spreden on hire kynde cours by rowe,/ Right so gan...... This Troilus " (**Troilus and Criseyde II, 967–972**). Cary also has noted, among others, Spenser's imitation in *Faerie Queene :* Book IV, Canto XII, Stanza 34 (Where the heart revives like 'a withered weed through cruell winters tine / That feels the warmth of sunny beames refle tion, / lifts up his head...') and Book VI, Canto II, stanza 35 ('Full glad and ioyous then young *Tristram* grew, / Like as a flowre, whose silken leaues small, / Long shut up in the bud from heauens vew, / At length breakes forth, and brode displayes his smyling hew').

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129. straighten and all unfold upon their stems when the sun brightens them

tal mi fec' io di mia virtude stanca,
e tanto buono ardire al cor mi corse,
ch'i'cominciai come persona franca : 132
" Oh pietosa colei che mi soccorse !
e te cortese ch'ubidisti tosto
a le vere parole che ti porse ! 135

---

130. **tal** (e) such. **mi** *rfl.* **fec'=feci<fare** *rfl.* to become 1*st sing. past def.* **di** in. **virtude=virtú** *f.* virtue, strength. **stanca** *adj. f.* weary, faint. **'di mia virtute stanca** ; as regards my preceding condition of prostration and doubt' (Sp).

131. **tanto** so much. **buono** *adj.* good. **ardire** *m.* courage. **a** to. **cor=cuore** *m.* heart. **corse<corere** (C 5) to run, rush 3*rd sing. past def.* **mi** *rfl.*

132. **ch'i'=che io. cominciai<cominciare** to begin (A 3) 1*st sing. past def.* **come** as. **persona** *f.* person. **franca** 'set free' (G & S); ' resolute,' (T). '131 –32. **ardire...persona franca** : takes up the expressions used by Virgil, vs. 123' (Sp).

133. **pietosa** *adj. f.* compassionate. **colei** *pers. prn. f.* she, that woman. **che** who. **soccorse<soccorrere** (C 5) *tr.* to help 3*rd sing. past def.* cf. vs. 65,
134. **cortese** *adj.* gracious, courteous (cf. vss. 17, 58). **che** who. **ubidisti< ubidire** (D 2) to obey 2*nd sing.* Once again, the term is typiclly that of the poetry of courtly love. **tosto** adv. quickly.

135. **a** *ubidire* (vs. 134) takes the *prep.* **a. vere<vera** *adj.* true, *pl. f.* "truthful" (Sp). **parole<parola** *f.* word, *pl.* **che** which. **ti** to you. **' porse** said. cfr. *Inf.*, V. 118; VIII, 112' (Sp); '*porse* : Past absolute of *porgere* (literally, " to proffer ") ' (S).

130–135. such in my faint strength did I become; and so much good courage rushed to my heart that I began as one set free, " Oh, how compassionate was she who helped me, and how courteous were you, so quick to obey the true words she spoke to you !

Tu m'hai con disiderio il cor disposto
sì al venir con le parole tue,
ch'i' son tornato nel primo proposto. 138
Or va, ch'un sol volere e' d' ambedue :

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136. **m' hai=mi hai. disiderio=desiderio** *m.* desire, longing. **cor=cuore** *m.* heart. **dsposto<disporre** (B 21) *tr.* dispose, *past part;* **hai disposto** have disposed. 'Thou hast so disposed my heart with desire' (JDS).

137. **al venir=a + il venir [e]**, to come [with you]. **le parole tue** your words. 136–137, construe : *tu m' hai con le parole tue sì disposto il cor con disiderio al venir.*

138. **ch'** connects with *si* (vs. 137). **tornato<tornare** to return, *past part.* **son[o] tornato** I have returned. **nel=in il. in** to. '*proposto=proposito.* cf. " proposta ", vs. 38' (S); purpose, resolve.

139. **Or[a]** *adv.* now. **va<andare** (A 8) to go *2nd. sing. imperat.* **che** *conj.* for. **un=uno. sol[o]** *adj.* only. **volere** *m.* will. **d'ambedue=di ambedue di** in. **ambedue** *prn. pl. indecl.* both. 'Now go, for but one will is in us both' (JDS).

136–139. By your words you have made me so eager to come with you that I have returned to my first resolve. Now on, for a single will is in us both;

tu duca, tu segnore e tu maestro ".
così li dissi; e poi che mosso fue,
intrai per lo cammino alto e silvestro. 142

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140. '**duca** : guide' (Sp), leader. **segnore**=**signore** *m.* master. **maestro** *m.* teacher; cf. *Tu se' lo mio maestro e'l mio autore*... I, vss. 85–87, and note the renewed acceptance of Virgil as his master and spiritual guide, much more than a literary mentor. If initially Virgil was a mere voice of reason or a profound source of poetic imagination, now with the flow of divine grace through Mary, Lucy and Beatrice, he is Reason which includes the Love which transcends reason. The reinstatement of Dante in his first purpose is the phenomenon of "The Awakening of the Self' in mystical terminology, which is an act and event of conversion to the direct way, to God. (See Evelyn Underhill, **Mysticism**, Chap. II, Part II).

141. **cosi** *adv.* thus. '*li=gli*' (S) (to) him. **poi che** when. **mosso**<**muovere** (C 15) *intr.* (*aux. essere*) to move, *past part.* '*fue.=fu*' (S) ◁ **essere** *3rd sing. past def. f.*; **mosso fue** 'he had moved'.

142. **intrai**=**entrai**<**entrare** (A 1 C) to enter *1st past def.* **per** on, along. **cammino** *m.* way. **alto** *adj.* deep; 'arduous, cf. *Inf.*, II, 12; XIII, 99; XXVI, 132' (Sp). "For **alto** in this sense cp. *Inf.* XVI, 114, 'alto burrato.' The meaning 'deep' is suitable here, because the way lay through a valley (*Inf.* i. 14); and its association with **silvestro** suggests that it is a descriptive epithet" (T). **silvestro** *adj.* wild, savage. 'cf. *Inf.*, XXI, 84; *Purg.*, XXX, 118; and **silvestra** (*Inf.*, XIII, 100); thus elsewhere *alpestro* (*Inf.*, XII, 2); *terrestro* (*Purg.*, XXX, 120) etc.' (Sp). '"Alto" echoes what was said of the way or crossing to the other world ("alto passo", *Inf.* II, 12), while the adjective "silvestro" clearly connects with "selva" in "selva oscura" of the poem's opening verses (*Inf.* I, 2). Thus Virgil leads the wayfarer from the desert strand of this prologue scene into the way through Hell. This way will be described as savage, "silvestro" (*Inf.* XXI, 84). In metaphor then, the savage way ("cammino silvestro") of Hell corresponds to the dark wood ("selva oscura") of the sinful life. The journey beyond always remains potentially our journey here...' (S).

140–142. you are my leader, you my master and my teacher." So I said to him, and when he moved on, I entered along the deep and savage way.

Abbreviations

Cary H, F. Cary, **The Vision... of Dante Alighieri**, OUP, London. 1910.

DM E. G. Gardner, **Dante and the Mystics**, London, 1913.

DS Dorothy Sayers, **Dante : The Divine Comedy : 1 Hell**, Penguin Books, 1976.

EM Edward Moore, **Studies in Dante** (Four Vols), Oxford, 1968 reprint.

G & S Ed. C. H. Grandgent, Rev. by C. S. Singleton, **Dante Alighieri : La Divina Commedia**, Harvard University Press, 1972.

JDS Tr. and Comm. John D. Sinclair, **Dante, The Divine Comedy 1 : Inferno**, OUP, 1948.

PT Paget Toynbee, **Dante in English Literature** (2 vols) London, 1909.

RL Richard H. Lansing, **From Image to Idea : A Study of the Simile in Dante's** *Commedia*, Ravenna, 1976.

S Trans and Comm. Charles S. Singleton, **Dante Alighieri : The Divine Comedy, Inferno** (2 Vols), Princeton University Press, 1970.

Sp Ed. Natalino Sapegno, **Dante Alighieri : La Divina Commedia** (3 Vols) Firenze, 1982 (15th edition). The English renderings of the notes are mine.

T H. F. Tozer, **An English Commentary on Dante's** *Divina Commedia*, Oxford, 1901.

The text and translation are C. S. Singleton's. **The Cambridge Italian Dictionary**, Vol I (Italian-English) Ed. Barbara Reynolds is the dictionary used, and the verb patterns and abbreviations are according to her scheme.

Note : The glossing of elementry vocabulary will be reduced to the minimum in the notes to the subsequent cantos. The present information is meant only to help the beginner get a foothold.

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(*Continued from cover-page* 2)

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Sen, P. K. (1945). On the flowering on stock stem of mango grafts at nursery stage. Indian J. Hort., 3, 92.

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